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ABSTRACT
While the European-owned information technology multinationals, as represented in 
the IT Roundtable, exerted a preponderant influence on the development, approval and 
implementation of ESPRIT in the early and mid-1980s; by the early 1990s, they 
appeared unable to translate their policy preferences into policy outcomes.1
This thesis seeks to establish whether or not these companies lost some of their 
influence over the European Community and, if so, why. It argues that the IT 
Roundtable members' corporate diplomacy was less effective in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s than it was in the early and mid-1980s, for the following three reasons.
First, the effectiveness of the IT Roundtable as a channel of political activity was 
undermined by its declining representativeness, following the structural changes taking 
place in the industry; by its lack of internal coherence caused by the diverging interests 
of its members; and by the perception that the Roundtable was suitable for articulating 
preferences in the area of R&TD but inappropriate for voicing broader preferences on 
industrial policy.
Second, doubts about the necessity of an indigenous IT capability depreciated the 
perceived value of the asset which conferred political weight on the Roundtable 
companies: their capability to supply economically and militarily strategic technologies 
and products. While the realization of short-term economic objectives became more 
important - even amongst those governments paying lip-service to the necessity of an 
indigenous IT capability -, public investments into the Roundtable companies, ridden 
by crisis, were not perceived as yielding "value for money", particularly in terms of 
employment and social and economic cohesion.
Third, the EC's ability to realize the IT Roundtable's policy preferences was hampered 
by the lack of consensus amongst the national governments; the latter's insistence on 
subsidiarity, national solutions and juste retour; their resistance to spending money, and 
the fragmentation of the EC's decision-making structure. The EC's ability to supply the 
policies requested was further hampered by the increasingly globalized nature of the 
IT industry, and the EC's limited economic leverage over Japan and the US in 
international negotiations on IT.
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1PART 1
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 THE ISSUE
In the early 1980s, the competitive position of the European Information 
Technology (IT) industry, comprising the suppliers of semiconductors and other 
components, computers and other dataprocessing products, as well as applications, was 
relatively weak. At the start of the decade, Europe accounted for only 10 per cent of 
world production in two key segments within the IT industry: the semiconductor and 
computer industries. Europe's trade balance in IT was negative and deteriorating. 
Import penetration alone amounted to approximately 50 per cent of European 
semiconductor consumption and nearly 30 per cent of European computer consumption.
This relatively weak position of the European IT industry was of concern to the 
European Community (EC) and its Member State (M/S) governments. The IT industry, 
which affects nearly every function in almost any sector of the modem economy, was 
seen as the foundation of the third industrial revolution - just as coal, steel and oil had 
been of the previous two. Considering its strategic importance, the EC Commission felt 
the Community could not afford to lose its production capability in this industry.
Over the 1980s, the European Community sought to strengthen its IT industry 
through one policy instrument in particular: a subsidized, collaborative research and 
technological development (R&TD) programme. The European Strategic Programme 
for Research and Development in Information Technology (ESPRIT) went into force 
in 1984 to give a technology-push to the IT industry, and thus to close the technology 
gap with the United States and Japan. The introduction of ESPRIT signalled a move 
away from the 1970s, when the M/S governments promoted their national champions
3through a policy of consolidation, firm-specific subsidies, and preferential government 
procurement. The European governments had adopted, for the first time, a European 
rather than a national solution to the competitiveness problems of a sunrise industry. 
The launch of a Community R&TD programme, however, did not replace national 
programmes; nor did it substitute for cross-national efforts. In addition to ESPRIT, the 
EC also supported its IT industry through EC trade policies, including tariff protection 
and anti-dumping proceedings, and a market liberalization programme, leading to the 
completion of the Single European Market.
The introduction of ESPRIT, the heart of the Community's policy response to 
the plight of its IT industry in the 1980s, was the result of an EC policy-making 
procedure in which both the national governments, as represented in the Council of 
Ministers, and the Commission played an important role. However, the M/S 
governments and the Commission were not considered to be the only actors affecting 
the Community's policy response. It has been argued that, in the case of ESPRIT, the 
IT Roundtable, consisting of the largest, European-owned IT and telecommunications 
(equipment) producers, had a preponderant influence on the programme's development, 
its approval and, particularly in the first phase, its implementation (Langlois et al., 
1988:137-138;143; Mytelka, 1990:14; Peterson, 1992:232-233; Robinson in Business 
Europe, 15 February 1991; Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989:113-114; and van Tulder and 
Junne, 1988:177,196,213-216).
Although standard policy-practice ensures that private sector interests are heard 
in the EC's policy-making process, it is also known that European-level interest groups 
are generally relatively ineffective (see Chapter 7). Inherent weaknesses include a wide 
membership base, indirect participation, limited discretionary powers to represent the 
views of the members, unanimity requirements in voting procedures, and a lack of 
resources. Even if a European-level interest group provides direct membership for a
4selected group of multinational enterprises only, in order to overcome some of these 
weaknesses, differences amongst the member firms may continue to limit the 
association's effectiveness (McLaughlin and Jordan, 1993:122; Grant, 1993:34-36). 
Taking into account that European-level interest groups are often ineffective,<one could 
question why the IT Roundtable, which comprises the largest, European-owned IT 
companies, was so influential during the early and mid-1980s?
The tentative explanations given for the preponderant influence of the 
Roundtable on ESPRIT can be summarized along three lines: (1) the companies' 
combined size; (2) internationalization; and (3) rapid technological change. The first 
line of argument claims that the Commission asked the largest European-owned IT 
companies to provide their input, as they, as a group, were perceived as representative 
for the industry; together, the companies accounted for the majority of Europe's 
indigenous IT R&TD and production capabilities. Not only did this ensure that the IT 
Roundtable companies could influence the Commission's drafting process, also it 
ensured that they would be heard by their national governments, and thus, would be 
able to mobilize national support for the Commission's programme (Langlois et al., 
1988:139; van Tulder and Junne, 1988:179,181,213). The second line of argument 
points to the fact that internationalization in the IT sector has been shifting the control 
over wealth-creating operations increasingly into the hands of corporate management - 
thus further securing the IT companies' position as political actors (Sally, 1992:154- 
155; van Tulder and Junne, 1988:177). The third line of argument states that rapid 
technological change has moved high-tech policy-making beyond the capabilities and 
proficiency of the Commission officials, and made this public institution dependent on 
the IT companies to formulate their own innovation policies (van Tulder and Junne, 
1988:177,196,213-214; Ostry, 1990:31; Peterson, 1992:228,243; Butt Philip, 
1985:9,57).
5By the end of the 1980s, however, the competitive position of the European IT 
industry had not improved. Although the Community had maintained its share of IT 
production, the persistently small shares of world semiconductor and computer 
production and deteriorating trade balances remained a far cry from the ^ambitious 
Commission target of "parity with if not superiority over American and Japanese 
competitors, within the next 10 years" (CEC, P-40:20 May 1983). Moreover, the 
computer and semiconductor operations of most European-owned IT producers were 
or became loss-making. In 1990, Nixdorf was on the verge of bankruptcy, Philips was 
forced to withdraw from a prestigious R&TD project, and ICL was taken over by 
Fujitsu. The crisis developing in the European IT industry made urgent political action 
imperative. ESPRIT, however, was considered inadequate to improve, or even sustain, 
the competitive position of Europe's IT producers. This situation prompted the 
European Community to develop a new IT policy approach, in addition to its ongoing 
efforts to complete the Single European Market and its continued use of trade policy 
instruments.
In April 1991, the Commission presented its proposed policy response to the 
continued plight of its IT and electronics industry: the 1991 White Paper. This 
communication identified five areas of policy action: (1) the improvement of the 
business environment, including standardization, (2) the advancement of training, (3) 
the strengthening of technological mastery and dissemination, including the 
development of a second generation of R&TD projects, (4) the establishment of 
equitable conditions of competition and market access in an open, multilateral trade 
system, and (5) the stimulation of demand through pan-European infrastructural 
projects called Trans European Networks (TENs).
In contrast to the early and mid-1980s, when the shape of the Community's 
policy approach towards the IT sector had been strongly influenced by the IT
6Roundtable, the 1991 White Paper fell far short of the expressed preferences of the 
Roundtable, notably in terms of its support for the European-owned IT producers and 
its implications for foreign-owned competitors. Not fully satisfied with the 
Commission's response to the problems of the IT sector, the IT Roundtable companies 
pressed both the Commission as well as their respective national governments for a 
more far-reaching implementation of the areas of action identified in the White Paper, 
and for specific support measures beyond the scope of the White Paper.
Initially, the IT Roundtable's efforts appeared to have some success. The 
Council of Ministers, which had endorsed the Commission's White Paper in April 1991 
and had called upon the Commission to propose concrete measures, decided that the 
urgency of the matter justified the Council taking the initiative. In November 1991, it 
signed a Resolution which not only called for a swift implementation of the five action 
areas identified in the White Paper, but also provided for a more aggressive 
implementation of the White Paper's market access, R&TD and demand stimulation 
provisions. Additionally, the IT Roundtable companies had started discussions on a 
Semiconductor Initiative, which was to provide for specific support measures beyond 
the White Paper's scope. The Initiative, however, collapsed due to lack of funding and 
diverging corporate strategies. The Council Resolution, meanwhile, remained "a 
sleeping beauty", largely due to controversies amongst the Member States (EP sources, 
Interview 1;1993).
Despite the Council Resolution's call for immediate action, subsequent 
implementation of the White Paper proved to be a time-consuming process, particularly 
in the areas of R&TD, market access, and TENs. By December 1993, when structural 
changes had altered the industrial IT landscape substantially, the Fourth Framework 
Programme, providing for a second generation of IT research projects albeit with less 
funds then envisaged, had yet to be adopted. Market access agreements in the area of
IT had yet to be materialized. Moreover, the TENs, hampered by controversies over 
funding, had yet to be realized.
As the discrepancies between the IT Roundtable's policy preferences and the 
1991 White Paper seem to indicate, in the early 1990s, the IT Roundtable, as an 
association comprising the largest European-owned IT companies, appears to have been 
unable to exert a determining influence on the development the Commission's new 
policy approach towards the IT industry. Moreover, the IT Roundtable seems to have 
been unable to mobilize adequate support for a more aggressive implementation of the 
areas identified in the White Paper or for the adoption of more specific support 
measures beyond the scope of the White Paper. Finally, the IT Roundtable appeared 
unable to mobilize sufficient support for a swift implementation of the 1991 White 
Paper and to secure the preferred levels of funding.
In the early 1990s, the IT Roundtable seems to have been less successful in 
translating its policy preferences into policy outcomes than in the early and mid-1980s; 
it appeared less influential than it used to be. Yet, in the early 1990s, the companies 
continued to account for the majority of Europe's indigenous IT production capability 
(Communication 36; 1994); the trend towards internationalization continued to shift 
control over national wealth increasingly into the hands of corporate management; and 
rapid technological change continued to move high-tech policy-making beyond the 
proficiency of the Commission officials. If one takes into account that the factors that 
allegedly explained the IT Roundtable's preponderant influence on ESPRIT continued 
to be applicable, how can the Roundtable's apparent loss in political influence be 
explained?
1.2 LOCATING THE ISSUE IN THE THEORETICAL REALM
1.2.1 THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
By addressing this question, this thesis focuses on an issue in international 
political economy (IPE). Along the lines of Gilpin (1987:9) and Frieden and Lake 
(1991:1), IPE has been defined in this thesis as the area of study focusing on the 
mutual interaction between states and markets in the global arena.
In IPE, three forms of "diplomacy” matter (Stopford and Strange, 1991): (1) the 
interaction between states and their respective governments; (2) the interaction between 
firms and, in particular, multinational enterprises (MNEs) in the global markets1; and 
(3) the interaction between states (governments) and firms (MNEs). By focusing on the 
interaction between the IT Roundtable companies, both individually and as a group, 
as the "firms", and the EC and its Member States as the "home government", this 
thesis addresses these three forms of diplomacy.
Inter-state relationships are highlighted when discussing the position of the EC 
in the international system of states (see Chapters 6 and 9). In particular, the EC's 
relationships with its Triad partners are stressed, as exemplified by the discussion of 
the EC's leverage over Japan and the US in international negotiations on IT-related 
issues (see Chapter 9). Moreover, diplomacy between governments plays an important 
role within the EC; interaction and bargaining between the EC's national governments 
constitute central elements in EC policy-making.
Inter-firm relationships are addressed when discussing the IT Roundtable 
companies and their economic and political alliances. Not only do the individual IT 
Roundtable companies cooperate with their European and foreign counterparts on 
R&D, production, marketing and distribution (see Chapter 5), also the companies
9cooperate to gain political advantage - as their participation in the IT Roundtable and 
other industry lobby groups has illustrated (see Chapters 3,4 and 7).
Central to this thesis is, however, the third form of diplomacy, namely the 
relationships between states and firms. In IPE literature, most readings dealing with 
state-firm relationships focus on the interaction between Western MNEs, on the one 
hand, and the governments of developing countries, the so-called host governments, on 
the other2. However, as Eden (1991:215) argues, a logical extension of the prevailing 
IPE literature would be to discuss the interaction between MNEs and their home 
governments, as has been done in international business literature3. Like host 
governments, home governments would prefer their multinationals to invest in their 
country, create employment, and generate value-added. Like host governments, home 
governments are pressured by their multinationals to supply favourable policies aimed 
at improving both the operating conditions for business. It is this interaction that 
warrants further description and analysis.
1.2.2 EUROPEAN COMMUNITY STUDIES
As a case-study on the EC, its IT industry, and their mutual interaction, this 
thesis can be located in the area of European Community studies. In particular, three 
aspects of this case-study should be emphasized. First, in the early 1980s, the European 
Community became an active player in the area of information technology policies - 
a move well-documented by authors like Sandholtz (1992), Sharp (1987,1991) and 
Mytelka (1991). While this thesis touches upon ESPRIT, its main emphasis is on the 
new IT policy developments in the early 1990s. As such, this thesis seeks to update 
the existing literature on EC IT policies.
Second, as outlined above, one of the driving forces behind the introduction of
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common IT policies was the deteriorating performance of the European IT industry. 
Albeit far less the focus of academic attention than the performance of the US and 
Japanese IT industries, the development of the European IT industry until the 1990s 
has been described and analyzed by, amongst others, Malerba (1985, 1991), Flamm 
(1988), and Brady and Quintas (1991). Since the late 1980s, however, the IT industry, 
and notably the computer segments, have been subject to substantive structural 
changes. Analysis of the dynamics taking place in the European IT industry in the 
early 1990s, however, has remained predominantly the domain of economic reporters, 
particularly Alan Cane of the Financial Times. By focusing on the development of the 
Community’s IT industry over the late 1980s and early 1990s, this thesis includes 
coverage of a crucial period in the Community's IT industry.
Third, to the extent that the European-owned IT companies and the EC 
Commission cooperated in establishing EC-level policies, this case-study links in with 
the literature on the dynamics of European integration, and the roles played by 
European institutions, national governments and societal actors in this process4. In 
particular, this thesis will focus on the role played by multinational enterprises in the 
process of integration. The issues addressed include: whether or not the IT Roundtable 
members shifted the focus of their lobbying activities towards the Community, 
indicative for some form of political spillover (Haas, 1958:9,10,16; Lindberg, 
1963:6,94-103; Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991:14); and whether or not the European 
Commission used this high-profile group of companies to strengthen its information 
base, assert its identity and legitimize its policy proposals in its attempt to "cultivate" 
spill-over (Butt Philip, 1985:9,46; Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991:15).
1.3 METHODOLOGY
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At the heart of the question about the IT Roundtable's ability to shape the 
Community's IT policies, mobilize support for these policies, and affect their 
implementation, is the question of its political influence over the European 
Community, i.e. its ability to affect public policy formulation, decision-making and 
implementation in such a way that the policy outcomes reflect the Roundtable's policy 
preferences (see Chapter 2). Did this association of the largest, European-owned IT and 
telecommunications companies indeed exert a preponderant influence over the 
Community in the case of ESPRIT, as various authors have suggested? Did the IT 
Roundtable subsequently lose some of its political influence on EC IT policies in the 
early 1990s and, if so, why did this happen?
1.3.1 ASSESSING CORPORATE POLITICAL INFLUENCE
The first area of research, which will be addressed in Chapters 3 and 4, centres 
around the question whether or not the IT Roundtable, as a group of companies, was 
able to exercise political influence over the Community over two time periods: (1) the 
early and mid-1980s (1980-87); and (2) the late 1980s and early 1990s (1987-1993). 
Although the changes in political influence became only apparent in the early 1990s 
in the context of the 1991 White Paper, the year 1987 has been chosen to mark the 
approximate start of the second period, as many of the structural changes affecting the 
companies' influence started to accelerate and intensify from the late 1980s onwards 
(see Chapters 5,6). As two interviewees commented: "the influence [of the IT 
Roundtable firms] disappeared after 1987" and the companies had lost their "credibility 
by the late 1980s" (CEC and IT company sources, Interviews 11,15;1993). From the
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outset, one should note that these time periods, delineating two phases in the 
effectiveness of the IT Roundtable's corporate diplomacy, are not synchronized with 
the duration of the Community's policies; for example, this thesis argues that the 
companies started losing influence while the ESPRIT programme was still imoperation.
In order to be able to verify any change in corporate political influence over 
the two time periods, it is important that the basic assumption, i.e. the assertion that 
the IT Roundtable was influential in the case of ESPRIT in the early and mid-1980s, 
will have to be tested on the same basis as the hypothesis that the IT Roundtable lost 
some of its influence in the case of the Community's IT policy response in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. The key question that thus arises is: how can one measure 
corporate political influence, both relative to other explaining variables as well as over 
time?
Establishing Correlations. Milner (1987a:258) justifies her assumption that
industry preferences influence public policy outcomes on the basis of a correlation
between the preferences and the policies:
In none of the [..] cases were industries accorded protection when they, or 
substantial parts of them, did not desire it. [..] in many cases when industries 
demanded changes in barriers, they were able to obtain them.
Beyond the fact that arguments based on identifying a high association between
corporate policy preferences and policy outcomes easily give in to circularity, as
Gourevitch (1986:58) points out5, such arguments do not provide sufficient proof of
any causal links. As Causer (1978:47) argues: "just because a policy serves the
interests of a group, it is not necessarily a result of the pressure of that group". Other
policy-conditioning variables, beyond the pressures exerted by societal interest groups
like companies, could include ideological influences6; the specific pressures exerted
and roles played by state structures and actors, including bureaucrats and politicians7;
and the constraints imposed and the opportunities generated by the broader structure
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of international economic and political relations8 (Cohen, 1990:268-269; van Walsum, 
1990:7-13;126-152). In order to strengthen such arguments, more should be known 
about the importance of companies in shaping policy outcomes relative to other 
explaining variables.
Abstract Model Building. Cohen (1990:270) argues that only abstract model 
building and empirical tests can allow for a more systematic specification of the 
relative roles of various variables, including companies, in explaining public policies. 
However, aside from the advantages and disadvantages of the various statistical 
techniques used, such an exercise would have to overcome a number of obstacles: (1) 
the measurement of political influence; (2) the gathering of empirical evidence; and (3) 
the complications posed by both the nature of the policy-making and implementation 
processes and the nature of lobbying.
First, political "pressure cannot be measured directly" (Lavergne, 1983:6).
Indicators have to be found to proxy both the results of political influence (dependent
variables) as well as the determinants of corporate political influence (independent
variables). As the explanatory power of a model is only as good as the proxies are,
selecting, defining and interpreting these indicators thus constitutes the first major
hurdle to overcome in building "formal structures to the interactions between market
and politics" (Cohen, 1990:281)9.
Second, once the indicators have been established, empirical evidence has to
be gathered to give substance to these indicators. The required information may be
neither available nor accessible or complete, posing an additional problem. As Salamon
and Siegfried (1977:1035) noted:
Measuring the actual exercise of political influence - lobbying, campaign 
contributions, informal contacts, and so forth - across numerous industries is 
highly sensitive to the gross imperfections in the information reporting 
requirements and the resulting glaring gaps in data.
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Third, it is questionable whether establishing a statistical correlation between 
the indicators for corporate political power on the one hand, and public policies on the 
other, overcomes the methodological problems posed by establishing a correlation on 
the basis of argument. Establishing a statistical correlation negates the nature of the 
policy-making and implementation processes and that of corporate lobbying. 
Companies advocate their policy preferences at various points in the policy formulation 
and decision-making process and at various points in time. The results of a company's 
lobbying at one point in time may only crystallize after a number of years. In the 
process, the company's policy preferences may have become intertwined with, for 
example, a bureaucrat's own, independent ideas, making it difficult to separate 
corporate political influence from other explanatory variables. Moreover, the main 
outcomes may actually be the result of developments in other, non-related and non­
targeted policy areas.
For the above mentioned reasons, the author agrees with Gourevitch (1986:66) 
that "the testing of alternative explanations and specifying their relative weights" 
through modelling, "cannot be used here, because satisfying the conditions of 
experimentation is impossible".
Measuring Perceived Influence
Rather, this thesis argues that corporate political influence is only measurable 
in terms of "perceived" influence, i.e. the political influence of companies on public 
policy outcomes as perceived by selected government officials, corporate executives 
and representatives, and industry/government observers. This method, which will be 
applied to the EC IT policy case in Chapters 3 and 4, is comparable to what Dahl 
(1963:52) calls "judgements of well-placed observers". Although this method "puts us 
at the mercy of the judges", Dahl (1963:52) also considers it to be "relatively simple,
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quick and economical" and potentially "highly useful". The potential benefits of this 
method lie, in particular, with its ability to be applied to comparisons. First, by asking 
well-placed observers about a wider range of explaining variables (see above), some 
general assessment can be obtained about the importance of the companies' influence 
relative to the influence of other factors. Second, by asking these observers to give 
their perception of the change in corporate political influence over time, this method 
helps to overcome the problem of comparing influence over two time periods.
A crucial element of this approach to measuring influence is the selection of 
the so-called "well-placed observers". Three complementary and partially overlapping 
methods were used to select the interviewees in this thesis. First, through analysis of 
documents on EC IT decisions, a list was compiled of which actors (institutions, 
organizations, companies, departments, divisions, persons) participated in the decision­
making on IT policy issues in general, and ESPRIT, the 1991 White Paper, the Fourth 
Framework Programme, the TENs and the EC’s trade policies in particular. Second, 
within the relevant institutions, a list was compiled of the responsible officers and 
executives, partly on the basis of directories, partly with the help of public relations 
and personnel officers and other primary sources. In order to contact the persons that 
were actually involved in the 1991 White Paper policy-making and implementation 
process, many of the interviewees were interviewed not in relation to their current jobs, 
but in relation to their former positions; by 1993, most of the EC officers dealing with 
the 1991 White Paper and its implementation, for example, had moved to new posts. 
Due to the time-lapse involved, selecting figures that were involved in the policy­
making and implementation of ESPRIT in the early and mid-1980s proved to be more 
difficult. Only a few of the interviewees were able to give first-hand accounts; the 
others, albeit showing a detailed knowledge of the situation in that time period, gave 
evidence on the basis of secondary accounts - which constitutes a potential weakness
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in the approach adopted in this thesis. Third, a snow-ball approach was used; the 
selected interviewees either were asked to name additional key figures or 
spontaneously mentioned other relevant officers and executives.
Over the course of 1993, semi-structured, in-depth interviews and shorter, 
follow-up discussions (communications) were conducted with 47 interviewees from the 
EC, the national governments, the European IT companies, and their industry 
federations.
At the EC level, the Commission and the European Parliament were contacted. 
Issues related to the Council of Ministers were addressed mainly via the national 
governments. Within the Commission, officers of DG 3 (Internal Market and Industrial 
Affairs), DG 13 (Telecommunications, Information Industries and Innovation) and DG 
12 (Science, Research and Development) were interviewed. As DG 3 has been 
involved in the coordination of IT industrial policies since 1990/1991, this directorate 
has also been a focal point for the formulation and analysis of the external trade and 
competitive aspects of IT policies, even though these formally fall under the 
responsibilities of respectively DG 1 and 4. Additional information about the position 
of these DGs was obtained through secondary sources. Within the European 
Parliament, representatives of the two committees that deal with IT issues, were 
contacted: the Committee on Energy, Research and Technology and the Committee on 
Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy.
At the M/S level, efforts were focused on the five countries with an indigenous 
IT production capability, namely the Netherlands, France, Germany, Italy and the UK 
(see below). Amongst the interviewees were the national representatives to ESPRIT. 
The policy stances of the remaining EC Member States was covered mainly through 
secondary sources, such as government documents and reports, news coverage, and 
other publications.
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At the corporate level, interviews were conducted with executives of the largest, 
European-grown IT companies Bull, Philips, Siemens, Olivetti, Thomson and ICL (see 
below). Information about the telecommunications core within the IT Roundtable and 
other IT consumers, foreign IT companies, and European-owned IT SMEs was 
obtained through secondary sources.
Contacts with the companies' interest groups were largely confined to the 
European-level industry federations, industry associations, and standardization bodies: 
UNICE, ORGALIME, EECA, EUROBIT, CEN, CENELEC, ETSI, the ERT, the IT 
Roundtable, BOS, ECMA, SPAG and EWOS. Although various national organizations, 
and notably ANIE and the EEA, were contacted to give insight into specific questions 
(see, for instance, Chapter 7), it was beyond of the scope of this thesis to contact all 
national industry associations and standardization bodies involved. This move, 
however, can be justified in the light of the relatively small role played by the national 
associations and standardization bodies in IT policy-making at the EC level. First, 
although the national industry associations and standardization bodies may have 
directly contacted the Commission on IT-related policies, little evidence was found 
thereto in the interviews with EC officials. Most national associations and 
standardization bodies appeared to operate via their European-level counterparts. 
Second, although the national industry associations and standardization bodies are 
expected to have influenced the policy stances of their respective home governments 
on IT policy issues, so have the individual IT Roundtable companies. As Chapter 7 
will show, the national governments have not only been open to the lobbying of their 
former "national champions", also they have been susceptible to their arguments - with 
the possible exception of the UK government.
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1.3.2 EXPLAINING CORPORATE POLITICAL INFLUENCE
Assuming that the IT Roundtable has lost some of its political influence on the 
Community's IT policies over the late 1980s and early 1990s, the second area of 
research, which will be the focus of Chapters 5 to 9, concentrates on the question why 
the IT Roundtable has become less influential. In order to answer this question, two 
issues have to be addressed: (1) what determines corporate political influence over 
governments in general, and the EC, a non-monolithic regional public authority in 
particular, and (2) what causes any changes therein. To what extent can the existing 
literature help us understand corporate political influence better?
International Political Economy Literature. In IPE, an extensive literature exists 
on explaining economic (trade) policy outcomes, as evidenced by the works of 
Baldwin (1989), Bhagwati (1988), Conybeare (1987), Gourevitch (1986), Lake (1988), 
Lavergne (1983), and Milner (1987a). Although most of these studies do acknowledge 
that economic, non-governmental interests in general, and companies in particular, have 
a role to play in the explanation of economic policy outcomes, most research has not 
gone much beyond this recognition. Even Milner (1987b), who argues that her case 
studies "do lend credence to the idea that industries' access to the state provided them 
with influence", pays little emphasis to how and why companies, individually or as a 
group, exercise an influence over government, and the extent to which they do relative 
to the other influences mentioned above; her main emphasis is on the factors 
determining corporate policy preferences. More thus needs to be known about the 
conversion of corporate policy preferences into public policy outcomes.
Yet, these IPE studies are valuable in the sense that they stress that the 
influence of companies is not the only factor shaping policy outcomes; as outlined 
above, other domestic-level variables and system-level variables may play a role.
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Although this thesis emphasizes the role of companies, it is thus clear that any 
approach focusing on analyzing corporate political influence should integrate other 
explaining variables as well. Readings focusing on governments, their competencies, 
instruments and resources10, and readings discussing the success and failures of 
government intervention in industries11, for example, give valuable insights into the 
impact of the "state" and the "international system" on economic policy outcomes.
Interest Group Literature. Important concepts regarding the conversion of 
corporate policy preferences into policy outcomes can be derived from interest group 
literature. European-based interest group literature, including the works of Butt Philip 
(1985, 1987), Kirchner and Schwaiger (1981), and Sidjanski (1972), has yielded 
important insights into the political activity undertaken by companies. Deriving their 
strength from their descriptive, classifying nature, these studies have focused on the 
various forms of interest representation at the Community level and their respective 
membership, organization, objectives, lobbying resources, and activities. Additionally, 
they have focused on the public institutions targeted and the latter's institutional and 
procedural arrangements.
Recent studies have started to place more emphasis on the structural economic 
variables underlying political activity; as McLaughlin and Jordan (in Mazey and 
Richardson, 1993a: 123-157) illustrate, economic factors affect not only the forms of 
interest representations prevailing in a particular industry, but also the answer to 
question why companies participate in collective actions at the Community level in the 
first place.
At the heart of this question is Olson's argument on collective action. Olson 
(1965:5-52) argues that the ability of political actors to organize themselves depends 
upon the size of the benefits that the participants are likely to derive from joint 
political action, the costs of participation, and the opportunities for free-riding. By
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recognizing that the opportunity for free-riding is smaller and the likelihood of greater 
individual gains is larger in small, elitist groups, like the IT Roundtable, Olson accords 
an explicit role to the number of players in explaining collective action. Moreover, 
Olson accords a role to the degree of concentration in an industry; despite the greater 
opportunity for free-riding, a few large actors operating in a larger group, such as the 
top European-owned semiconductor producers in the European Electronic Component 
Manufacturers Association (EECA) or the top computer companies in the European 
Association of Manufacturers of Business Machines and Information Technology 
Industry (EUROBIT), may be willing to incur the costs of collective action if they 
would stand to gain disproportionally from joint action.
Olson's assertions have been tested empirically by various interest group studies 
that are rooted in the tradition of economics. Quantitative studies by authors, like 
Caves (1976), Esty and Caves (1983), Salamon and Siegfried (1977) and Lavergne 
(1983), have sought to correlate structural economic variables that are supposed "to 
describe an industry's potential for exerting political influence” (Esty and Caves, 
1983:29), such as industry concentration, geographic dispersion and company size, with 
some indicator for political activity.
However, as Esty and Caves (1983) argue, there is a difference between 
political activity and political success. This raises the question as to what transforms 
an industry's potential for exerting political influence into a reality. Lindblom (1977) 
and other authors, like Finer (1955) and Causer (1978), have sought to address this 
issue by focusing on the structural influence of business, which finds its source in the 
economic functions performed and controlled by companies. According to Lindblom 
(1977:174), the dependency of governments on these economic functions has made it 
imperative for governments to accommodate corporate policy preferences.
Lindblom, however, focuses on the disproportionate influence of business
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relative to other societal interests, while this thesis seeks to address the 
disproportionate influence of a specific segment within business, namely the indigenous 
European IT companies, relative to other interest groups. Lindblom's basic concept, 
namely that companies perform and control certain functions that are in demand by 
government, thus has to be altered and fmetuned for our purposes. As the demands of 
governments and the control of companies over economic functions may change, 
corporate political influence is not static. This thesis recognizes, in line with Finer 
(1955:292), that corporate political influence may change over time.
International Business Literature. Research on the economic, political and social 
impact of multinationals on home and host countries12 and studies researching the 
bargaining between companies and host countries13 provide additional insights into 
the structural influence of business in general, and companies in particular. These 
international business studies show that governments are interested in the benefits that 
companies may provide to their respective countries, that multinationals are interested 
in the resources countries have to offer, why this is the case, and why this gives both 
the governments as well as the companies more or less bargaining power in their 
interaction with each other.
Additionally, these studies illustrate that and analyze why bargaining power 
may change over time. In these studies, a shift in bargaining power away from the 
government and in favour of high-tech companies is often explained by pointing at 
internationalization and rapid technological change (see, for instance, Kobrin, 1987). 
However, although valid, these explanations neglect the fact that internationalization 
and rapid technological change may make "firms at once more and less dependent on 
their governments" (Milner, 1987a:296). Even internationalized high-tech firms depend 
on their governments to create and maintain the conditions necessary for a stable and 
open international market, favourable to large and long-term resource commitments.
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Any approach on analyzing changes in corporate political influence should thus re­
evaluate the impact of internationalization and technological change, and take into 
account other imperatives, both structural as well as short-term, that may contribute to 
an explanation of the changing ability of companies to transform their policy 
preferences into policy outcomes at any given point in time.
A New Approach
Although the concepts and notions outlined above provide us with interesting 
insights, none of the individual strands of literature appears to present a coherent and 
comprehensive approach for analyzing corporate political influence. For that reason, 
this thesis develops in Chapter 2, on the basis of the theoretical foundations outlined 
above, an interdisciplinary approach for analyzing what determines corporate political 
influence and what causes it to change over time. As most of the theoretical works 
apply to national governments rather than public authorities operating at a regional 
level, some theoretical concepts have had to be adjusted to enable their application to 
the European Community (see Chapter 2).
Defining Corporate Political Influence. Companies are only politically 
influential if they succeed in converting their (professed) policy preferences14 into 
actual public policy outcomes. In order to address the conversion process in an 
analytical manner, this thesis defines corporate political influence as a product of three 
determinants, namely political activity, political weight and political realization.
Corporate political activity, which is a precondition for political influence, 
comprises all the activities that companies undertake to make their preferences heard. 
These activities vary according to the effort involved, the channels used, the 
institutions and officials targeted, and the timing of the events. However, despite the 
fact that companies are in control of decisions regarding their political activity,
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companies can only partially "create" the opportunities for articulating their policy 
preferences. The opportunities for voicing their policy stances are also affected by the 
"openness" of the political systems in which they operate. The openness depends on 
a number of factors, including the degree of fragmentation of policy-making and 
implementation, the extent of insulation of the policy-formulating bureaucracy, the 
legitimacy of the public authority, the public authority’s need for information, and the 
attitude towards corporate demands, based on ideology and past experiences.
Political activity alone, however, is not sufficient to influence the government. 
Rather, a government's susceptibility to the preferences brought forward depends on 
the weight that the companies' policy preferences carry. The political weight of 
corporate policy preferences can be perceived as a function of two variables: the real 
and perceived value of "corporate assets". Corporate assets are those firm-specific 
resources that are in demand by a government as they could further the government's 
objectives of greater wealth, political sovereignty, security, and social stability. 
Corporate assets, which may be allocated unevenly across a country or region, include, 
for instance, employment, value-added and exports. The real value of these assets 
depends on their absolute size; their perceived value depends on the ranking of the 
government's objectives and the available alternative sources of assets. Since 
companies, as sources of these assets, can offer or withhold the assets at their 
discretion, the government cannot be indifferent to their policy preferences.
Even if the companies' preferences carry sufficient political weight, these 
companies will only exert political influence if the government is able to deliver upon 
its promises and can provide the policies or actions requested. A government, however, 
may be hampered in the political realization of corporate policy preferences if it is 
constrained in its actions by shortcomings in its competencies, its array of policy 
instruments, its resources, and its speed of policy-making and implementation, or by
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external constraints.
Dynamics. If corporate political influence can be perceived as a product of three 
determinants, namely political activity, political weight and political realization, what 
then causes these determinants of corporate political influence to change over time? 
What determines whether or not corporate diplomacy pays off? This thesis argues that 
changes in the determinants of corporate political influence may be caused by 
structural and short-term changes in the industrial production and public policy-supply 
arrangements which govern what products are produced or what policies are supplied, 
how, on what terms, by which companies and where, or by what government at which 
level.
1.4 THE PLAYERS
Prior to discussing this approach in detail, it is important to discuss the key 
actors that play a role in this thesis, namely (1) the European-owned IT multinationals, 
together constituting the information technology core of the IT Roundtable, and (2) the 
European Community.
1.4.1 THE EUROPEAN-OWNED IT MULTINATIONALS AND THE IT 
ROUNDTABLE
The thesis focuses on the largest, European-owned IT multinationals, 
constituting the information technology core of the European Information Technology 
Industry Roundtable (IT Roundtable). The IT Roundtable, which brings together 
representatives from Europe's largest indigenous IT and telecommunications 
(equipment) producers into a private and comparatively little institutionalized
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association, was formed over the course of 1979/80 when Industry Commissioner 
Etienne Davignon invited these companies to give the Commission policy input on 
R&TD-related issues. Davignon, which regarded the IT and telecommunications 
industries as strategic for Europe's economic future, sought to set up an EC R&TD 
policy aimed at improving the competitive position of Europe's indigenous producers 
vis-a-vis their American and Japanese counterparts. Over the period 1987-89, however, 
the IT Roundtable companies decided that the time had come to cooperate in a more 
formal manner both in the area of R&TD as well as in areas beyond this field. Since 
1989, when the companies formally presented the Roundtable's new set-up to the 
Commission, the IT Roundtable has been preparing joint recommendations on all 
issues concerning the IT industry, including external trade and internal barriers 
(Communication 36; 1994).
At its inception, the IT Roundtable constituted of the representatives of the 12 
largest European-owned electronics companies. In the early 1980s, the main IT 
producers within the IT Roundtable included the large, diversified electronics 
companies Siemens (G), Philips (NL) and Thomson (F), and the smaller undiversified 
computer and semiconductor producers Bull (F), Nixdorf (G), Olivetti (I), ICL (UK), 
and Plessey (UK). Since the late 1980s, however, the number of computer and 
semiconductor producers within the IT Roundtable has been reduced. Following the 
take-overs of Plessey and Nixdorf and the expulsion of ICL from the IT Roundtable, 
the remaining computer and semiconductor producing IT Roundtable members have 
been Siemens (including SNI), Philips, Olivetti, Bull and Thomson (including SGS- 
Thomson).
Since the European Commission has continued to seek improvement of the IT 
industry's competitive performance over the subsequent years, and the IT Roundtable 
has been a partner of the Commission in the formulation of the EC’s policy response,
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this thesis will focus on this "interest group" and, within this group, on the largest, 
European-owned information technology multinationals that have been members, i.e. 
SGS-Thomson (via Thomson), Olivetti, Bull, and the IT operations of Philips and 
Siemens. Nixdorf will be discussed in the context of Siemens, as Nixdorf merged with 
Siemens' dataprocessing operations in 1990. To the extent that Plessey will be 
discussed, it will be done so in the context of Siemens, as the latter acquired Plessey 
in a joint bid with GEC in 1989. ICL will be discussed as a separate and special case; 
the company was expelled from the Roundtable in 1991, following its take-over by 
Fujitsu. Despite its current status as a foreign-owned firm, attention is warranted as the 
friendly take-over of the only large, British-grown computer producer by a Japanese 
company has had serious implications for the political balances in IT policy-making 
at the European Community level. Figure 1.1 outlines the key characteristics of the 
five European-owned IT companies and ICL. For a fuller understanding of the 
companies and their performance, the reader should refer to Appendix 1.1, which gives 
a profile of the companies in question. Throughout the course of this thesis, these 
profiles may serve as useful background reading.
The focus on the largest, European-owned IT multinationals within the IT 
Roundtable imposes three limitations to the scope of the thesis that need to be 
specified in further detail. The first limitation is the thesis' focus on European-owned 
companies. The "Europeanness" of a company can be defined by numerous criteria, 
varying from the location of headquarters and incorporation, to the citizenship of the 
company's managers in a European country (Kline, 1989:26). The most commonly used 
criterion is that of ownership. In this thesis, a company is called European-owned if 
European shareholders own more than fifty per cent of its stock (see Table 1.1). 
Although a 10 per cent share is generally assumed to yield an "effective voice" in 
corporate management (IMF and OECD in Robock and Simmonds, 1989:22), only a
Figure 1.1 European-Grown IT MNEs: Profiles, 1987-1993
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Top 20 Suppliers to the European Semiconductor Market, 1990
Top 20 ITRT OWN Cl RANK C3
Philips
Siemens
SGS-Thomson
YES
YES
YES
NED {  
GER V" 
FRA/ITA {
1 V
2 V
3 {
Motorola USA
Texas Inst USA
Intel USA
Toshiba JAP
NEC JAP
Nat.Semicon USA
AMD USA
Hitachi JAP
ITT USA
GEC Plessey YES UK f 13
Telefunken YES a GER V 14
Samsung KOR
Fuj itsu JAP
Harris USA
Mitsubishi JAP
Analog USA
LSI Logic USA
Source: EC Panorasa 1991:12-11.
Criteria
Criterion 1 (Cl)
Criterion 2 (C2)
Criterion 3 (C3)
Ownership: A company is considered to be European- 
owned if European shareholders own more than fifty 
per cent of its stock.
IT Focus: In the case of computer companies, this 
thesis focuses on those companies that obtained at 
least 40 per cent of their dataprocessing revenues 
out of computer hardware prior to 1991.
Size: A company is considered to be amongst the
largest companies if it has a position in the Top 10 
of suppliers to the European market.
Notes
OWN
ZHW
RANK
ITRT
Ownership
Percentage hardware in total dataprocessing revenues 
Position in Top 10 of Suppliers to the European 
Market
IT Roundtable Membership
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Table 1.1
Top 25 Suppliers to the European Computer Market, 1990
Top 25 ITRT OWN Cl % HW C2 RK C3
IBM USA
Siemens YES GER V 61.5 i 2 {
DEC USA
Olivetti
Bull
YES
YES
ITA / 
FRA {
55.4 {  
57.0 V"
4 {
5
HP
Unisys
USA
USA
Philips 
ICL b
YES
Y/N
NL {
u k /j m
63.2 {
44.2 {
8 { 
9 {
NCR USA
Compaq USA
Apple USA
CGS FRA / 0.0
Canon JAP
Alcatel FRA
Nokia FIN / 54.0 {
Xerox USA
Finsiel ITA V 0.0
Sun USA
Memorex NL ( 67.9 {
Amdahl USA
Wang USA
Commodore USA
Comparex GER V 83.9 {
Tandem USA
Source: Datamation, 15 June 1991:62.
a AEG's Telefunken Electronic is currently owned by
Daimler
b  Until 1990, ICL was British-owned. After the take­
over by Fujitsu, ICL was ousted from the IT 
Roundtable
Choice of Year
The year 1990 is representative for the period 1987-1993, with the 
following exceptions: (1) with respect to the criteria of ownership in 
the computer industry, one should note that ICL (which was incorporated 
in STC prior to 1990) became Japanese-owned in 1990; (2) with respect 
to the criteria of size in the computer industry, one should note that 
Nixdorf had a position in the Top 10 of computer suppliers prior 
Siemens' takeover in 1990.
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share of more than 50 per cent, i.e. an absolute majority, ensures that European 
shareholders have a decisive influence on management decisions. According to this 
definition, the British-based computer producer ICL used to be a European -owned 
company; only since Fujitsu's acquisition of an 80 per cent stake in the company has 
it been Japanese-owned. ICL, nevertheless, remains European by origin and 
development; it is a European-grown company.
The emphasis on European-owned companies, however, does not mean that 
foreign-owned firms will or can be excluded from the analysis. Economically, they 
cannot be neglected. A large share of the European IT market is supplied by foreign 
corporations, which either export to the Community and/or have established themselves 
in the EC through foreign direct investment (see Chapter 5). Politically, the "national" 
treatment of foreign-owned companies has proven to be a sensitive issue at the EC 
level, with some Member State encouraging their investments and others taking a far 
more cautious approach (see Chapter 4).
The second limitation in the thesis' scope is formed by its emphasis on 
information technology. Defining IT has proven to be an arduous task (see Appendix 
1.2). This thesis defines the IT industry as the industry comprising the suppliers of 
components (including semiconductors), dataprocessing products and applications. 
Although this definition covers a wider range of products, the main emphasis in this 
thesis will be on two high-profile segments within the IT industry, namely the 
semiconductor and dataprocessing (computer) segments. These segments have not only 
been politically sensitive but also subject to major economic changes. In this thesis, 
the data on the semiconductor industry comprises both information on discrete devices 
as well as integrated circuits, unless otherwise stated. Data on the computer or 
dataprocessing industry refers not only to processing and peripheral hardware, such as 
mainframe, mini and microcomputers and printers, but also to computer software and
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services, datacommunications, and other dataprocessing products. The main emphasis 
of this thesis, however, will be on those companies that concentrated on computer 
hardware. Companies that obtained more than 60 per cent of their dataprocessing 
revenues out of computer software, services, datacommunications and other 
dataprocessing products prior to 1991 will be discussed only marginally (see Table 
1.1).
The third limitation in the thesis' scope is the emphasis on the largest 
multinational enterprises (MNEs). Multinational enterprises can be defined for working 
purposes as companies that own and manage operations in two or more countries 
(Gilpin, 1987:231). Whether or not a multinational is one of the "largest" is a relative 
concept, entirely depending on the industry in which the multinational operates. Some 
companies that are ranked in the Top 3 of their own industry, may be considered 
SMEs in another. For working purposes, this thesis will focus on those firms that have 
a position in the Top 10 of suppliers to the European market (see Table 1.1).
The emphasis on the largest multinationals, however, does not mean that small 
to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) will or can be excluded from the analysis. From 
an economic point of view, the relative importance of SMEs in the IT industry remains 
minimal although their ranking within the indigenous IT industry improved 
substantially after some larger European-owned producers, such as Philips (NL), sold 
their computer divisions to foreign manufacturers (see Chapter 5). Politically, the 
European Community has been attaching a substantive weight to SMEs, since they are 
seen as sources of employment (see Chapter 8).
1.4.2 THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
Central to this thesis is the political influence of the largest European-owned
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IT companies over the European Community, i.e. the network of EC institutions 
involved in the policy-formulation, decision-making and implementation of Community 
policies, namely the EC Commission (CEC), the Council of Ministers (CoM) and its 
subordinate bodies, the European Parliament (EP), the Economic and Social Committee 
(ESC), other advisory bodies and their inter-linkages. Within the EC policy-making 
process, the Commission, representing the "European” interest, has been responsible 
for drafting proposals for Community legislations, while the Council of Ministers, 
platform for M/S interests, has been responsible for the final approval of legislative 
proposals. In accordance with EC decision-making rules, the Council has to request the 
input of the European Parliament, and, in many cases, the input of the Economic and 
Social Committee, prior to taking any decisions on legislative proposals. The EP has 
been directly elected by the citizens of the European Community, while the ESC 
represents employers, employees and other societal actors (see Chapter 7).
Companies that seek to influence the Community, however, should not confine 
their efforts to lobbying the EC institutions. This thesis argues that companies need to 
mobilize not only the support of the Community institutions but also that of the 
national governments, in order to get their policy preferences translated into EC policy 
outcomes. Although the policy-making takes place at the EC level, the role of the 
national governments in EC policy-making should not be underestimated for the 
following five reasons.
First, representatives of the national governments, sitting on expert committees 
and/or addressing the Commission informally, cooperate with the Commission when 
it is drafting the proposals for EC policies. Second, together with Commission officials, 
national representatives serve on the preparatory Council working groups that conduct 
the technical negotiations on these policy proposals. Third, the ambassadors of the 
Member States to the EC and their deputies sit on the Committee of Permanent
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Representatives (COREPER) that perform the lower-profile political negotiations on 
the proposals. Fourth, the ministers of the Member States, constituting the Council of 
Ministers, have the authority to adopt final decisions on the policy proposals, or, 
alternatively, to amend them, stall their progress or reject them. The final decisions are, 
consequently, often the result of a lowest common denominator bargaining process 
between the Member States. Finally, M/S governments are either responsible for the 
implementation of EC decisions or send their national representatives to serve on 
committees cooperating with the Commission when the latter is responsible for 
implementation (see Chapter 7).
According to this account of the Community's policy-formulation and decision­
making processes, it is unlikely that the European-owned IT companies can ever 
successfully press their case at the EC level without the support of the Member States, 
notably the three largest. Gaining the backing of the national governments and their 
representatives at the EC level is therefore seen as a crucial step in influencing the 
Community.
The Member States can be divided into two groups, namely those that are 
"home" to a European-owned IT company and those that are not. The main emphasis 
in this thesis will be on the first group of Member States, which comprises France, the 
UK, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. Figure 1.2 outlines the position of these 
countries as producers, consumers, exporters and importers of information technology. 
One should note that data on national IT production is not confined to national 
producers, but also includes production by other European producers and non 
European-owned firms, notably American, manufacturing in the country in question. 
This applies particularly to the UK; allegedly, 49% of the total number of UK-based 
IT companies is foreign-owned, representing approximately 80% of the value yielded 
by the UK IT industry (DTI sources, Interview 40; 1993).
Figure 1.2
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The four large countries have been accounting for the majority of European IT 
production, consumption and trade. At the end of the 1980s, France, the United 
Kingdom, Italy and Germany accounted for 80 to 90 per cent of European production, 
consumption and trade in semiconductors. Similarly, the four large countries accounted 
for the majority of European production, consumption and trade in computers (see 
Figure 1.2). The importance of France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy has 
been further illustrated by the fact that in 1990, for example, these countries accounted 
for 88.3 per cent of EC turnover in dataprocessing, 89.4 per cent of EC value-added 
in dataprocessing and approximately 90 per cent of EC investment in this segment. 
Moreover, they accounted for 92.1 per cent of EC employment in this area (EC 
Panorama, 3/93).
The Dutch share in total IT production and consumption has been quite small. 
Yet, with a share of 13 per cent in European integrated circuit (IC) production in the 
late 1980s, the Netherlands has been constituting a significant semiconductor 
manufacturing base15. Moreover, it accounted for nearly 7 per cent of EC exports of 
microcircuits. In contrast, the Netherlands' significance in terms of European computer 
production has been minimal; in 1989, the Dutch share must have been below 2 per 
cent of total European computer production. Its computer consumption, however, 
amounted to approximately 6 to 7 per cent (EC Panorama 1991:12-34; UNCTC, 
1986:25,48; IDC in EITO, 1993:210).
The second group, of which the vote matters as well at the EC level, comprises 
Ireland, Denmark, Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal and Greece. This group of 
countries will be discussed only marginally. However, the positions of Ireland and 
Spain are worth emphasizing in the context of the computer industry. Over the 1980s, 
Ireland has developed a significant computer hardware production base on the basis of 
mostly non-European inward investment in manufacturing16; in 1992, it accounted for
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7 per cent of EC computer hardware production. In that year, however, Irish 
consumption amounted to less than 1 per cent of EC hardware consumption - 
indicative for its export platform status. Ireland's experience appears to be repeated to 
a certain extent in the case of Spain. Like Ireland, Spain has experienced a rapid 
growth in computer production over the 1980s, mainly through inward investment. 
Spain's market for computers has been growing as well. In 1992, Spain accounted for
6 per cent of EC computer hardware production and 8.1 per cent of EC hardware 
consumption (IDC in EITO, 1993:247,210,211).
1.5 THE PLAN
This thesis consists of four parts. The first part (Chapters 1 and 2) outlines the 
central question and the approach developed to address this issue. The second section 
(Chapters 3 and 4) discusses whether or not the largest European-owned IT 
multinationals have lost some of their influence over the European Community. The 
third part of the thesis addresses the question why corporate political influence has 
changed over time. Chapters 5 and 6 outline the independent variables, while Chapters
7 to 9 show how these variables affect the three determinants of political influence, 
namely political activity, weight and realization. The final part (Chapter 10) concludes 
this thesis.
1.6 NOTES
1. See also Eden, 1991:197,218.
2. See, for instance, Kobrin (1987) and Stopford and Strange (1991).
3. See, for instance, Hood and Young (1979); Rugman, Lecraw and Booth (1985).
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4. See, for example, Butt Philip (1985); El-Agraa (1990); Greenwood, Grote and 
Ronit (1992); Haas (1958); Hairop (1989); Lindberg (1963); Lodge (1993); Keohane 
and Hoffmann (1991); Kirchner (1992); Mazey and Richardson (1993b); Nicoll and 
Salmon (1994); Nugent (1991, 1992); Sandholtz and Zysman (1989); Taylor (1983, 
1991); Tranholm-Mikkelsen (1991); Tsoukalis (1990); Wallace (1990); Wallace, 
Wallace and Webb (1983); Urwin (1991).
1
5. Gourevitch (1986:58): "Advocates of the successful policy had the power 
because they won, and we know that because if they had not had the power, they 
would not have won".
6. See, for instance, Goldstein (1989), Bhagwati (1988) and Gourevitch (1986).
7. See, for instance, Hall (1986), Bhagwati (1988), Boadway and Wildasin 
(1984:158), Causer (1978:47) and Gourevitch (1986).
8. See, for instance, Lake (1988), Conybeare (1987) and Gourevitch (1986).
9. For examples of empirical studies on the political influence of industries, see: 
Caves (1976); Esty and Caves (1983); Lavergne (1986); Salamon and Siegfried (1977).
10. See, for instance, Katzenstein (1977), Milner (1987), Skocpol (1985:17-19), and 
Zysman (1983:300-301). See also readings on interest groups in the Community.
11. See, for instance, Dixit (1986), Grossman (1986), Krugman (1987), and 
Yarbrough and Yarbrough (1988).
12. See, for instance, Borrus (1988); Chapman and Walker (1991); Cohen and 
Zysman (1987); Daniels and Radebaugh (1992); Dicken (1992); Fayerweather (1982); 
Haggett (1982); Hood and Young (1979); Martinelli (1982); Nye (1974); Reich (1991); 
Robock and Simmonds (1989); Safarian (1993); and United Nations (1988).
13. See, for instance, Behrman and Grosse (1990); Daniels and Radebaugh (1992); 
Dicken (1992); Doz and Prahalad (1980); Eden (1991); Gladwin and Walter (1980); 
Jenkins (1986); Kobrin (1987); Poynter (1985); Rugman, Lecraw and Booth (1985); 
and Safarian (1993).
14. There may be a difference between what firms profess as being in their interest 
and their real interests. For examples, see the Economist. 6 October 1990:19 and De 
Jonquieres, 11 March 1991: VTl.
15. Over the early 1980s, the Netherlands produced approximately the same amount 
of semiconductors as Italy. The latter accounted for roughly 7 to 8 per cent of 
European semiconductor production. In terms of semiconductor consumption, the 
Dutch share was slightly less than the Italian share. The Benelux countries as a whole 
accounted for 6 per cent of European consumption (UNCTC, 1986:25,48).
16. In 1986, 21 per cent of Ireland's net output by foreign investors, mostly non- 
EC, was in the area of office and dataprocessing equipment (EC Panorama, 1991:59).
Chapter 2
APPROACH AND HYPOTHESES
This chapter seeks to outline a framework for the analysis of corporate 
influence on public policy outcomes. Through applying this framework to the EC IT 
policy case, insight may be obtained into the influence of the IT Roundtable and its 
members on the EC's IT policies in the 1980s and early 1990s. The chapter has been 
divided into four sections. The first part defines corporate political influence. The 
second part discusses the determinants of political influence, while the third part 
describes the variables that bring about changes in these determinants. Assuming that 
the IT Roundtable lost some of its influence, the fourth part outlines a number of 
hypotheses regarding the causes of the IT Roundtable's declining political influence, 
on the basis of the theoretical framework developed in the first three sections.
2.1 DEFINING CORPORATE POLITICAL INFLUENCE
Corporate political influence can be defined as the ability of companies to 
affect public policy formulation, decision-making and implementation in such a way 
that the policy outcomes reflect the companies' policy preferences. This definition 
comprises three basic elements: (1) the policy preferences of a company or a group of 
companies, (2) the conversion or translation of the preferences into policy outcomes 
and (3) the public policy outcomes.
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2.1.1 CORPORATE POLICY PREFERENCES: THE EUROPEAN-OWNED IT 
MNEs
A company's or group of companies' policy preferences can be defined as the 
package of policies that the company or group of companies would like to see 
implemented. This definition raises the question as to what policies companies would 
prefer, and why. This thesis makes the following assumptions concerning the policy 
preferences of the IT Roundtable members, which will be outlined and analyzed in 
Chapters 3 and 4: (1) companies are assumed to formulate their policy preferences, 
whether articulated individually or within a group context, in line with their interests; 
(2) the corporate interests are assumed to constitute of a mixture of the inter-related 
objectives of profitability, growth and longevity, which may alter over time; and (3) 
the companies' policy preferences are treated as if they were unitary stances.
Assumption 1: Bounded Rationality
The self-interest assumption, as has been postulated in different forms by 
Baldwin (1989:2), Gilpin (1981:20), Ham and Hill (1984), McKeown (1984:221-223, 
229), Milner (1987a:241-245) and Simon (1955), argues that given the information that 
companies have access to and given their computational capabilities, corporate 
management may display "a kind of rational behaviour" (Simon 1955:99), in the sense 
that corporate managers will consider a number of alternative policies, attempt to 
evaluate the associated costs and benefits, and favour any one alternative that satisfices, 
not maximizes, their interests. Limits to the corporate management's computational 
capabilities and access to information render unattainable an interest-maximizing 
strategy, i.e. a strategy which searches for the optimum policy alternative (Ham and 
Hill, 1984:77-78).
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Interviews with the European-owned IT companies and their representative 
organizations seem to support the assumption of satisficing rational behaviour, both 
when operating individually and as a group. Although contextual and ideological 
factors, such as the traditional ways of doing things, standard operating procedures, and 
prevailing economic preconceptions (Milner, 1987a:245), have had their impact on the 
companies' operations and actions, as illustrated in the case of Philips (see Appendix 
1.1), in the longer term such factors do not appear to have obstructed a rational 
formulation of policy preferences. The companies seemed aware of the costs and 
benefits of alternative policy options, and preferred those policy options that, in their 
perception, met their interests.
Assumption 2: Profit-Maximizing and Empire-Building
Assuming that companies indeed act in accordance with their interests, what 
then are their respective interests? Thurow (1992:125) argues that a company can be 
placed on the basis of its overall objectives along a spectrum, with profit-maximizing 
firms at one end and empire-building firms at another. In contrast to the profit- 
maximizing firms, empire-builders regard profitability of secondary importance. 
Maximizing market share is seen as the key to their main objectives of growth and 
longevity. Their longer-term horizon allows them to continue producing and investing, 
even if, in the short term, the rates of return on an existing or future investment are 
zero or negative.
From the outset, however, one should note that most companies are likely to 
have opted for some form of trade-off between profit-maximizing and empire-building, 
as the pursuit for growing profitability and larger market shares are mutually 
dependent. As will be illustrated in Chapter 5, large market shares facilitate profit- 
maximizing as it allows companies to exploit cost advantages and pricing strategies.
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At the same time, profitability constitutes the only long-term means towards greater 
corporate longevity and growth, as retained profits constitute both an internal source 
of capital and a key to external sources of capital; if quoted on the stock exchange, a 
high profitability may boost the value of a company's own "currency", namely its 
shares, and thus increase the amount of capital that a new rights issue might yield.
Until recently, Philips, Siemens, Thomson and Bull could be placed more 
towards the empire-building end of the spectrum, in the sense that the companies were 
willing to incur large losses to establish and maintain a position in markets that were 
considered to be of strategic importance, such as DRAMs and computers. Recent 
economic developments, however, have led to shifts along the spectrum. As Philips' 
emphasis on profitability rather than on a continued presence in strategic areas has 
shown (see Appendix 1.1; Chapter 5), poor corporate performance may stimulate a 
company to alter its specific mix of empire-building and profit-seeking.
Olivetti and ICL, however, have been located more towards the profit- 
maximizing end of the spectrum. In contrast to the large, diversified IT producers, 
neither Olivetti nor ICL have had the ability to compensate for potential losses in 
computers through profits on other operations (see Appendix 1.1), or to benefit from 
extensive public financial support, like Bull.
Assumption 3: Unitary Stances
Companies are not monolithic. Although corporate divisions have the same 
basic interests, namely that they have to be profitable in either the short-term (profit- 
maximizer) or long-term (empire-builder), they may differ on how these interests could 
best be served. In centralized firms, the hierarchical organization may ensure that the 
policy preferences of the various divisions will be translated into a unified policy 
stance. In less hierarchical firms, it is, as Hancher and Moran (1989:289) argue,
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"perfectly possible for separate divisions to operate independently of, and indeed in 
competition with, each other in the struggle for regulatory advantage".
For purposes of this analysis, however, it is assumed that policy differences 
between divisions within firms will be discussed and solved internally. Evidence from 
this study appears to support the assumption that a company's policy preferences can 
be treated as if they were unitary stances - semiconductor anti-dumping duties being 
a particularly good case in point. Despite internal divergencies between the 
semiconductor and computer divisions about the desirability of these duties, Philips and 
Siemens advocated one policy stance at the EC level (see Chapter 3) - reflecting the 
priority attached by management to semiconductors over computers.
2.1.2 CONVERSION OF CORPORATE POLICY PREFERENCES INTO PUBLIC
POLICY OUTCOMES
A company or group of companies, which has formulated its policy preferences, 
is only politically influential if it succeeds in translating or converting its policy 
preferences into actual policy outcomes. As Esty and Caves (1983:27-28) stress, there 
is a difference between political activity and success. Making one's policy preferences 
heard is not sufficient; an actor or group of actors has to be able to make itself heard 
effectively (DahU 1956:145-146). That is, political activity should prompt a satisfactory 
response on the side of the policy-makers. Obtaining a satisfactory response, however, 
raises the question of transformation, i.e. how preference through power becomes 
policy (Gourevitch, 1986:58). How are the policy goals of companies translated into 
the reality of government policy? Section 2.2 outlines the framework used in this thesis 
for analyzing this conversion process.
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2.1.3 PUBLIC POLICY OUTCOMES: THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND ITS 
MEMBER STATES
A company or group of companies seeks to convert its policy preferences into 
decisions that are not only taken but also implemented by regulatory bodies. As 
outlined in Chapter 1, this thesis confines itself to the European Community and its 
Member States as the authorities responsible for policy-making and implementation. 
In order to understand the Community's IT policy outcomes which will be outlined in 
Chapters 3 and 4, and to understand why or why not the IT Roundtable companies 
could exercise an influence on these policies (see Chapters 7 to 9), it is important to 
outline this thesis' assumptions regarding public policy outcomes.
This thesis makes the following assumptions: (1) the policy outcomes are 
perceived to be a product of rational behaviour but only to the extent that the 
government has given consideration to the costs and benefits involved, and has chosen 
the policy action which would satisfy its perceived interests; (2) rationality remains 
difficult to determine as the government is perceived as pursuing a mix of mutually 
dependent, potentially incompatible economic and political objectives, which may 
change over time; and (3) the policy inputs of lower-level governments into a higher- 
level government are treated as if they were unitary stances.
Assumption 1: Bounded Rationality
One could assume that governments, like companies, display rational behaviour. 
In that case, a government would formulate, decide upon and implement the policy 
choices that would satisfice its interests. This thesis found indications of rationality; 
the interviewed public officials at both the EC and national levels appeared to have 
considered the costs and benefits of alternative policy options, and given preference to
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those routes of action that were in their perception meeting their objectives.
Assumption 2: Economic and Political Interests
This assumption of rationality, however, poses one major question, namely: 
what are the government's interests? Some authors argue that the government's interests 
are synonymous to some long-term, general interests, which transcends the specific 
interests of groups within state and society, and maintain "the same transitive ordering 
over time” (Krasner, 1978:53). Others argue that governments have been captured by 
specific interests, i.e. the interests of bureaucrats and politicians or those of non­
governmental societal actors, such as voters, ruling elites, or dominant classes1.
This thesis assumes that any democratic government, irrespective of whether 
or not it has been captured by specific interests, has a number of basic economic and 
political objectives on its agenda, which it pursues to secure the continuing support of 
the electorate, and thus to ensure its stay in power. These objectives include the 
protection and promotion of the jurisdiction's wealth, political sovereignty and security, 
and social stability (Strange, 1985:237; Stopford and Strange, 1991:135; Causer, 
1978:41). Evidence from this study appears to support this assumption not only for the 
Member State governments, but also for the European Community.
These policy objectives, however, have not been ordered in a persistent, 
transitive and fixed order. Rather, these objectives have been mutually dependent and 
often conflicting, complicating any determination of rationality in governmental 
behaviour (Stopford and Strange, 1991:134-135). Moreover, as will be shown in this 
thesis, the government's prime objectives may change over a short period of time.
Assumption 3: Unitary Stances
Like companies, governments are non-monolithic. The various departments or
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groups within a government do not necessarily pursue the same combination of 
objectives. Even if they would, they may not agree on how their interests could best 
be served. It will, therefore, depend on the various departments' bargaining power 
whether or not a policy decision will be in their respective interests. «
Evidence from this research seems to suggest that the assumption of a non- 
monolithic government is valid in the case of both the European Community as well 
as the national governments (Mazey and Richardson, 1993b:6). At the EC level, for 
example, policy stances differed substantially within the Commission on the 1991 
White Paper and within the Council on the proposed budget for the Fourth Framework 
Programme (see Chapter 4). Within the national governments, similar divergencies 
have been existing between departments. Within the German government, for example, 
the finance ministry opposed the Fourth Framework Programme's budget while the 
ministry responsible for research and technology, the BMFT, advocated it (BMFT 
sources, Interview 33; 1993). Judging by the German opposition to the budget at the 
EC level, the finance ministry's influence on the final German position was clearly 
higher than the leverage of the BMFT.
This example, however, does show that when the national governments prepare 
their position on EC policy proposals, they seek to overcome internal divergencies. For 
purposes of analysis, it is thus assumed that policy differences within any national 
government will be discussed and solved internally so that the national policy stance 
as voiced at the EC level can be considered as if it were unitary.
2.2 DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE POLITICAL INFLUENCE
Once corporate political influence has been defined, the key question that arises 
is: what determines the influence of companies on public policy outcomes? As
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Gourevitch (1986:114) argues, "we need to have some notion of the connection 
between economic actors and political process, of the mechanisms whereby preferences 
acquire [political] power". How, when and why are corporate policy preferences 
converted into policy outcomes? On the basis of the theoretical foundations outlined 
in Chapter 1, this thesis argues that corporate political influence can be defined as a 
product of three determinants, namely political activity, political weight and political 
realization. This section will turn to each of these three determinants.
2.2.1 POLITICAL ACTIVITY
Once a company or group of companies has formulated its policy preferences, 
it has to articulate these preferences if it wants decision-makers to act in accordance 
(Olson, 1965:10). Decision-makers can only take corporate preferences into account if 
they are aware of their existence, and governments will only be aware of their 
existence if the company or group of companies has articulated its preferences. Making 
one’s preferences heard thus constitutes a necessary precondition for converting policy 
preferences into policy outcomes.
All the activities that a company or group of companies undertakes to make its 
preferences heard can be summarized as corporate lobbying or corporate political 
activity. When describing the political activity of companies, undertaken both 
individually and in a group context, as will be done with respect to the IT Roundtable 
members in Chapter 7, the following aspects should be stressed: (1) the effort put into 
lobbying; (2) the channels of lobbying activities; (3) the lobbying targets; and (4) the 
timing of lobbying activities.
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Effort Put into Political A ctivity
The effort put into lobbying by companies, both individually and as a group, 
facilitates a successful conversion of their policy preferences into policy outcomes 
(Esty and Caves, 1983:37)2. The type of activities undertaken, their frequency and 
magnitude, and the resources spent on them affect the intensity with which corporate 
policy preferences are conveyed to the targeted policy-makers. A visit by the chairman 
of a company to a high-level public official, for example, is bound to attract more 
attention than a simple letter.
The effort put into lobbying reflects to a certain degree the companies' 
perception of the importance of a certain policy issue; the type of activities chosen, 
their frequency and magnitude and the resources spent on them are likely to be higher 
if companies feel strongly about an issue, and lower if the companies are impartial 
(Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987:35).
However, even if companies feel very strong about an issue, the efforts devoted 
to corporate political activity may be constrained by the resources available to the 
companies in question. Multinational enterprises, which have more resources available, 
are in a better position to carry the costs of political activity than small to medium­
sized firms (Salamon and Siegfried, 1977:1029,1031). Similarly, profitable companies 
are in a better position than unprofitable ones.
Channels o f Political A ctivity
One should also determine which channels companies have been using to 
articulate their policy preferences. Figure 2.1 outlines four categories of channels of 
political activity on the basis of their membership base (individual, collective) and line 
of representation (direct, indirect). This classification focuses on those channels that 
represent corporate interests on a wide range of policy issues, such as trade and R&D.
Figure 2.1 Channels of Corporate Political Activity
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For the more specific standardization issues, the national and European standardization 
bodies and associations constitute the appropriate channel.
Direct, Individual. The main advantage of the direct, individual approach is that 
the companies can present their views in an unaltered version to the relevant decision­
makers. This advantage, however, has to be traded off against the disadvantages: unless 
an individual company commands a monopoly position, it cannot be seen as 
representative for the industry by public officials; a single company commands less 
political clout than if the company were to join forces with other companies; and a 
single company has the disposal over less resources than a collective of companies 
would have.
Indirect, Individual. Individual representations via lawyers, consultants, public 
relations companies, professional lobbyists, et cetera, face similar problems as direct 
representations. In fact, the situation could be worse; an intermediary's lack of inside 
knowledge into the issue presented, may thwart and misrepresent the companies' 
respective cases (Hull, 1993:86). Even if the intermediaries are qualitatively good, they 
remain third parties; government officials prefer to talk to those that are actually 
responsible (IT company sources, Interview 15; 1993). These disadvantages, however, 
may be counterbalanced by the intermediaries' comprehensive and up-to-date 
knowledge about issues concerning them, and their experience in targeting public 
officials. Moreover, developing such knowledge in-house may be considered as too 
expensive.
Indirect, Collective. A third channel of political activity is formed by the 
interest groups which represent an industry or group of industries on a wide range of 
issues: the European-level federations of national associations and the nationally 
organized industry associations. As the following will show, the advantages and 
shortcomings of the European industry federations do not so much differ in nature from
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those of the national associations; rather, they differ in scale.
Companies may derive three main advantages from participating in these 
associations and federations. First, when the industry associations and federations 
represent the majority of the country's or region's industry, the government may 
perceive these groups as representative for the industry/industries they embody, and 
thus grant these groups a privileged position in interacting with the government. Like 
the national industry associations, which have been established partners to the M/S 
governments in policy-making, the European industry federations are the Commission's 
preferred partners (Hull, 1993:86; Mazey and Richardson, 1993a:ll; Butt Philip, 
1987:282; 1985:45; Streeck and Schmitter, 1991:135-137). Second, companies that 
succeed in unifying their policy stances, whether this is at the national or European 
level, command more political clout (Causer, 1978:32; Hall, 1986:232-233; Butt Philip, 
1985:41; Robock and Simmonds, 1989:369). Third, by acting collectively, either at the 
national or European level, companies may share the costs of their political activity, 
mobilize more funds for their activities and for a longer period of time (Finer, 
1955:282; Butt Philip, 1985:41).
Industry associations and federations, however, may face difficulties in building 
a consensus out of the diverging positions of their broad membership base, which may 
cross sectoral and, in the case of the European industry federations, national 
boundaries. Notably the European industry federations have, as a result, often failed 
to undertake unified actions or to upgrade their common positions beyond the lowest 
common denominator. This disadvantage may have been aggravated by requirements 
of unanimity in the federations' voting procedures and limits to the discretionary 
powers of the groups in representing the views of their members (Grant, 1987:13, 
1993:31; Hull, 1993:86,88; Kirchner and Schwaiger, 1981:10; Mazey and Richardson, 
1993b:7).
53
Additionally, in the time-consuming process of consensus-building, the industry 
associations and federations may combine and ultimately alter the preferences of their 
members (Hall, 1986:33). This applies, in particular, to the European federations, 
which are characterized by a larger membership base and a longer line of 
representation (Grant, 1987:111; Butt Philip, 1985:34-35,39).
Moreover, European industry federations may be constrained by lack of 
resources and expertise, since they are financially dependent on the national industry 
associations (Grant, 1993:30; Mazey and Richardson, 1993b:7; Butt Philip, 1985:36). 
The lack of resources may reflect both free-rider problems as well as limited 
expectations on the side of the individual members as to the size of the gains to be 
derived from collective action in comparison to the costs (Olson, 1965).
Direct, Collective. Due to these limitations, companies may prefer to opt for 
a fourth channel of political activity, namely associations of companies, which offer 
direct membership to a small and select group of companies. By virtue of their size 
and organization, associations of companies combine the advantages of both individual 
corporate representations as well as collective representations through industry
associations or federations. In comparison to the European industry federations, for 
example, associations of companies operate on the basis of shorter lines of
representation, reducing the extent to which any individual company's interests are 
compromised in the process of aggregation. Additionally, the small membership base 
diminishes the chances of free-rider problems; deviant behaviour of individual 
participants is more likely to be noticed and easier to be corrected, while the individual 
responsibility of each company in the success of the lobbying attempt make such 
behaviour less likely (Olson, 1965). Moreover, the size of the gains that a successful
lobbying attempt could yield to an individual company may imply that the
participating companies are willing to contribute more resources to the political activity
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of their association. Finally, an association's political activity as a collective of 
companies may confer semi-representativeness on the association and increase the 
companies' political clout.
However, even though an association's membership base may* be more 
homogeneous than those of the broad-based, industry federations, diverging interests 
amongst the member firms may continue to limit the association's effectiveness, 
blocking the development of common positions or leading to the formulation of 
relatively superficial platforms (Grant, 1993:36).
Lobbying Targets
A third point related to the political activity of companies is the issue of the 
companies' lobbying targets; whom or what has been the subject of the corporate 
political activity? Companies seek to target those bodies that are responsible for 
regulations and their implementation, such as the national governments and the 
European Community. As the loci of policy-formulation, decision-making and 
implementation vary per policy case, the companies' lobby targets shift as well; each 
stage in the policy-making process and implementation involve different individuals, 
departments and committees.
The companies' opportunities to articulate their policy preferences, however, are 
not unlimited; they are constrained by the political system in which the companies 
operate. Political systems differ in their "openness"; they differ in the extent to which 
companies can be involved in the policy-formulation, decision-making and 
implementation processes. These divergencies in openness are likely to affect both the 
lobbying strategies of companies, as well as the cost of lobbying incurred by these 
companies.
The "openness" of a political system to corporate political activity depends on
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a number of factors, including (1) the degree of fragmentation of policy-making and 
implementation, (2) the extent of insulation of the policy-making and implementing 
bureaucracy, (3) the legitimacy of the public authority, (4) the public authority's need 
for information, notably on technical issues; and (5) the attitude towards political 
activity, based on ideology and past experiences.
First, the more fragmented the policy-formulation, decision-making and 
implementation processes are, the more opportunities exist for companies to articulate 
their preferences (Milner, 1987a:275-278; Salamon and Siegfried, 1977:1029). The 
European Community, for example, is far more fragmented than its national 
counterparts, with the possible exception of the federally-organized Germany and 
Belgium.
Second, the opportunities for corporate political activity will be further 
increased if the public authority's bureaucracy is not insulated from, but exposed to 
external influences. This occurs, for example, when the bureaucracy hires employees 
from the private sector or employs them on secondment; when the bureaucracy uses 
the private sector to inform it on specific issues or supply it with expertise; or when 
long-standing relationships between the bureaucracy and business have been left intact 
(Causer, 1978:36; Finer, 1955:283; van Tulder and Junne, 1988:185-185; Milner, 
1987a:278-280). In comparison to the national governments, the European Community, 
for example, has been far less insular. Interested societal parties have been facing a 
relatively easy entry into the EC policy network (Mazey and Richardson, 1993b: 12; 
Chapter 6).
Third, the opportunities for companies to articulate preferences are likely to be 
greater if the public authority is in need for legitimation. In contrast to the national 
governments, the European Community, for example, has been a relatively new 
institution. The power relations between the EC institutions and the national
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governments, and between the key institutions at the EC level have not yet fully 
crystallized. Consequently, the EC has been attempting to assert its identity and secure 
its legitimacy by drawing interested parties into its policy-network (Butt Philip, 
1985:45; Mazey and Richardson, 1993b: 10,11; Chapter 6).
Fourth, the public authority's need for information may also increase the 
opportunities for companies to express their policy preferences. Most bureaucracies 
lack an in-house expertise, notably on technical issues. Even if public officials did have 
an adequate expertise upon entering the government, this knowledge has often dated 
rapidly. In contrast, companies have the resources to analyze their needs in the wake 
of rapidly changing technology and to design the policies necessary to address these 
needs. Companies, in this respect, have been displaying what Cohen and Bauer 
(1985:60-65) call a "monopoly of legitimate expertise"3. Both national governments 
and the EC, for example, have been using companies and other societal interest groups 
as important sources of analytical expertise and factual information (Butt Philip, 
1985:9,10,42,57; Kirchner and Schwaiger, 1981:10,146; van Tulder and Junne, 
1988:177; Chapter 6).
Finally, the opportunities for corporate political activity may increase if the 
government adheres to an ideology proposing a significant role for government 
intervention in the economy. The Commission's information technology directorate, DG 
13, for example, has been relatively open to corporate political activity by virtue of its 
mandate to support the IT industry and its ideological inclination to do so through 
intervention (see Chapter 7). A favourable attitude towards corporate political activity 
may be further strengthened if the interaction between the public authority and the 
companies has been mutually beneficial and relatively free of controversies in the past.
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Timing o f Political A ctivity
A final issue concerns the timing of political activity, as this may affect the 
success of the lobbying efforts of a company or group of companies (Hull, 1993:87). 
According to one industry representative, "companies have to get through to the right 
man at the right time" (Interview 37; 1993). Whether or not the timing of corporate 
political activity has been appropriate is determined, in part, by the political and 
economic conditions prevailing at the time of the companies' efforts. Companies which 
have been lobbying in vain for a certain policy for a longer period of time, may 
suddenly find that changing political or economic conditions have made the 
government more receptive to their preferences than previously. The appropriateness 
of the timing of political activity is also determined by the state of advance of a policy 
proposal in the policy-making process at the time of the company's lobbying efforts. 
Companies, targeting government officials responsible for drafting policies, may fmd 
that their opinions were articulated too late to be of any use if, at that point in time, 
the proposal in question had already been finalized.
Lobbying is thus not a one-time, one-off activity. Rather, "corporate lobbying 
is a long-term process. Ideas get produced and reproduced. It is a process of constant 
talks and presentation of ideas" (ORGALIME, Interview 23; 1993). One main problem 
that companies thus face in their lobbying strategy is the "need to keep up constant 
pressure until their goals have been reached" (ERT, Interview 37; 1993).
2.2.2 POLITICAL WEIGHT
The fact that a government is made aware of the policy preferences of a 
company or group of companies through corporate political activity, however, does not 
necessarily mean that the government will seek to act in accordance with these
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preferences. Whether or not a government decides to satisfy the policy preferences 
brought forward, appears to be determined by factors that attach a certain importance 
to the corporate policy preferences in the policy-making processes.
When addressing the issue of political weight, as will be done concerning the 
European-owned IT companies in Chapter 8, this thesis argues that the political weight 
that corporate policy preferences carry, can be perceived as a function of two variables: 
the real and perceived value of the "assets" that companies control.
Any company commands certain assets, such as capital, technology, and 
employment, that are in demand by a government as they could further the 
government's objectives of greater wealth, political sovereignty, security, and social 
stability (see 2.1.3). The dependency of the government on corporate assets for the 
realization of its agenda implies that the government cannot be indifferent to the policy 
preferences of companies; the corporate assets can be offered or withheld by corporate 
management at their discretion. Consequently, if a company or group of companies 
would express their preference for certain policies on the basis that these would be 
essential for performing and acting in a manner that would benefit the country or 
region, government officials will be inclined to satisfy these corporate demands. Failure 
to oblige could lead to a deterioration of the companies' performance or to a 
withdrawal of investments, employment and other assets through divestments and 
relocations (Lindblom, 1977:170-188; Bowler, 1987:157,170; Causer, 1978:39,46; 
Eden, 1991:215; Finer, 1955:285; Hancher and Moran, 1989:275). The fact that 
companies control certain assets, that are in demand by the government, attaches a 
certain weight to the companies' policy preferences, and enables companies to wield 
political influence.
It has been argued that the government may increase its control over the 
realization of its own agenda by increasing government employment (Bowler,
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1987:170)4. To the extent that these jobs would be created through the nationalization 
of private sector companies, one should note that the publicly-owned companies' 
limited profitability and/or large investment requirements have imposed financial 
constraints on any further expansion of the publicly-owned segments within society. 
Moreover, as Chapter 7 will illustrate in the case of France, government ownership 
does not necessarily imply a dirigiste relationship between government and state-owned 
companies, allowing the latter to influence their government as well.
The Determinants o f Political Weight: Real and Perceived Value o f Corporate Assets
Research on the political influence of companies5, the relative bargaining 
power of firms6, and the economic, political and social impact of multinationals on 
home and host countries7 give an insight into the determinants of political weight. 
These studies focus, first of all, on the real value of the assets that companies have to 
offer: the number of people they employ, the size of value-added, the percentage of 
sales exported, the R&D spending in terms of sales, et cetera.
If the size of the assets offered by a company or group of companies is large, 
the policy preferences of the company or group of companies will carry more political 
weight than if the company or group of companies provide only assets of limited size. 
Caroline Walcot, Assistant Secretary General of the European Round Table (ERT), for 
example, explains that the political clout of the ERT follows from the combined size 
of its members; the 40-odd members have a combined annual turnover of ECU 500 bn 
and employ about 3 mn people (Interview, 1993; ERT, September 1991:2).
Yet, it is important to stress that the real value of the assets as such may not 
be sufficient to give the policy preferences of a company or group of companies the 
necessary political weight. The perception by the government of the value of these 
assets in furthering its objectives matters as well. If a government perceives a
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company’s assets as highly important for the realization of its goals, the policy 
preferences of the firm in question will carry political weight, irrespective of the real 
value of its assets.
The government's perception of the value of corporate assets depends on two 
factors. First of all, it depends on the ranking of the objectives on the government's 
agenda. For example, if sovereignty and security are ranked highly on a government's 
agenda, the government may attach a greater value to the policy preferences of 
companies producing strategic products than to those of companies producing non- 
strategic goods. Second, the government's perception of the value of corporate assets 
depends on the available alternatives. If a company or group of companies, constitutes 
the only supplier of certain assets that the public authority needs to realize its 
objectives, the assets of this company or group of companies will be highly valued by 
the authority in question.
The most realistic alternative sources of corporate assets are likely to be 
companies of a similar size (1) and origin (2) that operate in the same or in buying, 
supplying or otherwise related industries (3). First, corporate size is likely to be a 
factor determining whether or not other sources of corporate assets are realistic 
alternatives. The size of the resources that small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
may yield are insignificant in comparison to those of a large multinational.
A second factor may be "origin" or ownership. Although foreign-owned 
multinationals may be, in terms of size, an alternative to the home country's (region's) 
counterparts, in terms of origin, they may only constitute a realistic alternative if 
autonomy and security objectives rank relatively low on the agenda of the home 
government. As soon as autonomy and security become more important, however, 
concerns may arise regarding the security of supply and the transfer of sensitive 
technologies that limit the foreign companies' suitability as alternative sources of
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corporate assets (Kline, 1990:27; Moran 1990:5-14; Nye, 1974:157,168).
A third factor determining whether or not other sources of corporate assets are 
realistic alternatives could be the type of industry, such as an up or downstream- 
industry or a high or low-tech industry, in particular when the government’is looking 
for industry-specific assets, such as the production of strategic goods or the supply of 
high-skilled jobs.
In sum, the political weight of a company's or group of companies' policy 
preferences is determined by the coordinates of the company or group of companies 
in a matrix delineated by the real and perceived value of the company's or group of 
companies' assets (see Figure 2.2).
Defining Corporate Assets
As outlined above, corporate assets are those firm-specific resources that are in 
demand by a government as they could further the government's objectives of greater 
wealth, political sovereignty, security, and social stability. On the basis of Hood and 
Young's analysis of the impact of multinational enterprises on economies (1979), 
interviews with M/S officials (18,19,33,39,40; 1993) and other studies mentioned 
above8, the following (non-exhaustive nor mutually exclusive) listing of corporate 
assets can be made up: (1) value-added; (2) investment; (3) employment; (4) product 
and process technology and managerial skills; (5) exports and FDI; and (6) 
economically and militarily strategic products and/or technologies. As these assets may 
not be spread evenly across a country or region, the allocation of these assets may play 
a role as well.
Value-Added. Companies constitute sources of value-added and, thus, sources 
of wealth. National or regional wealth (income)9, as proxied by either the gross 
national product (GNP) or the gross domestic product (GDP)10, can be defined as the
Figure 2.2 Political Weight
Perceived Value of Corporate A ssets
Political Political
Weight: Weight:
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HIGH
Political Political
Weight: Weight:
LOW LOW/MEDIUM
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Real Value of Corporate A ssets
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sum of value-added11 of all economic activities at factor cost (Bannock et al., 
1987:288). Companies contribute to the wealth of a country or region through: (1) 
deploying factors of production (capital and labour) in a productive use, thus 
contributing to value-added, and (2) increasing these factors' productivity12, generating 
growth in value-added (Porter, 1990b:84; Munnell, 1990:4,6; Maital, 1980).
Investm ent Corporate expenditures on existing and new machinery, equipment, 
plants and property, for example, contribute to the total value-added in the economy 
and, thus, to the national or regional income. In addition, these investments may 
mobilize further capital injections by both indigenous as well as foreign companies.
Employment. Through sustaining and generating employment, either directly 
or indirectly via linkages13 and multiplier effects14, companies contribute as well to 
the total value-added in the economy and, thus, to the national or regional income. 
Moreover, the employees' productivity may increase through learning on the job (Reich 
1990:58,59). The interest of a government in corporate employment may also follow 
from the often decisive impact of employment on the electoral success of the 
government.
Technology and Managerial Skills. Companies constitute sources of technology 
and management skills. Human capital, in the form of new or improved product and 
process technologies and management skills, is considered to be a key factor behind 
productivity increases (Porter, 1990b:84; Reich, 1991). Companies, as sources of these 
new technologies and skills, could improve the GDP through locating high value-added 
activities, such as R&D, within the government's jurisdiction or through improving 
productivity by applying their new or improved technologies and skills to their 
operations. In this context, one should also note that companies may generate positive 
externalities, such as the creation of a highly skilled labour pool benefitting other 
employers.
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Exports and EDI. Companies may constitute sources of exports and FDI. In 
general terms, trade allows a country or region to specialize in those industries or 
segments of industries in which its companies are more competitive, and thus to deploy 
its factors of production in more a productive manner. Similarly, international 
investment allows a country or region to deploy its factors of production across the 
world in a more productive, and thus higher value-added yielding manner (Reich, 
1990:59; Porter, 1990b:85)15. Additionally, by exporting more goods, services, capital 
and other items (technology, skills) than importing, companies may improve the 
country's or region's balance of payments.
Strategic Products and Technologies. Companies may be sources of 
economically and militarily strategic products and/or technologies - a much sought 
after asset that serves a government's economic and political sovereignty and security 
objectives. What exactly makes a product or technology "strategic" is politically 
defined: it depends on the threat perception of the government at a certain point in 
time. The government's threat perception, in turn, appears to be determined to a large 
extent by security of supply concerns; how accessible are the relevant products and 
technologies at any given point in time?
Two main types of technologies and products are generally considered to be 
"strategic" by a government. The first type comprises those technologies and products 
that have military applications. The use of Japanese semiconductors in the American 
Stealth fighter and the latter's crucial role in the Gulf War, for example, has raised 
security of supply concerns; a delay or halt on the delivery of these Japanese 
semiconductors could thwart America's military capability.
A second category of strategic products and technologies includes those 
products and technologies that constitute a necessary input into almost any sector of 
the economy (such as semiconductors, computers and oil). Not only may the
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production of such goods and technologies yield positive externalities, also the 
application of these products and technologies may yield synergies, i.e. 
interdependencies between the technological progress of the producing companies and 
the technological development of their users and/or suppliers. For1 example, 
technological progress in the semiconductor industry may not only improve the 
industry's own competitiveness, it may also improve the competitiveness of the sectors 
of application.
Strategic trade economists, such as Brander and Spencer16, discern a third type 
of strategic products and technologies. They argue that "high rent yielding" industries 
are also strategic. However, this argument negates that (1) the firms in these industries 
are only generating excess profits if they are at the cutting edge of technology, and (2) 
the rents dissipate when new firms enter the industry and increase competition. Betting 
the odds on an industry, which is only strategic on the basis of its substantial profits, 
may proof to be a short-lived benefit for any government that cares to support it.
This thesis argues that the security of supply concerns, which affect the threat 
perception of the EC and its M/S governments and thus the definition of strategic 
products, are related to the characteristics of the industries in question, notably: (a) the 
availability of the industry's product on the world markets (customized good or 
commodity product); (b) the structure of the industry (concentrated or not); (c) the 
nationality of the main suppliers (one nationality involved or more; Japanese or 
American); (d) the availability of alternative suppliers; and (e) the height of the entry 
barriers in terms of capital, technology and accumulated experience (high or low)17.
Security of supply concerns are likely to be small if the product is a 
standardized commodity good, supplied by many alternative producers of various 
nationalities, in a dispersed industry with low entry barriers. However, security of 
supply concerns are likely to be larger, if the product in question is a customized good,
66
supplied by only a few producers of the same nationality, notably Japanese, in an 
oligopolist industry with high entry barriers. One should note that, the economically 
strategic technologies and products, by virtue of their generic application, have to be, 
or will be in due course, commodity goods characterized by ample supply and low 
prices.
If a government's security of supply concerns are considerable, it is likely to 
pursue a domestically owned, controlled, and/or located capability in developing and 
producing strategic products. Rightly or wrongly, such an indigenous capability is 
perceived as ensuring the country's or region's economic and political sovereignty and 
security.
2.2.3 POLITICAL REALIZATION
Once a company or group of companies has articulated its preferences and these 
preferences carry sufficient political weight, it will exert political influence on policy 
formulation and decision-making. However, a decision to adopt a certain policy does 
not necessarily mean that the policy will actually be implemented. Companies will be 
able to realize their goal of influencing policy outcomes only if the public authority 
is able to deliver upon its promises.
One can make a distinction between internal and external factors constraining 
a government's ability to act, as will be done regarding the IT Roundtable's policy 
preferences in Chapter 9. Internal constraints on a government's ability to deliver 
include: shortcoming in the government's competencies, its array of policy instruments, 
its resources, and its speed of policy-making and implementation18. External 
constraints on a government's actions include those limitations set by the 
internationalized nature of the industry in which the government has been intervening,
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including: the difficulties to discriminate between foreign and European industries, 
companies and products; the cost of intervention; and, in particular, the threat of 
retaliation19.
Moreover, one of the problems caused by the globalization of industries is that 
the realization of some corporate policy preferences may go beyond the government's 
jurisdiction; obtaining market access, for example, requires the cooperation of third 
country governments. The realization of policies, of which the implementation reaches 
beyond the jurisdiction of the public authority, thus depends on the economic and 
political leverage of the government over third country governments, convincing the 
latter to cooperate.
The size of a government's leverage is, basically, a question of asymmetry in 
economic and political inter-dependency; how dependent is the government's 
jurisdiction on certain economic and political assets from other countries, in 
comparison to the dependency of other countries on the economic and political assets 
that the government's jurisdiction could offer? The power of a public authority can be 
translated into a number of indicators, such as: (1) the share of its producers in 
supplying products, particularly strategic ones, to third country markets; (2) the share 
of its consumers in buying third country produce; (3) the share of third country debt 
held by actors within the public authority's jurisdiction; and (4) the contribution of the 
public authority to third country defence. The latter two factors, however, appear to be 
predominantly applicable to US-Japan negotiations. Japan's economic leverage in its 
trade relations with the United States, for example, has allegedly been boosted recently 
by the end of the Cold War, reducing Japan's dependency on America's nuclear 
umbrella, and by Japan's majority holdings of American debt (EEA sources, Interview 
32;1993).
68
2.3 CHANGES IN CORPORATE POLITICAL INFLUENCE
If corporate political influence can be perceived as a product of three 
determinants, namely political activity, political weight and political realization, what 
then causes these determinants of corporate political influence to change over time? 
What determines whether or not corporate diplomacy pays off? This thesis argues that 
the determinants of political influence are affected by structural and short-term changes 
in the industrial production and public policy-supply arrangements, which govern what 
products are produced or what policies are supplied, how, on what terms, by which 
companies and where or by what government at which level. As Chapters 7 to 9 will 
show in the case of the IT Roundtable companies, these changes contribute to an 
explanation of shifts in corporate political influence.
Changes in the production and policy-supply arrangements may have prompted 
companies to undertake or defer political activity, step up or reduce their lobbying 
efforts within the constraints set by the available resources, alter their choice of 
channels of political activity, shift their lobbying targets, alter their timing of lobbying, 
and modify their policy preferences. Changes in such arrangements may also have 
affected the political weight of the companies' policy preferences, by appreciating or 
depreciating the real or perceived value of the assets that the companies have to offer. 
Moreover, such changes may have affected the ability of governments to realize 
corporate policy preferences by affecting their policy competencies, instruments, 
resources and speed of decision-making, by influencing the practical implementation 
of policies, and by altering the costs of intervention.
The following two sections will discuss the main changes taking place within 
prevailing production and policy-supply arrangements. The specific changes taking 
place in respectively the IT industry and the European Community will be discussed
in Chapters 5 and 6.
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2.3.1 CHANGING ECONOMICS
The following structural and short-term changes have been identified in the 
arrangements governing the supply of products. From the outset, one should note that 
these changes are closely inter-twined, and that the causal direction in their relationship 
is not always clear-cut. The changing nature of competition, for example, is both a 
consequence of as well as a driving force behind rapid technological change.
Globalization and Intensification o f Competition
Over the past decade, companies in both high-tech as well as traditional 
industries have come to face growing and, increasingly, globalized competitive 
pressures. The globalization and intensification of competition has been driven and/or 
facilitated by technological change, standardization and deregulation, and changes in 
the size and nature of demand (Porter, 1986; Stopford and Strange, 1991; Turner and 
Hodges, 1992).
Technological Change
Companies have also been facing rapid changes in technology. Rapid 
technological change, which has resulted in new product and process technologies and 
shorter product and process lives, has been driven by regulatory imperatives and 
competitive pressures, and pulled by demand incentives (Freeman, 1991; Freeman, 
Sharp and Walter, 1991; Stopford and Strange, 1991:34; van Tulder and Junne, 1988).
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Size and Nature o f Demand
Additionally, companies have been facing changes in the size and nature of 
demand. Changes in the size of demand refer to cyclical developments within product 
markets (i.e. sequences of shortages and gluts) and to conjunctural developments within 
economies (sequences of recessions and recoveries). Albeit not discussed separately in 
the following section, the latter have also been affecting the prevailing policy-supply 
arrangements.
Changes in the nature of demand comprise developments like the 
homogenization of demand or the shift from a quality towards a price-based demand. 
These changes in the nature of demand have been caused and/or facilitated by 
developments in product technologies, corporate marketing and advertising, and 
communications and regulations (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Levitt, 1983; Turner and 
Hodges, 1992).
Internationalization o f Operations, Cross-Border M&A and Alliances
Over the last decade, an increasing number of companies has opted for the 
internationalization of their operations and the conclusion of cross-border mergers, 
acquisitions and alliances in a bid to improve their corporate competitiveness. 
Internationalization can be defined as the increasing geographical spread of economic 
activities across national boundaries (Dicken, 1992:1), brought about by greenfield and 
brownfield (acquisitions) foreign direct investment and other vehicles. These trends 
have been facilitated and/or prompted by deregulation, the intensification of 
competition, and rapid technological change (Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Dicken, 
1992; Mytelka, 1991; Ohmae, 1990; Stopford and Strange, 1991; Strange, 1992; van 
Tulder and Junne, 1988).
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2.3.2 CHANGING POLITICS
The following structural and short-term changes have been identified in the 
arrangements governing the supply of public policies. «
Transformation o f the International System
Stopford and Strange (1991:50) point to the transformation of the international 
system from a bipolar system based on the United States and the USSR and their 
respective allies, to a multipolar system - following the collapse of communism in the 
former USSR and Eastern Bloc countries. Associated with this transformation has been 
an increasing emphasis on economic rather than military capabilities (Stewart, 1993).
Deepening and Widening o f Regional Trading Areas
Following the collapse of the bipolar international system, regional trading 
areas have become increasingly prominent. Examples of regional trading areas range 
from the European Community to the North American Free Trade Agreement. Over 
time, regional integration schemes may have experienced both a widening, i.e. a 
broadening of the membership base, as well as a deepening, i.e. a transfer of national 
competencies to the regional institutions - altering the prevailing policy supply 
arrangements.
2.4 HYPOTHESES
This chapter has sought to provide a framework for analyzing corporate 
political influence and the changes therein. In Chapters 5 to 9, this framework will be 
applied to the EC IT policy case with the objective of determining why any change
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in the IT Roundtable's political influence has occurred. Assuming that the IT 
Roundtable has lost some of its political influence, what hypotheses can be drawn on 
the basis of this theoretical framework, with respect to the political activity undertaken 
by the IT Roundtable companies, the political weight attached to their policy 
preferences, and the realization of these preferences in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
in comparison to the early and mid-1980s?
Political A ctivity
► It is expected that, in the early 1990s, as in the previous decade, the IT 
Roundtable did undertake political activity to make its preferences heard, thus 
meeting the necessary precondition for influencing the Community.
► Although the crisis developing in the IT industry may have prompted the IT 
Roundtable's members to intensify their political activity at the EC-level, it is 
more likely that the reduced profit margins, symptomatic for the structural 
changes in the IT industry and the recession, have drained the companies' 
resources, and led to cut-backs in their lobbying efforts.
► Despite the advantages of lobbying as an association of companies over 
lobbying through an industry federation or individually, the IT Roundtable's 
effectiveness as a vehicle for voicing corporate policy preferences may have 
been undermined by the structural changes taking place in the IT industry and 
the changing policy agenda of both the companies and the EC. Doubts 
concerning the effectiveness of the IT Roundtable may have prompted member 
companies to opt for alternative channels of political activity.
► The European Community institutions are expected to have become 
increasingly important as lobbying targets, following the institutional changes 
of the mid-1980s and early 1990s. The fact that the EC has become
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increasingly part of European political life may have implied that the EC has 
become so established that it currently does not need the inputs and support of 
business any more. Even if that is not the case, the EC may have obtained 
access to so many alternative sources of information and legitimation that it 
does not necessarily need the inputs and support of the IT Roundtable 
companies any more.
► Although further research may prove that the IT Roundtable's reduced influence 
was linked to the timing of its lobbying activities, preliminary evidence 
suggests that, in the early 1990s, the IT Roundtable's political activity was 
timed rightly to affect the Commission's drafting processes. However, as will 
be outlined below, the policy preferences voiced may have had no chance of 
realization considering the economic and political conditions at that time.
Political Weight
► It is expected that the political weight of the IT Roundtable's policy preferences 
has declined in the early 1990s in comparison to the early and mid-1980s, 
following a depreciation of the Roundtable members' main corporate asset: its 
ability to produce strategic technologies and products. The end of the Cold War 
and the commoditization of IT products may have altered the Community's 
perception that IT constitutes an economically and militarily strategic 
technology, and that an indigenous IT production capability is consequently a 
necessity. Even if the technology as such is still considered to be strategic, the 
recognition that it is the application of IT that yields value and not its 
production, combined with the alleviation of security of supply concerns, may 
have reduced the perceived and real need for an indigenous IT production 
capability.
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► Due to the recession of the early 1990s and the problems associated with the 
widening and deepening of the Community, short-term economic objectives, 
such as cutting budget deficits and reducing unemployment, may have become 
more important to the EC and its M/S governments than the longer term 
strategic objective of maintaining an indigenous production capability in IT. As 
a consequence of the crisis in the IT industry, however, the IT Roundtable 
companies may not have been able to meet the EC's and Member States' 
demand for corporate assets. This may have prompted the EC and its national 
governments to shift their support to industries and industry segments that 
would contribute to a larger extent to the realization of their short-term, 
economic objectives.
Political Realization
► Although, in theory, the EC should have been able to convert the IT 
Roundtable's policy preferences into policy outcomes, particulary considering 
the institutional changes brought about by the Single European Act and the 
Maastricht Treaty, in practice, the EC's competencies, its instruments and its 
resources may not have been sufficient. The Member States' ideological 
differences; their insistence on subsidiarity, national solutions and juste retour; 
their need to reduce public spending; and their emphasis on cohesion may have 
impeded the EC in the actual use of its competencies, in its development of 
more interventionist policy instruments, and in its ability to raise the necessary 
resources. The EC's decision-making structure, moreover, may have unduly 
delayed the formulation, approval and implementation of the EC's IT policy in 
the early 1990s. Shortcomings in the EC's ability to realize corporate policy 
preferences may have increased the pressure on the national governments to
75
support their former national champions.
► Additionally, structural economic changes, notably the increasingly 
internationalized nature of the IT industry, may have limited the Community's 
practical possibilities of intervention. This, in turn, may have prompted the 
Community to reconsider its prevailing policy approaches and instruments.
2.5 NOTES
1. For various examples, see, for instance, Bartlett (1973:22,26); Downs and 
Romer-Rosenthal in Boadway and Wildasin (1984:154-160); Poulantzas in Knutilla 
(1987:109-115); Frieden and Lake (1987:14-15); and Milliband in Knutilla (1987:107- 
109).
2. In their study on the political influence of manufacturing industries, Esty and 
Caves (1983:37) found that corporate political expenditures facilitated political success. 
In addition, they found some indications that the level of these expenditures could also 
explain, rather than merely facilitate, political success.
3. See also Jenkins (1986:164); Kobrin (1987:619-20;634); Poynter (1985:95); and 
Robock and Simmonds (1989:363).
4. A similar argument has been made by Rueschemeyer and Evans (1985:68), who 
state that "by augmenting the resources under the state's control, intervention 
diminishes the state's reliance on privately generated resources".
5. See, for instance, Causer (1978); Esty and Caves (1983); Gourevitch (1986:59); 
Lavergne (1983), Milner (1987a); and Salamon and Siegfried (1977).
6. Behrman and Grosse (1990); Daniels and Radebaugh (1992); Doz and Prahalad 
(1980); Eden (1991); Gladwin and Walter (1980); Jenkins (1986); Kobrin (1987); 
Moran (1985); Poynter (1985); Rugman, Lecraw and Booth (1985); Strange (1992); 
and Stopford and Strange (1991).
7. See, for instance, Borrus (1988); Chapman and Walker (1991); Cohen and 
Zysman (1987); Daniels and Radebaugh (1992); Dicken (1992); Fayerweather (1982); 
Haggett (1982); Hood and Young (1979); Martinelli (1982); Nye (1974); Reich (1991); 
Robock and Simmonds (1989); Safarian (1993); and United Nations (1988).
8. See endnotes 5 to 7.
9. In this thesis, national (regional) wealth and income are used interchangeably.
10. The national (regional) income equals the net national (regional) product at
factor cost. The gross national product (GNP) constitutes a proxy of the national 
(regional) income as (1) it is a gross rather than a net figure (it includes capital
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consumption), and (2) it is measured at market prices rather than at factor cost. The 
gross domestic product constitutes a proxy as (1) it is a gross rather than a net figure, 
(2) it is measured at market prices rather than at factor cost, and (3) it comprises the 
value of the output produced by both indigenous as well as foreign companies within 
a country's (region's) geographical boundaries, rather than comprising the value of the 
output produced by a country's (region's) indigenous companies irrespective of the 
location of production (Bannock et al., 1987; Yarbrough and Yarbrough, 1988).
11. Corporate value-added can be calculated by subtracting the cost of bought-in 
raw materials, services and components from the total corporate revenues (Bannock et 
al., 1987:415).
12. Productivity, which can be defined as the value of the output produced by a 
unit of labour or capital, will increase if the same units of labour and capital at 
constant factor prices yield a higher output value than before.
13. For example, an expansion of a company's operations in a country or region 
may increase the company's demand for local inputs and services and, thus, indirectly 
create jobs at the supplying firms.
14. For instance, if a company invests in a new production facility and creates a 
number of jobs, the resulting increase in income of the formerly unemployed may 
stimulate the demand for consumer-oriented products and services. This demand may, 
in its turn, increase output and generate new employment throughout the economy.
15. The link between trade and investment and national (regional) income is 
probably better illustrated by alternative, non value-added based definitions of national 
or regional income. The national (regional) income can also be defined as the sum of 
all expenditure on final consumption (C) and investments (I) plus net exports (X-M). 
Alternatively, one could define national (regional) income as all payments for the use 
of the factors of production, i.e. wages, rents, profits, and net income from abroad, 
excluding transfer payments (Bannock et al., 1987:288).
16. See, for instance, Brander (1986,1987); Borrus, Tyson and Zysman (1986), and 
Krugman (1987).
17. See, for instance, Moran (1990), Murdock (1977) and other readings on 
corporate bargaining power.
18. See, for instance, Katzenstein (1977:303-306); Milner (1987:280-284); Skocpol 
(1985:17-19); and Zysman (1983:300-301).
19. See, for instance, Dixit (1986:290); Economist, 24 February 1990:71; Grossman 
(1986:50-65); Krugman (1987); Yarbrough and Yarbrough (1988:249); Zysman 
(1983:300-301).
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PART 2
Chapter 3
CORPORATE DIPLOMACY AND EC IT POLICIES:
THE IT ROUNDTABLE'S PREPONDERANT POLITICAL 
INFLUENCE IN THE EARLY AND MID-1980S
1
Chapters 3 and 4 seek to answer the first research question, namely whether or 
not the IT Roundtable, as a group of companies, was able to exercise political 
influence on the Community's IT policies over two time periods: (1) the early and mid- 
1980s and (2) the late 1980s and early 1990s. Chapter 3, which will focus on the first 
time period, seeks to discuss the IT Roundtable's role in the Community's IT policy- 
formulation, decision-making and implementation processes and to establish, on the 
basis of the perceptions of government officials, corporate executives and 
representatives, and industry/government observers, whether or not the IT Roundtable 
exerted a preponderant influence on the policy outcomes in the early and mid-1980s.
This chapter starts with a short history of IT policies in the European 
Community. In particular, it focuses on the question why "common" European IT 
policies only came about in the early 1980s. The second section outlines the 
Community's policy responses to the plight of its IT industry in the 1980s. The third 
section focuses particularly on ESPRIT, the only policy specifically aimed at 
improving the IT industry's competitiveness in the longer-term. It seeks to answer the 
question whether or not the European-owned IT companies, as represented in the IT 
Roundtable, exercised a preponderant influence on ESPRIT's development, approval 
and implementation.
3.1 THE ROAD TOWARDS A COMMON IT POLICY
In the first decades after the Second World War, the national governments
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within Europe adopted an attitude of "benign neglect" towards their indigenous 
computer and semiconductor industries (Lauber, 1986). Although tariff barriers were 
in place, the governments provided only limited funds for government procurement and 
R&D support over the 1950s and early 1960s - in contrast to the United States, where 
substantial public funding for military procurement and R&D had pushed technological 
progress in both the computer as well as semiconductor industries (Malerba, 1985:77; 
Flamm, 1988:143,154,162,169).
By the mid-1960s, however, the European national governments had become 
aware of the fact that their semiconductor and computer companies had fallen behind 
those of the United States; American companies, and not European ones, benefitted 
from the rise in European IT demand. The American penetration of the European 
market (see Chapter 5), was perceived as threatening the survival of the European 
computer and semiconductor industries - industries which were considered vital by 
their national governments for both national wealth and security reasons.
Recognizing the need to catch up with the Americans, the European national 
governments adopted over the late 1960s and the 1970s a tripartite approach to 
strengthening the position of their respective IT industries, consisting of: industrial 
restructuring, preferential government procurement, and R&D programmes (see Table 
3.1). The main beneficiaries of these policies were the "national champions", which 
were either created by the government or already prevailing in the market1.
In Germany, Siemens was the main beneficiary of the government's IT policies. 
Over the period 1974-1983, Siemens received the single largest share (25 to 30 per 
cent) of the government's semiconductor R&D support, with AEG-Telefunken's 
semiconductor operations receiving approximately 10 to 15 per cent (Sandholtz, 
1992:83). Similarly, Siemens was the main beneficiary of the government's computer 
R&D funding - particularly in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when AEG-Telefunken's
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Table 3.1
MAIN NATIONAL IT PROGRAMMES, 1960s-1970s
France
First Plan Calcul, 1967-70 
Budget: FF 450 mn
Second Plan Calcul, 1971-75 
Budget: FF 1030 mn
Third Plan Calcul, 1976-80 
Budget: IT7 1438 mn
VI Plan, 1971-75 
Budget: FF 1290 mn
VH Plan, 1976-81 
Budget: FF 1850 mn
Plan Informatisation de la Societe, 
1977-80. Budget: FF 400 mn
Plan Circuits Integres, 1978-81 
Budget: FF 600 mn
UK
Advanced Computer Technology 
Project, initiated in 1964.
Budget: ca. £ 6 mn
Microelectronics Support Scheme, early 
and mid-1970s. Budget: £ 12 m
Electronic Component Industry 
Scheme, 1977-80. Budget: £ 20 mn
Microelectronics Industrial Support 
Programme (MISP), 1978-83. Budget: 
£ 70 mn. Later reduced to £ 55 mn
Microprocessor Applications Project 
(MAP), 1978-81. Budget: £ 55 mn. 
Refunded in 1982 with £ 30 mn
Germany
First Electronic Dataprocessing 
Programme, 1967-70.
Budget: DM 387 mn
Second Electronic Dataprocessing 
Programme, 1971-75 
Budget: DM 2.41 bn
Third Electronic Dataprocessing 
Programme, 1976-79 
Budget: DM 1.58 bn
Electronics Components Programme, 
1974-78. Budget: DM 388 mn
Italy
Applied Research Fund, 1968 onwards. 
Budget 1968-89: L 4179 bn
Electronics Fund, established in 1968.
Special Electronics Fund, established in 
1975. Budget: L 60 bn
Netherlands
Prior to 1984, no comprehensive IT 
policy; some projects organized by 
individual ministries
Sources: BMFT (1992;1993b); Brandin and Harrison (1987); Bnckman (1986:71-87); CEC/CREST
(1989a,b,c;1990; 1991;1992); De Jonquieres, 9 May 1991; Dosi (1983:227-229); DTI sources; Financial _ 
Times. 1 July 1982; EZ (1989,1990,1993; Communication 19;1994); JFIT (1988); Langlois et aL (1988:14 - 
151); Malerba (1985:193-200); Nelson (1993); Sandholtz (1992:59-91; 146-159).
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troubled computer operations did not constitute a real contender to Siemens' national 
champion status2. In the mid-1970s, however, the German government shifted its 
funding priorities; in the computer sector, it adopted a "dual championship" strategy, 
promoting not only Siemens but also the highly successful minicomputer producer 
Nixdorf (Flamm, 1988:165).
The French government, meanwhile, faced the problem that there was no de 
facto national champion present in the French computer and semiconductor markets. 
In the light of the absence of a clear champion, the French government fostered the 
creation of Compagnie International pour l'lnformatique (CD) in 1967 through the 
merger of the computer operations of Societe d'Electronique et d’Automatique (SEA) 
and Compagnie Europeenne d’Automatique (CEA). However, despite substantial 
financial government support, CD’s market share and profitability did not improve. In 
1975, the French government therefore encouraged the creation of a new "national 
champion", CII-HB, made up from CII and the then partly French, partly American- 
owned Honeywell-Bull. In order to acquire Honeywell shares, absorb losses and 
finance research, HB received S 440 mn in government funds over the period 1976- 
1980 (Brickman, 1986:74).
Similarly, the French government played an active role in creating a national 
semiconductor champion. In 1968, it fostered the creation of Sescosem, the product of 
a merger between Thomson's and CSF's semiconductor operations SECO and COSEM. 
Following the merger of CSF with Thomson, Sescosem came under the control of 
Thomson-CSF. Over the 1970s, Thomson-CSF was the main beneficiary of the 
government's semiconductor funding - particularly if one takes into account that EFCIS 
and Eurotechnique, which also benefitted from public funding, were controlled by 
Thomson-CSF (Maierba, 1985:193). From 1978 onwards, two other semiconductor 
producers also received public funding: Radiotechnique and the government-backed
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joint venture between Matra (F) and Harris (US) (Sandholtz, 1992:81-82).
In the United Kingdom, ICL constituted the British computer champion. ICL 
was formed in 1968 through a government-backed merger of the computer operations 
of Plessey with those of the two surviving British commercial computer companies 
English Electric Computers (EEC) and International Computers and Tabulators (ICT). 
In the semiconductor industry, however, no clear "national champion" was discemable. 
The government did not only support Inmos, the government-created mainstream 
memory ICs and microprocessor producer, but also the niche players Ferranti, Plessey, 
GEC and STC.
In contrast to France, Germany and the United Kingdom, Italy "acted more like 
a small country", as it "did not adopt a national champion policy" (Lauber, 1986:41). 
By the time the Italian government started to give some support to its high-tech 
industries in the late 1960s, Olivetti had already sold its computer operations to 
General Electric. In the mid-1970s, however, Olivetti re-entered the computer industry, 
and could subsequently be considered a "national champion" in computers; together 
with Fiat and IRI (including SGS), Olivetti was one of the main beneficiaries of Italy's 
Applied Research Fund over the period 1970-1987 (Malerba, 1993:253). In the 
semiconductor industry, the majority of the government's financial support was 
channelled to SGS-ATES. SGS-ATES was formed in 1972 when the government- 
owned STET merged its semiconductor operations (ATES) with those of SGS.
In the Netherlands, Philips constituted the de facto national champion, and 
benefitted from firm-specific IT projects sponsored by the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs (EZ sources; Communication 19; 1994). Beyond some random activities 
organized independently by the various ministries, however, the Dutch government did 
not adopt a comprehensive IT policy until 1984 (EZ, 1993:4; Communication 
19;1994).
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During the late 1960s and the 1970s, the European national governments thus
largely opted for national solutions - attempting to solidify and strengthen the positions
of their respective national champions. To the extent that the national governments
supported European actions, whether at the cross-national or the Community level,
these were largely ineffective, as the following two examples illustrate (Sharp and
Shearman, 1987:38; Swann, 1992:308-310).
In 1972, Unidata was formed, a joint venture between Philips, CII and
Siemens3. Unidata, a cross-national initiative, sought to contest IBM's lead through the
joint development and manufacture of a complete range of mainframe, mini and
microcomputers. However, from its very conception, the venture proved to be troubled
by widely diverging corporate interests, resulting in extremely slow decision-making,
inefficiencies in management and organization, and increasing mutual distrust. These
problems were aggravated when, in 1974, it transpired that, despite substantial
government support, Unidata could only survive if the constituent partners would inject
large funds into the venture. When the French government subsequently decided to
merge CD with the partly American-owned Honeywell-Bull, the joint venture rapidly
fell apart. According to Sandholtz (1992:97):
Siemens and Philips declared that CQ-HB was no longer welcome in Unidata. 
CII-HB would be a trojan horse, carrying an American company (Honeywell) 
straight into the centre of Europe's supposed champion. After all, Unidata was 
to be the European answer to American domination of the computer industry.
In 1974, when the hopes for the success of Unidata were still riding high, the
Commission successfully managed to push through a Council Resolution advocating
the establishment of a computer policy at the Community level (Sharp, 1993:203).
While earlier Commission initiatives to promote high-technology industries had
stranded on the lack of consensus amongst the EC Member States, this Resolution was
adopted through a unanimous decision of the Council of Ministers, on the grounds that
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"the importance of dataprocessing for all aspects of modem society" and the 
"unbalanced" structure of the world computer industry justified an EC-wide approach 
to support this industry (OJ C86, 1974).
The Council Resolution, however, was never fully implemented. Although a 
number of small and isolated Commission projects resulted from it (OJ L223,1976:11- 
15; 16), the idea to prepare a medium-term, "systematic Community programme to 
promote research, industrial development and applications of dataprocessing", aimed 
at ensuring a "fully viable and competitive European-based industry" by 1980, never 
got off the ground (OJ C86, 1974). The Member States' diverging interests and 
squabbles about funding hampered a speedy policy-formulation and decision-making. 
Moreover, the companies' criticisms about their lack of involvement in the formulation 
of the programme and their unwillingness to cooperate in joint projects, especially after 
the failure of Unidata, rendered a common policy unviable (Lauber, 1986:38-40; 
Sandholtz, 1992:98; Sharp, 1993:203; Sharp and Shearman, 1987:46-47).
Only towards the end of the 1970s did the Member State governments and the 
national computer and semiconductor firms become more receptive to the idea of a 
common policy, as advocated by the European Commission. Four conditions have 
played a crucial role in altering the attitudes of both business as well as national 
governments: (1) the increasing competitive pressures on the European IT industry; (2) 
the perceived strategic importance of a European presence in IT; (3) the shortcomings 
of national solutions to the European IT industry's competitiveness problem; and (4) 
the prospects that a European solution offered.
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3.1.1 THE PROBLEM: THE DECLINING COMPETITIVENESS OF A 
STRATEGIC INDUSTRY
By the late 1970s, the European-owned IT companies had come under 
increasing competitive pressure both in the world market as well as in their home 
market, the European market. Over the period 1964 to 1980, the European share in the 
world semiconductor market declined from approximately 17 to 10 per cent. Over the 
same period, the European share in the world computer market fell from approximately 
24 to 10 per cent. In 1980, Europe’s trade balance in semiconductors and computers 
was negative and declining. Import penetration alone amounted to approximately 50 
per cent of European semiconductor consumption and nearly 30 per cent of European 
computer consumption (see Chapter 5).
The competitive pressures, moreover, did not only come from the established 
American companies but, increasingly, also from Japanese competitors - companies 
that in the early post-war period had been trailing the European companies. Supported 
by their government through, for example, the VLSI programme, the Japanese 
producers rapidly improved their position in the world semiconductor markets; their 
share increased from 19 per cent in 1975 to 28 per cent in 1983. In the world computer 
markets, the Japanese competitive threat was not as serious as often portrayed; by 
1984, the Japanese companies still held less than 10 per cent of the market (see 
Chapter 5). European M/S politicians and corporate management, however, feared that 
the technological preeminence in semiconductors of the Japanese vertically integrated 
companies would confer competitive advantages on their downstream operations, such 
as telecommunications, consumer electronics and computers.
Although not a primary stimulus for Community action (House of Lords, 
1985:xvii,35), the announcement of the Japanese Fifth Generation Computer Project
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in 1981 did set a credible threat; it was felt that the scope of this and other R&D 
programmes4 and the scale of the funding involved would propel the Japanese 
forwards, and increase their technological and competitive advantage over European 
producers even further. Similarly, the American Very High Speed Integrated Circuit 
(VHSIC) Programme (1980), its Strategic Computing Initiative (SCI) (1983) and, at 
a later stage, the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) (1985), were perceived as further 
widening Europe's technological gap in electronics in general and IT in particular (see 
Figure 3.1)5.
This increasing lack of international competitiveness of the European-owned 
IT companies was perceived as a major problem - not only by the companies in 
question, but also by their national governments, as IT was perceived as a strategic 
technology. Aside from the importance of information technology for military 
purposes, this technology was perceived as the key to future corporate competitiveness; 
as an input into almost any sector of the economy, information technology was 
perceived as extending "beyond its own particular industry and its relative weight 
within the economy" (CEC, 1986:15), affecting a wide range of industries (CEC, 
1986:15; CEC, P-40:20 May 1983; Sharp, 1990:57). Staying at the cutting edge of 
information technology was thus not only vital for the competitiveness and profitability 
of the IT companies in question, but also for the competitiveness and wealth of the 
nation as a whole.
Consequently, the European-owned IT companies and their national 
governments felt that they could not afford to let their future be decided by foreign 
suppliers of information technology. It was believed that "whoever possesses 
[information technology] also dominates the other industries, because [IT], as 
component or ingredient, makes possible the development of new classes of products 
and processes that could not otherwise be developed" (CEC, 1986:15). An indigenous
Figure 3.1 Europe's Relative Technological Disadvantage in 
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IT  production capability was perceived a necessary prerequisite.
At the corporate level, the wish to control their profitability, growth and 
prosperity was translated into the need to develop and maintain an in-house capability 
in IT in general, and semiconductors in particular. The vertically integrated companies 
Philips, Siemens, and Thomson regarded the latter as vital "building blocks" for their 
downstream applications, such as computers. At the national level, the wish to control 
their economic future and, consequently, their political autonomy and security, made 
a nationally-controlled production capability in information technology imperative. 
Even the Thatcher government, with its anti-interventionist policy stance, continued 
supporting Inmos over the late 1970s and early 1980s (Sandholtz, 1992:83; 146-159).
The government's arguments concerning the necessity of an indigenous IT 
production capability and the companies' arguments regarding an in-house capability 
of semiconductors, can be grouped into two categories: (1) the benefits derived from 
producing IT; and (2) the dangers of dependency on foreign suppliers.
The Benefits Intrinsic to Producing IT
In the early 1980s, it was believed that the mere production of IT products, and 
memory ICs in particular, would bring benefits; the manufacturing experience would 
yield certain skills and knowledge that would help the manufacturer gain a competitive 
advantage in other, more advanced semiconductor and IT segments. DRAMs, in 
particular, were perceived as technology drivers (see Chapter 5). As a French 
government official commented with respect to semiconductors:
You cannot just import chips and use them. In order to be able to use chips
properly, you have to have a [production] capability (Interview 18; 1993).
89
The Dangers o f Dependency on Foreign Suppliers
Additionally, an indigenous/in-house capability, particularly in semiconductors, 
could overcome the following disadvantages associated with a dependency on foreign 
suppliers, and ease security of supply concerns. First, a foreign supplier or group of 
suppliers might obtain a dominant position in the world market and exert their 
monopoly power - not an unfounded fear, as was illustrated by the Japanese DRAM 
chip producers' cartel-like behaviour in the mid-1980s (Flamm, 1990:257-260).
Second, the companies' supply lines might be cut off and/or their deliveries 
substantially delayed if either foreign commercial or national security interests would 
be at stake - the alleged delays in the supply of Japanese liquid crystal display (LCD) 
production equipment in the early 1990s or the American government's refusal to grant 
IT export licenses being a case in point (Government, EP and IT company sources, 
Interviews 15,18,19,21,31,33;1993).
Third, the competitiveness of the companies' downstream applications, and the 
improvements therein, could be thwarted by the quality /cost ratios of the IT inputs 
provided, notably if these IT inputs constitute an important part of the value of the 
downstream product6. Considering the extensive synergies existing between IT inputs, 
especially semiconductors, and their applications (Dosi, 1983:223; Government and IT 
company sources, Interviews 18,29; 1993), it has been perceived as essential to get 
access to inputs at the cutting edge of technology. Dependency on foreign suppliers, 
however, would limit the companies' control over the quality/cost ratios of their inputs 
and any improvements therein. Moreover, the companies' specifications as to the type 
of IT input wanted might reveal their trading secrets and lead to an unwanted transfer 
of technology to the foreign producer. In particular, this has been seen as a problem 
if the foreign producer is vertically integrated and competes with the companies in 
question in downstream areas (Government and EP sources, Interviews 18,21; 1993).
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Fourth, the dependency on foreign IT products could undermine the companies' 
ability to obtain military contracts - a particularly important issue for firms that derive 
a substantial share of their turnover from supplying the military, such as Thomson-CSF 
(van Tulder and Junne, 1988:36).
3.1.2 THE FAILURE OF NATIONAL IT POLICIES AND THE PROSPECTS OF
A EUROPEAN SOLUTION
The competitive pressures undermining the European IT industry alerted the 
national governments to the fact that further action should be taken to strengthen the 
industry's competitiveness. By then, however, the shortcomings of a national solution 
to the European IT industry's competitiveness problems had become apparent (Keohane 
and Hoffmann, 1990:285; Swann, 1992:310-11; van Tulder and Junne, 1988:210-212).
Not only had the national policies of preferential government procurement, 
R&D support and industrial restructuring failed to improve the international 
competitiveness of the home companies (see Chapter 5); they also had fragmented the 
European market. It was estimated that any company needed to have a share of 8 per 
cent of the world digital market in order to break even. However, even the largest 
national market within the Community, the German market, only accounted for 6 per 
cent of world consumption - too small to break even (IT company sources, Interview 
16;1993).
Furthermore, the national governments' reluctance to fund cross-border projects 
had not created any real incentive for European, cross-border collaboration (House of 
Lords, 1985:169). Rather, as became apparent from projects like Unidata, the national 
policies appeared to have strengthened the animosity of the national champions vis-a- 
vis each other. Over the 1970s, the companies had been staunched competitors, which
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preferred non-European firms as their cooperative partners over European ones. 
Although alliances with non-European firms were perceived as holding benefits for 
those involved, it was clear, however, to both the national governments as well as the 
companies in question that the associated dependency on foreign companies rendered 
them inadequate as long-term solutions (Europe, 8/9 November 1982:12).
The need to improve the competitiveness of the European IT industry and the 
failure of the national policies to do so, made the national governments and the 
European-owned companies receptive to alternative solutions; "new ways had to be 
found to redress the balance" (IRDAC sources, Interview 13; 1993). It was felt, albeit 
initially hesitantly, that a policy at the European level (whether at the EC or at the 
cross-national level) might provide a solution to the IT industry's competitiveness 
problems; only an unfragmented European market would allow companies to yield the 
economies of scale in production, R&D and distribution that the American and 
Japanese competitors enjoyed. Only a combined effort amongst the national companies
a
would yield the necessary human and financial capital to regain international 
competitiveness. As Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Germany's former foreign minister, 
argued:
No [European] country can on its own keep up with developments in high 
technology in the United States and Japan. Only the European democracies in 
their entirety have the researchers and the engineers, the wealth of companies 
both large and small, the capital and above all, the market to be competitive 
in the new technologies (in Smith, 1986:219).
3.2 A EUROPEAN SOLUTION
Over the 1980s, the European Community adopted a three-way approach to the 
competitiveness problems of the European IT industry. First, in the early 1980s, the 
Community and its Member States introduced government-supported, collaborative IT
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research and technological development (R&TD) programmes, at the national, cross­
national and European Community level. These programmes would allow the IT 
companies to share the costs of R&D in a selected number of innovation areas. 
Second, in the mid-1980s, the EC adopted a programme to overcome the fragmentation 
of the European market. This liberalization programme was not specifically targeted 
at the European-owned IT companies, but would benefit these companies, as it sought 
to create a homogeneous European "home market" (Hayen, 1990:52). Third, over the 
1980s, the EC intensified its trade policy, notably through the initiation of anti­
dumping proceedings which would protect Community producers against unfair 
competition from foreign producers. Although most anti-dumping cases targeted 
consumer electronics products, in the late 1980s, the EC initiated two cases, later 
followed by a third, which affected the European-owned semiconductor producing and 
using companies.
The following section will shortly discuss these three approaches and outline, 
under the heading "corporate diplomacy", the policy preferences of the companies and 
the main channels through which they voiced these preferences.
3.2.1 COLLABORATIVE R&TD PROGRAMMES
In the early 1980s, the European Community adopted the European Strategic 
Programme for Research and Development in Information Technology (ESPRIT). This 
programme, which went into force in 1984 after a pilot phase (1983), sought to give 
a technology-push to the European-owned IT industry; through stimulating industrial 
cooperation in precompetitive research, ESPRIT sought to provide the European IT 
industry with the basic technologies and standards necessary to meet future competitive 
requirements7.
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The first phase of ESPRIT was adopted on the basis of Article 235 (EEC 
Treaty (58)), which allows the Council to take the appropriate measures in areas where 
the Treaty has not provided the necessary powers thereto8 (OJ L67, 1984). In 1987, 
however, the Community's efforts in this area were given a legal basis. The Single 
European Act formalized the establishment of multiannual R&TD Framework 
Programmes at the EC level (EEC Treaty (87): Title VI; OJ C208 (1983); L302 
(1987); LI 17 (1990); LI26 (1994)), which define the Community's strategy in the field 
of research and development and form the basis for specific programmes, like the 
second and third phase of ESPRIT (OJ LI 18, 1988; OJ L218, 1991).
In the context of ESPRIT, the European Community financed 50 per cent of 
R&TD projects involving industrial partners, and, in exceptional circumstances, up to 
100 per cent of R&TD projects involving academic institutions. The projects had to 
include participants from at least two different Member States. The participants, 
however, did not have to be European-owned; formally, ESPRIT was open to 
participation of foreign-owned firms, provided that these firms had been established 
in the Community for several years and had been carrying out R&D in information 
technology within the borders of the EC. The de facto number of foreign companies 
that participated in ESPRIT, however, remained limited. When admitted, these 
companies generally remained outside the "inner circle" of European-owned IT 
companies, which worked closely with the Commission on the programme's 
implementation (De Jonquieres, 20 July 1990). Moreover, they remained at the 
periphery of ESPRIT networking (Mytelka, 1990:14-18; 1991:199-205).
While the actual projects were proposed by the participants upon invitation of 
the Commission, the EC was responsible for outlining the general areas of research, 
approving the projects, and allocating the funds. ESPRIT, in other words, could be 
seen as a top-down, Commission-administered programme. The first phase of ESPRIT
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(1984-1988), worth ECU 1.5 bn in total, targeted mainly precompetitive research 
projects in advanced microelectronics, software technology, advanced data processing, 
office information, computer assisted manufacturing, and infrastructure actions. In the 
second phase (1989-1993), worth ECU 3.2 bn in total, ESPRIT targeted 
microelectronics, which included a shift in emphasis away from memory chips to 
ASICs; peripheral technologies; information processing systems; and IT application 
technologies. When ESPRIT II funds were exhausted by the end of 1990, the Council 
adopted a third phase, worth ECU 1.35 bn for the period 1990-1994. ESPRIT ID 
targeted microelectronics, information processing systems and software, advanced 
business and home systems, computer integrated manufacturing and engineering, and 
basic research (see Figure 3.2).
Over the 1980s, ESPRIT's emphasis shifted away from precompetitive research 
towards more application-specific projects (see Figure 3.2), mainly in response to 
criticisms that ESPRIT 1 did not sufficiently contribute to increases in competitiveness 
of the participants - a move increasing the interventionist nature of the programme. In 
1993, ESPRIT issued its last call for proposals.
Corporate Diplomacy
The adoption of ESPRIT was strongly supported by the European-owned IT 
multinationals and their forum, the European Information Technology Industry 
Roundtable (IT Roundtable) (see Chapter 1). The IT Roundtable was formed over the 
course of 1980, when Etienne Davignon, then Commissioner for industry, invited the 
twelve largest European electronics companies for roundtable discussions to provide 
the Commission with policy-input (Mytelka, 1990:10; 1991:185; Sharp, 1993:206; 
Davignon in House of Lords (1985:174; also: 19,35,83).
Initially the companies found it difficult to harmonize their views on what
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approach had to be adopted to improve the competitiveness of their industry (van 
Tulder and Junne, 1988:213). In contrast to what Sandholtz (1992:142) claims, this 
thesis argues that, initially, the European-owned companies were not very receptive to 
the idea of intra-European collaboration. Although Sandholtz is right in arguing that 
the technological changes taking place had motivated the companies to seek inter-firm 
alliances with foreign companies, collaborating with one's closest competitor was 
considered out of question. According to one account, Philips suggested in the early 
1980s stronger cooperative links with its European counterparts, on the grounds that 
only inter-firm cooperation could help the European companies survive the impending 
shakeout which was looming over an industry characterized by too many small players. 
The response of other European IT companies, however, was negative. Allegedly, 
Philips was told:
You are operating in a small home market, and even that market you share 
with Siemens and Ericsson, despite the fact that you are the national champion. 
If there will be a shakeout, you will go bust before we do. The Dutch market 
will then fall into our hands and we will be able to increase our economies of 
scale (Interview; 1993).
By 1982, however, the companies had learned to act according to an informal 
code of conduct, which allowed them to lobby in unison for collaborative actions at 
the European Community level. Moreover, they had become willing to dispatch their 
own people, without compensation, to the Community for policy drafting purposes 
(Pannenborg, 1986:25; van Tulder and Junne, 1988:213; IT company sources, Interview 
16;1993; J.M. Watson, Technical Director ICL in House of Lords, 1985:57,63,68). By 
that time, however, there was still no united view of the strategic priorities as signalled 
by the larger number of areas covered by ESPRIT 1 in comparison to ESPRIT 2. 
Neither did the companies wish to cooperate in areas that constituted an integral part 
of their business strategies - not surprisingly, as participation in ESPRIT required that, 
under certain conditions, the contractors share information and research results and
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grant patents and licenses to other participants (CEC/ERB:8; see also Chapter 9).
National and Cross-National IT  R&TD Programmes
As an EC programme, ESPRIT signalled a move away from the national 
champion policies of the 1970s; for the first time, the EC Member States opted for a 
"common" rather than a national approach. However, the competitiveness of the 
European IT industry was obviously too important to be left to the Community alone; 
the actions at the EC level complemented, rather than replaced national policies. The 
Member States continued to promote their respective IT industries through preferential 
government procurement and IT research support (see Table 3.2). Furthermore, the 
ESPRIT did not replace cross-national collaborative projects. As Table 3.2 shows, the 
national governments financially participated in various cross-national efforts, of which 
the Joint European Submicron Silicon Initiative (JESSI) has been by far the most 
important.
JESSI was formally launched in 1989 within the framework of EUREKA. 
Launched as a response to Reagan's SDI, EUREKA, a cross-national initiative 
involving both EC and other European countries, has been seeking to promote 
advanced technologies9. JESSI has been seeking to strengthen Europe's technological 
capabilities across the electronics foodchain10 over a period of 8 years. Initially, it 
was focused on mainstream memories - an orientation thwarted by Philips' withdrawal 
from a key JESSI mainstream memory project in 1990 and Siemens's DRAM alliances 
with Toshiba and IBM (see Chapters 4,5). Over the early 1990s, the programme has 
been refocused towards ASICs - an orientation which appears to work better (DG 3 
sources, Interview 3; 1993).
JESSI's founding members, i.e. those companies and institutions which signed 
the JESSI Frame Agreement include SGS-Thomson, Siemens, Philips, Olivetti and
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Table 3.2
MAIN NATIONAL IT PROGRAMMES, 1980s
France
Filiere Electronique, 1982-87 
Budget: FF 70 bn
National Programme in Electronics, 
basic research, 1987 -
JESSI, 1989-96 (EUREKA project)
Germany
Microelectronics Program, 1979-early 
1980s. VLSI: DM 125 mn, 1979-81
Megabit Project, 1984-89 
Government contribution: DM 300 mn
Informationstechnik, 1984-88 
Budget: DM 3 bn
BMFT support for IT R&D projects, 
late 1980s -. Budget 1992: DM 673 mn
BMFT institutional promotion of public 
research institutions, late 1980s -. 
Budget 1992: DM 437 mn
JESSI, 1989-96 (EUREKA project)
The Netherlands
Megabit Project, 1984-89.
Government Contribution: /  200 mn
Informatica Stimulerings Plan, 1984-88. 
Budget: f  1.7 bn (incl. Megabit)
IC Technology Innovation Oriented 
Programme, 1985-92. Budget: f  27 mn.
SPIN (Stimulation Project Team for IT 
Research) projects, completed in 1989.
UK
t
Support for Innovation Programme. 
Budget 83-86: £ 304.1 mn
Alvey, 1983-89. Budget: £ 350 mn of 
which £ 200 mn by government
MISP n, 1984-90. Budget: £ 120 mn
JF1T National Programme, initiated in 
1988. Budget for 1992: £ 85 mn
JESSI, 1989-96 (EUREKA project)
Italy
Electronics Plan, 1978-81 
Budget: L 130 bn
Technological Innovation Fund, set up 
in 1982. Budget: L 2314 bn
Microelectronics R&D Programme, 
1984-88. Budget: > $ 100 mn
Targeted Projects and National 
Research Programmes in IT. F.i.: 
Microelectronics National Programme, 
L 104.35 bn (1990)
JESSI, 1989-96 (EUREKA project)
The Netherlands
National Programme Information 
Technology, late 1980s. Budget 1989: 
f  105.5 mn/1990: f  81.5 mn. 1989-91: 
no R&D. 1992: reintroduction R&D 
(Micro-Electronica Stimulering, incl. 
JESSI, /  112 mn; PBTS-IT, f  17 mn)
JESSI, 1989-96 (EUREKA project)
Sources: see Table 3.1
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Bull. ICL, albeit not one of the founding members, has been participating in JESSI 
projects. The ECU 3.8 bn programme has been financed by the participating companies 
(50%), the national governments, and the EC. In 1989, the M/S governments and the 
EC had agreed to contribute 25 per cent of the costs each; over the period 1990-1992, 
however, the Commission only contributed 11 per cent, while the national governments 
accounted for 39 per cent (see Figure 3.3). Despite EC funding, however, it has 
remained a cross-national collaborative effort, which adheres to the rules of EUREKA 
rather than to those of the EC’s collaborative R&TD programmes.
In contrast to ESPRIT, EUREKA is considered to be a decentralized, bottom-up 
programme. There is no central organization outlining the main research priorities or 
allocating the funding. Neither are there centrally-set regulations ruling the 
participation and cooperation. It is up to the participants to initiate the projects and to 
decide how, on what conditions, and with whom to cooperate - a principle which 
allowed the continental European IT firms to review ICL's participation in JESSI when 
it was taken over by Fujitsu and to readmit it to only two of the five projects in which 
it had been participating (DTI sources, Interview 12;1993; see Chapter 4). Moreover, 
EUREKA projects are not confined to precompetitive R&D. Finally, the national 
governments exercise a tighter direct control over EUREKA projects and only 
subsidize that share of the project accounted for by their own national companies11.
3.2.2 SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET PROGRAMME
At the Milan summit in 1985, the European Council endorsed the Cockfield 
Report on the completion of the Internal Market. This report identified nearly 300 
measures aimed at eliminating the remaining non-tariff barriers to the free movement 
of goods, services, labour and capital within the Community. The elimination of these
Figure 3.3 JESSI Budget by Contributing Partners
1990-1992 
Total: US $ 1 bn
European
Germany
35.0%
Industrial Partners
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Source: Electronics, 11 January 1993:12
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barriers would create a level playing field for business across the Community. The 
EC's commitment to complete its common market by 31 December 1992 was 
formalized by the Single European Act, which went into force in 1987 (EEC Treaty 
(87): Art.8a).
Corporate Diplomacy
The completion of the Single European Market was strongly advocated by the 
largest European multinationals and their forum, the European Round Table of 
Industrialists (ERT) (Sandholtz and Zysman, 1990:116-117; van Tulder and Junne, 
1988:214-215). The ERT's membership base included a core of IT producers, namely: 
Philips, Siemens, Olivetti, Plessey12 and Thomson. Philips, in particular, was a 
driving force behind the European business community's "Euro-lobby" - not 
surprisingly considering the fact that Philips' operations were hampered to a far greater 
degree by the size of its home market than, for example, Siemens' and Thomson's 
operations.
According to Drs. G.J.J.M. Hayen, Deputy Director Corporate External 
Relations of Philips, the company developed its pro-European integration policy around 
1980 (Hayen, 1990:53). In contrast to Moravcsik (1991:65) who argues that 
"transnational business lobbies got involved late" on the basis of the fact that "by the 
time Dekker delivered his oft-quoted speeches, nearly a year had passed since the 
beginning of the path-breaking French presidency [1984]", Philips communicated its 
views to national and European politicians and competitors far before Wisse Dekker, 
then President of Philips, presented Philips' "Europe 1990" plan (1985). Philips' initial 
ideas were presented through various channels, including: the "Europa"-working group 
set up in the context of the 1981 Dutch Presidency; meetings with Dutch and European 
MPs; and speeches and lectures. Philips only prepared its action plan "Europe 1990:
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An Agenda for Action", when the plans for European market integration did not
progress as smoothly as was hoped for (Hayen, 1990:55).
From Hayen's account, one could draw the conclusion that it was Philips' initial
lobbying activity that helped mobilizing transnational support for the completion of the
Single European Market;
Our public call for European integration and cooperation did not only draw a 
response from the European Movement, the Groupe de Talloires and the like, 
but also from EEC-Commissioner Davignon and other captains of industry in 
Europe. In those circles, the initiative was bom to establish the Round Table 
of European Industrialists (ERT) which could serve as initiator and/or 
soundingboard for European projects (Hayen, 1990:54).
Allegedly, Davignon suggested that "if the companies would form a platform, he
would not have to contact UNICE and other lobby groups. He would then tune his
policies to the companies and he would know that, in any case, he could count on the
support of strong, influential companies in each Member State" (IT company sources,
Interview 16; 1993).
Single European Market-Related Policies
Pursuant to the implementation of the SEM programme, the EC also stepped 
up its efforts in three closely related policy areas: standardization, trade and 
competition.
Standardization. In order to ensure an efficiently functioning common market, 
the Community felt it necessary to increase its standardization activities. Beyond the 
standard-setting promoted within the context of ESPRIT, the EC adopted in 1985 a 
new approach towards standardization, laying down the essential requirements 
concerning health and safety in EC legislations and delegating the actual technical 
harmonization to the European standardization bodies CEN, CENELEC and ETSI 
(Council Resolution of 7 May 1985). Over the period 1985 to 1990, the total number
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of European standards subsequently increased from less than 200 to over 1300 (Swann, 
1992:155; CENELEC Annual Report 1992; CEN information brochure). The European- 
owned IT companies have played a substantial role in this standardization process, via 
their participation in technical committees within the national and«European 
standardization bodies as well as their direct membership of the Standards Promotion 
and Application Group (SPAG), the European Computer Manufacturers Association 
(ECMA) and the European Workshop for Open Systems (EWOS) (van Walsum- 
Stachowicz, 1994; Chapter 7).
In December 1986, the Council adopted a decision stating that the M/S 
governments, who have been accounting for approximately 20 per cent of Community 
IT spending, should base their large public procurement orders for information 
technology on international and/or European IT standards (OJ L36, 1987; Rosario and 
Schmidt, 1991:192). As will be outlined in Chapter 5, this insistence on non- 
proprietary standards in public procurement has had major implications for IT 
companies in general and the European-owned IT companies in particular, as it helped 
opening up national procurement markets - the national champions' captive markets 
(COM(90)556:13) - to foreign competition.
Trade. Additionally, the Community felt it necessary to abolish the remaining 
national quotas13. Such national barriers had become incompatible with the EC's 
common market objective (Kelly et al., 1992:24). As Chapter 9 will show, the EC's 
abolishment of these national quotas or their translation into EC-wide quotas that will 
be phased out after a transition period (Barber, 9 February 1994:6), has had 
implications for the options available to national governments to support their 
respective home companies.
Competition. The Community began to enforce a stricter competition policy 
(EEC Treaty (58),(87): Art.85-94). Mergers and acquisitions of a "European
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dimension"14, national incentives to attract companies, and state aids in particular, 
became subject to increasing Commission scrutiny15. As Chapter 9 will show, the 
Commission's stricter attitude towards state aids, has had major implications for the 
state-owned European IT companies in general, and Bull in particular.
3.2.3 EC TRADE POLICIES
Over the 1980s, the European IT industry was protected against cheap computer 
and semiconductor imports through the Common Customs Tariff (CCT). The 
European-located semiconductor companies were by far the largest beneficiaries of the 
protection provided by the CCT. In the period prior to 1986, imported semiconductor 
devices were subject to a 17 per cent duty (Most Favoured Nation rate) and after 1986 
to a 14 per cent duty. Wafers, not yet cut into chips, were subject to a 9 per cent duty 
during the whole decade (see Table 3.3).
In January 1986, the tariffs on semiconductors were reduced to compensate 
Japan for the harm caused by the EC's decision to increase EC tariffs on VCRs from 
8 to 14 per cent (Kostecki 1989:24). Despite this reduction, the tariff rate remained 
high, not only relative to tariffs on other IT products, but also in comparison with the 
American and Japanese rates - particularly after 1986, when the American and 
Japanese governments reduced their tariffs on semiconductor imports to zero (Kostecki, 
1989:22). Computer imports, in contrast, were subject to relatively low tariffs, which 
gradually declined over the 1980s (see Table 3.3). According to Kostecki (1989:22), 
the Community's simple average tariff rate on automatic dataprocessing imports over 
the period 1984 to 1987 amounted to 2.5 per cent while the American and Japanese 
rates totalled 4.7 and 10.6 per cent respectively. The European-located computer 
producers thus not only received little protection, but also bore the burden of the high
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Table 3.3
EC MOST FAVOURED NATION TARIFF RATES ON SEMICONDUCTORS AND 
COMPUTERS, 1980-1993
SEMICONDUCTORS
D is p e r s io n  Wafers D ev ice s
COMPUTERS
D is p e r s io n
1980 6 .3 — 17 . 0 9 . 0 17 . 0 0 _ 6 . 7
1981 6 .0 - 17. 0 9 . 0 17 . 0 0 - 6. 5
1982 5 .8 - 17 . 0 9 . 0 17 . 0 0 - 6 . 2
1983 5 .6 - 17. 0 9 . 0 17 . 0 0 - 6 . 0
1984 5 .3 - 17 . 0 9 . 0 17 . 0 0 - 5 . 7
1985 5 .1 - 17. 0 9 . 0 17 . 0 0 - 5 . 4
1986 4 . 6 - 17. 2 9 . 0 17 . 0 0 - 4 . 9
1987 4 . 6 - 15. 0 9 . 0 14 . 0 0 - 4 . 9
1988 4 .6 - 14 . 0 9 . 0 14 . 0 0 - 4 . 9
1989 4 .6 - 14 . 0 9 . 0 14 . 0 0 - 4 . 9
1990 4 . 6 - 14 . 0 9 . 0 14 . 0 0 - 4 . 9
1991 4 . 6 - 14. 0 9 . 0 14 . 0 0 - 4 . 9
1992 4 . 6 - 14 . 0 9 . 0 14 . 0 0 - 4 . 9
1993 4 . 6 — 14. 0 9 . 0 14 . 0 0 — 4 . 9
Sources: Sem iconductors NIMEXE 85.21  (1 9 8 0 -8 7 ), CN 8541 and 8542 (1988-  
1993); Computers NIMEXE 8 4 .5 3  (1 9 8 0 -8 7 ), CN 8471 (1 9 8 8 -9 3 ). OJ L342, 
1979; OJ L315, 1980; OJ L335, 1981; OJ L318, 1982; OJ L313, 1983; OJ 
L320, 1984; OJ L331, 1985; OJ L345, 1986; OJ L256, 1987; OJ L298, 1988; 
OJ L282, 1989; OJ L247, 1990; OJ L259, 1991; OJ L267, 1992.
Notes
Dispersion Lowest and highest tariff levels in the relevant 
NIMEXE and CN categories
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semiconductor tariffs.
The protection provided by the CCT, however, was not considered sufficient 
to counter unfair trading practices, notably by Japanese electronics producers. In 1987, 
a maximum of nine anti-dumping cases were initiated against Japanese electronics 
producers (CEC 6th Anti-Dumping Report, COM(89)106). In that year, the EC 
initiated, amongst others, anti-dumping proceedings against Japanese exporters of 
Dynamic Random Access Memories (DRAMs) and Erasable Programmable Read Only 
Memories (EPROMs) (OJ C181, 1987; OJ C101, 1987). In 1991, a third case was 
initiated against Korean exporters of DRAMs (OJ C57, 1991). The anti-dumping 
complaints were filed by the European Electronic Component Manufacturers’ 
Association (EECA) on behalf of practically all actual or potential Community 
producers of the semiconductors in question. In the 1987 DRAM case, these 
constituted Motorola (US), Siemens (G), SGS (I), and Thomson (F). Although Philips 
was not a DRAM producer, it allegedly supported the procedure (IT company sources, 
Interview). In the EPROM case, the complainant companies SGS and Thomson were 
perceived as constituting "practically all actual or potential Community producers". In 
the 1991 DRAM case, EECA acted on behalf of Siemens and Motorola (OJ L20, 1990; 
OJ L65, 1991; OJ L272, 1992).
In all three investigations, the Commission found that the Japanese and Korean 
exporters had dumped their semiconductors - the origin of which had been determined 
on the basis of the EC’s rules of origin (OJ LI48, 1968; OJ L363, 1987; OJ L33, 1989) 
- in the European market, causing injury to the Community industry as represented by 
EECA. In respectively 1990 and 1991, the Commission accepted minimum price 
undertakings offered by all known Japanese manufacturers in the 1987 DRAM and 
EPROM cases, which established a floor price for the exported semiconductors for an 
agreed period of time. These minimum prices would provide the Community industry
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with "a safety net against predatory pricing (Europe, 22 June 1989:8). In order to 
ensure the effectiveness of the price agreements, the Commission also imposed 
provisional and, later, definitive anti-dumping duties on "grey market" sales of 
Japanese DRAMs and EPROMs to the Community (OJ LI93, 1990; OJ L292, 1990; 
OJ L65, 1991a,b; OJ L20, 1990). The 1991 DRAM case against Korean exporters was 
concluded over the course of 1992/93 with the imposition of provisional anti-dumping 
duties, the subsequent adherence of the leading three Korean manufacturers to a 
minimum price system, and the imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties on 
remaining Korean exporters (OJ L272, 1992; OJ L66, 1993; Nak-Hieon, 28 
September:3; Barber and Kehoe, 17 March 1993).
Corporate Diplomacy
The 1987 DRAM case was subject to substantial controversy, not only amongst 
the Japanese suppliers charged with dumping, but also amongst the European IT 
companies. In the course of the DRAM case, the European computer companies, 
operating through EUROBIT, argued that the price undertakings and anti-dumping 
duties would further raise the costs of inputs faced by the Community's computer 
companies and, thus, hamper their competitiveness. In line with the analysis of 
Lindblom and others (see Chapter 1), EUROBIT argued that if the EC would indeed 
take such measures, the Community's computer companies would be forced to 
discontinue their investments in the Community, re-locate part of their operations 
abroad, and shed thousands of jobs across the EC. Although EUROBIT expressed its 
support for the need to develop a strong European manufacturing capability in 
integrated circuits, it also found that no punitive measures should be imposed in this 
case, given the protection already afforded to the Community's semiconductor 
producers via the CCT (OJ L20, 1990:23).
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EECA, in contrast, exercised its political weight by pointing at the overriding 
strategic importance of an indigenous DRAM production capability for the overall 
European electronics industry, justifying the introduction of measures which might 
impose a cost on the European-located DRAM users. EECA stressed the importance 
of IT production for accumulating manufacturing skills, which would not only drive 
progress within the semiconductor industry but also across the electronics industry. 
Moreover, EECA emphasised the importance of a European source of DRAMs for the 
competitiveness of DRAM users. In the absence of any European source of DRAMs, 
the European-located users would have to accept both the type of products supplied as 
well as the prices dictated by the Japanese producers, which, due to their vertical 
integration, would be their direct competitors. In the absence of any European source 
of DRAMs, the users would also have to forego the benefits of close cooperative links 
with European semiconductor suppliers (OJ L20:23).
In contrast to the 1987 DRAM case, the EPROM case proceeded relatively 
quietly. Although EUROBIT did express its opposition to the establishment of 
minimum prices for electronic components in general, arguing that it would create 
artificial market conditions, no formal objections by EUROBIT were recorded in the 
EPROM anti-dumping case according to the Commission account of the case outlined 
in OJ L65 (1991:13-14). There may have been a number of reasons for EUROBIT's 
acquiescence. First, EPROMs have been less important to the European computer 
producers than DRAMs; while the European EPROM consumption totalled only S 500 
mn in 1989, DRAM consumption amounted to S 1.6 bn (Skapinker and Kellaway, 12 
September 1990). Second, the Japanese companies have never dominated the European 
EPROM market like they have been dominating the DRAM market; Japanese 
companies have been holding an estimated share of 15 per cent of the European market 
in comparison to 55 per cent for American companies and 30 per cent for European
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companies (1990) (Financial Times, 13 March 1991). Various alternative sources of 
supply have thus been available.
The 1991 Korean DRAM case, however, was again subject of controversy, 
albeit not as vigorous as before. Two user groups, amongst which EUROBIT 
(Communication 17; 1994), expressed their opposition to the imposition of anti­
dumping duties. Their arguments were similar to those outlined by EUROBIT in the 
1987 case; the duties would increase their costs of production, while the Community 
DRAM industry already benefitted from high tariffs and publicly supported R&TD 
projects (OJ L272,1992:23,24).
By accepting the DRAM and EPROM price undertakings and by imposing the 
anti-dumping duties, however, the European Commission made a strategic choice in 
favour of the Community semiconductor industry, irrespective of the validity of 
EUROBIT’s arguments. Albeit aware of the arguments of users, the Commission 
argued that it was of utmost importance to maintain a viable and strong Community 
semiconductor industry, as semiconductors were perceived as the building blocks for 
downstream applications and, thus, for a viable user industry. In the words of one 
corporate executive:
IT is like a tree. Communication and computers are the branches, 
semiconductors the stem, and R&D the roots. If the tree is to survive, you can 
cut off a branch, but you cannot cut down the stem (Interview 16; 1993).
3.3 THE INFLUENCE OF THE IT ROUNDTABLE COMPANIES ON ESPRIT 
IN THE EARLY AND MID-1980S
Although the Community’s IT R&TD programme ESPRIT, the Single European 
Market Programme and the Community's trade policies all affected the operations of 
the European-owned IT companies, it was ESPRIT that constituted the heart of the
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Community's policy response to the plight of its IT industry in the 1980s. In contrast 
to the Single European Market programme, ESPRIT was specifically designed to 
promote the IT industry. In contrast to the short-termist solutions provided by the 
Community's trade policies and, particularly, its anti-dumping cases, ESPRIT formed 
a coherent, longer-term strategy to improve Europe's competitiveness in IT.
The above has outlined that the European-owned IT companies, as represented 
in »the IT Roundtable, supported ESPRIT and lobbied for collaborative actions at the 
EC level. However, were the companies merely involved in the policy-making process 
or did they exert an influence over the development, approval and implementation of 
the programme? Did the IT Roundtable's diplomacy pay off?
3.3.1 POLICY FORMULATION
In late 1979, the Commission produced a document on a "common" IT strategy, 
which eventually, in 1981, led to the adoption of a meagre ECU 40 mn 
Microelectronics Programme, aimed at the development of equipment and computer 
aided design for VLSI (OJ L376, 1981; COM(87)22:l-8; Sandholtz, 1992:161-163; EP 
sources, Interview 20; 1993).
Shortly after this document was presented, Davignon, recognizing that the 
Commission lacked the specialist technical knowledge necessary and that the 
cooperation and commitment of the Community's companies was essential, invited the 
largest European electronics companies for roundtable discussions to provide the 
Commission with policy-inputs (Sharp, 1993:206). During their discussions, over the 
course of 1979/80, the discussions initially focused on the establishment of joint 
production activities. These, however, proved hard to organize from the top-down. 
Moreover, the companies were reluctant to share information. If such projects were to
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occur, they could only occur on a "one-to-one basis as a natural development" (House 
of Lords, 1985:35). The discussions of these companies, later known as the IT 
Roundtable, subsequently focused on joint precompetitive R&TD activities. Not only 
could such activities "be discussed on a total Community basis" (House, of Lords, 
1985:35), also the activities would be compatible with the EC's competition 
legislation16 (IT company sources, Interview 16; 1993).
In late 1981, Davignon invited the companies to draw up a detailed work 
programme for their industry (Sharp, 1993:206; Sandholtz, 1992:164). A Steering 
Committee of Roundtable R&D executives, set up to advise the Commission on the 
broad outlines of an EC IT programme and on projects within that programme, 
established five technical working parties covering separate areas of research. Over 
1982, approximately 100 employees of the twelve largest electronics companies 
cooperated in the context of these technical panels, leading the Commission to 
conclude that the companies "played a leading role so far in assisting the Commission 
in the preparation of the programme" (COM(82)486:7; see also COM(82)287:6; 
Sandholtz, 1992:166; van Tulder and Junne, 1988:214; Fishlock, 12 December 1984; 
IT Roundtable sources, Interview 36, 1993; House of Lords, 1985:36).
In May 1982, the Commission presented its first formal proposal of a larger 
scale, comprehensive R&D programme, which would build on the Microelectronics 
Programme, to the Council of Ministers. In its communication, "Towards a European 
Strategic Programme for Research and Development in Information Technology", the 
Commission explained the nature of ESPRIT and argued in favour of a pilot phase of 
collaborative R&TD projects, which would start in 1983 (COM(82)287:7,10). The pilot 
phase would allow the 12 largest companies to test the waters and let the Commission 
proof its ability to mount a Community-wide programme, without alarming the 
Member States concerning any large financial commitments (COM(82)486:4, Annex
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4; Sharp 1993:207). The Council's positive reaction of 30 June 1982 led to a detailed
preparation of the pilot plan by the Steering Committee and technical panels mentioned
above. In December 1982, the Council allocated ECU 11.5 mn to the pilot phase,
which was launched in February 1983. From September 1983, 38 pilot projects were
initiated. More than 80 per cent of the contracts were allocated to the Big Twelve
(CEC/ISEC/B1/83; CEC/Task Force:21; Sharp, 1993:207; House of Lonis, 1985:xviii).
In May 1983, the Commission proposed the Council to adopt the ten-year
ESPRIT programme (COM(83)258). Endorsed by the European Summit in July 1983
and encouraged by the success of the pilot phase, the first phase of ESPRIT was
adopted in February 1984, after the decision had been held up for four months by the
German and British governments which had made their approval conditional upon the
Community's acceptance of budgetary reforms (House of Lords, 1985:xviii).
The European-owned IT companies, as represented in the IT Roundtable, thus
played an important role in shaping the ESPRIT programme. As one national
government official argued: "In that period, the companies discussed extensively the
contents of ESPRIT with the Commission and I think they have seen many of their
ideas realized" (Interview 39; 1993). This view was confirmed by Mr. D.H. Roberts,
Technical Director of GEC, one of the IT Roundtable companies17:
I find it very difficult, as a member of GEC or any other of the 12 companies, 
to say that we do not think the shape of the programme as defined was sensible 
because we had excellent opportunity to influence it and in many areas I think 
we did [..] it is not a programme dreamt up by Brussels bureaucrats and forced 
on us, it is our programme.
No doubt the large companies, the 12 who constitute the Round Table, had the 
inside track position in the first round [..]. (House of Lords, 1985:36,50).
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3.3.2 POLICY APPROVAL
Not only did the IT Roundtable companies play an important role in developing 
and defining "the entire ESPRIT project with respect to concept, size,’ scope of 
research, management, and legal questions" (Nasko in Langlois et al., 1988:138), also 
they played an important role in getting the proposals for ESPRIT adopted (Peterson, 
1992:244; van Tulder and Junne, 1988:213). On the basis of various interviews with 
Commission officials, Roundtable executives and national officials, Sandholtz 
(1992:173-175) confirms that the IT Roundtable companies "were instrumental in 
selling the programme to the governments". The IT Roundtable companies, mostly 
their home countries' national champions, were able to persuade their governments 
about the benefits of ESPRIT - a programme they considered the fruits of their efforts.
3.3.3 POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
Moreover, the IT Roundtable companies played an important role in ESPRIT's 
implementation for the following four reasons (Sandholtz, 1992:181-182; van Tulder 
and Junne, 1988:214; EP, DTI and IT Roundtable sources, Interviews 1,10,36;1993). 
First, the IT Roundtable companies continued to play a central role in the execution 
of ESPRIT, particularly in drafting the annual work programmes through their 
participation in the ESPRIT Steering Committee and, together with representatives 
from universities, smaller companies and research institutes, in the Industry Technical 
Panels and Workshops (see Figure 3.4). Second, during these drafting stages, the IT 
Roundtable companies maintained, individually and as a group, informal contacts with 
the Commission (Sandholtz, 1992:166,182; DG 13 sources, Interview 6;1993). Third, 
indirectly, their case was presented via the national government officials present in
Figure 3.4 ESPRIT Implementation: Involvement of IT 
Roundtable Companies
Commission (DG 13)
Adopts final draft of annual work programme, agreed with EMC and EAB and sends this to the
Council for approval
Publishes calls for project proposals
Under its auspices, evaluation of projects by independent experts which make recommendations 
to the EMC
Awards contracts to selected parties after consultation with EAB and approval of EMC 
Supervises execution of contracts
Informal Interaction Formal Interaction
National Governments 
Academia and Research Institutes 
Industry via Federations, Professional 
Lobbyists, Associations, or Direct 
Other Societal Interests
ESPRIT Management Committee (EMC) 
ESPRIT Advisory Board (EAB)
ESPRIT Steering Committee (ESC)
ESC EMC EAB
Membership includes IT Roundtable companies
Workprogramme: general outline
Technical Panels and Workshops
Membership: academia, research institutes, 
industry, including IT Roundtable 
Workprogramme: prepare programme in detail
Membership: 
National 
Governments 
Workprogramme: 
gives advice; gives 
consent to final draft 
Selection of projects: 
final approval
Membership: Experts 
from industry and 
academia in personal 
capacity
Workprogramme: 
gives advice; gives 
consent to final draft 
Selection of Projects: 
advice
Sources: House of Lords (1985: xxii, 9, 19, 142); Sandholtz (1992:181-182); CEC (1985); DG 13, DTI and corporate 
sources, Interviews 6,12; 1993 and Communication 29; 1994.
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ESPRJT's Management Committee (EMC) - the Committee which gave final approval 
to the ESPRIT projects selected by the Commission (initially the IT Task Force, set 
up to get around the existing bureaucracies within the Commission, and later DG 13). 
Fourth, representatives of the Roundtable companies were present on the ESPRIT 
Advisory Board (EAB). They were, however, not the only members; in order to 
increase ESPRIT's political acceptability, about 50 per cent of the EAB members came 
from research institutions, universities and SMEs (Sandholtz, 1992:182). Although, 
formally, the representatives were sitting on this advisory body in their personal 
capacity, "this is not always the case. There are tremendous vested interests involved" 
(Government sources, Interview 10; 1993).
Although EC R&TD funding only constitutes an insignificant share in the IT 
Roundtable companies' total R&D budget and the funding has certainly not been the 
main reason for their participation in ESPRIT (Mytelka, 1991:190; BMFT and IT 
company sources, Interviews 15,29,33; 1993), it is interesting to note that the IT 
Roundtable companies were the main beneficiaries of the pilot phase and ESPRIT I. 
In the pilot phase, 70 per cent of the funding was directed at the 12 largest companies. 
In ESPRIT I, these companies participated in 70 per cent of the projects and benefitted 
from 50 per cent of the funding (CEC/ERB, 1989:17; Sandholtz, 1992:171). However, 
over time, even within ESPRIT I, the share of the IT Roundtable companies in total 
funding fell; as Peterson (1992:226) argued: "the lock that the Big 12 [..] had on EC 
funding in the early stages of Framework has loosened over time" (see also CEC/ERB, 
1989:17).
3.3.4 PREPONDERANT INFLUENCE
As follows from the above, the European-owned IT companies, as represented
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in the IT Roundtable, had a virtual monopoly on corporate policy input into the
Commission, particularly in ESPRIT's starting phase. Moreover, on the basis of
interviews with Community and national government officials, corporate executives
and representatives and industry/government observers (Interviews
1,3,4,6,10,11,12,15,19,21,26,30,33,39, 1993; Communication 42, 1994), this thesis
found that, in the early and mid-1980s, the IT Roundtable's involvement had gone
beyond the level of giving policy inputs - a conclusion supported by Langlois et al.
(1988:137-138;143), Mytelka (1990:14), Peterson (1992:232-233), Business Europe, 15
February 1991, House of Lords (1985), Sandholtz and Zysman (1989:113-114), and van
Tulder and Junne (1988:177,196,213-216). The perception exists that, notably in the
pilot and first phase of ESPRIT, the IT Roundtable exerted a preponderant influence
over the shape, approval and implementation of ESPRIT. As one DG 3 official argued:
Yes, the IT Roundtable companies were influential in the case of ESPRIT. The 
IT Roundtable played a determining role in getting the programme politically 
of the ground and in giving further suggestions as to the shape of the 
programme. This was justified at the time. It was conceived as a technology 
push programme. It was natural that the main technology suppliers would be 
the main actors (Interview 26; 1993).
3.4 CONCLUSION
Despite attempts of the European Community to adopt a "common" solution 
to the European IT industry's competitiveness problems, only in the late 1970s the 
national governments and the European-owned IT companies became receptive to the 
idea of policy actions at the EC level. The declining competitiveness of the companies 
in the face of American and Japanese competition and the credible threat posed by the 
American and Japanese governments' programmes in support of their respective 
industries, alarmed European corporate management and national governments alike.
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Their concern was due to the fact that information technology was considered to be 
of strategic importance for the future wealth of both companies and nations, and an 
indigenous IT production capability was perceived as necessary to capture the benefits 
of IT. Towards the end of the 1970s, it became clear that further action should be 
taken to strengthen the industry's competitiveness. By then, however, the shortcomings 
of national solutions to the European IT industry's competitiveness problems, which 
had been prevailing since the mid-1960s, had become apparent. In contrast, policies 
at the European Community level could offer a solution; it was felt that only an 
unfragmented market and the combined resources of the national champions could help 
Europe overcome its competitiveness problem.
Over the 1980s, the Community adopted a three-way approach towards the 
competitiveness problems of the European-owned IT industry: it established common 
R&TD programmes, providing for collaboration between European IT companies; it 
adopted the Single European Market programme, aimed at liberalizing the EC market; 
and it adopted trade policies offering protection to the European-owned IT companies. 
At the heart of the Community's policy response to the plight of its IT industry in the 
1980s, however, was ESPRIT. ESPRIT formed a coherent, longer-term programme, 
specifically designed to promote the IT industry. Notably in the pilot and first phase 
of ESPRIT, the main beneficiaries of the EC subsidized programme were the IT 
Roundtable member companies.
These companies played an important role in the Community's IT policy- 
formulation, decision-making and implementation processes. First, the IT Roundtable 
companies, thereto invited by Commissioner Davignon, played an important role in 
shaping the contents of the ESPRIT programme. Second, the companies were vital in 
convincing the national governments to adopt ESPRIT. Finally, the IT Roundtable 
members were represented on committees affecting the execution of ESPRIT and
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contributed to the implementation of ESPRIT's annual workprogrammes. Overall, it 
was found, on the basis of interviews with Community and national government 
officials, corporate executives and representatives, and industry/government observers, 
that, in the early and mid-1980s, the IT Roundtable did not only have a virtual 
monopoly on corporate policy input into the Commission, but also exerted a 
preponderant influence over the shape, approval and implementation of ESPRIT - 
particularly in ESPRIT's starting phases.
3.5 NOTES
1. The following account relies on: Chesnais (1993: 203-205); Flamm (1987:153- 
167; 1988:134-171); Keck (1993:142-145); Malerba (1985; 1993:251-255); Sandholtz 
(1992:59-94); and van Tulder and Junne (1988:159-162).
2. In 1974, Siemens took over AEG's computer division in a bid approved by the 
German government (van Tulder and Junne, 1988:160).
3. Sources: Flamm (1988:157-159); Metze (1991:79-80); Sandholtz (1992:96-97); 
Sharp (1993:203); and Sharp in Freeman et al. (1991:61).
4. In the early 1980s, the Japanese government also launched the government- 
backed Optical Electronics Integrated Circuits (OEIC) Project and the New Functions 
Elements Project, which provided for research on new types of ICs, such as three- 
dimensional ICs (Langlois et al., 1988:132).
5. Sources: Flamm (1990:260); Langlois et al. (1988: 130-133,144); Lauber 
(1986:37); Ostry (1991:71-72); Sandholtz (1992:113-131); Sharp (1990:53-57).
6. In 1992, the estimated share of electronic components, including 
semiconductors, in the total value of electronic equipment production, including 
computers, was close to 20 per cent (EECA, European Electronic Components Industry 
Report 1992:3). EUROBIT estimates that ICs account for 30 to 60 per cent of the 
manufacturing costs of PCs and workstations, and 60 to 80 per cent of the 
manufacturing costs of processors and memory systems (EUROBIT information 
brochure).
7. The following review has been based on: Andre (1988); CEC/ERB (1989); 
CEC/ESPRIT brochures; European File, 15, 1989; Langlois et al. (1988:137-144); 
Mytelka (1990); (1991:182-210); Sandholtz (1992:4, 143-208); Sharp (1990:57-58), 
(1993:205-209); Sharp in Freeman et al. (1991:63-72).
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8. EEC Treaty, Art. 235 states that: "If action by the Community should prove 
necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common market, one of the 
objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, 
the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after 
consulting the European Parliament take the appropriate measures."
9. Sources: Baum, 4 April 1991; Castle, 1 November 1991; De Jonquieres, 5 April 
1988; Dempsey and Dodsworth, 20 June 1989; Dodsworth, 29 October 1988; 
Economist. 2 February 1989:74; Financial Times. 18 June 1990:6; Gosh, 11 January 
1993:12; JESSI office, Munich, Information Brochures/JessiNews bulletin.
10. I.e. semiconductor materials, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, 
semiconductors and applications.
11. Sources: Andersen (1992:243); Olav Meyer, General Director of the EUREKA 
European Research Program in Business Europe. 21 September 1990:4,5; Mytelka 
(1991:189); Sandholtz (1992:257,258,297); Sharp (1992:23-24; 1991:71-72); Swann 
(1992:317-19).
12. Plessey was not a founding member but joined the ERT shortly after its 
establishment (ERT sources, Communication 42; 1994).
13. See, for instance, GATT (1989:160-170); Kelly et al. (1992:117); and McAleese 
(1990:440).
14. A merger or acquisition will have a European dimension if (1) the total 
worldwide turnover of all participating undertakings is larger than 5 bn ECU; (2) the 
combined EC turnover of each (of at least two) undertakings is larger than 250 mn 
ECU; and (3) each (of at least two) undertakings achieves less than two thirds of its 
turnover in one single Member State (Swann, 1992:141).
15. Sources: Barber, 29 July 1993:2; Brittan, 29 March 1994:17; CEC/Stateaid, 
1990:1-3,1992:1-3; COM(90)556:8; Claveloux, 14 September 1992:3; Dixon, 11 March 
1994:17; Hill, 28 May 1991:2; 9 July 1993:2; OJ C273, 1991:2-17.
16. Sources: EEC Treaty (58):Art.85(3); Commission guidelines 1968 in Curzon 
Price, 1990:175; Sharp (1991:64); Swann (1992:135,319).
17. See also Brian Oakley, former Director of the Alvey Programme; Sir Herbert 
Durkin representing Plessey; Memorandum submitted by ICL in the Minutes of 
Evidence, Select Committee on the European Communities (House of Lords, 
1985:2,18,24,51).
Chapter 4
CORPORATE DIPLOMACY AND EC IT POLICIES
THE IT ROUNDTABLE'S WITHERING INFLUENCE 
IN THE LATE 1980s AND EARLY 1990s
Chapter 3 has outlined that the European-owned IT companies, represented in 
the IT Roundtable, exerted a preponderant political influence on ESPRIT - the EC’s 
only long-term policy initiated in the early 1980s aimed specifically at improving 
Europe's competitiveness in IT. However, did the IT Roundtable's influence last into 
the early 1990s or was it subject to changes over time? On the basis of the continued 
importance of the IT Roundtable companies within the Community's industrial fabric, 
their discretion in deciding whether or not to internationalize their operations, and their 
ability to keep abreast of technological changes (see Chapter 1), one might expect that 
the IT Roundtable would have maintained its influence. Yet the IT Roundtable's 
continued lobbying for measures beyond the scope of the Community's IT policy 
approach of the early 1990s appears to tell a different story.
This chapter, which focuses on the period 1987-1993, discusses the IT 
Roundtable's role in the Community's IT policy-formulation, decision-making and 
implementation processes in that time period, and seeks to establish, on the basis of 
the perceptions of government officials, corporate executives and representatives, and 
industry/government observers, whether or not the IT Roundtable continued to exert 
a dominant influence on the Community's policy outcomes. The chapter starts with 
explaining why the Community felt it necessary to develop a new IT policy approach 
in the early 1990s. After a short discussion of the Community's continued market 
liberalization efforts and its trade policies in sections two and three, the fourth section 
focuses on the Community's new policy response to the plight of its IT industry in the 
early 1990s: the 1991 White Paper.
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4.1 THE NECESSITY OF A NEW EC IT POLICY APPROACH
Despite the Community's efforts, by 1990, the competitive position of the 
European-owned IT companies had not improved. Although the companies had 
managed to sustain their positions in the world market, Europe's trade balance in both 
semiconductors and computers had in fact continued to deteriorate. Import penetration 
alone had increased to 67 per cent of European semiconductor consumption in 1990 
and 37 per cent of European computer production. Moreover, the computer and 
semiconductor operations of most European-owned IT producers had become loss- 
making (see Chapter 5).
In 1990, three events, in particular, shocked IT producers and politicians alike. 
First, in January 1990, Siemens bought the heavily loss-making minicomputer producer 
Nixdorf. The success-story of the 1970s and early 1980s had been on the verge of 
bankruptcy. Second, in May 1990, it became clear that Philips, the Dutch electronics 
giant, would become loss-making. Faced with extremely high losses on its IT 
operations, the company announced in September 1990 its withdrawal from the highly 
prestigious, but also very costly SRAM project - thereby putting not only the future 
existence of JESSI into peril, but also the Dutch and European technological base in 
mainstream memory chips (Skapinker and van de Krol, 5 September 1990). Third, in 
July 1990, Fujitsu's impending acquisition of ICL, Europe's best performing IT 
company, became public (Cane, 20 July 1990; De Jonquieres, 20 July 1990). The 
takeover of ICL in November 1990 would eventually lead, in February 1991, to the 
expulsion of ICL from the IT Roundtable on the grounds that membership of the 
association was reserved for truly European-owned companies and, in March 1991, to 
the exclusion of ICL from three of the five JESSI projects in which it had been 
participating (see Chapter 3; De Jonquieres and Thomson, 5 February 1991; Skapinker,
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27 March 1991:1; Business Europe, 15 February 1991:16; Coghlan, 6 April 1991:9).
This crisis in the European IT industry generated a sense of urgency; immediate
political action needed to be undertaken to stop the European-owned IT industry from
collapsing. As one Commission official described:
[In 1990], it turned out that the IT industry had gotten into a disastrous state. 
It became obvious that a large number of firms were in trouble. Firms, like 
Philips, announced losses and layoffs. Everyone thought it was a disaster. ICL 
had been taken over, Nixdorf was nearly bankrupt, IBM faced reduced profits, 
et cetera. On top of that, there was the microelectronics disaster, which was 
made visible when Philips stepped out of the JESSI project.
Then it became public - the poor state of the industry became known to the 
public. As a consequence, there were motions in the EP, in the press, bringing 
[the state of the industry] to the attention of the people. [Commissioner] 
Pandolfi had to put something on the table (Interview 11;1993).
The crisis developing in the IT industry gave the public the perception that
ESPRIT, the Community's main answer to the IT industry's competitiveness problems,
was not adequate to improve, or even sustain, the competitive position of Europe’s IT
producers; the expected new products, larger market shares and improved corporate
results had failed to materialize (EP, UNICE and IT company sources, Interviews
1,4,8; 1993). As the Economist (6 October 1990:18) commented: "As company profits
slide and firms change hands, those programmes and the philosophies behind them
look increasingly redundant".
ESPRIT, however, should not be considered a failure; it played a central role
in promoting industrial cooperation and standardization efforts amongst European
companies1. As one IT company executive commented: "The programmes brought
corporations together and taught them how to cooperate" (Interview 8; 1993). Rather,
with the benefit of hindsight, one could argue that the expectations of what ESPRIT
could achieve were set too high. ESPRIT did not and, arguably, could not succeed in
improving the overall competitiveness of the European-owned IT companies for the
following five reasons2.
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First, ESPRIT’s focus on R&TD hampered its effectiveness in improving overall 
corporate competitiveness, as R&TD constitutes only one out of the many elements 
necessary to improve the competitiveness of companies (IRDAC sources, Interview 
13; 1993). Second, the amount of Community funding available for ESPRIT constituted 
a negligible part of the total funding necessary for corporate R&D and even these 
limited amounts were spread over a large number of projects (see Chapter 9). Third, 
the precompetitive nature of ESPRIT's R&TD projects thwarted the prospects of 
immediate and tangible commercial results (Dekker Report, 1992:19). Fourth, much 
of the work carried out in the context of ESPRIT was not central to the business 
strategies of the large participants, reducing the incentive to commercialize the research 
findings (Dekker Report, 1992:21-22). Fifth, ESPRIT's top-down approach, resulting 
in a relatively slow process of project approval, limited its ability to rapidly respond 
to changing market conditions (IT company sources, Interview 8; 1993)
Whether justified or not, the mounting criticisms towards the efficacy of 
ESPRIT and the need to respond to the crisis developing in the IT industry prompted 
the European Community to develop a new IT policy approach. This policy approach 
was to form the basis of a series of measures to be implemented in concurrence with 
the EC's ongoing efforts to complete the Single European Market and its continued use 
of trade policy instruments (DG 3 sources, Interview 3; 1993). After a short discussion 
of the main developments in the Community's market liberalization programme and 
trade policies in the early 1990s, the Community's new IT policy approach will be 
discussed.
4.2 SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET PROGRAMME REVISITED
On the first of January 1993, the Single European Market came formally into
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being. By that time, however, about five per cent of the 282 measures identified in the 
Cockfield Report (see Chapter 3) had yet to be adopted by the Council of Ministers. 
Moreover, twenty to thirty per cent of the adopted measures still had to be 
incorporated into the Member States' legislations (Financial Times, 4 January 1993).
Corporate Diplomacy
In the early 1990s, the European-owned IT companies displayed an ambiguous 
attitude towards the completion of the Single European Market. Concerned by the 
tendency displayed by Member States to stall the process of completing the Single 
European Market, the companies called, both individually and collectively, for a 
speedy completion of the programme, as only a unified market would allow them to 
enjoy economies of scale (ERT, 1991:41-42; IT Roundtable, 1992; IT Roundtable 
sources, Interviews 14,16,36; 1993).
At the same time, however, fears that the Community's liberalization process 
would open the door to non-European companies prompted the European-owned 
companies to call for "a realistic synchronisation of costs and revenue for Europe's own 
industry" and for "strict reciprocity" in the Community's trade and industrial policies 
(IT company sources, Interview 16; 1993). The rapid market penetration by Japanese 
and South East Asian companies had prompted the companies to re-asses their previous 
position of outright support for the 1992 programme (see Chapter 3).
4.3 EC TRADE POLICIES REVISITED
In December 1993, the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations were brought to a 
conclusion. The agreement provided, amongst others, for reductions in the 
Community's semiconductor tariffs, albeit differentiated per product family (see Table
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4.1). In those areas in which the Community had been developing a production 
capability, such as smartpower ICs, tariffs would be kept at the 14 per cent level. 
Alternatively, as in the case of DRAMs and EEPROMs, a grace period would be 
granted, after which the tariff would be reduced to 7 per cent. In those areas in which 
there had been no true European competitor, such as microprocessors and SRAMs, 
tariffs would be reduced - in some cases even to zero per cent (Communication 
31; 1994; Kehoe, 14 December 1993:4).
The Uruguay Round compromise reflected both the international pressure on 
the Community to lower its semiconductor tariffs as well as the Commission's 
recognition in its 1991 White Paper on the IT and electronics industries (see below) 
that "the inconsistencies in the present tariff structure for semiconductors are liable to 
place the Community's processing industries at a competitive disadvantage" 
(SEC(91)565:23,24). With imported components facing relatively high tariffs and 
finished products relatively low ones, the Community's semiconductor users were 
clearly handicapped (see Chapter 3).
In the White Paper, the Commission also recognized that its anti-dumping 
measures may have had a "controversial impact” on the semiconductor-consuming 
industries (SEC(91)565:23,24); the minimum price agreements, concluded in the 
context of the anti-dumping cases (see Chapter 3), have been imposing a cost on the 
semiconductor users by suspending price reductions which would normally occur in 
maturing semiconductor markets (EUROBIT, November 1991; Dataquest in Nakamoto, 
3 July 1992:3).
Corporate Diplomacy
The Uruguay Round brought to conclusion, at least temporarily, the heated 
debate between the European-owned computer and semiconductor producers about the
Table 4.1
URUGUAY ROUND COMPROMISE: SEMICONDUCTOR TARIFF
REDUCTIONS
CN No. Description Base Rt Bound Rt
8541 Diodes, transistors and similar SC devices; 
photosensitive SC devices; light emitting 
diodes; mounted piezo-electric crystals:
8541.10 -Diodes, other than photosensitive or light
emitting diodes:
8541.10.10 --Wafers not yet cut into chips 9.0 7.0
--Other:
8541.10.91  Power rectifier diodes 14.0 7.0
8541.10.99  Other 14.0 7.0
-Transistors, other than photosensitive 
transistors:
8541.21 --With a dissipation rate of less than 1W:
8541.21.10  Wafers not yet cut into chips 9.0 7.0
8541.21.90  Other 14.0 7.0
8541.29 --Other:
8541.29.10  Wafers not yet cut into chips 9.0 7.0
8541.29.90  Other:
EX1-NEW  PowerMOS field effective transistors 14.0 10.0
(To be phased in over 10 years. First 
reduction in year 6)
EX2-NEW  Integrated gate bipolar transistors 14.0 14.0
EX3-NEW  Other 14.0 7.0
8541.30 -Thyristors, diacs and triacs, other than
photosensitive devices:
8541.30.10 --Wafers not yet cut into chips 9.0 7.0
8541.30.90 --Other 14.0 7.0
8541.40 -Photosensitive SC devices; light emitting
diodes:
8541.40.10 --Light emitting diodes:
EX1-NEW  Laser diodes 14.0 14.0
EX2-NEW  Other 14.0 7.0
--Other:
8541.40.91  Solar cells whether or not assembled in
modules or made up into panels 4.6 2.3
8541.40.93  Photodiodes, phototransistors, photo­
thyristors or photocouples 4.6 0.0
8541.40.99  Other 4.6 0.0
8541.50 -Other SC devices:
8541.50.10 --Wafers not yet cut into chips 9.0 7.0
8541.50.90 --Other 14.0 7.0
8541.60.00 -Mounted piezo-electric crystals 8.0 4.0
8541.90.00 -Parts 5.8 2.9
8542 Electronic ICs and Microassemblies:
-Monolithic ICs:
8542.11 --Digital:
8542.11.10  Wafers not yet into chips
 Other:
8542.11.30  Chips
9.0 
14 . 0
7.0
7.0
CN No. Description Base Rt Bound Rt
 Other:
8542.11.71  Memories:
EX1-NEW -Dynamic random access memories (DRAMs) 14.0 7.0
(First 2 years: existing rate will remain 
unchanged. After 2 years: rate will
become 7% in 3 equal steps) i
EX2-NEW ----- UV erasable, programmable read-only
memories (EPROMs) 14.0 7.0
EX3-NEW ----- Electrically erasable, programmable
read-only memories (EEPROMs), incl.
FLASH EEPROMs 14.0 7.0
(First 4 years: existing rate will remain 
unchanged. After 4 years: 7 %)
EX4-NEW ----- Static random access memories (SRAMs);
Mask-programmable ROM; Digital CAM;
Digital cache-tag RAM; Digital FIFO;
Digital LIFO; Ferroelectric memory 14.0 0.0
EX5-NEW ----- Other 14.0 7.0
8542.11.75  Microprocessors and single-chip
computers:
EX 1 - NEW ----- Microprocessors 14.0 0.0
----- Microcontrollers incl. microcomputers:
EX2-NEW ------ With a processing capacity < 4 bits 14.0 0.0
EX3-NEW ------ With a processing capacity > 4 bits 14.0 14.0
8542.11.91  Logic Circuits, control circuits and
interface circuits:
EX1-NEW ----- PLDs (ASICs); standard logic; micro­
peripherals 14.0 0.0
EX2-NEW ----- Gate Arrays; standard cells; full
custom logic (ASICs) 14.0 0.0
(To be phased in over 10 years; first 
reduction in year 6)
EX3 - NEW ----- Other 14.0 7.0
8542.11.99  Other:
EX1-NEW ----- Microperipherals 14.0 0.0
EX2-NEW ----- Other 14.0 7.0
8542.19 --Other:
8542.19.10  Wafers not yet cut into chips 9.0 7.0
 Other:
8542.19.20  Chips 14.0 7.0
 Other:
8542.19.30  Amplifiers 14.0 7.0
8542.19.50  Voltage and current regulators 14.0 7.0
8542.19.70  Interface circuits 14.0 7.0
8542.19.90  Other:
EX1-NEW ----- Smartpower ICs 14.0 14.0
EX2-NEW ----- Mixed digital-analog IC 14.0 7.0
(First 4 years: rate will remain unchanged; 
after 4 years: reduction to 7%)
EX3-NEW ----- Other 14.0 7.0
8542.20.00 -Hybrid ICs 14.0 7.0
8542.80.00 -Other ICs and microassemblies 14.0 7.0
8542.90.00 -Parts 5.8 2.9
Source: Schedule LXXX-European Communities
Notes
CAM Content Addressable Memory RAM Random Access Memory
FIFO First-in/First-out memory ROM Read-Only Memory
IC Integrated Circuit SC Semiconductor
LIFO Last-in/Last-out memory Rt Rate
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continued protection of the Community's semiconductor industry (see Chapter 3). The 
European semiconductor producers, as represented by EECA and supported by the 
Dutch, French and German governments, had argued that any reduction of the 14 per 
cent tariff might eventually lead to the disappearance of Europe's semiconductor 
production capability altogether (EECA sources, Interview 31; 1993 and in Nakamoto, 
28 May 1992). The European-grown computer producers, in contrast, favoured a zero 
per cent tariff on semiconductor imports - a position in which they were supported by 
foreign-owned computer producers like Digital Equipment (EUROBIT, 22 November 
1991:3-5; Nakamoto, 28 May 1992; IT company sources, Interviews 5,15, 1993; 
Shingles, 5 July 1993). Allegedly, the strife between EECA and EUROBIT escalated 
to such a degree, that joint task force discussions with the Commission on IT industry 
policy guidelines broke down on this very issue. According to one observer, "there was 
no understanding between EECA and EUROBIT" (Interview 31;1993). The 
compromise found in the differentiated tariff reductions, however, shows that the 
Commission has sought to "iron out" the tariff inconsistencies, "while taking into 
account the respective interests of [both] Community producers and users" 
(SEC(91)565:23).
With respect to the Community's anti-dumping policies, the opinions were
divided as well - the European semiconductor producers favouring price undertakings
and the computer producers opposing them (see Chapter 3). The European computer
companies, as represented by EUROBIT, did not contest the validity of actions against
unfair trading practices. Rather, they argued that the minimum price undertakings had
been distorting the market at their cost. According to EUROBIT sources,
EUROBIT worked hard to have the EC Commission fully recognize the 
ambivalence of anti-dumping measures imposed on semiconductors for the IT 
industry (Communication 17; 1993).
Following the Commission's recognition that its anti-dumping measures may have had
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a controversial impact on users, EUROBIT "feels a gradually growing consideration 
of the consequences of such measures for the European computer industry" 
(Communication 17; 1993).
1
4.4 THE COMMUNITY’S NEW POLICY APPROACH: THE 1991 WHITE 
PAPER
The Community's main response to the competitiveness problems of its IT 
industry was to develop a new IT policy approach which would go beyond promoting 
collaborative R&TD. The following section will discuss the development, endorsement 
and implementation of the Community's new IT policy approach and outline the 
European-owned IT companies' involvement in these processes. Moreover, it seeks to 
answer the question whether or not the companies, as represented in the IT Roundtable, 
maintained their say over EC IT policies. Were they as influential as they used to be 
in the case of ESPRIT?
4.4.1 POLICY FORMULATION
In the late spring of 1990, the Commission started drafting its new IT policy 
approach. At this preliminary stage in the policy-formulation process, the IT 
Roundtable was closely involved; in July 1990, the Commission invited the chairmen 
of the largest European-owned IT companies for high-level discussions on the 
development of an IT policy framework (Cane, 18 July 1990; DG 3 sources, Interviews 
3,11; 1993).
In the subsequent months, however, the drafting process became a Commission 
affair. Although the draft policy paper allegedly took into account what was discussed
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at the July meeting, in contrast to ESPRIT, "industry was not involved in the actual 
formulation. This was a paper written by bureaucrats" (DG 3 sources, Interview 
11;1993). One should realize, however, that constant informal interaction between the 
Commission officials and the IT industry, including contacts with the IT Roundtable, 
EECA and EUROBIT, did enable the IT industry to articulate its policy preferences 
(DG 3 and IT Roundtable sources, Interviews 3,11,36;1993).
In September 1990, a first draft of the new policy approach was presented by 
DG 13, the Commission's IT directorate. This draft was heavily criticized within the 
Commission, and in particular by DG 4 (Competition), for its interventionist and 
protectionist nature (Business Europe. 21 September 1990:4; DG 3 and IT company 
sources, Interviews 3,11,29;1993). The key conflict between the two directorates 
centred around the question whether or not the EC should have a European 
technological and industrial competence in IT and how the EC could secure such a 
capability. DG 13 advocated an industrial policy aimed at maintaining a European IT 
capability, while DG 4, as proponents of a free-market approach, rejected such a policy 
line a priori. DG 3, the Commission's Industry directorate, allegedly found itself in the 
middle of this ideological debate (DG 3 sources, Interviews 3,11 ;1993).
In November 1990, the Commission adopted a communication, entitled 
"Industrial Policy in an Open and Competitive Environment: Guidelines for a 
Community Approach" (COM(90)556). The communication, which was prepared by 
Industry Commissioner Bangemann in response to pressure by the European Parliament 
and with the view of giving shape to the Maastricht Treaty (DG 3 and EP sources, 
Interviews 11,20; 1993), argued that companies, and not governments, bear the main 
responsibility for adapting to change. Governments, however, could assist the process 
of industrial change in three ways, namely (1) by creating and maintaining a 
favourable, open and competitive business environment, (2) by providing the catalysts
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for change, and (3) by introducing policies that would accelerate the ongoing structural 
adjustments (COM(90)556:7-18). The communication, which sought to side-step the 
ideological debate by defining the principles on the basis of which the Community 
could start applying industrial policy measures, was endorsed unanimously by the 
Council in its meeting of 26 November 1990 (Presse 10159/90; Catinat, 6 July 1993). 
In July 1991, the European Parliament approved the "first steps taken by the 
Commission" in this respect (OJ C240, 1991:219).
Bangemann's initiative proved very important, as it opened the way for an IT 
industrial policy at the Community level. By formulating the Community's new IT 
policy approach on the basis of these guidelines, the Commission would be able to 
present an IT industrial policy without arousing concerns, notably amongst DG 4 
officials, that such a policy would hamper a strong competition policy.
Over the winter and spring of 1991, the proposals for a new EC IT policy 
approach were finalized. In late March 1991, the Commission presented its proposed 
policy response in a communication called "The European Electronics and Information 
Technology Industry: State of Play, Issues at Stake and Proposals for Action" (1991 
White Paper: SEC(91)565).
The 1991 White Paper
On the basis of its analysis of the condition of the European IT industry, the 
Commission identified five areas of policy action (see Table 4.2)3.
Business Environment First, the Commission sought to improve the 
Community's business environment, through measures to improve EC financing 
systems, speed up standardization and integration of standards into products, integrate 
IT into the Community's structural policies, and stimulate cooperation amongst SMEs, 
MNEs and research institutions and amongst IT producers and users.
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Table 4.2
IT POLICY POSITIONS
ApfiH IS®!
Business Environment
► Standardization
► Improvement financing
► Cooperation
► IT and structural policies
Labour
► Training
R&TD
► Second Generation:
- Smaller number
- Better targeted
- Closer to market
- Closer cooperation with users
Competition/Market Access
► Establishment of equitable 
conditions of competition and 
market access:
- Maintaining an open, multilateral 
trading system
- Improvement of market access
- Establishment of fair competition
Demand Stimulation
► TENs
Business Environment 
► Strengthening within the context of 
EC R&TD
Labour
► Strengthening within the context of 
EC R&TD
R&TD
► Second Generation:
- More funding
- Adaptations and improvements in 
scope and methods including R&TD 
closer to the market, the introduction 
of a clustering approach, and greater 
cooperation with EUREKA
- Measures to stimulate stronger 
vertical ties
Competition/Market Access
► Establishment of fair conditions of 
competition
- Maintaining transitional protective 
arrangements to ensure a balanced 
opening of third country markets, 
including equitable concessions 
regarding the excluded sectors
- Control of national incentives to 
inward investment
Demand Stimulation 
► European Nervous System
- Relaxation of EC anti-trust
- Measures to ensure that European 
-owned IT companies are given first 
consideration
Business Environment Business Environment Business Environment
► Speedy implemen- ► Ongoing efforts
tation White Paper
Labour
► Speedy implemen­
tation White Paper
R&TD
► Speedy implemen­
tation White Paper
► Relaxation EC anti­
trust
Labour
R&TD
► Government subsidies 
for semiconductor R&D
► Vertical ties: 
increased involvement 
semiconductor users
Labour
► Ongoing efforts
R&TD
► 4th FW not yet adopted. 
(Adopted: Apr.94)
Incl. 2nd gen. IT:
- Relative fall ITC funding
- Cluster approach: linkages 
& better targeted R&TD
- Precompetitive R&TD 
closer to market
- Coordination EUREKA
- More user-oriented
C o m p e t i t io n  and
Market Access
► Speedy implemen­
tation White Paper
► Monitoring of int. 
trading relations
► Potential departure 
of multilateral 
trading principles
Competition and Market Competition and Market
Access Access
► Centralized information 
point
► No departure of multi­
lateral trading principles in 
IT. However, maintenance 
of 3% price preference in 
telecommunications 
procurement
► No control of national 
incentives to inward 
investment
Demand Stimulation
► Speedy implemen­
tation White Paper
► Relaxation EC anti­
trust
Demand Stimulation Demand Stimulation
► Implementation only in 
preliminary stage
► Difficulties in securing 
funding.
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Labour. The Commission also sought to improve its human capital supply 
conditions through the creation and strengthening of labour training schemes.
R&TD. Additionally, the Commission advocated the launch of a second 
generation of R&TD projects, which would concentrate work on a smaller number of 
better targeted projects, ranging from those in the precompetitive sphere to those close 
to the market (near-market projects). The projects would have to involve closer 
cooperation with users, provide for training, and be opened up to international 
cooperation.
Competition/Market Access. Moreover, the Commission sought to maintain an 
open, multilateral trade system and to improve access to third country markets, through 
a satisfactory conclusion of the Uruguay Round. In order to establish fair competition 
in international markets, which could also further the market access objective, the 
Commission called upon non-European competitors to refrain from unfair practices in 
their own and third country markets. However, if such practices would be shown to 
exist, the Commission would bring pressure to bear on the relevant public authorities. 
While meeting its international obligations, the Commission outlined that, where 
necessary, it would have to fall back on defensive measures, namely: its customs 
regulations (temporary suspension of the autonomous duties of the CCT) and its trade 
policy instruments (anti-dumping measures and customs duties).
Demand Stimulation. Finally, the Commission sought to stimulate demand 
through the creation of pan-European infrastructural projects called Trans European 
Networks (TENs). These TENs would have the additional benefit of contributing to 
European integration - as already recognized by the ERT in the mid-1980s (ERT, 
1986). Although the Commission envisaged mainly a coordinating and facilitating role 
for the Community in the realization of TENs, it did state that the Community might 
contribute to the financing of these programmes.
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The IT  Roundtable’s Alternative Appmacb
The 1991 White Paper was perceived by the IT Roundtable and its members 
as a relatively general policy statement, constituting a step in the right direction - but 
merely a first step (Interviews 29,36; 1993). The White Paper fell far short of the 
European IT industry's own policy recommendations, especially in terms of its support 
for the European-owned IT producers and its implications for foreign-owned 
competitors.
The core of the IT Roundtable's alternative policy approach was expressed in 
a February 1991 letter addressed to Industry Commissioner Bangemann and copied to 
R&TD Commissioner Pandolfi - coinciding with the final stages of the EC 
Commission's drafting process of its 1991 White Paper. The IT Roundtable's 
recommendations were reiterated and further explained in the Roundtable's reaction to 
Bangemann's Communication on an Industrial Policy. The circulation of its reaction 
in March and April 1991 coincided with the Commission's presentation of its new IT 
policy approach. The main points of these two documents were summarized in 
Business Europe. 19 April 1991:7.
In its policy recommendations regarding an IT industrial policy, the IT 
Roundtable argued that the key to its recovery would be "the creation of unified, 
coherent market demand, coupled with measures to establish a transition period" which 
would allow the European IT industry "to become strong in relation to the rest of the 
world" (IT Roundtable, 1991). Specifically, the policy recommendations centred around 
three themes: (1) the promotion of industrial restructuring; (2) the improvement of 
external trade and investment conditions; and (3) the stimulation of IT demand (see 
Table 4.2). In order to achieve "political acceptability for these moves", the IT 
Roundtable called upon the Commission to mount "a joint awareness campaign to a 
broad audience". This campaign should be directed at the European Parliament, the
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national governments and the general public (IT Roundtable, 1991).
Industrial Restructuring. The IT Roundtable urged the EC to introduce "policies 
which emulate the Japanese model of vertical integration". In order to bring about 
changes in the existing industrial structure, the Commission should combine its 
subsidies for collaborative R&D projects with additional measures that would foster 
stronger vertical ties between industry segments. R&D subsidies, for example, should 
be combined with subsidies for a pilot introduction of the product developed in the 
R&D project or with a purchasing programme. Similarly, the IT Roundtable suggested 
that the EC take measures to promote cooperative relations in the area of design and 
production between large and small companies (IT Roundtable, 1991).
External Trade and Investment Conditions. The IT Roundtable also advocated 
a number of measures to ensure fair competition at the regional and international level.
One key suggestion was that action should be undertaken "to ensure real access 
to the homogeneous markets of our competitors, or reciprocal action to limit the entry 
of foreign suppliers". In sectors where European-owned companies would not be able 
to compete on an equal basis with non-European competitors, the IT Roundtable 
argued that it might be necessary to "maintain transitional protective arrangements" 
which should be reviewed in the light of the opening of non-European markets. In that 
context, the IT Roundtable, which also represents telecommunications equipment 
producers (see Chapter 1), argued that any further concessions by the EC relating to 
the excluded government procurement sectors, including telecommunications, should 
be on an "agreed equivalent basis" (IT Roundtable, 1991; IT Roundtable sources, 
Interview 14; 1993).
Another main recommendation was that the EC should control national 
incentives to foreign direct investment, especially in areas characterized by a surplus 
productive capacity. Supported in this matter by EECA, the IT Roundtable members
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argued that such incentives distort competition; the national governments were paying 
for new, top-of-the-line factories owned by foreign companies which would produce 
products that would compete with the European-owned IT companies’ products, 
produced in un-subsidized, older facilities (IT Roundtable, 1991; EECA sources, 
Interview 31; IT Roundtable sources, Interviews 29,36; 1993).
Demand Stimulation. Finally, the IT Roundtable suggested that the Commission 
shift its emphasis towards "programmes for the creation of pan-European demand", 
taking the form of, for example, the "European Nervous System" (ENS) - a project 
which would link the national computing and communication links into a common IT 
infrastructure or "information highways". In the implementation of these market 
development programmes, the IT Roundtable recommended, first of all, that measures 
be taken to ensure that the European-owned IT companies would be given first 
consideration. The IT Roundtable even called upon the Commission to insist that the 
development of the common infrastructure should be carried out by European-owned 
companies. An additional recommendation was that the Community relax its anti-trust 
legislation to allow for both the EC's financial participation as well as cooperation 
amongst the large European-owned companies in the implementation of these demand- 
stimulating programmes.
Although the IT Roundtable's recommendations could certainly be interpreted 
as protectionist and discriminatory, the recommendations could also be seen as 
reflecting tensions between (1) the absence of a level playing field in the world market 
and unilateral liberalization; (2) the increasingly internationalized nature of the IT 
industry and nationally or regionally oriented policies; and (3) the crisis in the IT 
industry and the need to reduce regional economic disparities.
First, the IT Roundtable members felt that the absence of a level playing field 
in the world market and the need to secure one warranted a deviation from the EC's
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unilateral liberalization principles. As the American and Japanese competitors
benefitted from various preferential practices, the IT Roundtable argued, one should
not make the mistake of subjecting competition between the European-owned
companies and their main non-European rivals to exactly the same free market
principles applicable to competition amongst European-owned companies. In order to
secure a level playing field in the world market, liberalization of the Community's
market should go at par with liberalization in the American and Japanese markets.
Seen from this perspective, the IT Roundtable's policy demands for preferential
treatment in the implementation of the demand-stimulating programmes and their
insistence on transitional protective arrangements reflected the IT Roundtable's fear that
unilateral liberalization of the Community's markets, including that of its procurement
market, would not be balanced with greater openness of the American and Japanese
markets. As one IT company executive argued:
A carrot will not be enough. You need a stick to relax some barriers (Interview 
5;1993).
Second, the IT Roundtable companies felt that the increasingly globalized
conditions of competition in the world industry (see Chapter 5) warranted a policy
perspective reaching beyond the national/regional borders. In an internationalized
industry, the IT Roundtable members argued, a company's position in the national or
regional markets does not matter as much as its position in the global market. Seen
from this perspective, the IT Roundtable's demand for eased anti-trust regulations
reflected the need to survive in the global market. As an executive at an IT Roundtable
member company argued:
Especially in the area of IT, competition policy must not be seen only in the 
European field. To survive, we need to have certain dimensions and strength 
relative to the world market, not only relative to the European market. From 
a European point of view, this may lead to a very large company with a 
dominant position, but this is not necessarily a large company in the 
international field. You cannot say that any European semiconductor
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manufacturer may not have a monopoly [in the European market] when 90 per 
cent of the world market is dominated by the Japanese. In that sense, the 
Commission should not be too strict in its implementation of its competition 
policy (Interview 29; 1993).
Third, the IT Roundtable companies felt that the crisis in the IT industry
1
warranted a more coherent regional policy (Interviews 29,31; 1993). As one IT
company executive argued:
We thought it absurd to allow billions of ECUs to be pumped into Japanese 
plants in Greece and Portugal in a sector in which we had commercial and 
industrial policies attempting to protect the European industry against Japan. 
There was no coordination (Interview 29; 1993).
Seen from this perspective, the IT Roundtable's call for controls on national incentives
to FDI reflected an attempt to bring about coherence between the Community's
industrial and commercial policies on the one hand, and its regional policies on the
other.
The IT  Roundtable's Alternative Approach: Reaching Far Beyond the 1991 White 
Paper
Comparing the IT Roundtable's recommendations with the Commission's White 
Paper, however, it becomes clear why the latter fell short of the IT Roundtable's 
preferences. First, despite the importance attached to the improvement of third country 
market access and the elimination of unfair practices in the White Paper, the 
Commission did not envisage maintaining transitional protective arrangements to 
secure a balanced opening of Triad markets. Second, the Commission had not included 
provisions regarding the control of national incentives to foreign direct investment in 
areas characterized by a surplus productive capacity. Third, although the Commission's 
White Paper identified the stimulation of demand through pan-European projects as an 
area of policy action, the paper refrained from advocating any form of preferential 
treatment for the European-owned IT firms in the implementation of these demand-
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stimulating projects. Fourth, the White Paper did not call for a relaxation of anti-trust 
legislations with respect to inter-company allegiances and EC assistance in the 
implementation of these projects.
In fact, according to Commission sources, Commissioner Bangemann "would 
never countenance some of the IT Roundtable's suggestions", particularly with respect 
to the use of transitionary protective measures to force open foreign markets (Business 
Europe, 19 April 1991:6).
4.4.2 POLICY ENDORSEMENT
On the 29th of April 1991, the EC Industry Council endorsed the Commission's 
White Paper. The representatives of the national governments, however, differed 
substantially on the concrete measures to be taken. The Council debate broadly 
reflected a split between the nations now enjoying substantial foreign direct 
investment, notably the UK, Ireland, Spain and Portugal, and the countries with large 
home-grown and home-owned IT firms, namely France, Italy, Germany and the 
Netherlands (see Chapter 1).
While fully endorsing the Commission’s policy approach, the latter group called 
for an implementation which would give sufficient support and protection to the 
European-owned IT industry in general, and the semiconductor industry in particular. 
The UK, Ireland, Spain and Portugal, meanwhile, expressed both their opposition to 
measures that would discriminate against foreign-owned companies, and their concern 
that special support might be concentrated on the European-owned IT MNEs, located 
in the centre of the Community, at the cost of support for SMEs in peripheral areas 
(Europe, 29/30 April 1991:7-8; Goldsmith, 30 April 1991:9; WSJ. 30 April 1991:A21).
In the end, the Council called upon the Commission to propose, in close
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consultation with a high-level working party comprising of national specialists and in 
dialogue with industrialists, users and investors, specific initiatives and concrete 
measures to implement the new policy approach. These proposals were to be in line 
with the principles adopted on a common industrial policy at the Council meeting of 
26 November 1990. With the aim of maintaining an open world market based on 
equitable conditions of competition, the Council also asked the Commission to rapidly 
carry out in-depth studies on the risks of distortions in international competition (Presse 
5812/91).
The European Parliament's response to the Commission's White Paper was only 
presented in January 1994, after the EP's Economic and Monetary Affairs and 
Industrial Policy Committee presented its long-awaited report on the state of the IT 
industry (PE 206.993, 1994; DG 3 sources, Communication 3; 1994). In pursuance of 
this so-called "Metten Report", the Parliament adopted on 18 January 1994, in the 
presence of Commissioner Bangemann, a resolution which, ironically, called for an 
active industrial and commercial IT policy to be implemented as a matter of urgency 
"so that Europe does not lose control over, and access to, subsectors of electronics and 
does not become dependent on third parties in this strategic and dynamic area" (PE 
178.920, 1994).
4.4.3 INTERMEZZO
Not fully satisfied with the 1991 White Paper, the IT Roundtable companies 
pressed both the Commission as well as their respective national governments for a 
more far-reaching implementation of the five areas of action identified in the White 
Paper, and for specific support measures beyond the scope of the White Paper. 
Initially, their efforts seemed to have some success.
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The November Council Resolution
In the face of the crisis in the European IT industry, the Member States decided 
that the urgency of the matter justified them taking the initiative. Rather than opting 
for the more time-consuming, formal route through the Commission, the Council 
Presidency presented a resolution to the Council of Ministers, developed by the 
Member States in close cooperation with representatives from the Commission (DG 
3 and DG 13) (DG 3 and national government sources, Interviews 3,11,39;1993).
The Resolution, which was adopted in November 1991, called not only for a 
swift implementation of the five action areas identified in the White Paper, but also 
set out guidelines for a more aggressive implementation of the external trade, R&TD 
and demand-stimulation provisions outlined in the White Paper (see Table 4.2).
First, the Council argued in its Resolution that it is "convinced of the necessity 
for industry in the Community to be competitive at a world level, particularly when 
assessing strategic alliances and capital-intensive investment in the framework of the 
rules of competition" (OJ C325, 1991:3). This clause has been interpreted by some 
M/S officials as providing for a relaxation of the Community's anti-trust regulations 
when evaluating the impact of collaborative ventures on competition; it could ease the 
Community's competition regulations in the case of, for example, collaborative R&TD 
ventures or capital-intensive investments on TENs, if these are considered to be 
necessary for improving Europe's international competitive position (Interview 
17;1993).
Second, the Council accepted the need to monitor international trading 
practices, and recognized that a departure from the Community's multilateral trading 
principles might be necessary in the case of the IT industry; "additional bilateral 
initiatives of the Community, without prejudice to existing GATT obligations, may be 
necessary to create effective market access with equal opportunities" (OJ C325,
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1991:3). Although the Commission had recognized the need to maintain "detailed 
statistics" and "investigate the existence of [unfair] practices" and had stressed in its 
executive summary (but not in the actual text of the White Paper) that the Community 
may have "to recourse to bilateral measures" (SEC(91)565:4,24), it was the Council 
Resolution which instituted the principles of monitoring unfair practices and 
concluding bilateral agreements. According to one Commission official:
This was for the first time ever that the EC did not adhere to multilateralism.
It was the first time that such bilateral trade arrangements have been considered
(Interview 11;1993).
The Council Resolution, however, has only been a partial success. Although the 
Community's anti-trust regulations appear to have been eased over the early 1990s, one 
could question whether this was a direct consequence of the Resolution. Far more 
important appears to have been the decision of Delors to nominate Karel van Miert as 
Competition Commissioner in January 1993. In contrast to his predecessor Sir Leon 
Brittan, van Miert has recognized that in certain industries and, particularly, 
electronics, the world market and not the national or European market are increasingly 
the more appropriate reference points for determining whether or not collaborative 
ventures are anti-competitive (Hill, 25 October 1993:36). Taking the intense 
competition in the world market for Liquid Crystal Display (LCD) screens into 
account, the Commission, for example, has allowed the only two European producers, 
i.e. Philips and SGS-Thomson, to cooperate on the research, development and 
production of LCD screens (Hill, 25 October 1993:36). Similarly, the nomination of 
Martin Bangemann as Commissioner for Industry and ITC technologies may have 
contributed to a relaxation of the Community's anti-trust legislation; Bangemann is 
known for his pragmatic rather than ideological, case-by-case approach to industrial 
policy (Hill, 30 November 1992:32; Bangemann, 1992; IT Roundtable sources, 
Interviews 14,36; 1993).
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Moreover, the Council Resolution has been perceived as being of little effect 
in bringing about a more aggressive market opening policy. In this respect, it is 
important to note that the M/S support for the Resolution was never whole-hearted. 
While the French government advocated a relatively protectionist policy stance, the 
United Kingdom's position was far more liberal. Only the German government 
allegedly succeeded in convincing the British government to accept the Resolution 
(CEC, national government and industry representative sources, Interviews 
11,19,32,39; 1993). According to one national government official, "bringing all twelve 
Member States on one line had been a hard row to hoe" (Interview 39; 1993).
Hampered by controversies amongst the Member States, the only tangible 
consequence of the Council Resolution with respect to third country market access in 
the area of information technology, appears to have been the establishment of a 
centralized information point (Catinat, 6 July 1993). The task of this information point 
has been to monitor the (unfair) marketing, market access and distribution practices of 
other industrialized countries, notably those of the United States and Japan, and to feed 
this information into bilateral and multilateral negotiations (DG 3 sources, Interview 
3; 1993). According to both corporate as well as national government sources, in the 
end, the Resolution turned out to be little more than a "paper solution" (Interviews 
19,32,34,39;1993).
A Semiconductor Initiative
On the 19th and 20th of April 1991, gathered at a secret meeting in Burgundy, 
the CEOs of Siemens, Philips, Olivetti, Bull and Thomson pressed President Delors 
and Commissioners Bangemann and Pandolfi for specific support measures going 
beyond the action areas outlined by the Commission in its White Paper (Dawkins and 
Buchan, 23 April 1991:3,18). It was within this context that plans for a Semiconductor
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Initiative were discussed, affecting Siemens, Philips and SGS-Thomson (Jenkins and 
Lorenz, 5 May 1991; IT company sources, Interview 29; 1993).
The initiative, which sought to develop a presence in each generation of 
mainstream memory ICs, comprised four elements (see Table 4.2): (1) restructuring of 
the production capabilities of the three companies to adapt to the changing needs; (2) 
increased cooperation with semiconductor users; (3) substantial government subsidies 
for joint R&D; and (4) a capital injection of public funds to overcome problems of 
undercapitalization - a particularly pressing problem for SGS-Thomson (DG 3 and IT 
company sources, Interviews 3,29; 1993; Skapinker, 29 April 1991). Interestingly, the 
plan did not envisage any external trade policy prescriptions. As one participant 
explained:
There was a consensus not to speak about that, as we had the ambition of 
involving the main users into the capitalization of the venture. The tariff level 
is a sensitive issue, as users prefer to buy cheaper products. We almost 
succeeded in convincing them to put capital into semiconductor production. 
Creating links between the semiconductor producers and users would be 
beneficial to the users: manufacturers could provide the users with the products 
adapted to their needs (Interview 29; 1993).
The cost of the proposed programme, to be bom in part by the Commission and the
Member States, allegedly would amount to ECU 24 bn for a duration of 5 to 7 years
(DG 3 and IT company sources, Interviews 3,29; 1993).
The Semiconductor Initiative, however, never got off the ground. Diverging
corporate strategies and lack of funding hampered its realization.
At the financial level, the companies faced difficulties in raising the necessary
funds. The German government refused to support the plan altogether. The
Commission was willing to finance part of the expenditures within the context of its
R&TD and Structural Programmes, but only if certain conditions would and could be
met (DG 3 sources, Interview 3; 1993). First, the Commission would only be able to
finance the envisaged R&D activities if it would re-allocate its R&TD resources and
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shift funding away from other sectors to the semiconductor industry - a move unlikely 
to be politically acceptable. Second, the Commission could only help if the companies 
would invest in regionally deprived areas. But, as one IT company executive explained: 
"that was not possible. We are not a kind of industry that can just move. We need to 
locate our manufacturing facilities near our R&D facilities" (Interview 29; 1993). Third, 
the measures would not be horizontal but directed at specific companies. As such, they 
would be opposed, most likely, by DG 4.
At the corporate level, the companies were unable to agree on one strategy. 
While SGS-Thomson had been advocating closer ties, and even a mega-merger, with 
Siemens and Philips on the production of mainstream memory chips, Philips' departure 
from SRAM production and Siemens conclusion of an alliance with IBM to develop 
64M DRAMs undermined both SGS' dreams as well as the success of the 
Semiconductor Initiative4. By the autumn of 1991, the Semiconductor Initiative had 
definitely collapsed. At a lower level, however, the initiative did have a spinoff, 
namely the collaboration between SGS-Thomson and Philips on semiconductor 
technology (IT company sources, Interview 29; 1993).
4.4.4 POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
In February 1993, the IT Roundtable met Commissioner Bangemann to discuss 
the state of the industry and the policy measures to be taken. At this meeting, the IT 
Roundtable allegedly asked for specific support measures. As one IT Roundtable source 
commented:
There are some emerging sectors where help is necessary, like Airbus. We feel 
that microelectronics is a similar area. Bangemann has not said yes or no. 
Other areas of importance include software and flat panel display. We need 
political and financial stimulation for a limited and defined period. If you let 
it go, you will not get any development at all.
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Bangemann is partly in favour. If it is really of transitional nature and there 
exists a clear time frame. Four years. This is not protection but "support", 
which would enable us to overcome the difficulties of producing the initial 
products. A small plant needs the cover of a glass house. If the plant is out in 
April, it will die. Bangemann is not against it, but it needs careful 
consideration (Interview 36; 1993).
4
By that time, however, the Commission appears to have been fully tied up in trying 
to implement the recommendations outlined in the 1991 White Paper and Council 
Resolution, let alone in attempting to realize any specific support measures going 
beyond the scope of the White Paper.
Despite the Council's insistence on urgent action in its November Resolution 
(OJ C325, 1991), the implementation of the five areas identified in the White Paper 
proved to be a time-consuming process, notably in the more politically sensitive areas 
of R&TD, competition and market access, and demand-stimulation (see Table 4.2). By 
December 1993, the Fourth Framework Programme, providing for a second generation 
of IT research projects, had yet to be adopted; IT market access agreements had yet 
to materialize; and the realization of TENs had not moved beyond a preliminary stage 
(see Figure 4.1).
To the extent that progress was made on the implementation of these five areas, 
the IT Roundtable and its companies did succeed in getting various of their ideas, 
confined by the scope of the White Paper, translated into the policy proposals - notably 
those on IT research and TENs. The IT Roundtable and its members, however, did not 
succeed in securing the preferred levels of funding for these initiatives (see Figure 4.1). 
The following sections will discuss in detail these initiatives as well as the 
implementation of the White Paper's clause on market access.
R&TD: Second Generation
The Fourth R&TD Framework Programme was adopted only in April 1994,
Figure 4.1 Second Generation IT R&TD Programme: Proposed 
Breakdown by Activity
Microprocessor, HPC 
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Business Processes 
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Long Term Research 
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Components, Subsystems 
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Software, Multimedia 
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Source: COM(93)459:59
149
four months after it was supposed to start, delaying the actual start of the R&TD 
projects to approximately 1995 (DG 3 sources, Interview 28; 1993). The delay in 
adoption was caused by the disagreement between the Commission, the Council and 
the European Parliament about the size of the Framework’s overall budget and the 
allocation of the available funds over the various categories.
As Table 4.3 illustrates, the Commission and Parliament favoured a budget of 
ECU 13.1 bn - already less than the originally envisaged ECU 14.7 bn package 
(COM(92)406). Within the Commission proposal, 35.7 per cent of the ECU 10.9 bn 
earmarked for R&TD would be devoted to information technology and communications 
(ITC) research, including 19.6 per cent for IT R&TD (COM(93)459). Germany, France 
and the UK, however, refused to allocate more than ECU 11 bn to the Framework 
Programme in total. In December 1993, the European Council, however, decided that 
"not less than ECU 12 bn" should be allocated to the Framework Programme and a 
reserve of ECU 1 bn might be added at a later stage. Within the Council compromise,
28.2 per cent of the ECU 10.5 bn R&TD budget would allegedly be allocated to ITC 
research - a considerably smaller share than envisaged in the Commission proposal 
(Hill, 26 October 1993:16; 12 October 1993:2; 13 December 1993:3). The budget 
finally adopted in April 1994 amounted to 12.3 bn. In the end, 31.9 per cent of the 
ECU 10.6 bn R&TD budget was allocated to ITC R&TD, including 18.1 per cent for 
IT R&TD (OJ LI26, 1994).
Like other lobby groups, such as EUROBIT (1993) and UNICE (1992), the IT 
Roundtable had called for a "significant increase in funding for the IT part" in its 
position paper on the competitiveness of the European IT industry and R&TD 
programmes (1992), and for "adaptations and improvements" in the scope and methods 
of the Fourth Framework Programme. The IT Roundtable called specifically for the 
introduction of R&TD programmes beyond the precompetitive stage into the sphere
Table 4.3
FOURTH FRAMEWORK PROGRAMME: BUDGET PROPOSALS
In ECU mn Total Budget R&TD (1st Act.) ITC ITC/T IT IT/T
CEC Proposal 1992 14,700 11,600 N/A N/A N/A N/A
CEC Proposal 1993 13,100 10,925 3, 900 35.7% 2,138E 19.6%
Council Proposal 12/93 12,000 (+ 1,000) 10,500 2,961E 28.2% N/A N/A
Approved budget 12,300 10,686 3,405 31.9% 1, 932 18.1%
Sources: C0M(92)406; COM(93)459; Hill, 13 December 1993:3; OJ L126, 1994.
Notes
E Estimate
T Total Budget
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of product development, the adoption of a "clustering" approach providing for greater 
coherence in R&D and better targeted funding, and greater cooperation with EUREKA 
(IT Roundtable, 1992/93; IT Roundtable sources, Interview 36; 1993; Economist, 8 June 
1991:26).
Judging by the Fourth Framework Programme's funds allocated to ITC research 
and, within this category, to IT research, the IT Roundtable's call for more funds was 
not very effective. Although the Framework Programmes are not fully comparable due 
to inflation and changes in the Programmes' composition, the share of rTC/IT R&TD 
in total funding has declined in the Fourth Framework Programme in comparison to 
the Second and Third Programmes - despite an increase in absolute terms (see Table 
4.4). Moreover, securing both the absolute as well relative size of funding for ITC/IT 
R&TD remained difficult in the case of the Fourth Framework; in the end, rTC/IT 
R&TD was allocated less than originally envisaged by the Commission (see Table 4.3), 
due to competition from other HT sectors, such as biotechnology (see Chapter 9).
Judging by the contents of the Fourth Framework Programme, however, the IT 
Roundtable was more successful. The Fourth Framework's specific programme in 
information technology provides for new orientations in both technical scope and 
method of implementation - in line with various of the IT Roundtable's policy 
preferences (COM(93)459:42-43) as well as evaluations and recommendations made 
by the Dekker commission (1992), IRDAC (1992), the Court of Auditors (1991)5 and 
other committees and organizations.
With respect to technical scope (see Figure 4.1), the Commission has 
emphasized those areas, i.e. software, multimedia, components and subsystems, that 
contribute to the development of a "common information infrastructure" in line with 
the Community's new R&TD orientation. Moreover, in contrast to the initial phases 
of ESPRIT, which were far more directed towards the supply rather than the demand
Table 4.4
EC FRAMEWORK PROGRAMMES: IT AND ITC BUDGET ALLOCATIONS
In ECU mn Total Budget R&TD ITC ITC/T IT IT/T
1st Framework 3, 750 N/A N/A N/A N/A
2nd Framework 5,396 2, 275 42 .2% 1, 600 29.7%
3rd Framework 5, 700 2,221 39.0% 1,352 23 .7%
4th Framework 12,300 10,686 3,405 31.9% 1, 932 18.1%
Sources: OJ C208, 
Notes
1983; OJ L302, 1987; OJ L117, 1990; OJ L126, 1994.
T Total Budget
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-side, the IT programme provided for in the Fourth Framework, emphasizes the
demand-side. According to one DG 3 official,
The programme does not seek to give a technology push in search of bigger 
market shares for the IT suppliers. The goal is not merely competitiveness of 
the IT industry as such, but of the whole industry. Rather, this programme 
concentrates on contributing to a European IT infrastructure. It seeks to 
facilitate access of users to information technology (Interview 26; 1993).
With respect to the method of implementation, four changes are worth
mentioning. First, in addition to the more traditional R&TD projects fostering a
stronger intra-European cooperation, the new specific IT R&TD programme provides
for the launch of "focused clusters", which are sets of a broader range of activities
focused on a single, well-defined goal (COM(93)459:42). In order to increase the
effectiveness of the programmes, these clusters may incorporate activities, beyond
precompetitive R&TD, some of which may be closer to the market, such as product
development, manufacturing and commercialization. The EC's financial support,
however, will be confined to the up-stream, precompetitive elements of the projects
(DG 3 sources, Interview 3; 1993). By including near-market activities, the focused
clusters may also foster stronger vertical linkages, as recommended by the IT
Roundtable (see above).
Second, these focused cluster projects should be central to the participating
firms' operations - a goal which the Commission seeks to secure through the
involvement of both IT producers as well as users in the drafting of the work
programmes on the basis of which the EC issues its call for proposals, and through the
imposition of this objective as a precondition for participating in the EC's specific IT
R&TD programme (DG 3 sources, Interviews 26,28; 1993). The realization of this
objective has been facilitated by the economic pressures faced by most IT companies
in the early 1990s, which has forced them to cooperate on elements that are an integral
part of their business strategies rather than on marginal issues. As one DG 3 official
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argued:
Nobody can do it alone. It is not possible any more to cooperate on marginal
issues only. You have to concentrate your funding. Firms have to focus.
(Interview 26; 1993).
Due to their centrality to the participating companies' strategies, it is believed that 
corporate management will be committed to turn these focused cluster projects into a 
technological and commercial success.
Third, the EC’s IT R&TD projects will be conducted in greater synergy and 
complementarity with the more market-oriented EUREKA projects (DG 3,12 sources, 
Interviews 3,9;1993; COM(93)276:12,15). As the Commission's working document on 
the specific programmes implementing the Fourth Framework Programme outlines, the 
focused clusters may involve cooperation with EUREKA (COM(93)459:42). 
Theoretically, this could involve EC financial participation in EUREKA projects, as 
advocated by the IT Roundtable (1992, 1993). Its decentralized management arguably 
make EUREKA more suitable for the execution of near-market R&TD projects than 
the EC (UNICE, 10 March 1993; UNICE sources, Interview 4; 1993).
Fourth, the procedure of application for these projects has been altered, to 
facilitate application, particularly of SMEs. In contrast to the former procedure, which 
was regarded as "cumbersome and too expensive, especially for SMEs", the new 
procedure provides for (1) four calls a year at fixed dates, overcoming the problems 
of irregular, infrequent calls, and (2) a spread of the proposals, allowing the applicants, 
and particularly the SMEs, to spread both the work-load of preparing a proposal as 
well as the costs of bidding (DG 3, Interview 28; 1993).
With the change in the methods of implementation and technical focus of the 
IT programme, the Commission has altered its consultation mechanisms as well. As 
one IT Roundtable source argued: "Initially the Commission almost exclusively dealt 
with our club. Now, the Commission has extended its circle of consultation" (Interview
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36; 1993). This has affected, in particular, the involvement of users and, to a lesser
extent, the involvement of software and services companies.
Following the shift in focus towards the development of an information
infrastructure and the increased emphasis on access and usability, the Commission has
argued that the "programme must to a greater extent be led by the needs of users and
the market" - an intention which has been reflected in the involvement of users in the
policy-making procedure. Although the IT Roundtable was closely involved in the
formulation of this second generation IT R&TD programme, both through more as well
as less formal ways of interaction, it was not the only one to be consulted. As
illustrated by a DG 3 official,
When the new programme was formulated, the IT Roundtable was consulted, 
but we also had consultations with a wide range of users, such as the 
pharmaceutical industry, banking, chemical industry, car industry, transport 
industry, health, education, telecommunications and telematics (Interview 
26; 1993).
Similarly, the IT Roundtable is expected to lose its near-monopoly on policy-input in 
the implementation of the new programme (see Chapter 3). The companies will still 
participate in an IT (formerly ESPRIT) Steering Committee and play an active part in 
the Industrial Working Groups (Technical Panels) which prepare the annual work 
programmes, but they will not be represented in the newly established Industry 
Advisory Panels which look at the overall work programmes from a user point of 
view. Although the Commission recognizes that IT companies are also consumers of 
IT - a point stressed by the IT Roundtable (1993) -, "the Industrial Advisory Panels are 
the place to look at other industries" (DG 3 sources, Interview 28; 1993; also IT 
Roundtable sources, Communication 36; 1994).
As software has become more important and pervasive over time, 
correspondingly, software producers have also become increasingly involved in the 
policy formulation of the Community's IT R&TD programmes (DG 3 sources,
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Communication 28; 1994). The increasing involvement of software (and services) 
companies, however, cannot be compared with the rise of users. Software suppliers 
have always been involved in the process - partly because software is not only 
produced by specialized software houses but also by hardware producers and IT users.
Beyond the involvement of the largest IT hardware producers, IT users and 
software and services companies, the Commission has also received the policy input 
from SMEs. It has been a long-standing goal of the Commission to increase the 
involvement of SMEs in R&TD policy-formulation and implementation (House of 
Lords, 1985). Their limited resources, however, have often impeded the smaller 
companies to undertake political activity and prepare project proposals. Through the 
changes in the new programme's application procedures, the Commission has sought 
to increase the involvement of the smaller companies, including the many smaller 
software producers, in the policy-formulation process (DG 3 sources, Communication 
28; 1994).
Informal input has also been given by foreign-owned companies, both within 
the context of the Community's R&TD programmes as well as beyond - the 
participation of IBM Europe and the currently Japanese-owned ICL in the 1994 
Bangemann Group being a case in point (see Chapter 7). The new IT R&TD projects 
will remain open to participation of foreign firms, provided that these companies meet 
the necessary conditions (see Chapter 3). Both the continued participation of foreign 
companies as well as the terms on which they would be allowed to participate, had 
been put into doubt following the take-over of ICL by Fujitsu. In the Research Council 
of 24 April 1991, however, the Council declared that the Community's R&TD 
programmes remain open to foreign participation, provided the necessary conditions 
are met, and questioned the benefits of a Code of Conduct for foreign firms 
participating in EC R&TD programmes. The Code, proposed by the French, was based,
157
amongst others, on the principle that foreign firms must not "undermine the interests 
of European industrialists present in sensitive sectors" (Business Europe, 3 May 
1991:6). The Commission's allocation of important ESPRIT projects on Artificial 
Intelligence computers to ICL in 1992, confirms that the EC R&TD programmes 
remain open to foreign-owned IT companies (Cane, 1 September 1992:14).
Fair Competition and Market Access
By December 1993, the only tangible result of the 1991 White Paper and the 
Council Resolution with respect to improving market access had been the 
establishment of a centralized information point (see above). Although various IT 
issues, such as US subsidies for parallel computing research and prototype production, 
have been discussed in bilateral and multilateral fora, no specific bilateral IT 
agreements remotely similar to the 1991 US-Japan Semiconductor Trade Agreement 
have been adopted so far6 - let alone transitional protective arrangements to enforce 
a balanced opening of the American and Japanese IT markets, as suggested by the IT 
Roundtable. Neither has the Resolution led to other measures, beyond those outlined 
in the Uruguay Round agreement, that would improve the EC companies' market 
access.
In the area of telecommunications, however, the EC did maintain, at least 
temporarily, the 3 per cent price preference given to "European" companies7 in the 
allocation of public sector contracts - in line with the IT Roundtable's preferences (IT 
Roundtable, 1991; Dawkins, 3 December 1992). After substantial negotiations with the 
American government, agreement was reached in April 1993 to waive the Article 29 
provisions in the case of American companies bidding for EC government procurement 
contracts in the excluded sectors of transport, water and electricity, in return for a 
gradual elimination of the "Buy American" clauses at the US state level which hamper
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European companies bidding for American government procurement. This waiver, 
however, did not apply to telecommunications (Barber, 23 April 1993:7; Dunne, 22 
April 1993:7; Financial Times. 16 December 1993:4).
Although the Commission did tighten its competition policy in the1 context of 
the completion of the Single European Market (see Chapter 3), by December 1993, the 
EC had not introduced any mechanism to control national incentives on FDI, as 
preferred by the IT Roundtable. The absence of any controls on national incentives to 
inward investment did not reflect a lack of political activity; EECA, for example, 
lobbied for the introduction of a code of conduct. These guidelines, which would apply 
in particular to cases in which financial or other forms of support would be sought 
from a public authority, outlined criteria for the evaluation of inward investment 
proposals - the basic objective being that any inward investment policy should ensure 
the EC's long-term technological and economic interests, without damage to the 
indigenous industry8. Not surprisingly, the guidelines failed to gain acceptance of the 
Commission's directorate for Regional Policy (Interview 31;1993).
Trans European Networks
By December 1993, the demand-stimulating TENs were still in their 
preliminary stages, delayed in part by the slow ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. 
Although a major impetus was given to the realization of the TENs in December 1993, 
when the European Council endorsed the Commission's communication on Growth, 
Competitiveness and Employment, the European Council did not agree with the 
Commission's proposed financing schemes - and particularly the idea to raise ECU 8 
bn on the financial markets through the issue of "Union Bonds" (Dixon, 21 February 
1994:17). Rather, it decided to submit the financing of the Commission's TENs 
initiative for further perusal to a taskforce consisting of high-level Member State
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officials - causing further delays in the implementation of TENs (Barber and Marsh,
11-12 December 1993:1; Dixon, 21 February 1993:17). Only in June 1994, at the
European Summit in Corfu, some hurdles were cleared which could speed up the
implementation of TENs. The European Summit outlined its commitment to financing
the TENS and endorsed the Bangemann Group's report, which stated that the
liberalization of the national telecommunications markets should be accelerated - both
necessary conditions for the realization of the TENs (see Chapter 9; Gardner, 27 June
1994:3; Tucker and Adonis, 28 June 1994:3).
The IT Roundtable companies, which had been involved in the preparation of
the Commission's communication both on a collective and individual basis, appeared
concerned about the financial controversies, but pleased with the provisions on TENs
in the communication. As one IT company executive commented:
[Our company] put together extensive contributions, especially on the Common 
Infrastructure Area and the Trans European Networks. Our ideas have been fed 
into the Commission through interfacing. This has been extremely effective. 
The final version of the [1993] White Paper could have been written by us. It 
is not because of us having more power, but because some of our ideas were 
right and were shared by other companies and the Commission (Interview 
5;1993).
In its communication, the Commission called for a Telecommunications or Information 
Network, which would constitute the "nervous system" of the economy (COM(93)700: 
87-89). This network would not only provide the necessary infrastructure for a 
"common information area" and thus contribute to the completion of the SEM, it 
would also create new demand for IT/telecommunications products (COM(93)700:105- 
114). So far, however, no mention has been made of any form of preferential treatment 
of the European-owned IT companies in the implementation of these networks, as 
recommended by the IT Roundtable - although, in theory, Article 29 could apply.
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4.4.5 CORPORATE POLITICAL INFLUENCE
In contrast to the early and mid-1980s, when the IT Roundtable exerted a 
preponderant influence on ESPRIT (see Chapter 3), the association of the largest, 
European-owned IT companies looked less influential in the early 1990s, for three 
reasons. First, the fact that the Commission's 1991 White Paper fell far short of the IT 
Roundtable's own policy preferences, as expressed in the Roundtable's 1991 position 
papers, appears to indicate that the IT Roundtable was unable to exert a determining 
influence on the development of the Commission's new policy approach towards the 
IT industry. Second, the lack of results of the Council Resolution and the failure of the 
Semiconductor Initiative seem to indicate that the IT Roundtable was unable to 
mobilize adequate support - neither for a more aggressive implementation of the areas 
identified in the White Paper nor for the adoption of more specific support measures 
beyond the scope of the White Paper. Third, the slow implementation of the areas 
identified in the White Paper appear to indicate that the IT Roundtable was unable to 
mobilize sufficient support for a swift implementation of the 1991 White Paper. 
Moreover, the controversies surrounding the funding of the Fourth Framework 
Programme and the TENs seemed to imply that the IT Roundtable was unsuccessful 
in securing the preferred levels of funding.
On the basis of interviews with Community and national government officials, 
corporate executives and representatives and industry/government observers, this thesis 
has indeed found that, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the IT Roundtable was less 
influential than it used to be (Interviews 1,3,4,8,11,12,15,19,26,30,33,39;1993). This 
was the case even in the IT Roundtable's traditional stronghold, namely R&TD 
policies, on which it arguably exercised the greatest influence. As one national 
government official described:
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In the past, there was a close relationship between the Big 12 and the 
Commission, especially in the lead of Davignon. In that time, Davignon asked 
the industry: "give me a paper about what we should do".
Now, the situation has changed. It is more the task of the Commission to give 
some ideas and industry is invited to react. The IT Roundtable still has a good 
influence, but it is a smaller one. [..] The influence of the IT Roundtable is not 
as strong as it was in the beginning (Interview 33; 1993).
Although the loss of influence became only apparent in the early 1990s, in the context
of the Community's White Paper, according to one government official, "the influence
[of the IT Roundtable companies] disappeared after 1987. It was still there in ESPRIT
II, but not afterwards" (Interview 11).
While the companies had been extremely influential in the early and mid-1980s,
by the early 1990s this situation had changed, leading one IT company executive to
conclude that:
The value of the Roundtable has been doubted and has been under discussion - 
even within [our company] (Interview 8; 1993).
4.5 CONCLUSION
Despite the EC's efforts to foster the competitiveness of its IT industry over the 
1980s, by 1990 the situation had not improved. The crisis developing in the IT industry 
over the course of 1990, combined with mounting criticisms regarding the efficacy of 
ESPRIT in improving corporate competitiveness, prompted the European Community 
to develop a new IT policy approach, which would form the basis of a series of 
measures. These measures would complement the Community's ongoing efforts to 
complete the Single European Market and its continued use of trade policy instruments.
In April 1991, the Commission presented its new policy approach identifying 
five areas of policy action, namely: (1) the improvement of the business environment, 
including standardization, (2) the advancement of training, (3) the strengthening of
162
technological mastery and dissemination, including the development of a second 
generation of R&TD projects, (4) the establishment of equitable conditions of 
competition and market access in an open, multilateral international trade system, and 
(5) the stimulation of demand through pan-European infrastructural projects (TENs). 
Although the White Paper was perceived as a step in the right direction by the IT 
Roundtable, the policy approach fell far short of the European IT industry's own policy 
recommendations on the improvement of external trade and investment conditions, the 
stimulation of demand, and the improvement of vertical integration - fuelling the 
impression that the IT Roundtable was unable to exert a determining influence on the 
development of the Commission's new policy approach towards its IT industry.
Not fully satisfied with the White Paper, the IT Roundtable companies pressed 
both the Commission as well as the respective national governments for a more far- 
reaching implementation of the five action areas identified in the White Paper, and for 
specific support measures beyond the scope of the new IT policy approach. The 
Council Resolution of November 1991, which was to provide for a more aggressive 
implementation of the White Paper's provisions on market access, R&TD and demand- 
stimulating projects, could hardly be called a success. Although the Community 
appears to have eased the application of its anti-trust regulations over the early 1990s, 
one could question whether this was due to the Council Resolution. Moreover, no IT 
market access improving measures have resulted from the Resolution beyond the 
establishment of a centralized information point. Additionally, the Semiconductor 
Initiative, which was to provide for specific support measures, never came off the 
ground. In both the case of the Council Resolution as well as the Semiconductor 
Initiative, the IT Roundtable appeared unable to mobilize adequate support for their 
full implementation.
Despite the Council Resolution's call for a swift implementation, implementing
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the White Paper proved to be a time-consuming process - fuelling the impression that 
the IT Roundtable was unable to mobilize sufficient support for immediate action. The 
Fourth Framework Programme, providing for a second generation of IT research, was 
adopted four months after it was supposed to go into effect. By December 1993, no 
substantial progress had been made in opening third country markets for computers and 
semiconductors, beyond the opening provided for by the GATT agreement. Moreover, 
the implementation of TENs had remained in a preliminary stage. Although the IT 
Roundtable did see various of its policy preferences, that were within the scope of the 
White Paper, translated into the new IT R&TD programme and into the TENs, the 
European-owned IT companies seemed unsuccessful in securing the preferred levels 
of funding.
This perception of a loss in influence on the side of the IT Roundtable, even 
in the area of R&TD, was supported by the results of interviews with Community and 
national government officials, corporate executives and representatives, and 
industry/government observers. Although this loss in influence does not imply that, in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, the IT Roundtable was completely ineffective and did 
not exercise any influence, it does imply that the IT Roundtable was less influential 
in that time period than it used to be.
4.6 NOTES
1. Sources: IT company sources, Interviews 8,15;1993; CEC/ERB (1989); Hans
Gunter Danielmeyer, Head Research of Siemens in Sietmann (1993); Mytelka 
(1991:192); Sandholtz (1992:201); Sharp (1990:58).
2. The following discussion of ESPRIT relies on the following sources: IT
company, corporate representative, CEC and national government sources, Interviews 
4,5,8,16,19,26,33,39, 1993; Mytelka (1991:189,207); Sandholtz (1992:188).
3. SEC(91)565:19-26. Other sources: Business Europe, 5 April 1991:6-7; Europe, 
27 March 1991:9; Hill, 27 March 1991:2; Levine, 25 March 1991:48; 1992, 5 April 
1991:5.
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4. Sources: de Jonquieres, 19 June 1991; Dawkins and Skapinker, 11 June 1991; 
Skapinker, 25 October 1991; Dawkins, 15 October 1991:27; DG 3 and IT company 
sources. Interviews 3,8,29; 1993.
5. In Taylor, 17 March 1992.
6. The 1991 bilateral agreement between the EC Commission and the US Justice 
Department to cooperate on anti-trust issues may affect IT market access; it is 
expected, for example, that the 1994 anti-trust deal between Microsoft and the US 
Justice Department/EC Commission will make it easier for competitors of any 
nationality to penetrate the world software market (Financial Times, 19 July 1994). 
The competition agreement, however, does not require the US to alter those aspects 
of its anti-trust policy that might hinder European IT companies in entering the 
American IT market.
7. Article 29 of Council Directive 90/531/EEC of 17 September 1990 outlines that 
a price preference shall be given to those tenders that meet a de facto local content 
requirement; the proportion of the products originating in third countries, as determined 
on the basis of die EC’s rules of origin, should not exceed 50 per cent of the total 
value of the products constituting the tender (OJ L297, 1990).
8. EECA (no date). "Inward Investment: Guidelines on Behalf of the EC 
Electronic Components Industry". Mimeo. Distributed around 1993.
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PART 3
Chapter 5
IMPERATIVES FOR CHANGE:
THE CHANGING ECONOMICS OF THE IT INDUSTRY
Part in  seeks to answer the question why the IT Roundtable has lost some of
1
its political influence over the Community's IT policies in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, using the framework of analysis outlined in Chapter 2. Chapters 5 and 6 focus 
on the changing political economy within which both policy-makers as well as 
companies operate and identify the main structural and short-term changes in the 
production and policy-supply arrangements. Chapters 7 to 9 outline how these changes 
in the IT industry and in Community politics have affected the determinants of 
corporate political influence, i.e.: (1) the political activity undertaken by the IT 
Roundtable members, both individually and as a group, (2) the political weight 
attached by the EC and the national governments to the IT Roundtable's policy 
preferences, and (3) the extent to which the EC and its Member States have been able 
to realize the IT Roundtable's preferences.
This chapter focuses on the changes in the international IT production structure, 
which governs what is produced, how, on what terms, by whom and where. In 
particular, it analyzes the changing economic conditions encountered by the European- 
owned companies in the two segments of the IT industry that are politically most 
sensitive: the semiconductor and the computer industry (see Appendix 1.2). Each 
industry profile consists of three parts. The first part gives a historical overview of the 
main players in the industry until the early 1990s. Supply and demand conditions will 
be outlined in the three main world markets, with a particular focus on European IT 
production and consumption. The second part outlines the major changes taking place 
in the production of semiconductors and computers, including the globalization and 
intensification of competition, rapid technological change, and changes in the size and 
nature of demand (see Chapter 2). The final part discusses the corporate responses to
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these challenges, including the further internationalization of operations and the 
conclusion of M&A and alliances (see Chapter 2).
5.1 THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY
5.1.1 THE PLAYERS
In 1947, the discovery of the transistor at Bell Laboratories "officially 
established the semiconductor industry" (Malerba, 1985:5)*. Over the 1950s, the world 
semiconductor industry expanded rapidly. By the late 1950s, the United States was by 
far the largest producer and consumer of semiconductors, followed by the European 
countries, which had entered the industry in the first half of that decade, and Japan, 
which had started commercial production in the second half (see Figure 5.1). American 
penetration of the European and Japanese markets, however, remained relatively
limited over that period. American entry into the European market was hampered by
the competitive strength of the indigenous European producers, while, in Japan, market 
entry was discouraged by the Japanese government's barriers to foreign entry (Malerba, 
1985:65,69,87-88,136-137,224).
In the 1960s, however, it became clear that the American semiconductor 
industry had enjoyed two major advantages over its European and Japanese 
counterparts over the 1950s: (1) a large and technologically sophisticated domestic 
market and (2) consistent and sizeable government support. The American demand for 
semiconductors had expanded rapidly, driven by public procurement for US defence 
and space programs and by a fast growing computer industry. The size of the market 
had allowed the American producers to yield economies of scale and learning in 
production, and thus to create a competitive edge over Japanese and European
Figure 5.1 World Semiconductor Production, Consumption and
US Dominance in Supplying Markets, 1950s-1960s
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manufacturers. The technologically sophisticated nature of the demand of both the 
military and the computer industry had stimulated progress in semiconductor 
technology, culminating in the development of the integrated circuit (IC). R&D 
subsidies and product refinement contracts provided further support for the American 
semiconductor producers.
In contrast, both European and Japanese producers were supplying smaller and 
less sophisticated markets over the 1950s. The consumer electronics industry, and not 
the computer industry or military, constituted the largest consumer of European2 and 
Japanese semiconductor output. Moreover, government support programmes were either 
absent or limited, while preferential government procurement was small in absolute 
size. As a consequence, by the early 1960s, European and Japanese manufacturers 
trailed the American producers in the more advanced integrated circuit market, both 
competitively and technologically (Malerba, 1985:75-88;224-225).
When the European demand for ICs took off during the second half of the 
1960s, the indigenous European producers were unable to successfully compete with 
their American rivals. Evading Europe's relatively high semiconductor tariffs (see 
Chapter 3) through FDI, American producers established a strong position in the 
European IC market. While in 1960, only 11 per cent of the total French, German and 
British consumption of semiconductors was supplied by imports from the United 
States, by the end of the 1960s, the American share of these markets had increased to 
approximately 40 per cent (Finan in Malerba, 1985:90,105,112; Braun and MacDonald, 
1978:151).
In Japan, the government protected its semiconductor and computer industry not 
only from American imports but also from American inward investment. Import 
barriers took the form of quotas and tariffs. Barriers to inward investment included the 
prohibition of both greenfield as well as majority stake brownfield investments;
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provided they would meet stringent conditions, western companies could only acquire 
a minority stake in a Japanese-based joint venture. Only Texas Instruments succeeded 
in establishing a wholly-owned subsidiary after a transitionary period of joint 
ownership, using its semiconductor technology patents as a bargaining chip (Langlois 
et al., 1988:72-73). Overall, the Japanese barriers to American imports and FDI 
hindered the American penetration of the Japanese market; in 1968, American 
producers accounted for only 10 per cent of the Japanese market (Braun and 
MacDonald, 1978:151; Malerba, 1985:103-110;131,136-137).
Over the 1970s and early 1980s, the American producers maintained their 
dominant position, although their lead shrank over time. Nevertheless, in the early 
1980s, American producers still accounted for more than half of world semiconductor 
production (see Figure 5.2). In Europe, meanwhile, the indigenous semiconductor 
manufacturers had come under increasing competitive pressure. During the price war 
of 1970-1971, most European producers were forced out of mainstream, high volume 
semiconductor production, with the exception of the larger companies Philips (NL), 
Siemens (G), SGS (I), Sescosem (Thomson-CSF) (F) and AEG-Telefunken (G) (Dosi 
1983:185). Despite increasing government support (see Chapter 3), the share of these 
large European-owned companies in world semiconductor production declined from 
approximately 17 per cent in 1975 to 11 per cent in 1985. In contrast, Toshiba, 
Hitachi, Mitsubishi and Fujitsu succeeded in developing an internationally competitive 
semiconductor production capability over those years; Japan's share in world 
semiconductor production rose from 19 per cent in 1975 to 39 per cent in 1985 (see 
Figure 5.2).
This success of the Japanese producers can be explained by three main factors. 
First, in contrast to the European market, the Japanese market continued to be 
protected against both imports and FDI during the late 1960s and early 1970s, when
Figure 5.2 World Semiconductor Production, Consumption and
Trade, 1975-1991
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American investments into the European market were most intensive (Tyson and 
Yoffie, 1993:33). Only in the mid-1970s, the Japanese market gradually opened under 
pressure from the United States3.
Second, the Japanese computer industry developed rapidly over the early 1970s, 
which dramatically increased Japan's demand for the more sophisticated integrated 
circuits. In Europe, meanwhile, the less sophisticated semiconductors (discrete devices) 
continued to account for a disproportionally large share in production. Moreover, in 
Europe, the demand was fragmented; the firms were operating in a larger number of 
smaller, national markets (see Chapter 3).
Third, in the early 1970s, when market liberalization was looming, the Japanese 
government decided to target the semiconductor industry as a strategic industry. 
Industrial development was stimulated through a coherent and consistent programme 
of government coordinated and subsidized collaborative R&D programmes and through 
government procurement, targeting a larger number of competing firms (Malerba, 
1985:205-207). In contrast, the European semiconductor policies were less coherent and 
mostly directed at one national champion (see Chapter 3).
By 1986, Japan had surpassed the United States as the largest producer of 
semiconductors. In the early 1990s, Japan maintained its dominant position, despite the 
resurgence of American producers. The latter was caused by a rapid growth in the US- 
dominated microprocessor segments and by a fall in prices in the Japan-dominated 
memory segments (Tyson, 1992:127; Skapinker, Thomson and Kehoe, 19 March 1991). 
The European semiconductor industry's position stabilized over the 1980s and early 
1990s at approximately 10 per cent of the world market; clearly the third player in an 
industry dominated by Japan and the United States (see Figure 5.2). As will be seen 
in Chapter 9, this situation has affected the Community's bargaining position in 
international semiconductor-related negotiations.
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European firms accounted for less than 1 per cent of the Japanese market, and 
approximately 5 to 6 per cent of the American market (Dataquest in Skapinker, 26 
March 1991; EECA, press-release, October 1993). Even within the European market, 
their core market4, the European firms' did not command a dominant position; their 
market share fell from 45 per cent in 1978 to 38 per cent in 1991. In 1991, over 60 
per cent of European semiconductor demand was supplied by American, Japanese and 
other, mostly South East Asian producers5. Over the 1980s, the market share of the 
American companies fell from over 50 per cent in 1978 to approximately 42 per cent 
in 1991, while the Japanese share increased from a negligible percentage in 1978 to 
20 per cent in 1991 (Dataquest in Nakamoto, 28 May 1992:6). Due to the European 
semiconductor producers' lack of competitiveness, Europe's semiconductor trade 
balance deteriorated and its import and investment penetration ratios increased (see 
Figure 5.2).
Although world production over the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s was 
concentrated in the hands of Japanese and American producers, the industrial structure 
itself showed a reasonable degree of dispersion. In 1992, the top four firms (T4) 
accounted for approximately 30 per cent of world semiconductor revenues. The T4- 
indices for 1972 and 1983 also amounted to 30 per cent, demonstrating the stability 
of the level of concentration in world semiconductor markets over the past two decades 
(Dataquest in Kehoe, 9 February 1993:13; Malerba, 1985:159).
The concentration in the European semiconductor market was higher than the 
concentration in the world market (see Table 5.1), but declining. In 1974, the European 
T4 accounted for over 50 per cent of the market. By 1983, their share had fallen to 39 
per cent. In 1990, the T-4 index totalled 33 per cent (Malerba, 1985:160; EC Panorama 
1992:12-5). The reduction in concentration took place despite the consolidation taking 
place in the European semiconductor industry. In 1987, Thomson-CSF merged its civil
Table 5.1
CONCENTRATION IN THE WORLD AND EUROPEAN SEMICONDUCTOR MARKETS, 1987-1992
Year 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 T20 1987
Concentration in the World Semiconductor Market, 1987-1992
Tl in % 7.7 8.0 N/A 8.8 8.9 N/A 11.5
T4 in % 29.6 28.8 N/A 30.1 30 .4 N/A 39.2
T10 in % 53 .9 54.9 N/A 55.2 57.2 N/A
World Total in $ mn 65587.0 59636E N/A 57213.0 50859.0 N/A T20 : 29219.0
Concentration in the European Semiconductor Market, 1987-1992
Tl in % N/A 10.3 10.8 10.9 N/A N/A 17.6
T4 in % N/A 33.3 35.6 37.5 N/A N/A 46.0
T10 in % N/A 60.4 62.3 68.2 N/A N/A
EUR Market, $ mn N/A 11370.0 12284E 8808.6 N/A N/A T20 : 5495.0
Source: Appendix 5.4
Notes
• The index-values have been calculated by dividing the sum of revenues of respectively the largest (Tl), the 4
largest (T4) or the 10 largest firms (T10) by the cumulative total revenues 
E Estimate based on reverse calculation, through calculating the sum of each Top 10 player's ((sales/market share)
x 100) , and dividing this by 10
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semiconductor operations with SGS Microelettronica. The resulting SGS-Thomson 
subsequently acquired the British semiconductor producer Inmos. In 1989, Plessey was 
jointly taken over by Siemens and GEC; Plessey's semiconductor operations, however, 
were consolidated within GEC (see Appendix 1.1). Plessey, meanwhile, had already 
acquired Ferranti.
5.1.2 PRODUCTION: SHORT-TERM AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES
Since the introduction of the integrated circuit in the early 1960s, the share of 
these devices in world semiconductor production and consumption has been increasing 
at the expense of the less technologically advanced discrete devices (see Figure 5.3). 
At the end of the 1980s, ICs accounted for over 80 per cent of world production and 
consumption.
The American semiconductor companies were the first entrants into IC 
production and have shown a relative bias towards the manufacture of these devices 
ever since. Japanese producers, which were initially heavily biased towards the 
production of discrete devices, rapidly caught up with the American producers during 
the early 1970s - stimulated by the Japanese government and attracted by the 
increasing demand from the fast growing Japanese computer industry. The European- 
owned manufacturers only made a serious attempt to develop an IC production 
capability in the mid-1970s, when it transpired that discrete devices were becoming 
less and less important even in their traditional markets.
The European-owned producers' late entry into IC production has implied that 
the European industry has been relatively biased towards the technologically less 
advanced discrete devices. In 1979, ICs accounted for 36 per cent of European 
production, in comparison to respectively 79 and 60 per cent of American and Japanese
Figure 5.3 Semiconductor Typology
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semiconductor production (Langlois et al, 1988:27). By 1989, this share had increased 
to 72, 88 and 79 per cent respectively (EC Panorama, 1991:12-10).
In particular, the European-owned semiconductor producers have been relatively 
late in developing and producing two key IC product categories: (1) metal oxide 
(MOS) memory ICs, and (2) microprocessors (see Figure 5.3).
MOS Memory ICs
In the early 1990s, memory ICs accounted for approximately 25 per cent of the 
world semiconductor market (Economist, 30 May 1992). Figure 5.3 shows that there 
exist various types of MOS memory chips. This thesis will focus predominantly on the 
dynamic random access memory chip (DRAM), although the following discourse will 
also be applicable to other types of MOS memory devices. The reason for this 
emphasis is that DRAMs account for the largest share of the MOS memory IC market. 
In 1984, for example, DRAMs accounted for 51 per cent of the MOS memory IC 
market, while SRAMs and EPROMs accounted for 18 per cent each. Estimates for 
1991 envisage a 44, 21 and 21 per cent share for DRAMs, SRAMs and EPROMs 
respectively (Langlois et al., 1988:19).
Like SRAMs and EPROMs, DRAMs are standard devices with a wide 
application in computers, office equipment, telecommunications, consumer electronics 
and industrial equipment. The rapid technological progress made in DRAMs, as 
reflected in a quick succession of new generations, have stimulated innovations in 
those industries in which these memories have been incorporated, such as computers. 
The first generation of dynamic random access memory chips, the 1 Kilobit DRAM, 
was introduced to the market by the American producers Intel and Advanced Memory 
Systems in 1970. This was followed by the 4K DRAM in 1973, the 16K in 1976, the 
64K in 1978, the 256K in 1983, the 1 Megabit in 1986, the 4M DRAM in 1989, and
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the 16M DRAM in 1992 (Turner and Hodges, 1993:51).
During the 1980s, DRAMs were considered "technology drivers". As DRAMs 
are high-volume products with relatively simple designs, it was understood that the 
production of DRAMs would yield skills in large scale production process technology 
that could be transferred to more complex, less-standardized, higher value-added chips, 
and thus could help "drive" the producer down a steep learning curve. This, in its turn, 
would improve the "yield" of these semiconductors, i.e. the share of usable 
semiconductors in total output. A better yield would decrease the manufacturing cost 
per semiconductor, and thus improve the competitive position of the company in 
question (Baldwin and Krugman, 1988:173,174; Langlois et al., 1988:16;88; Yoffie, 
1988:84; Tyson, 1992:98; Tyson and Yoffie, 1993:30).
The production of the earlier generations of DRAMs was dominated by 
American semiconductor manufacturers (see Table 5.2). However, by the time that the 
64K DRAM was introduced, Japanese semiconductor producers had reached 
technological and competitive parity with the American suppliers. Their success was 
facilitated by Japanese industrial policies, and notably the VLSI collaborative R&D 
programme of the mid-1970s; government protection allowed Japanese producers the 
time to move down the learning curve and to reach the necessary minimum scale while 
"promotion reduced their risk in making the big capital investments necessary to enter" 
(Tyson, 1992:98). The Japanese producers' success was further facilitated by the 
decision of American producers to cut back capacity in the recession of 1975, which 
led to production shortfalls (Tyson, 1992:97; Fallows, 1994:21-71).
Similarly, the American DRAM producers' response to the recession of the mid- 
1980s played in the hands of the Japanese suppliers. As in the mid-1970s, the cyclical 
fall in consumption and the failure of semiconductor producers to adjust their 
production in line with demand resulted in over-supply. The subsequent fall in prices,
Table 5.2
TOP 10 DRAM PRODUCERS, 1972-1991
1972 (IK) 1975 (4K) 1978 (16K) 1981 (64K) 1984 (256K) 1987 (1M) 1991
TI TI TI Motorola Hitachi Toshiba Toshiba
Motorola Fairchild Motorola TI NEC Hitachi Samsung
Fairchild N .Semicon. N .Semicon. NEC Fuj itsu Mitsubishi Hitachi
RCA Intel Intel Hitachi Toshiba NEC NEC
GE Motorola NEC N .Semicon. ATT Techn. Oki Fuj itsu
N .Semicon. Rockwell Fairchild Toshiba Mitsubishi Fuj itsu TI
GI GI Hitachi Intel Oki TI Mitsub.
Corning RCA Signeticsa Philips TCMC Matsushita Oki
Westinghouse Signeticsa Mostek Fuj itsu TI Micron
American American Toshiba Fairchild Intel Siemens
Sources: Dataquest in Butler and Kehoe, 14 July 1992:17 and Okimoto in The Economist. 2 December 1989:9-10
Notes
a  S i g n e t i c s  w a s  a c q u i r e d  b y  P h i l i p s  i n  1 9 7 5
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exacerbated by vigorous price competition and dumping, forced many American 
producers to withdraw from DRAM production. By the time demand picked up again, 
the American manufacturing capability had contracted to such a degree that the 
remaining American semiconductor producers could no longer keep up with the rise 
in demand. Since DRAMs produced by different manufacturers according to the 
industry standard are near-perfect substitutes, consumers could easily switch from 
American to other sources of supply. The American response of cutting production in 
a downturn, while Japanese manufacturers continued to produce at full capacity, left 
the Japanese firms in the mid-1980s with a firm control over DRAM supplies (Kehoe, 
31 January 1992:12; Wall Street Journal, 22 August 1989; Howell, Benz and Wolff 
1986:249).
In 1990, Japanese producers, notably Toshiba, Hitachi, NEC, Mitsubishi and 
Fujitsu, still accounted for over 60 per cent of world production - despite increasing 
competition from South East Asian producers and, especially, Samsung. In that year, 
American producers accounted for 17 per cent of world production, South East Asian 
producers for 14 per cent, and Siemens - the sole European DRAM manufacturer, for 
4 per cent. In the same year, the larger Japanese firms controlled nearly 50 per cent 
of the EPROM market and a substantial share of the SRAM market (see Figure 5.4).
Microprocessors
In 1971, Intel launched the first commercially developed microprocessor - an 
integrated circuit which includes most or all of the central processing functions of a 
computer on a single chip (see Figure 5.3). The introduction of the 4-bit CISC 
(Complex Instruction Set Computing) microprocessor was followed by the 8-bit 
microprocessor in 1972, the 16-bit in 1974 and the 32-bit in 1982. In the mid-1980s, 
a new type of microprocessor was introduced to the market, the RISC (reduced
Figure 5.4 World Memory and Microprocessor Production by 
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instruction set computing) processor, which is expected to replace the conventional 32- 
bit CISC microprocessor, especially in the smaller computer systems (Langlois et al., 
1988:13; EC Panorama 1991:12-7; Kehoe, 10 November 1992:28).
Microprocessors are standard inputs into a larger number of applications. For 
our purposes, it is particularly important to stress that the introduction of the 
microprocessor has revolutionized the computer industry (see below), through the 
development of the microcomputer. Over the 1970s and 1980s, the application of 
successive generations of microprocessors in computers has allowed computers to 
become smaller and cheaper while improving upon their dataprocessing capabilities, 
thus effectively undermining the larger systems producers (Langlois et al., 1988:21: 
Trainor and Krasnewich, 1992:40-43; Kehoe, 8 March 1993:15). Similarly, the RISC 
processor is expected to increase the performance/cost ratio of future generations of 
microcomputers.
The production of microprocessors has been dominated by American producers, 
notably Intel and, to a lesser extent, Motorola. In 1990, Intel accounted for 53.2 per 
cent of the world microprocessor market, followed by Motorola with 13.3 per cent 
(Dataquest in Tyson, 1992:127). Japanese producers have never been able to establish 
a dominant presence in the microprocessor markets, and have been largely confined to 
manufacturing microprocessors of American design in the context of second source and 
licensing agreements with American producers (Langlois et al., 1988:36). The costs of 
late entry in the production of microprocessors are higher than in the case of DRAM 
manufacturing, reducing the chances that Japanese producers can repeat their DRAM 
success-story in the microprocessor industry (Tyson, 1992:98).
In contrast to DRAMs, microprocessors of different manufacturers are not near- 
perfect substitutes, but are characterized by proprietary designs. Consequently, new 
proprietary designs are unlikely to get accepted by the market when the de facto
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industry standard has already been set; the costs of switching from one design to 
another would be prohibitively high. In the conventional 16 and 32-bit microprocessor 
markets, for example, the Intel design has been the primary industry standard. With the 
exception of Motorola, the microprocessor supplier to Apple, other proprietary designs 
have posed little competitive threat to Intel over the 1980s and most of the early 
1990s. Rather, competition has come from the smaller clone makers, such as Advanced 
Micro Devices (AMD), which undercut the price of Intel's established products. AMD, 
for example, currently accounts for 50 per cent of the Intel 386 market (Ligtenberg, 
23 March 1993:15-16).
The high costs of switching have implied that a new proprietary design 
producer can only enter the market with some chance of success when the product is 
at a relatively early stage in its product life cycle and the industry standard has not yet 
been set. In the case of RISC production, for example, no industry standard has been 
set as yet; various companies, including IBM and DEC, have entered this market and 
are currently competing with each other for consumers of their respective RISC 
variations in order to set the standard.
In 1990, the larger American producers accounted for more than 70 per cent of 
the world production of microprocessors, in comparison to 9 per cent for the larger 
Japanese producers and 2.3 per cent for SGS-Thomson, the only European-owned 
microprocessor manufacturer of any significance (see Figure 5.4). The American 
companies' first-mover advantages and their restrictive licensing policies towards their 
Japanese partners appear to have contained effectively the competitive threat posed by 
Japanese producers in this product segment. Moreover, it has allowed them to develop 
new generations before clone producers would be able to copy the then prevailing 
generation (Skapinker, Thomson and Kehoe, 19 March 1991).
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The European-owned Semiconductor Producers' Legacy o f Late Entry
The European-owned semiconductor producers' late entiy into both memory and 
microprocessor production has implied that the firms have not been able to benefit 
from first-mover advantages. These play an important role in an industry, characterized 
by high entry barriers in the form of high fixed costs, scale and learning economies, 
and proprietary standards, and by substantial price competition and shortening product 
life cycles.
The manufacturing of ICs involves large and rising investments in R&D, plants 
and machinery. The initial capital investment required to set up a new semiconductor 
plant, for example, increased from approximately $ 2 mn in the 1960s to at least $150 
mn at the end of the 1980s (Dicken, 1992:320). The next generation of wafer 
fabrication plants is expected to cost between $ 800 mn and $ 1 bn per factory (Kehoe, 
9 February 1993). Similarly, R&D costs have escalated; while the development of the 
4M DRAM involved an investment of $ 250 mn in R&D, the 16M DRAM requires 
$ 850 mn (NRC, 15 July 1992:15). The development of the future generation of 
memory chips, the 256M DRAMs, is expected to cost $ 1 bn (Causey, 12 October 
1993:11). In contrast, the variable costs of IC production have been relatively low. 
Even labour costs, the largest variable cost item, can be reduced through either 
automatization or assembly in low-wage countries. The costs of raw materials (silicon), 
operations, distribution and marketing incurred in producing one additional device are 
said to total $ 1 per chip (Economist, 22 November 1986).
Faced with high fixed costs and low variable costs, semiconductor producers 
have an incentive to maximize sales on a global scale, as this would allow them to 
recuperate the high initial costs of investment, and reduce their cost per unit through 
exploiting economies of scale and learning. In a market, which has been characterized 
by price-based competition, the most effective strategy to increase market share is to
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undercut the competitors' prices up to the level where the price equals the producer's
variable costs (Economist, 22 November 1986).
Although prices have been rising occasionally, following cyclical upturns and
government intervention in the form of tariffs, anti-dumping duties, price accords and
import and export agreements (see Chapters 3 and 4), this cost-competition strategy has
turned memory ICs and the older generations of microprocessors into commodities
characterized by ample supply and low prices. As the Economist (2 December 1989:9-
10) illustrates in the case of memory ICs:
At its peak in 1978, the 4K [DRAM] was being produced at a rate of 100 mn 
units a year and priced at 50 cents a kilobit. By 1978, the 16K DRAM had 
become the standard memory chip. Three years later, some 200 mn pieces were 
being produced annually for about ten cents a kilobit. [..] At peak production 
[of the 64K DRAM], in 1984, more than 800 mn pieces a year were spilling 
out of the semiconductor industry's 'fab' plants. [..] By 1985, prices [for the 
256K DRAM] had plummeted below one cent a kilobit.
However, this strategy has one great disadvantage; prices may be driven down
to the level where companies cannot recuperate their initial investments and/or finance
future investments. This has been particularly the case in the memory segments. This
problem has been aggravated by shortening product life cycles; newer generations with
improved performance/cost ratios have been introduced in a rapid sequence at ever
lower price differentials, leaving producers less and less time to recoup their fixed
costs before a new generation hits the market. In the case of DRAMs, for example,
new generations should be introduced at premium prices of 30 to 40 times the price
of the mainstream devices. Under the pressure of competition, however, they are
launched at far smaller price differentials (Economist, 23 February 1991:66).
Under these conditions, moving first allows a company to develop a lead on
the learning curve and, thus, establish a cost-advantage towards its competitors. A
subsequent build-up in volume of production allows it to exploit economies of scale
and further reduce the per unit costs, thus increasing its chances to record a profit on
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its operations. The initial lack of competition allows the company to sell products at 
premium prices before increased competition drives prices down. In the microprocessor 
markets, this period of premium pricing has been relatively long, as clone 
microprocessor producers have been trailing the market leaders substantially. Finally, 
in the case of microprocessors, the establishment of a large market share or even a 
monopoly position allows the first-mover to turn its product into the industry standard. 
This, in turn, will secure a demand for the producer's product and/or its technology.
The European producers had none of the above first-mover advantages. 
Consequently, the European manufacturers were unable to conquer a large share of the 
market and build up large volumes with all the associated benefits (see Figure 5.4). 
This occurred not only in the world market, but also in companies' home markets 
which, in contrast to Japan, had not been heavily protected against foreign direct 
investment.
The competitive difficulties faced by the European-owned semiconductor 
producers was further aggravated by regional and company-specific demand factors. 
Company-specific reasons comprise, inter alia, lack of strategic insight and poor 
management. Philips' Megabit project, for example, illustrates the consequences of 
Philips' unfortunate choice for SRAMs, the difficulties of developing rather than 
buying the technology necessary for an inhouse production capability, and the 
disproportional importance attached by the highest management levels to prestige over 
profitability (see Metze, 1991:290-293). Regional-specific factors include the 
fragmentation of the European market, the weak demand from Europe's small and 
technologically trailing computer industry (see above), the falling demand from the 
semiconductor industry's largest consumer, the consumer electronics industry, and the 
comparatively high costs of capital and labour (see Figure 5.5)6. According to Heinz 
Hagmeister, Head of Philips' semiconductor division,
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The same [semiconductor] plant, of the same size, making the same product in 
the same production volumes will have 10 to 20 per cent higher costs in 
Europe than its identical sisters in the US and Japan, and more than 30 per cent 
higher costs than an identical plant in a newly industrialized country (quoted 
in Nakamoto, 16 November 1992).
Despite the support of their respective home governments, all of <the above 
made it very difficult for the European firms to turn their large R&D and capital 
investments in semiconductors into successful commercial ventures, as the following 
will show.
Philips started developing advanced memory chips in 1984, when it began 
cooperating with Siemens in the government-subsidized Megabit project (see Table 
3.2). In this attempt to catch up, Philips chose to develop the static random access 
memory chip, which is particularly suitable for consumer electronics applications. In 
hindsight, this proved to be the wrong move. Not only did the demand for SRAMs 
develop below expectations, also the competition in this market turned out to be 
suffocating, as most late-entrants into the MOS memory IC market had opted for 
SRAMs rather than DRAMs (Metze, 1991:290,294). Although the project was a 
technological success - by 1987, Philips had developed a functioning 1M SRAM chip 
and by 1989, the company had started to produce the 64 and 256K SRAMs -, 
financially the project proved to be extremely costly. In 1989, the costs of the Megabit 
project allegedly totalled 1 mn guilders a day (Metze, 1991:293-294) (see Figure 5.5).
Siemens, meanwhile, had opted for the development of dynamic random access 
memories, which the company could use for application in its computer range. 
Realizing that the investments in memory technology could only pay off if the 
company would be able to reduce its innovation time-span and enter the market 
quickly, Siemens decided to secure access to the latest technology through an alliance 
with Toshiba (Metze, 1991:291-292). In 1988, when demand for 1M DRAMs rose, 
Siemens brought its version to the market and managed to capture approximately 4 per
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cent of world demand (1990). Yet, this success was reached at a high cost. According 
to a Siemens' official, the group has been making a loss for every DRAM it sells 
(Nakamoto, 2 September 1992:15) (see Figure 5.5).
Like Siemens and Philips, SGS-Thomson sought to develop its presence in the 
memory chip markets. By the turn of the decade, SGS-Thomson had succeeded in 
establishing its position in the world EPROM markets with a solid share of 7 per cent 
(1990). SGS-Thomson also succeeded in establishing a share, albeit small, in the world 
SRAM markets; its SRAM sales, boosted by the acquisition of Inmos, totalled S 49 
mn or about 12 per cent of the European SRAM market. This, however, compares 
favourably with Philips' SRAM sales of $ 3 mn (Dataquest in Tyson, 1992:125 and in 
Skapinker and van de Krol, 5 September 1990). SGS-Thomson's attempts to develop 
a DRAM production capability were less successful; by 1990, it had not been able to 
fmd a partner to share the costs of R&D and capital investments (Skapinker, 25 
October 1990).
The acquisition of Inmos also endowed SGS-Thomson with a microprocessor 
production capability. While Siemens and Philips have remained dependent on second- 
source agreements with respectively Intel and Motorola for their production of 
microprocessors, the Inmos acquisition has given SGS-Thomson access to the 
transputer - a microprocessor which is currently as fast as DEC's RISC variation (Cane, 
30 March 1993:19). In 1990, SGS-Thomson held 2.3 per cent of the world market. 
Although SGS-Thomson's was thus successful in establishing a presence in both 
memory and microprocessor segments, its operations were loss-making for most of the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. Only in 1992, helped by a resurgence in demand, the 
company returned to the black (see Figure 5.5).
In conclusion, by 1990, the semiconductor operations of all large, European- 
owned semiconductor producers were loss-making (see Figure 5.6). This constitutes a
Figure 5.6 Performance of the European-Owned Semiconductor 
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significant development as it affected the policy preferences of the European-owned 
IT companies, their effort put into political activity, and the weight attached to their 
policy preferences (see Chapters 7,8).
1
5.1.3 CORPORATE RESPONSES
The substantial losses made on semiconductor production prompted the 
European-owned semiconductor producers to implement restructuring programmes and 
alter their strategies. Attempts by Siemens, Philips and SGS-Thomson to return to the 
black can be organized as follows: (1) reorganization of operations; (2) reduction of 
labour force; (3) return to core activities; (4) retargeting production from the general 
purpose, mainstream memory and logic chips to the semi-customized application 
specific integrated circuits (ASICs); and (5) accelerated internationalization of 
operations, including the conclusion of cross-border mergers, acquisitions and 
alliances7. These actions will be discussed in greater detail, as they have affected the 
political influence of the European-owned IT companies and their interest groups (see 
Chapters 7 to 9).
Reorganizations
In order to improve their profitability, all European-owned semiconductor 
producers introduced changes in their management and financial organization to 
streamline their operations, reduce their costs and improve their efficiency. With the 
exception of the changes implemented by SGS-Thomson following its merger (see 
Appendix 1.1), the measures introduced by the European-owned IT companies are 
discussed in greater detail in the context of the computer industry.
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Reduction o f Labour Force
The most politically sensitive measures taken in the context of the companies' 
restructuring programmes have been the reductions in the companies' semiconductor- 
related employment. At SGS-Thomson, for example, the labour force shrank! by 16 per 
cent (3472 employees) over the years 1990-1992. Philips' withdrawal from SRAM 
production and its cost-reduction in the context of Operation Centurion (see Appendix 
1.1) caused a loss of 7000 out of the 27,000 jobs in its semiconductor division - a 
member of the product group Components and Semiconductors. Similarly, Siemens has 
trimmed its semiconductor labour force.
Return to Core Activities
In 1990, Philips announced that it would halt the production of SRAMs and 
that it would withdraw from a JESSI programme aimed at developing the 16 and 64M 
memory IC (see Chapter 4). By doing so, Philips resigned as a player in both current 
as well as future general purpose RAM markets, as the entry barriers, especially in the 
form of the knowledge acquired from leaming-by-doing, could hamper any such move. 
Philips' withdrawal from the SRAM production had only a marginal impact on its 
sales; SRAMs did not even account for 1 per cent of Philips’ total component sales8. 
Yet, it dramatically improved the financial health of Philips' remaining semiconductor 
and component operations (see Figure 5.5 and van de Krol, 6 August 1993:15).
Siemens also announced its intention to reduce its concentration on memory 
production, albeit in a more gradual manner. In June 1992, Siemens decided to 
withdraw from its agreement with IBM to build a 64M DRAM production facility, on 
the grounds that Siemens did not seek to be "a major player in the DRAM market after 
the 16-megabit." (Siemens sources, Financial Times. 19 June 1992:26). Siemens' 
decision may seem surprising, considering the fact that Siemens has been the only
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European-owned producer to catch up and secure a share in the world DRAM market. 
Yet, Siemens has been deriving less than 3 per cent of its semiconductor sales from 
its 1M DRAM deliveries9 and these operations have been heavily loss-making.
SGS-Thomson, however, has continued to focus on the mainstream memory and 
microprocessor segments - regarding those as its core business. Beyond the strategic 
importance attached to its operations by the larger Thomson group, SGS-Thomson's 
drive towards a greater presence in the memory and microprocessor segments in all 
areas of the Triad reflect its intention to avoid a situation in which it is too large to 
be a niche player, but too small to operate profitably in the mainstream of the market. 
With less than $ 2 bn in sales and less than 5 per cent of the world semiconductor 
market10, SGS-Thomson will have to continue increasing its turnover and profitability 
in order to yield the necessary funds for reinvestment (Skapinker, 25 October 1991; 
Causey, 12 October 1993:11).
Shift towards ASICs
The decision of Siemens and Philips to reduce their presence in dynamic or 
static RAM production reflects a general shift in emphasis in production away from 
mainstream memory chips to the more profitable, application specific integrated 
circuits (ASICs). Despite its continued focus on mainstream memory production, SGS- 
Thomson has also increased its emphasis on ASICs.
The European-owned semiconductor producers currently have a greater share 
in the production of ASICs than in any other IC segment (EC Panorama, 1991:12-11). 
Nevertheless, their position in the ASIC segment is not without concern. According to 
EECA sources, the current lack of advanced consumer applications within Europe 
limits the demand for highly advanced semiconductors (Interview 31;1993).
In the context of the shift from DRAMs to ASICs, the necessity of mass
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production of the technology-driving DRAMs has been re-assessed. It has been argued 
that the value in the semiconductor industry is not longer a function of the industry's 
mass-manufacturing processes but a function of specialization. As, for example, 
Rappaport and Halevi (1991:73) argue: "specialization depends on responsive design, 
not on high-volume, low-cost production". Philips' decision to withdraw from SRAM 
production can be interpreted in that light. It allowed the company to concentrate on 
the wide range of more specialized, higher value-added ASICs, utilising the knowledge 
acquired in the development of SRAMs. Similarly, Siemens' intention to withdraw 
from future DRAM production can be seen as a reassessment of the need to produce 
DRAMs.
Siemens, however, did not give up its capability to develop DRAMs, as 
illustrated by the conclusion of an alliance with IBM and Toshiba to develop the 256M 
DRAM chip for S 1 bn in July 1992, shortly after it announced its intention to 
withdraw from future DRAM production. Possibly Siemens believes that the skills 
acquired from developing DRAMs are still important for developing and manufacturing 
ASICs (Financial Times. 19 June 1992:26; Siemens Annual Report, 1992:22). 
However, even a technological capability in DRAMs or other memories may no longer 
necessary to maintain a presence in ASICs. While the previous generations of DRAMs 
used to precede the equivalent generations of ASICs by more than a year, currently the 
gap has become much smaller. According to DG 3 sources, this implies that 
increasingly a producer can use ASIC lithography to maintain technological leadership 
rather than having to depend on a transfer of know-how from the development and 
production of DRAMs (Interview 3; 1993).
Internationalization, Mergers and Acquisitions, and Alliances
The European-owned semiconductor producers, like most other semiconductor
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manufacturers, have been internationalizing their operations and have been concluding 
cross-border mergers, acquisitions (M&A) and alliances. Internationalization allows 
firms to establish their production and sales operations in those locations where costs 
and risks are minimized and/or where considerations of market access and presence are 
making direct investment imperative. M&A and alliances offer companies the 
opportunity to share the costs and risks involved in R&D and to speed up innovations, 
to get access to complementary assets, including market channels and technology, to 
establish the necessary scale and to secure demand for the firms' own products (see 
Figure 5.7).
The world semiconductor industry is one of the most internationalized 
industries; semiconductor production has been organized on a world wide basis 
(Dicken, 1992:330). The general investment pattern has been to move the labour- 
intensive assembly and testing stages to the developing countries, characterized by their 
low labour costs and more flexible labour practices (offshore-assembly). In some cases, 
however, the assembly and testing stages have been moved to industrialized countries, 
when access-to-market considerations made such "point-of-sale" assembly and testing 
operations imperative.
In contrast, the capital-intensive, R&D-intensive and high value-added stages 
in the production process, namely the design and generation of photomasks and the 
fabrication of wafers, including the etching of electronic circuits on the surface of the 
silicon wafers (diffusion), have been located in the home country and in industrialized 
host countries. Investments in complete manufacturing in industrialized countries other 
than the home country have been prompted by both political pressures exerted by host 
governments as well as by commercial imperatives. Political imperatives include the 
threat of exclusion from the market in question unless the foreign semiconductor 
producers upgrade their investments. Commercial imperatives include the need to
Figure 5.7 Main Motives for Alliances in the Semiconductor 
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follow the semiconductor users abroad in order to secure their buyer-supplier 
relationships, or the need to interact closely with the semiconductor users, particularly 
when it concerns ASICs (Dicken, 1992; Flamm, 1990; Langlois et al., 1988; Skapinker, 
26 March 1991; UNCTC, 1986).
In comparison to their American and Japanese counterparts, the large, 
European-owned semiconductor companies have been far less "internationalized"; their 
global production networks appear modest in comparison to those of their American 
and, even, their Japanese counterparts (see Figure 5.8; Dicken, 1992:334). The 
European semiconductor producers' investments in POS assembly operations or 
complete manufacturing abroad, for example, have been limited; over recent years 
European firms were involved in only two FDI deals into American semiconductor 
operations, in comparison to over 40 deals concluded by Japanese companies 
(Nakamoto, 7 August 1992:4). This is not surprising considering the companies' small 
share of the main non-European semiconductor markets, i.e. the American and 
Japanese markets.
Figure 5.8, however, does not reveal that Philips, Siemens and SGS-Thomson 
did move the majority of their labour-intensive semiconductor testing and assembly 
operations to developing countries for cost-competitiveness reasons. While, in 1988, 
the diffusion of only 6 per cent of the companies' ICs sold in the European market 
took place abroad, 63 per cent of the European firms' ICs sold in the European market 
were tested and assembled outside of the Community (Flamm, 1990:267-271).
While European investments in the US and Japan have remained limited, 
American and Japanese producers have invested substantially in the European 
Community, notably since the announcement of the EC's Single European Market 
programme (see Chapter 3). In many cases, these foreign firms benefitted from 
government investment incentive schemes. The main recipients of these inward
Figure 5.8 Share of ICs Produced Offshore in Total IC 
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investments were Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Germany. American companies 
have invested more heavily in complete manufacturing than in assembly and testing 
facilities; in 1988, 43 per cent of US companies' ICs sold in Europe were diffused in 
Europe, while 24 per cent was assembled locally. Japanese companies, by contrast, 
have been biased towards investments in assembly facilities; in 1988, 39 per cent of 
their ICs sold in Europe were assembled locally, while only 5 per cent was diffused 
within Europe (Dicken, 1992:332-335; Flamm, 1988:271). Following the change in the 
Community's rules of origin (see Chapter 9), Japanese companies have been prompted 
to upgrade their European production facilities.
In the process of internationalization, semiconductor companies have concluded 
an increasing number of cross-border M&A and alliances. Forced by the increasing 
costs and risks of production and their reduced profitability, companies have become 
more willing to cooperate on issues, central to their business strategy (DG 12 sources, 
Interview 26; 1993).
In addition to cooperation amongst European producers, notably in the context 
of ESPRIT and JESSI (see Chapter 3), the European-owned semiconductor companies 
have continued and intensified their cooperation with foreign semiconductor 
companies, as, for example, Siemens' alliances with Toshiba and IBM on DRAM 
technology exemplify. In their choice of partners, the European-owned semiconductor 
producers have displayed a preference for American over Japanese or other Asian 
partners. Between January 1980 and July 1986, 38 major cooperation agreements were 
concluded involving European semiconductor producers. Nearly 60 per cent of these 
agreements involved a partnership between a European and an American company; 
only 24 per cent involved an alliance with a Japanese firm (van Tulder and Junne, 
1988:234-243; see also Haklish in Langlois et al., 1988:84). The cultural proximity of 
American management and a shared threat perception concerning Japanese companies,
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may have contributed to the European-owned companies' preferences for American 
partners.
5.2 THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY
5.2.1 THE PLAYERS
The modem computer industry has its foundation in the development of the first 
electronic digital computer by American and British research teams in the early post­
war period11. At the end of the 1940s, Britain rivalled the American computer 
research and development capabilities. Moreover, Britain's employment of computers 
was roughly equal to that of the United States. By 1950, the United Kingdom had an 
estimated three electronic digital computers in use, while the United States employed 
two devices (Flamm, 1988:135).
Yet, over the 1950s, Britain quickly lost ground to the rapidly growing US 
industry. During the 1950s, the American market for computers boomed while 
European and Japanese demand increased at a far slower pace (see Figure 5.9). When 
demand took off in the European and Japanese markets in the 1960s, the American 
firms, benefitting from substantial government R&D support, fiscal incentives, and 
sizeable military procurement (Flamm, 1987:93-124), sought to take advantage of their 
competitive strength in the Japanese and European market.
In the European market, where the indigenous commercial computer industry 
was relatively uncompetitive12 and barriers to trade and investment comparatively 
low13, the large American producers managed to establish themselves and increase 
their market share. By the time that the European governments responded to this 
"American Challenge" with R&D subsidies and preferential government procurement
Figure 5.9 World Computer Production, Consumption and US
Dominance in Supplying Markets, 1950s-1960s
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(see Chapter 3), IBM and the "Bunch"14 had already consolidated their market 
positions; their share had increased from 45 per cent in 1961 to 59 per cent in 1971 
(see Figure 5.9; Flamm, 1988:134-171; 1987:154).
The American firms encountered more difficulties to establish a solid position 
in the Japanese market. In contrast to the European governments, the Japanese 
government had sealed off the Japanese market during the 1950s; it imposed stringent 
barriers to imports and inward investments. IBM, as the market leader in computers, 
was the only foreign computer company allowed to operate through a wholly-owned 
subsidiary in Japan, in exchange for Japanese producers obtaining the right to use 
certain IBM patents (Flamm, 1988:181-182).
Like the European governments, Japan also resorted to public policies to 
stimulate the performance of its computer industry during the 1960s (see Chapter 3). 
In contrast to the European policies, however, the Japanese policy package targeted a 
small group of competing, commercially-oriented computer firms rather than one 
national champion. As a consequence, the Japanese computer firms were never shielded 
from competition. Moreover, in contrast to the European governments, the Japanese 
government simultaneously targeted computers and semiconductors, recognizing the 
mutual interdependence existing between the two industries; computer producers would 
benefit from a competitive semiconductor industry while semiconductor producers 
would benefit from the computer industry's sizeable and sophisticated demand for ICs. 
Finally, in contrast to the European producers, the Japanese IT firms benefitted from 
an unfragmented market (Flamm, 1987:126-131; 1988:172-202; Howell, Benz and 
Wolff, 1986:240-242).
As a consequence of this strategy, the share of American producers in the 
Japanese market declined from 56 per cent in 1961 to 32 per cent in 1971, with IBM 
accounting for the majority of this share (Malerba, 1985:137) (see Figure 5.9). By the
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time Japan liberalized its computer market, its companies were strong enough to face 
the test of competition15.
By the mid-1970s, American companies still supplied nearly 90% of the world 
computer market (Malerba, Torrisi and von Tunzelmann, 1991:96, 107-108)t From the 
mid-1970s onwards, however, their dominance was challenged by Japanese companies. 
By 1992, the American producers' share had fallen to roughly 63 per cent, while the 
Japanese share had risen to over a quarter of world production (see Figure 5.10). These 
trends have also been reflected in the various segments of processing hardware: 
mainframes, minicomputers, and micros (Malerba, Torrisi and von Tunzelmann, 
1991:104). Notably in the mainframe market did the American producers' preponderant 
position erode under the competitive pressures of Japanese firms (see Figure 5.11).
Meanwhile, the rise in the share of the European computer industry in world 
production over the late 1970s and early and mid-1980s had come to a halt. While in 
1987, European producers still accounted for 17 per cent of world production, by 1993, 
the European share had declined to 9 per cent. Within the European market, the 
European producers' main market16, the companies supplied approximately 30 per cent 
of demand. The majority of Europe's consumption was supplied by American firms17. 
Not surprisingly, Europe's negative balance in computer trade deteriorated over time 
(see Figure 5.10). European firms only accounted for marginal shares in the American 
(4%) and Asian (3%) markets (Gartner Group in Gomes-Casseres, 1993:94). As in 
semiconductors, the European computer producers remained small actors in the world 
markets - a situation which has compromised the EC's bargaining position in 
negotiations on computer-related issues (see Chapter 9).
Following the rise of non-American producers as well as smaller American 
start-ups, the concentration in the world computer industry fell from 65 per cent in 
1975 to approximately 50 per cent in the late 1980s (McKinsey in Economist, 22
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December 1990:94). Despite the preponderance of IBM18, the world computer 
industry was not overly concentrated over the period 1987-1993, although considerably 
more so than the semiconductor industry (see Tables 5.1,5.3). Moreover, the degree of 
concentration in the world computer industry remained relatively stable over that 
period, thus refuting foregone conclusions that developments taking place in the 
processing hardware segments (see below) would inevitably lead to a further 
concentration of the world computer industry19 (see Table 5.3).
In comparison to the world market, the European market showed a slightly 
higher degree of concentration; in 1991, the largest four suppliers to the European 
market accounted for a 60 per cent share of the European market in comparison to a 
T4 index of 54 per cent for the world market. The European T4 index remained 
surprisingly stable over the late 1980s and early 1990s, despite take-over activities 
taking place. In 1990, Siemens took over Nixdorf. In the same year, Fujitsu acquired 
ICL which, in its turn, took over Nokia Data. In 1991, Philips and Mannesmann sold 
their computer divisions to Digital Equipment. Nevertheless, these take-overs did not 
consolidate supply.
5.2.2 PRODUCTION: SHORT-TERM AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES
The leading American computer manufacturers as well as their Japanese and 
European counterparts specialized initially in producing mainframe computers, i.e. 
large, expensive and high performance computers. In the mid-1960s, however, a 
number of new firms, mostly American, entered the computer market. These firms 
specialized in minicomputers, i.e. mid-range sized, lower priced computers with a 
smaller processing speed and storage capacity than the mainframes. From the mid- 
1970s onwards, another wave of new companies entered the market. Their operations
Table 5.3
CONCENTRATION IN THE WORLD AND EUROPEAN COMPUTER MARKETS, 1987-1993
Year 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987
Concentration in the World Computer Market, 1987 -1993
Tl in % 18.6 20.3 21.7 24.1 23 .8 22.6 24.2
T4 in % 34.6 35.9 38.5 37.7 37.8 36.5 37.5
T10 in % 52.7 54 .2 56.1 55.1 55.0 53 .1 54.2
T100 in $ mn 337997.9 317993.3 289921.6 278511.6 255773.3 243122.4 208881.9
Concentration in the European Computer Market, 1987-1993
Tl in % N/A N/A 34.7 36.0 33 .4 N/A 34 .2
T4 in % N/A N/A 60.4 59.9 56.7 N/A 57.1
Cum. T20 in $mn N/A N/A 72365.1 74513.3 63718.7 N/A 53670.3
Source: Appendix 5.9.
Notes
• The index-values have been calculated by dividing the sum of revenues of respectively the largest (Tl), the 4 
largest (T4) or the 10 largest (T10) firms by the cumulative total revenues. Ideally, the indexes should be 
calculated as a share of the total world/European/European-grown production. Unfortunately, compatible data was 
not available.
were in microcomputers, i.e. hardware that is relatively small and low-priced and offers 
a relatively low performance in comparison to the larger mainframe and mid-range 
systems (see Figure 5.12). Although mini and microcomputers initially were not 
competing with mainframes, over time, these computers substantially undermined the 
demand for mainframes.
Over the last two decades, rapid technological change in both the architecture 
of the computer20 and in its components21 has resulted in the development of 
increasingly smaller, cheaper and more powerful devices. With every improvement, 
new applications have sprung up in all product segments from micros to mainframes, 
and new sources of demand have been tapped. Yet, the performance, cost and size of 
the smaller systems has improved faster than the performance, cost and size of the 
larger systems (see Figure 5.13; Malerba, Torrisi and von Tunzelmann, 1991:97). This 
differential rate of technological change in the computer product segments has resulted 
in the erosion of the existing markets for the larger systems. Microcomputers, and 
especially the low cost, high performance workstations, have begun to compete with 
the larger mainframes and minis in segments that were originally considered to be the 
latter's application areas (Malerba, Torrisi and von Tunzelmann, 1991:98).
Faced with cheaper alternatives, large computer consumers, such as 
governments, have been switching their demand from the larger to the smaller systems 
- first, from mainframes to minis; more recently, from mid-range to microsystems. As 
a result, the smaller systems have grown in relative importance in the world markets 
at the cost of mainframes and minis (see Figure 5.14)22.
With the shift in production from the larger to the smaller systems, the 
profitability of producing processing hardware has substantially declined. Rather than 
gross profit margins of 60 per cent, as was common in the case of producing 
proprietary mainframes and minis, the industry's margins declined to 20-30 per cent
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or less in the early 1990s (Cane, 7 April 1992:1; de Jonquieres, 23 April 1991:XIII). 
Three main reasons underlie this fall in profitability, namely (1) the commoditization 
of the smaller computer systems, intensifying competitive pressures (2) the trend 
towards standardization, and (3) changes in the size and nature of consumer demand.
Commoditization
The costs of producing PCs and workstations are considerably lower than the 
cost of manufacturing mainframes or minicomputers. While the estimated cost of a 
mainframe computer lies around the 54000 dollars per MIPS, the cost of a PC is 
estimated to be 140 dollars per MIPS (Gamer Group in Malerba, Torrisi and von 
Tunzelmann, 1991:98). With the reduction in production costs, the barriers to entry 
into the industry have been lowered as well (Cane, 29 October 1992:16; Taylor, 18 
November 1992: 21. As Cane (7 April 1992:1) outlines, any producer can quite simply 
manufacture a cheap PC without any need for heavy expenditure in R&D, through 
combining a high performance microprocessor chip and some standard operating 
software. The resulting increase in competition has turned PCs and workstations into 
commodities; microcomputers have become both widely available at relatively low 
prices. Albeit a favourable development for consumers, the continuous downward 
pressure on the sales price of the smaller systems, culminating into annual price 
reductions of 25 to 40 per cent (Cane, 7 April 1992:1), has reduced the profit margins 
of the suppliers of the smaller systems.
Standardization
The trend towards the "commoditization" of microcomputers has been 
accelerated by the increasing standardization in both hardware and software. Until 
recently, most computer manufacturers developed their products according to their
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own, proprietary standards, which diverged from those of their competitors. Consumers, 
in other words, were effectively locked into using one supplier, as the costs associated 
with switching suppliers were prohibitively high. This offered the computer producers 
the benefit of having a secure market in which they could charge relatively high prices. 
This, in turn, facilitated the recuperation of the large R&D investments involved in 
developing the systems.
Since the mid-1980s, however, an increasing number of computer manufacturers 
has introduced products in line with non-proprietary standards, despite the apparent 
disadvantages associated with the introduction of "open" systems. Adherence to non­
proprietary standards would not only reduce the costs of switching between one 
supplier and another, but also lower the entry barriers to the industry, as systems based 
on standard components involve far lower development costs than those based on 
proprietary standards. As a result, competitive pressures would increase. The increasing 
importance of non-proprietary standards in the computer industry, however, can be 
explained by (1) the influence exercised by the large computer users in business and 
government, and (2) the advantages that adherence to such standards might yield to 
computer producers.
User Advantages. Computer consumers have been interested in open standards 
for the following two reasons. First, with the rise of networks of smaller, yet more 
powerful computers, the risks associated with using only one supplier have increased. 
As a CEN standardization officer explains:
It is not possible any more to be stuck with one manufacturer. The latter would 
have to anticipate all possible linkages between the hardware and operating 
systems of different manufacturers (Interview 2; 1993).
The need for greater compatibility between products from various manufacturers has
thus become more and more apparent. Second, the tighter financial constraints and the
need to obtain value for money (see below) has further emphasized the benefits of
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standardization; non-proprietary products would not only reduce the risk of investing 
in incompatible products, but would also bring down the total expenditures on 
computer purchases, as standardized products involve lower development and 
production costs.
Convinced about the benefits of standardization, large consumers, such as 
business and governments, have been translating their support for non-proprietary 
standards into their procurement requirements. The European Community, for example, 
has adopted a decision stating that the M/S governments should base their public 
procurement orders for IT on international and/or European "open" IT standards (see 
Chapter 3). This has had a major impact on the European-owned IT companies, as 
public procurement, mostly confined to European sources, has been accounting for 
approximately 20 per cent of all IT spending in the EC, thus constituting a significant 
source of their demand23.
Producer Advantages. In addition, computer producers have been interested in 
standardization as adherence to non-proprietary standards might yield advantages that 
counterbalance the disadvantages faced by the computer producers24. The most 
apparent motive for participating in standardization is that standardization secures a 
market share for companies that would otherwise have limited sales' prospects.
In an industry, where producers incur high and growing investments in R&D 
while these costs need to be recuperated in ever shorter time periods and under severe 
competitive pressures, securing a market share is of great importance as it creates an 
opportunity to recoup the costs of investment. As long as the larger manufacturers have 
a dominant share of the market, set the de facto industry standard, or have a large and 
growing market share for its proprietary products, the standardization effort will be 
hampered by difficulties; it is most advantageous for these producers to continue 
pursuing a strategy of differentiation rather than standardization, as such a strategy
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would maximize the manufacturer's earnings. IBM, for example, refused to joint the
Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) movement prior to 1988.
When the market shares of the main, larger competitors are more or less equal,
however, the manufacturers may opt for standardization as a strategy for regulating the
market. According to a CENELEC official,
Standards will not appear before the market shares of the larger companies are 
roughly equal. Standardization only works if all partners have something 
equivalent in house (Interview 25; 1993).
For example, although the "open systems" movement dates back from the 1970s, it
only gained momentum when the large computer manufacturers united behind the OSI
standards out of fear that IBM's internal standard for networking and interconnection,
the Systems Network Architecture (SNA), would become the de facto industry
standard. In the context of SPAG (see Chapter 7), the original 12 IT Roundtable
companies proposed European standards based on OSI standards and advocated that
the M/S governments require conformance to OSI standards in public procurement
(Sandholtz, 1992:202-203).
The standardization of hardware and operating software has contributed to the
"commoditization" of microcomputers and, thus, towards the fall in profitability of the
processing hardware producing companies. Yet, standardization is not only a cause of
the producers' difficulties, but also a consequence. The increased competitive pressures,
resulting in falling profitability, have made it even more imperative for the computer
producing firms to cooperate in the area of standardization in order to counter the
threat of one firm imposing the de facto standard and/or to ensure some return on their
investments.
Demand
The impact of standardization on the competitive position of proprietary
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hardware suppliers would have been limited if consumers would have continued to be
willing to pay premium prices for well-known brandnames. Initially, the producers of
"clones", i.e. computers compatible with the dominant (IBM) proprietary standard, did
not pose any substantial competitive threat; hampered by lack of brandname
recognition, the clone producers could only secure a presence in the more mature
and/or lower-end segments. Since the late 1980s, however, consumers increasingly
have been selecting their hardware on the basis of price, giving preference to the
functionally identical, lower priced clones. Currently, clones represent 60 per cent of
the PC market (Schondorff, 4 February 1993:18).
Certain consumer groups perceive the price differentials between the clones and
the brandname products as justifying the risk of buying a less reliable computer. Others
perceive the clones as yielding the same performance and reliability as the higher
priced brandname products (Cane, 17 March 1992:VII; Cane and Kehoe, 20 July
1992:11; Economist 30 November 1991:17-18). Consequently, consumer brand loyalty
in the area of personal computers has proven to be relatively low. As Michel Jalabert,
member of Cap Gemini Sogeti's presidium, explains:
Computer users have all become extremely price conscious. They ask: "how 
much do I have to pay and what do I get in return" (quoted in Hudson, 26 
November 1992:13-14).
The changes in the nature of demand have been aggravated by a reduction in 
the size of demand. In part, the declining demand for computers in the early 1990s has 
been caused by the world-wide recession, as it stalled investment decisions by 
European public and private consumers (Taylor, 23 March 1993:111; Ninean Eadle, 
President of ICL Europe, in Hudson, 26 November 1992:13,14). In part, the fall in 
demand has been caused by consumer resistance to buying new equipment while 
earlier investments have not yet yielded their benefits. Over the 1980s, European 
companies and governments have been investing large sums of money in computer
hardware without due regard for their application. Consequently, the productivity 
improvements, which the investments were supposed to bring about, did not 
materialize at all or were disappointing. As author Peter Wil (quoted in Cane, 12 
August 1992:16) notes: "What makes managers uneasy about IT is the lack of evidence 
that previous investments have generated business value".
The European-owned Computer Producers' Plight
As a result of the above trends, most "traditional" computer producers, i.e. those 
computer producers displaying a bias towards the production of processing hardware 
and, even worse, a bias towards the larger processing hardware systems, were facing 
diminishing profits or rising losses by the late 1980s (Business Week, 23 November 
1992:47; Economist. 27 February 1993:4).
The five European-grown computer producers were no exception; in the early 
1990s, only ICL's computer operations were profitable (see Figure 5.15). With the 
exception of ICL, which had rapidly reduced the share of hardware in total 
dataprocessing over the late 1980s, all companies had been relatively biased towards 
the production of hardware. Siemens and Bull, moreover, concentrated on the 
manufacture of the larger processing hardware systems (see Figures 5.16 and 5.18). The 
implications of this development for the IT Roundtable companies' political influence 
will be discussed in Chapters 7 and 8.
The reduction in margins of the European-grown computer companies has been 
further aggravated by region and company-specific factors. Region-specific factors 
contributing to the fall in profitability, include: the fragmentation of the European 
market; the comparatively high borrowing rates; the relatively high labour costs; and 
the relatively high costs of the computer producers' inputs, following the lack of 
competitiveness of indigenous sources of semiconductors and the high tariffs imposed
Figure 5.15 Performance of the European-Owned Computer 
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on imported chips (see also above). Company-specific factors include: adjustment 
difficulties associated with a merger or full integration of acquisitions, such as the 
difficulties experienced by Siemens and Nixdorf in their merger (see Appendix 1.1); 
and a lack of strategic insight and poor management. It has been argued, fo5r instance, 
that Philips' Data Systems operations were thwarted by organizational problems, lack 
of supporting software activities, and poor marketing (Cane, 14 May 1992:26; Metze, 
1991).
5.2.3 CORPORATE RESPONSES
The loss in profitability and the need to adjust to the changing market 
conditions have prompted computer multinationals to implement radical restructuring 
programmes and alter their strategies. Although the responses of the computer 
companies have been geared towards their specific problems, the following five 
elements are represented in most corporate restructuring programmes and strategies: 
(1) reorganization of operations; (2) reduction of labour force; (3) return to core 
activities; (4) retargeting production from the larger to the smaller systems and 
diversification into computer software and services; and (5) accelerated 
internationalization of operations, including the conclusion of mergers, acquisitions and 
alliances25. These actions warrant a further discussion, as they have affected the 
political influence of the European-owned IT companies and their interest groups (see 
Chapters 7 to 9).
Reorganizations
One element that the restructuring programmes have in common is the 
reorganization of corporate operations. In some cases, reorganizations target the
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corporate managerial and financial organization, focusing on speeding up decision­
making, improving interaction, and introducing decentralized profit and loss 
responsibilities. Philips, for example, has decentralized its managerial responsibilities 
to lower management levels and altered its financial reporting and accounting system 
accordingly, thus facilitating the calculation of divisional return on equity. Philips has 
also introduced "portfolio management" under which activities will be axed if they are 
not as profitable as their rivals' activities. Siemens has altered its corporate organization 
following the merger of Siemens' Data and Information Systems Group with Nixdorf 
and created individual profit centres within SNI. Olivetti has reorganized its group into 
four operating units, separating core from non-core activities. The resulting 
organization better reflects Olivetti's emphasis on the government and information 
systems markets. Bull has reorganized its subsidiaries in order to improve the 
integration of Zenith Data Systems (ZDS), and has been adopting a new organizational 
approach based on products rather than regions and on decentralized operational 
responsibilities. Finally, ICL has been in the process of establishing semi-autonomous 
businesses within its main business streams.
In other cases, the reorganization has entailed a geographical relocation and/or 
concentration of operations. Bull, for example, has been concentrating its 13 production 
and logistics sites into five locations in the context of its Transformation Programme. 
This type of reorganization opens up possibilities for exploitation of economies of scale 
at the plantlevel and may stimulate technical integration.
Reduction o f Labour Force
The most politically sensitive element that the restructuring programmes of the 
conventional computer manufacturers have in common is the reduction in direct 
employment. Excluding indirect job cuts, Philips reduced employment in its 17000-
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strong computer division by 50 per cent in the context of Philip's Operation Centurion. 
Over the period 1991-1993, SNI reduced its workforce by 16.1 per cent (8300 people), 
Bull by more than 20 per cent26, and ICL by 10.5 per cent (2800 people). Over 1990- 
1992, Olivetti reduced its workforce by 24.7 per cent (13278 job losses).1 Amongst 
those affected by job losses have been the direct sales representatives; as margins 
narrowed, direct sales forces have proven to be economically unviable. Rather, 
computer firms have sought to sell their computers through alternative channels, such 
as computer super stores, mail-order agencies and retail chains (Cane and Kehoe, 8 
November 1991:21). In some cases, whole divisions have been targeted; in order to sell 
its microcomputer division, for example, Philips had no choice but to cut the excess 
"fat" in order to make the division more marketable.
Return to Core Activities
The computer producers have also sought to concentrate on core segments and 
to hive off the computer activities if they were considered to be non-core operations. 
Philips, for example, sold its microcomputer operations to Digital Equipment in an 
attempt to streamline its operations. In 1993, Philips also withdrew from the production 
of PCs after cuts in operations and changes in the sales strategy adopted27 failed to 
bring about substantial improvements in the PC operations' profitability.
Shift towards Smaller Systems and Diversification into Software and Services
Companies, which retained their dataprocessing activities, have sought to shift 
their operations to segments with greater growth and profitability prospects. Within the 
processing hardware production, this strategy has resulted in a shift of operations from 
the larger processing hardware systems to the smaller systems. As Figure 5.16 shows, 
Siemens, Bull and ICL substantially reduced their presence in mainframes and
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increased their presence in PCs through both internal growth as well as acquisitions, 
such as Bull's acquisition of the American PC manufacturer Zenith (ZDS) and ICL's 
take-over of the Finish micro and mid-range computer producer Nokia Data. Olivetti 
had already a relatively large presence in microcomputers. 1
Figure 5.16, however, also shows that Siemens' presence in the mid-range 
segment increased substantially around 1990. This increase was caused by its 
acquisition of the German minicomputer producer Nixdorf. The merger provided 
Siemens with a number of complementary assets: access to Nixdorfs international 
marketing network, its contacts with small to medium-sized companies, and its 
technology on UNIX, mid-range, and specialized systems. Yet the criticism that the 
merger represented "German pressure for a German solution to Nixdorfs problems 
rather than commercial logic" (Cane, 11 March 1991 :Vin) is not totally unfounded if 
one takes into consideration that the overall trend in the industry had been a move 
away from mainframe and midrange computer production towards the manufacture of 
smaller systems.
The reduction in profitability of processing hardware, combined with similar 
trends in the production of peripherals, has prompted the companies to diversity into 
other IT products, notably software and services (Cane, 11 March 1991:VDI; Sonsino, 
23 March 1993:11; Datamation, 15 June 1992:22; 15 June 1990:190; 15 June 1989:158; 
15 June 1988:165).
Software, by itself, does not yield profit margins that are consistently higher 
than those in hardware, according to a study of McKinsey (quoted in the Economist, 
2 November 1991:93-94; also 7 November 1992:103). This applies even more so to 
the production of the relatively low cost, low margin, "packaged" software, which has 
been accounting for an increasing share in total software production. The share of 
packaged software increased from 57 per cent in 1987 to 59 per cent in 1991 in the
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American market; from 13 per cent in 1987 to 19 per cent in 1992 in the Japanese 
market; and from 58 per cent in 1987 to 68 per cent in 1992 in the European market 
(see Brady and Quintas, 1991:118-119).
A producer of hardware, however, can increase its profit margins if it moves 
higher up the value-added chain through adding customized software and services to 
its hardware products. The associated services may range from maintenance to 
consultancy on the selection of hardware and software, training, applications 
development and systems integration. Provision of customized software and services 
not only yields high profit margins, it has the additional advantage of influencing 
consumer satisfaction. Customized software and services may improve the efficacy of 
the hardware provided, and thus raise the user's return on its hardware investments. 
Through the provision of software and services which assure the client's satisfaction 
with the products supplied, the hardware producer can "tie" consumers to its hardware 
(Cane, 12 August 1992:16; Economist, 2 November 1991:93-94; Kehoe, 23 April 
1991:11).
The growing importance attached by consumers to software and services has 
been reflected in a corresponding rise in demand over the 1980s and early 1990s. The 
size of the American and European markets for both packaged software as well as 
customized software and consulting doubled over the period 1987-1992, while the size 
of the Japanese market nearly quintupled over the years 1987 to 1991 (Brady and 
Quintas, 1991:118-119). According to Serna Consulting, the European software and 
services market has been growing at an average annual growth rate of 24 per cent in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s in comparison to a 10 per cent growth of the hardware 
market (quoted in Cane, 17 March 1992:VIII).
The higher profit margins in services and software has resulted in a shift from 
hardware to the more down-stream, customer-oriented IT segments. As is shown in
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Figure 5.17, the share of hardware in the world IT market declined over the period 
1987-1992, while the shares of software and services increased - a trend also visible 
in the European market (IDC in Herald Tribune, 14 March 1991:7 and Financial 
Times, 3 December 1990:VI).
This blurring of boundaries between the IT industry’s segments has prompted 
Renato Riverso, President Director General of IBM Europe, to argue that a definition 
of a computer company should go beyond the limits of hardware, software and 
services:
It requires all of these things - and more. It means a company that provides its 
customers with a complete solution to their business needs .
This transformation from a traditional hardware to a "solutions" producer is visible
amongst all large system hardware producers, whether American, Japanese or
European. Figure 5.18 summarizes the supply characteristics of Siemens, Philips, Bull,
Olivetti and ICL. In 1987, only Siemens earned more than 50 per cent of its
dataprocessing revenues from non-hardware operations - a situation which changed in
1990 when it merged with Nixdorf. By 1992, all European-grown computer
multinationals, with the exception of SNI, had reduced the share of hardware in their
total dataprocessing revenues to less than 50 per cent.
The blurring of boundaries between the various IT segments, however, has
brought previously co-existing firms in competition with each other. Computer
producers that have shifted their orientations face the competition of not only other
computer firms but also software houses (such as Cap Gemini Sogeti of France), large
accounting firms (for example, Andersen Consulting), and value-added resellers (Cane,
17 March 1992:Vm; 23 April 1991:1).
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Internationalization, Mergers and Acquisitions, and Alliances
Although microcomputers, as has been described above, can be assembled
without substantial investments in technology, companies that seek to stay at the
cutting edge of rapidly changing technology, whether as producers of proprietary
systems or as manufacturers of clones, have to continue investing in R&D (Taylor, 17
March 1992:111; Francis Lorentz in Bull Annual Report 1991). At the same time, the
escalating R&D costs have been increasingly difficult to recuperate. Although
microcomputers form the largest growth segment in the processing hardware industry,
their production yields at the same time relatively low profit margins, due to increased
competition. Even if the producers would be able to sell the large number of
microcomputers necessary to recover the R&D costs, they still would have to sell a
large number more in order to accumulate the funds needed for future development.
As Cane (12 August 1992:16) notes:
Manufacturers [..] are being forced to accept narrower gross profit margins to 
the point where there is concern that the resources will not be available to 
support existing products or develop new ones.
This situation has been aggravated by the fact that the product life cycles of
microcomputers have been shortened with the rapid change in technology. This implies
that producers have only a limited period of time to obtain the revenues necessary to
recover their initial costs. In such an industry, first-mover advantages play an important
role (see above).
The need to reduce the surging costs of R&D, improve on the innovation time- 
span to get first to the market, secure market access and establish a market presence 
have prompted computer companies of all nationalities to accelerate the 
internationalization of their operations, and to conclude, as part of that process, cross- 
border mergers, acquisitions and alliances.
As in the semiconductor industry, computer manufacturers have been adopting
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internationalization strategies to exploit low production costs and/or to secure market 
access and presence. According to John Gardner, managing Director of ICL UK, 
computer manufacturers have been locating their production sites on the basis of 
market requirements rather than merely cost considerations (Cane, 1 March 1993:7). 
In particular, this appears to have been the case for the Japanese and American firms 
investing into the European Community. Although manufacturers located in Europe 
face the disadvantages of relatively high labour costs, inflexible labour practices and 
high tariffs on imported computer components (see above), a location close to the 
market also offers a number of advantages to computer manufacturers over the low 
cost South East Asian sites. A European location, often made more alluring by the M/S 
governments through investment incentive schemes, reduces transportation and 
distribution costs; these are considerably higher in the computer industry than in the 
semiconductor industry. It also improves the interaction of manufacturers with their 
European customers. In addition, it allows foreign companies to jump trade barriers 
and develop a European identity.
American firms have traditionally been well-established in the Community 
through both R&D and complete manufacturing facilities. In contrast, Japanese firms 
have confined themselves mostly to investments in original equipment manufacturing 
arrangements (EC Panorama 1991:12-31; 1993:10-18). The European-grown computer 
producers, meanwhile, have invested in South East Asia, with the objective of reducing 
costs, and in North America, in order to improve their market penetration. Despite the 
acceleration taking place in internationalization, however, the European computer 
producers continue to be far more "Europeanized" than internationalized; in 1992, for 
example, about 72 per cent of ICL's net assets remained located in Europe, and about 
73 per cent of Bull's assets (Annual Reports ICL and Bull, 1992). In contrast, less than 
half of the total assets of US computer producers was located in their domestic market;
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in 1986, 29 per cent of the total assets of American computer companies was located 
in Europe, 29 per cent in third countries, and only 42 per cent in the US (Gomes- 
Casseres, 1993:93).
As part of the process of internationalization, the number of alliances involving
computer firms has increased substantially over the late 1980s (Gomes-Casseres,
1993:108). The main motives for such alliances have been outlined in Figure 5.19. The
European-grown computer producers have not been an exception; Olivetti, Siemens,
Bull, Philips and ICL have engaged in M&A and alliances in order to improve their
competitive position vis-a-vis rivals in the world market and, more importantly, in the
European market. ICL, for example, stresses that:
Europe is ICL’s domestic market. ICL plans to be the leading supplier in its 
chosen markets in Europe in the 1990s. Corporate objectives are to increase 
turnover and market share with prime focus on Europe, through a policy of 
acquisitions, mergers, joint ventures and partnerships which fit the business 
strategy (ICL Annual Report, 1991:14).
ICL’s acquisition of Nokia Data, the ninth largest supplier to the European market,
proved to be a strategic move in that respect; it increased ICL's presence in continental
Europe by 300 per cent.
It is not surprising that the European-grown producers focus on maintaining and
improving their position in the European market for the following reasons (ICL Annual
Report 1991; Olivetti in Electronics, 22 March 1993:11). First, the European-grown
computer producers have been heavily dependent on the European market, deriving
over 70 per cent of their dataprocessing revenues from European sales (see Figure
5.20). It is estimated that approximately one third to a half of these revenues have been
made in the companies' respective national markets29. (An exception is Philips which
originates from a relatively small market, namely the Netherlands.) Erosion of the
computer producers' positions in their core market would have serious negative
consequences for their long-term financial position.
Figure 5.19 Main Motives for Alliances in the Computer Industry
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Second, international business theory would argue that the computer companies 
have, at least in principle, a competitive advantage over foreign computer producers 
in the European market. In contrast to the foreign companies, they would not have to 
overcome the costs of being "foreign" to the European market; they are aware of the 
consumers' demands, the local customs and regulations, et cetera. If the companies 
want to expand their sales, they are most likely to succeed in the European market. 
Moreover, discriminatory government procurement, constituting a large part of the 
demand for computers, would provide an additional advantage to the European-owned 
producers.
Third, a strong position in a unified European market would give the European- 
grown computer producers the power-base from which to compete and expand 
internationally. The American and Japanese experience has shown that firms, that can 
enjoy the economies of scale associated with a large, unfragmented home market, have 
a competitive advantage (IT Roundtable, November 1992).
Fourth, in the case of ICL, concentration on the European market may follow 
from coordination between ICL and Fujitsu to limit direct competition between ICL's 
and Fujitsu's range of products.
Many of the M&A and alliances, involving a European-grown computer 
multinational, have been on an intra-European basis, as ICL's 1991 acquisition of 
Nokia Data and Siemens' merger with Nixdorf in 1990 illustrate. During the 1980s, 
collaboration between the European-grown computer producers increased, both in the 
context of European cooperative R&D programmes, such as ESPRIT and EUREKA 
(see Chapter 3), as well as on a private basis (Hagedoom and Schakenraad 
(1993:387)30. These inter-firm alliances often involve technology and R&D cost 
sharing agreements. Examples include the European Computer Research Centre 
(ECRC) for research on fifth generation computing techniques, which is jointly owned
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by Siemens, Bull and ICL, and collaborative research between SNI, Olivetti and Bull 
on software methodologies.
However, the five companies have by no means confined themselves to 
"European" solutions. For example, STC decided to sell a majority stake5of ICL to 
Fujitsu in 1990, after a series of merger negotiations with other European-owned firms 
failed (Cane, 23 April 1991:111, 25 July 1990; Financial Times, 27 July 1990). 
Similarly, Bull sold part of its shares to the foreign producers NEC (J) and IBM (US) 
in 1991-2, after unsuccessful attempts of the French government to come to a 
"European" solution for Bull's problems, i.e. a mega-merger between Olivetti, Siemens 
and Bull (Cane, 23 April 1991:111). Moreover, in June 1992, Olivetti sold 10 per cent 
of its shares to Digital Equipment (US) (Cane, 1 July 1992:28). A year before, Philips 
and Mannesmann had sold their minicomputer operations to Digital Equipment. 
According to EC Panorama (1991:12-33), most major M&A, involving a European 
firm, were international (i.e. European-American) rather than European in nature.
Similarly, the European-grown companies have concluded alliances with non- 
European firms, such as SNI's extended cooperation with Fujitsu (J) on the supply of 
mainframe computers and semiconductor manufacturing technology, Bull's agreement 
with Packard Bell (US) on the development and manufacture of PCs, and Olivetti's 
alliance with Pyramid Technologies (US) on super minicomputers (Nakamoto, 18 June 
1993:23 and 27 March 1992:21; Ridding, 24-25 July 1993:12). In these inter­
continental alliances, the European firms have generally sought access to technology 
and products, while offering market access in return (Gomes-Casseres, 1993:82).
5.3 CONCLUSION
This chapter has focused on the industries in which the European-owned IT
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multinationals operate; it has discussed the changes in the position, performance and 
strategies of the European-owned IT companies in the world semiconductor and 
computer markets.
Despite the existence of government programmes in support of the industry, the 
European-owned IT producers have always been small actors in the world 
semiconductor and computer industries. Even in the European market, the majority of 
demand has not been met by the European-owned IT producers but by foreign firms 
exporting to or producing in the Community. Moreover, at the end of the 1980s and 
in the early 1990s, the performance of most European-owned IT producers was weak; 
the companies barely broke even or made losses on their semiconductor and computer 
operations.
In the semiconductor industry, the relatively weak corporate performances were 
caused to a large extent by the European producers' late entry into the more 
sophisticated IC segments. IC production has been characterized by high initial 
investments in R&D and capital which have had to be recuperated within a short 
period of time due to the fact that rapid technological change has led to shortening 
product life cycles. Recuperation in a short period of time, however, has become 
increasingly difficult as substantial price-based competition has turned semiconductors 
into commodities, available in ample supply and at low prices. This has put a 
downwards pressure on the revenues of the IC producers.
Under these market conditions, first-mover advantages play an important role, 
as first-movers enjoy cost, pricing and strategic advantages through their lead on the 
learning curve, their exploitation of economies of scale, and their use of premium 
pricing. First-movers may even set the industry standard, as has been seen in the case 
of microprocessors where Intel has established a near-monopoly position.
The European producers, however, have been entering these markets relatively
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late. In the case of memory production, this has implied that they were disadvantaged 
in terms of cost, learning and pricing, which has made it very difficult for them to 
recuperate the high initial costs of investment. In the case of microprocessor 
production, the entry barriers to the industry in the form of proprietary industry 
standards, have practically prohibited their entry. The resulting poor performance of 
the European-owned semiconductor producers has been further aggravated by firm and 
region-specific factors. In terms of regional factors, it is important to stress the 
relatively high labour and capital costs in Europe, the fragmentation of the European 
market, and the weakening of the competitive position of the European consumer 
electronics industry, the semiconductor producers' largest client.
In the computer industry, the relatively poor corporate performances were 
mainly a consequence of a transformation taking place in the industry as a whole, 
although regional and firm-specific factors played a role as well. First, rapid 
technological change has resulted in the development of increasingly smaller, cheaper 
and more powerful computers. The greater increase in speed of the smaller systems, 
combined with their faster decline in price and size, however, has undermined the 
market for the larger systems to the point where there has been a shift in relative 
importance in the world's markets from mainframes and minis to PCs and workstations. 
As smaller computer systems can be produced at little cost, the entry barriers to the 
computer industry have come down. The subsequent increase in competition has turned 
PCs and workstations into commodities; they have become both widely available as 
well as relatively cheap. Albeit a favourable development for consumers, the 
continuously downwards pressure on the prices has lowered the profit margin of the 
computer suppliers.
The trend towards the "commoditization" of the smaller systems has been 
accelerated and exacerbated by the increasing standardization in both hardware and
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software. The move away from proprietary systems, under pressure of the larger 
consumers and computer suppliers that saw standardized "open systems" as their 
chance to undermine IBM's market dominance, has increased the competition in the 
industry and reduced the producers' profit margins even further.
At the same time, customer demand has become less buoyant and more price- 
sensitive. The decline in demand under pressure of the world-wide recession, 
aggravated by factors such as the resistance of consumers to new investments and their 
inability to absorb ever changing technologies, has prompted manufacturers, competing 
on the basis of price rather than quality, to cut prices. The price differentials between 
brandname computers and no-name ones have become so great that certain computer 
consumer categories have found it justifiable to opt for a cheaper machine, even if the 
latter's quality could not be guaranteed. Others have been perceiving the no-name 
machines as yielding the same performance and reliability as the higher-priced 
brandname products.
The deterioration in the business performances of the European-owned IT 
producers, resulting from these changes, has forced a response on the side of both 
European-owned semiconductor and computer suppliers. First, the IT companies have 
resorted to major reorganization programmes, which have generally been aimed at 
reducing costs and improving efficiency. Second, as part of the cost-cutting exercise, 
the companies have reduced their workforce substantially. Third, some of the 
companies have hived off non-core operations and returned to their core activities. 
Fourth, the companies have retargeted or diversified their operations into higher growth 
and/or higher value-added IT products. Finally, the companies have sought to reduce 
their costs and increase their access to markets and technology through an acceleration 
of the internationalization of their operations as illustrated by the increase in M&A and 
alliances concluded.
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On the basis of this analysis of the changing economics of the IT industry, one 
could reiterate the main sets of short-term and structural factors that have affected the 
political influence of the European-owned IT producers, as will be illustrated in 
Chapters 7 to 9:
1. One set is formed by the European industry's past and present position as a 
small actor in the relatively internationalized world IT industry.
2. A second set of factors includes the IT companies' reduced profit margins of 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, caused by the increasingly globalized and 
intensified nature of competition in the IT industry.
3. A third set of factors is formed by the responses of the European-owned IT 
companies to the falling profit margins, including: lay-offs, an acceleration in 
internationalization of corporate operations, a consolidation of operations 
through M&As, the conclusion of intra and extra-European alliances, and a 
refocussing and retargeting of operations. The latter include a shift from 
mainstream memory chips to ASICs, from larger processing hardware systems 
to smaller systems, and from hardware to software and services - all indicative 
for the increasing emphasis on the application and use of IT over the 
production of IT.
5.4 NOTES
1. For more information about the origins and history of the semiconductor
industry, see Braun/MacDonald (1978), Dosi (1983), Malerba (1985), Langlois (1988).
2. Only in the United Kingdom, military demand for semiconductors outstripped 
the demand of the consumer electronics industry (Malerba, 1985:75).
3. Actual tariffs on ICs fell from 12 per cent in 1977 to 4.2 per cent in 1984.
Since 1986, when a bilateral agreement between the US and Japan came into force, 
Japan's applied import tariff on semiconductors has been zero. Over the early 1970s, 
Japan also started reducing its barriers to foreign direct investment. Formal restrictions 
to FDI were phased out by 1978. Structural barriers, however, are still in place (Tyson
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and Yoffie, 1993:37; Kostecki, 1989:23; Flamm, 1987:255, Annex D-4 and D-5; 
Malerba, 1985:207).
4. In 1989, the European producers supplied $ 5443 mn in semiconductors, of 
which approx. 65 per cent was sold in the European market (see App. 5.3 and 5.4).
5. Estimate based on import penetration alone (see Appendix 5.3).
6. Sources: De Benedetti, 23 September 1993; EECA, European Electronics 
Components Industry Report 1992:2,20; Kehoe, 25 August 1992:13; Nakamoto, 16 
November 1992.
7. Sources: Articles from the Financial Times, Economist, NRC, and the annual 
reports of Siemens, Thomson-CSF and Philips.
8. According to Mr. Byron Harding of Dataquest, Philips' SRAM sales totalled 
S 3 mn in 1989. This compares with Philips' total component sales of approximately 
$ 4 bn (Electronics, December 1990:321; Dataquest in Skapinker and van de Krol, 5 
September 1990; Stopford, 1992).
9. In 1991, Siemens' total semiconductor sales totalled DM 2.0 bn, of which DM 
55 mn came from the sales of 1M DRAMs (Siemens Annual Report 1991:25).
10. See Chapter 4.
11. For more information about the origins and history of the computer industry, 
see Flamm (1988) and Trainor and Krasnewich (1992).
12. See Flamm (1988:135-171) for a detailed argument as to why the European 
computer industry, and notably the British industry, remained behind the US industry 
in technological development and competitiveness over the 1950s and 1960s.
13. In 1968, the EC MFN tariff for automatic dataprocessing equipment was set at 
8.2 per cent. This compares with a Japanese tariff rate on central processing units of 
15 per cent (Official Journal, LI72, 22 July 1968).
14. That is, Burroughs, Univac/Sperry, NCR, Control Data and Honeywell.
15. In 1972, Japan removed its quotas on imports of peripherals, followed in 1975 
by the removal of quotas on imports of central processing units and computer parts. 
Tariff rates on computer hardware were reduced as well. Over the period 1972-1984, 
for example, actual tariffs on central processing units fell from 13.5 per cent to 4.9 per 
cent in 1984, while tariffs on peripherals were reduced from 15 per cent to 6 per cent. 
Finally, over the years 1974 and 1975, the government liberalized inward investments 
in computers (Flamm, 1987:Annex D-4 and D-5; Kostecki, 1989:22).
16. See Appendix 5.14.
17. In 1991, 66.6 per cent of the European computer market, as proxied by the 
cumulative dataprocessing revenues of the largest 20 suppliers to the European market, 
was supplied by American firms, 5.5 per cent by Japanese firms, and 27.9 per cent by 
European firms (see Appendix 5.9). In the same year, 40.9 per cent of Europe's 
dataprocessing imports originated in the US, 24.2 per cent in Japan, 18.7 per cent in
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Taiwan and Singapore and 16.2 per cent in the rest of the world (EC Panorama 
1993:10-16).
18. Over the period 1987-1992, IBM's sales accounted for an average of 22.8 per 
cent of the cumulative dataprocessing revenues of the largest 100 computer firms (see 
Appendix 5.9).
1
19. Bill Gates, President of Microsoft, formulated this expectation in a television 
interview (Channel 4, UK) in October 1992. Similarly, the Economist (22 December 
1990:94) outlined that "received wisdom says that [..] further concentration of the 
industry is inevitable".
20. Advances in the architecture of the computer, i.e. the way in which the 
hardware is designed and is connected with software, have improved the organization 
of the computer's memory and processor and, thus, the computer's performance.
21. Technological progress in computer components, and notably in 
semiconductors, has decreased the size of the computer and improved the 
performance/cost ratio of hardware.
22. References: Banks, 23 April 1991 :IX; Cane, 23 April 1991:1, 12 August 
1992:16, 9 March 1993:11; EITO, 1993:44; IBM Advertisement in the Financial 
Times. 16 March:7; Schoonbrood, 19 May 1990:33; Sonsino, 23 March 1993:11.
23. Sources: Black, 22 October 1991 :VI; Cane, 22 October 1991:VI; De Jonquieres, 
13 November 1989; Rosario and Schmidt, 1991:190; Taylor, 17 March 1992:111.
24. Sources: CEN, CENELEC, ECMA, EWOS, Interviews 2,22,25,35,38 (1993). 
See also van Walsum-Stachowicz (1994).
25. Sources: Articles from the Financial Times, Electronics, Economist, NRC, 
Business Week; EITO (1993); and the annual reports of Siemens, Philips, ICL, 
Olivetti, and Bull.
26. Bull's labour force fell by 20.9 per cent (9301 people) over 1991-1992.
27. Philips decided to sell its PCs as part of an overall systems package and/or 
under other companies' brandnames rather than on a stand-alone basis.
28. Quoted in 1999 Now: A European Review, published quarterly by IBM Europe, 
Autumn 1991: 3.
29. In the case of Bull, Olivetti and ICL, dataprocessing revenues account for all 
or the majority of their total revenues. This implies that if approximately a third of 
their total revenues are derived from the domestic market, one can safely assume that 
a similar percentage of the dataprocessing revenues are derived from the domestic 
market. This argument does not apply to Philips and Siemens. However, it is well- 
known that (a) the Netherlands only accounts for a small percentage of Philips' sales; 
(b) Germany accounts for a large percentage of Siemens' sales (See Appendix 5.15).
30. For more information on the cooperation of the European computer 
multinationals in both private and cost-sharing alliances, see, for example: Mytelka 
(1990), Hagedoom and Schakenraad (1990,1993), and Gomes-Casseres (1993).
Chapter 6
IMPERATIVES FOR CHANGE:
THE CHANGING POLITICS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
The political economy within which both policy-makers as well as Companies 
operate has not only been transformed by economic dynamics (see Chapter 5), but also 
by political imperatives. This chapter focuses on the changes in the policy-supply 
arrangements, which govern what policies are supplied, how, on what terms, by which 
government, and at which level. In particular, this chapter seeks to analyze the 
changing policy-supply conditions in the European Community (see Chapter 1). The 
first section focuses on the impact of the transformation of the international system 
(see Chapter 2) on the Community as a policy supplier. The second section discusses 
the impact of the EC's deepening on its policy-supplying capabilities, while the third 
section focuses on the impact of the Community's enlargement (see Chapter 2).
6.1 TRANSFORMATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: IMPACT ON
THE EC AS A SUPPLIER OF POLICIES
For four decades after the second world war, the international system was 
characterized by polarization into two rival camps, contesting each other on the basis 
of their military capabilities: the United States and its allies on the one hand, and the 
USSR and its satellite states on the other. When the Warsaw Pact was abolished in 
1991, this bipolar system fell formally apart. The stability in the international system 
provided by the balance of power between the United States and the USSR almost 
instantaneously dissipated and new security problems arose. Yet, at the same time, a 
window of opportunity was created for what James Baker, then US Secretary of State, 
dubbed: "a new architecture for a new era" (Economist, 8 December 1990).
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The new world order, which has been developing, has been described as a 
multipolar system, i.e. a system with multiple power centres of variable strength. In 
this system, national or regional economic capabilities, as expressed in terms of market 
size, GDP, share in domestic and export markets and other indicators, have become 
increasingly important as determinants of power. This has prompted some authors to 
argue that geopolitics has been and will be yielding to geoeconomics - a strategy under 
which capital and market penetration replace the projection of military power (Stewart, 
1993:123).
6.1.1 BIPOLAR INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
In the bipolar international system where military capability and foreign and 
security policies had primacy over economic wealth and economic policies, the 
European Community, as a predominantly economic organization1, was relatively 
unimportant. Politically, the EC was not even close to becoming a "third voice" 
bridging the Eastern and Western antipoles (Swann, 1992:2).
Far more important were the individual Member States, as each of them 
maintained a national military capability, developed national foreign and security 
policies, and cooperated in inter-governmental arrangements for information exchange, 
foreign and security policy coordination and formulation, such as the Western 
European Union (WEU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the 
(Davignon) Political Cooperation Procedure. In comparison to the USSR and the US, 
however, even Europe's largest military powers, i.e. Britain, France and Germany, were 
only small actors.
As a consequence, the general line of political action undertaken by the 
Community and its Member States was largely determined by their position as allies
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of the United States within NATO. External economic policies, set at the EC level, as 
well as the national and inter-governmental foreign and security policies were dictated 
by the principles of geopolitics.
1
6.1.2 MULTIPOLAR INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
The new world order’s shift in emphasis from geopolitics to economics, 
however, has changed the EC's position within the international system in the 
following four ways. First, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union, has allowed the EC to develop alternative policy lines in 
international politics, independent from the American point of view. In fact, the 
American concern about the rise of diverging European policies following the end of 
the Cold War was one of the driving forces behind the Bush administration's proposals 
for new institutional links between the EC and the US, which eventually culminated 
into the signing of the EC-US Transatlantic Declaration in November 1990. The 
Declaration sets out mechanisms for bilateral consultations on matters of common 
interest, both economic and political, and pledges cooperation in trade, arms control 
and other areas. Sofar, however, the Declaration has proven to be more a statement of 
intent rather than one of action; it has been unable to contain transatlantic differences 
on economic issues or security concerns - the handling of the Bosnian Crisis being a 
case in point.
Second, the increased emphasis on economic power in the international system 
has elevated the EC to the level of an economic superpower. Figure 6.1 illustrates the 
economic position of the European Community in comparison to Japan and the United 
State. In 1990, the EC accounted for 36.9 per cent of the total Gross Domestic Product 
of the developed world, while Japan and the United States accounted for respectively
Figure 6.1 Triad Powers: Comparison, 1990
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18.0 and 33.4 per cent. Its market size proxied 328 mn consumers in that year, in 
comparison to 250 mn for the United States and 124 mn for Japan. The EC also 
accounted for a substantial share of total exports and imports amongst the 
industrialized countries (see Figure 6.1). This economic position as one of the three 
large economic powers has allowed the EC to be, in principle; a credible opponent to 
the American and Japanese governments in bi- and multi-lateral negotiations. Whether 
or not this latent power has been translated into real power in the case of international 
negotiations on IT-related issues will be shown in Chapter 9.
Third, the end of the Cold War has led to substantial cuts in government 
expenditures on defence equipment, resulting in a dramatic increase in competition for 
shrinking markets (Thomson-CSF 1992 Annual Report; Siemens 1992 Annual Report). 
The fall in government demand has forced the producers of military or military-related 
equipment, including non-civilian IT products, to restructure, consolidate and diversify 
their operations. Siemens, for example, has introduced a rationalization programme in 
its defence electronics sector while Thomson-CSF, the French owner of SGS-Thomson, 
has strengthened its position in the defence markets through the conclusion of joint 
ventures and other cooperation agreements. Philips, meanwhile, has sold its defence 
interests in Western Europe altogether (Philips Annual Report 1991:42).
Fourth, the liberalization of trading relations between Eastern and Western 
Europe has allowed the Community's IT companies to exploit new market 
opportunities. Economic reforms, combined with a relatively immature market, have 
led to IT hardware spending growth rates far exceeding the 1.7 per cent compound 
annual growth rate for Western Europe. While Eastern Europe's average growth rate 
totalled 8.8 per cent per annum, Poland's growth rate totalled even 16.9 per cent 
(EITO, 1993:144). The potential of the Eastern European markets for IT products has 
been further boosted by customs reform, including the phasing out of most COCOM
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constraints on exports of dual-use technologies and products to the Eastern European 
countries (Dunne, 31 March 1994; Economist, 9 April 1994).
6.2 EC DEEPENING: IMPACT ON ITS POLICY-SUPPLYING CAPABILITIES
Since the establishment of the European Economic Community in 1958, the EC 
Member States have been involved in an ongoing process of regional integration. Over 
time, the EC has developed into an institution with an extensive range of competencies 
that affects nearly all policy areas (Mazey and Richardson, 1993b:2). This section will 
discuss, first, the impact of deeper regional integration on the Community as a policy 
supplier and, second, the impact of the deepening process on the EC's policy-supplying 
capabilities.
6.2.1 THE RESULTS OF DEEPENING: COMPETENCIES, DECISION-MAKING
PROCEDURES AND VOTING RULES
Over time, the legal scope of the original EEC Treaty has been expanded under 
influence of two international agreements: the Single European Act (SEA), signed in 
February 1986, and the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union), signed in 
February 1992. The SEA, which became operational in 1987, amended the original 
EEC Treaty on the following three points: (1) it formalized the EC's commitment to 
complete its common market and imposed a deadline on the elimination of the 
remaining barriers; (2) it endorsed the EC with new responsibilities; and (3) it 
introduced institutional reforms, altering the EC decision-making process (Nicoll and 
Salmon, 1994:48-52; Urwin, 1991:230-235). The Maastricht Treaty, which entered into 
force in November 1993, introduced further amendments to the EEC Treaty: (1) it
251
provided for the creation of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), (2) it endorsed the 
Community with greater competencies in both new and existing areas, and (3) it 
introduced institutional changes (Nicoll and Salmon, 1994:276-289; Financial Times, 
12 December 1991). The resulting EC Treaty, moreover, was incorporated into a wider, 
partly intergovernmental framework.
For our purposes, it is now important to determine what these two landmark 
agreements have meant for the supply of IT and IT-related policies at the EC level 
over the 1980s and early 1990s. What has been the impact of the increase in EC 
competencies and the reforms in EC institutions on the supply of IT and IT-related 
policies?
EC Competencies
The SEA and the Maastricht Treaty have endowed the Community with greater 
competencies in the area of IT and IT-related policies, increasing the necessity to lobby 
the EC. Over the late 1980s and early 1990s, the EC acquired new powers in three 
areas of importance to this thesis: Research and Technological Development, Trans- 
European Networks and Industrial Policy.
The SEA wrote the establishment of multiannual R&TD Framework 
Programmes and specific R&TD programmes, like ESPRIT (EEC Treaty (87):Art.l30f- 
q), into the EEC Treaty, while the Maastricht Treaty amended the specific provisions 
in this area (EC Treaty (93):Title XV, XIII). The Maastricht Treaty also gave a legal 
basis to EC actions regarding Trans-European Networks (TENs) (EC Treaty (93):Title 
XU) and the Community's industries (EC Treaty (93):Title XHI) (see Chapter 4).
Legal provisions for the Community's trade policies, including those affecting 
the European IT industry (see Chapters 3,4), were already included in the original EEC 
Treaty (58: Art. 110-116). In fact, so were the legal provisions for the completion of the
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Single European Market and for those policies necessary to make the market function 
properly (EEC Treaty (58):Art.3;9-37;48-73;85-102). As Urwin (1991:231) argues, "in 
that sense, the SEA was not a revolutionary document". The SEA, however, played an 
important role in giving a new impetus to the process of market liberalization within 
the EC (see Chapter 3).
Decision-Making Procedures and Voting Rules
The decisions of the Member State governments to endow the Community with 
more competencies, however, has not constituted an outright transfer of sovereignty 
from the national to the EC level. Rather, these decisions have led the Member States 
to "pool sovereignty" (Keohane and Hoffmann, 1991:8). Not only have the national 
governments continued to play an important role in EC policy formulation and 
implementation (see Chapters 1,7), also they have never transferred their authority to 
take decisions on the proposed EC policies to a supranational body. Decision-making 
at the EC level has remained an inter-governmental affair (see Chapter 7).
Since November 1993, three decision-making procedures have been used: (1) 
the consultation procedure, which was outlined in the original EEC Treaty; (2) the 
cooperation procedure, which was established under the Single European Act; and (3) 
the co-decision procedure, which has been applicable to a range of areas since the 
Maastricht Treaty came into force (see Figure 6.2). Although all three procedures have 
built-in mechanisms to safeguard the national interest, they could be spread out along 
a spectrum representing an increasing infringement on the individual countries' powers.
At the one end of the spectrum, one could position the consultation procedure, 
under which the rights of the individual Member States are well-protected and the role 
of the European Parliament, as representative of the European people, is minimal; the 
latter can only suggest non-binding amendments. At the other end of the spectrum, one
Figure 6.2 EC Decision-Making Procedures and Voting Rules
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could position the co-decision procedure under which the rights of the Member States 
are least protected; the EP can approve, reject and amend legislative proposals that the 
Council cannot simply overrule by unanimous voting. Despite its greater democratic 
accountability, however, this procedure can be considerably more time-consuming than, 
for example, the cooperation and consultation procedure (see Figure 6.2).
Dependent on the decision-making procedure, the various EC institutions thus 
have more or less powers. This, in turn, may have affected the lobbying strategies of 
the European-owned IT companies and their interest groups; it has altered the 
importance of the various EC institutions within corporate lobbying strategies (see 
Chapter 7).
As Figure 6.2 shows, within the three decision-making procedures, Council 
voting may take place on the basis of unanimity, a simple majority (SMV) or a 
qualified majority (QMV). In the case of voting by unanimity2, each individual 
government maintains the negative power to block any decision. Although governments 
lose this ability in the case of simple majority voting3 or qualified majority voting4, 
it is doubtful whether policies will be pushed through in the face of adamant 
opposition of a minority, especially if this minority involves one of the three largest 
Member States. Not only may the latter threaten to invoke the Luxembourg 
Compromise5, also, without sufficient backing, a policy decision is unlikely to work 
in practice.
Nevertheless, the changes in the voting rules applicable to EC IT policies may 
have affected the lobbying strategies of the European-owned IT companies and their 
interest groups; the introduction of majority voting, for example, may have made it 
more imperative to coordinate lobbying strategies and lobby other national 
governments beyond the home government (see Chapter 7). The upcoming enlargement 
of the Community and the associated changes in voting rules are expected to reinforce
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this trend. Although a "reasonable" delay will be offered to the Member States if a 
decision is opposed by a number between 23 and 27 votes, the new blocking minority 
of 27 would imply that the opposition of two large countries and one small one is not 
any longer sufficient to block an EC decision (Barber, 28 March 1994rl; Barber, 
Gardner and Brown, 23 March 1994:1).
R&TD. During the early 1980s, decisions on R&TD-related legislative 
proposals were taken on the basis of Article 235, which implied that unanimous 
Council approval in accordance with the consultation procedure was required (see 
Chapter 3). Alternative decision-making procedures and more lenient voting rules, 
however, were introduced by the Single European Act.
Under the amendments introduced by the SEA, the adoption of the R&TD 
Framework Programmes remained subject to unanimous approval of the Council in 
accordance with the consultation procedure (EEC Treaty (87):Art.l30q). Decisions 
about the R&TD Framework's overall budget and distribution of funding over the 
various categories of activities, including IT, thus continued to be highly politicized. 
This contributes to an explanation of the delays incurred in the adoption of, for 
example, the second phase of ESPRIT. Decisions on the implementation of the 
Framework Programmes, however, could be taken on the basis of a qualified majority, 
using the cooperation procedure. This included decisions on the specific programmes 
including ESPRIT, the supplementary programmes, and provisions for cooperation with 
third countries or Community participation in projects. The only exception was the 
establishment of joint undertakings and other structures necessary for an efficient 
execution of the programmes; these were made subject to unanimous approval in the 
context of the consultation procedure (EEC Treaty (87):Art.l30q).
The ratification of the Maastricht Treaty further changed the Community's 
R&TD decision-making procedures. The adoption of the R&TD Framework
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Programmes became subject to the co-decision procedure, granting the EP a greater 
political say (EC Treaty (93):Art.i). The Maastricht Treaty, however, also outlined that 
decisions on the specific programmes designed to implement the Framework 
Programmes, could only be taken on the basis of a qualified majority1 using the 
consultation procedure - giving the national governments more influence than they had 
under the SEA. Decisions on the establishment of joint undertakings and other 
structures remained subject to the consultation procedure and, thus, to unanimous 
approval (EC Treaty (93):Art.l30i.4,o). Other decisions concerning the implementation, 
such as the decisions covering the rules for participation in the programmes or the 
establishment of supplementary programmes, continued to be subject to the cooperation 
procedure (EC Treaty (93):Art.l30o).
TENs. The Maastricht Treaty also outlined the procedures and rules for 
decisions on Trans European Networks. The approval of the guidelines on TENs 
should be subject to the co-decision procedure - indicative for the lack of national 
sensitivity in this area. However, decisions concerning the financial support by the 
Community and the adoption of measures necessary to ensure the networks' 
interoperability were made subject to the cooperation procedure, giving the M/S 
governments a greater political say (EC Treaty (93):Art.l29d).
EC Industrial Policy. The Member States' concern about the form and shape of 
a common "industrial policy" is clearly reflected in their choice of decision-making 
procedure and voting rules applying to Title XIQ of the Maastricht Treaty, securing 
optimal protection of the national interest. Decisions regarding an "industrial policy" 
at the Community level were made applicable to the consultation procedure: "The 
Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, after consulting the 
European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, may decide on specific 
measures [..]" (EC Treaty (93):Art. 130.3).
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Trade and SEM. The consultation procedure has also been applying to trade- 
related decisions as well as various decisions regarding the operation of the Single 
European Market. Some clauses on the free movement of workers and their right of 
establishment, however, have been made subject to the cooperation procedure and, 
when the Maastricht Treaty entered into force, to the co-decision procedure (see Figure 
6.2).
6.2.2 THE PROCESS OF DEEPENING: IDENTITY-BUILDING AND TERMS OF 
CO-EXISTENCE
The transfer of competencies to the EC level and the introduction of
institutional changes, both integral parts of a deepening process driven by economic
and political imperatives6, has been fostered by active "identity-building" by the
European Commission and, to a lesser extent, the European Parliament. As argued by
an executive of the Brussels-based industry organization ORGALIME:
Both the Commission and the European Parliament are very new institutions. 
As a new level of power, the Commission and the Parliament had to try to sell 
themselves. Nobody would go initially to Brussels. So the Commission and the 
European Parliament were very keen to talk to any industry group. In order to 
get more power, they had to make sure that they would be open to pressure 
groups (Interview; 1993).
Identity-Building
Since its inception, the Commission has actively encouraged the formation of 
interest groups and their participation in the EC policy-making processes for two 
reasons (Streeck and Schmitter, 1991:137). First of all, interest groups have been 
perceived as a source of legitimation. By drawing interested societal parties into the 
Community policy network, the Commission would be able to get support for its
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policies at a level below that of its main partners: the national governments. The 
national governments would subsequently face pressures to adopt a certain proposal 
from two sides: top-down from the Commission and bottom-up from the interested 
parties. As such, the involvement of the interest groups could advance the integration 
process (Butt Philip, 1985:44,45). Second, interest groups have been perceived as 
sources of information. The data provided by these societal groups could reduce the 
Commission's dependency on the national governments and their willingness to provide 
information (Mazey and Richardson, 1993b: 10).
The Commission's preference has been to deal with the representative, 
European-wide sectoral groups. In those cases where the Commission felt it necessary 
to have the relevant sectors' input, the groups may even have been formed on invitation 
of the Commission (Sidjanski, 1972:402). Due to their operational shortcomings (see 
Chapter 7), however, the Commission has also encouraged the formation of elite 
associations of companies - the IT Roundtable being a case in point. Additionally, the 
Commission has invited representatives of societal interests to sit on consultative 
committees, which are organized and funded by the EC Commission (Nugent, 
1991:75).
Similarly, the European Parliament has actively sought the input of societal 
interests, particularly since 1979. The EP's committees organize approximately 30 
hearings a year. Through these hearings, MEPs may receive independent and expert 
advice, hear the policy preferences and views of interested parties, and establish a 
dialogue (EP sources, Interview 21 ;1993; Jacobs, Corbett and Schackleton, 1992:250- 
251).
Over time, the EC institutions' drive to mobilize interest groups and interact 
with them at the EC level has fostered the establishment of the EC as a locus of public 
decision-making and a target of political activity in co-existence with the national
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governments. However, despite the fact that the EC has become more established and 
more influential over time, the terms of co-existence between the EC institutions and 
the national governments have continued to be subject of debate.
1
Terms o f Co-Existence
The scale of deepening and the terms on which transfers of competencies and 
institutional change have been taking place, have been determined, to a large extent, 
by the ideologies of the constituent members and their inclination (whether 
ideologically, economically or politically based) to defend, maximize and prioritize 
national over regional interests through insistence upon subsidiarity, repli sur soi and 
juste retour.
Ideological Convergence. The degree of ideological convergence amongst the 
Member States has determined, to a certain degree, the range of competencies 
transferred from the national to the EC level, the type of policy instruments 
established, and the nature of policy implementation, as these constitute ideologically 
sensitive issues.
Traditionally, one could position the United Kingdom, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and other Northern European Member States towards the liberal end of 
the ideological spectrum, while France, Italy and the remaining Southern European 
countries could be allocated towards the interventionist end. Over the early 1990s, 
however, the ideological stances of the national governments appear to have converged 
slightly - a development which could, in principle, have facilitated IT consensus- 
building and decision-making at the EC level (see Chapters 7,9). This is particularly 
the case for France and the United Kingdom, which traditionally could be located at 
the opposite ends of the ideological spectrum (DTI and DG 3 sources, Interviews 
3,40,41; 1993).
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In April 1993, Michael Heseltine, the British Secretary of Trade and Industry, 
announced a new industrial strategy. Two elements deserve particular attention as they 
deviate from the "hands-off’ approach upheld by the previous UK government. First, 
the strategy envisaged an explicit role for the government in promoting the 
international competitiveness of British companies. Although government intervention 
should be limited and refrain from direct subsidies to companies, the government 
should work as a "catalyst for elements of national self-interest", notably in the area 
of innovation and exportation (Cassell, 26 April 1993:8). Second, the plan sought to 
rebuild the mutual partnership between the government and British firms. The 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) has been given the explicit mandate to 
advance the interests of industry within the British government and abroad. In order 
to stimulate the information exchange between the private sector and the government 
and reduce the insulation of DTI from private sector inputs, Heseltine has sought to 
increase the number of DTI employees that are on secondment from industry7.
While the British government has moved a step away from orthodox liberalism, 
the French government has shown some signs of departing from its interventionist 
tradition. In May 1993, the new conservative Bahadur government announced the 
privatisation of 21 companies, including Bull and Thomson. Non-EC companies would 
be limited to a maximum share of 20 per cent in the initial issue, but they could 
subsequently buy shares on the open market. In that context, one should note that in 
1991, the then Socialist government had already relaxed its restrictions on participation 
of privately-owned, foreign firms in state companies. In addition to its privatisation 
plans, the Bahadur government also indicated that it would be more stringent about 
injecting new capital into loss-making state companies than its predecessor. The 
government's intention, however, has not deterred it from injecting an additional FF 
7 bn into the loss-making company Bull. This injection, however, could be seen as a
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first step towards less public involvement in Bull, if one accepts the claim that the 
funds are aimed at preparing the company for privatisation8.
The slight convergence in the ideological stances of France and the UK has 
been caused, in part, by the change of guards in the French and British governments. 
In France, the conservatives regained power after a decade dominated by socialist rule 
(with the exception of a short spell between 1986 and 1988). In the United Kingdom, 
the conservatives stayed in power, but the Major government appears to have broken 
with the Thatcherite tradition of undervaluing the industrial base9. The trend towards 
ideological convergence, however, has also been driven by economic realities. Beyond 
the limits imposed on government intervention by budgetary constraints (see below), 
world market conditions have affected the attitudes of the national governments. 
According to a DTI official, the UK government had to recognize that some form of 
intervention constitutes a sheer necessity in a world market that is not a level playing 
field, while the French government had to accept the limits of protectionism in an 
increasingly internationalized industry where industrial partnerships are a precondition 
to survival (Interview 40; 1993).
Subsidiarity. The terms of co-existence, particularly after 1986, have also been 
affected by the inclinations of the Member States to defend their national interests 
through clinging to the principle of subsidiarity - a tendency which, ironically, has 
been caused by the process of deepening. Initially, the issue was raised by the German 
Lander, fearing that the new areas of Community action as provided for in the SEA 
would extend into their areas of exclusive competence and, thus, undermine the 
German federal constitution. Fear of losing sovereignty in the wake of a more 
widespread use of majority voting following the ratification of the SEA and concerns 
that the EC was already responsible for policy-making and execution in more areas 
than it could handle, subsequently prompted the Member States to increase their
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emphasis on subsidiarity (Wilke and Wallace, 1990:3-4).
Two questions, in particular, have been central to the debate on subsidiarity, 
namely:
First, whether the powers and competence of the EC should be extended and 
thus shift some powers away from Member States; and secondly and equally 
importantly, how to share powers between the EC and the Member States in 
the cases of conchorent powers, where competence as such is not the issue but 
the choice of the "appropriate" level at which to act (Wilke and Wallace, 
1990:4).
In response to these concerns, the Maastricht Treaty sought to outline the 
guiding principle for allocating competencies to the various levels of government and 
for selecting the level at which to act. The result has been the incorporation of an ill- 
defined clause on subsidiarity into the Treaty; responsibilities should be allocated at 
the lowest appropriate governmental level10. The debate on subsidiarity, however, did 
not stop with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty and the inclusion of the subsidiarity 
clause.
In June 1992, the Danish people rejected the Maastricht Treaty (see Table 6.1). 
Not only did this rejection, combined with the German constitutional court case 
challenge and the British government's decision to tie the timing of its vote to the 
second Danish referendum, delay the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty substantially, 
it also started a period of wide-spread, public debate about the desirability of the 
Maastricht Treaty. This debate was further fuelled by the weak approval of the Treaty 
in the French referendum, the vocal British opposition, and the de facto collapse of the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) which called into question the viability 
of Economic and Monetary Union altogether. The ratification debates of the various 
Member States were dominated, in particular, by concerns about the loss of national 
sovereignty, both politically as well as economically; the democratic deficit of a 
stronger, European Union; and the desirability of a European army, EC citizenship, and
Table 6.1
RATIFICATION PROCESS OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY
Country Date Process Result
Belgium 17.07.92 MPs 146 in favour; 33 against; 3 abstentions
04.11.92 Senate 115 in favour; 26 against; 1 abstention
Denmark 02.06.92 Referendum 50.3% against
18.05.93 Referendum 56.8% in favour
France 20.09.92 Referendum 51% in favour
Germany 02.12.92 MPs 543 in favour; 17 against; 8 abstentions
18.12.92 Senate 100% in favour
12.10.93 Court Win for all, clearing the way for ratification
Greece 31.07.92 MPs 286 in favour; 8 against; 1 abstention
Ireland 18.06.92 Referendum 68% in favour
Italy 17.09.92 Senate 176 in favour; 16 against; 1 abstention
29.10.92 MPs 403 in favour; 46 against; 18 abstentions
Luxembourg 02.07.92 MPs 51 in favour; 6 against
Netherlands 12.11.92 MPs 138 in favour; 12 against
15.12.92 Senate 67 in favour; 8 against
Spain 29.10.92 MPs 314 in favour; 3 against; 8 abstentions
25.11.92 Senate 22 in favour; 3 abstentions
Portugal 10.12.92 MPs 217 in favour; 22 against; 1 abstention
U.Kingdom 20.06.93 MPs 180 majority in favour
20.07.93 Senate 112 majority in favour
03.08.93 Court Abandonment of legal challenge, clearing the way for ratification
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a single European currency11.
Combined with recession-triggered changes in governmental attitudes (see 
below), this public reassessment of European integration further fuelled the Member 
States' insistence on subsidiarity. As Chapter 9 will illustrate, the increased insistence 
of the M/S governments on the application of this principle has hampered the 
development and, more importantly, the adoption and implementation of IT policies 
at the Community level in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Repli surSoi. Additionally, the terms of co-existence have been affected by the 
recession-triggered priority placed by the M/S governments on national solutions over 
European ones. Figure 6.3 shows that over the early 1990s, most European economies 
faced low and declining growth rates and that the British economy even contracted. In 
the face of these economic problems, the M/S governments have had the tendency to 
go back to short-term national solutions to economic problems serving their perceived 
national interests, rather than to opt for longer-term European solutions. As a DG 3 
official dubbed it, the Member States have adopted "repli sur soi" attitudes towards 
their economic problems (Interview 3; 1993).
As Chapter 9 will illustrate, the consequence of such attitudes has been that it 
has reduced the political will on the side of the Member States to implement EC-wide 
policy schemes, let alone to transfer any further competencies or resources to the EC 
level.
Juste Retour. Finally, the terms of co-existence have been affected by the 
recession-triggered insistence of the M/S governments to obtain a just return on their 
financial contributions; the funds that national companies, regions or other actors 
receive from the EC should be in line with the contributions that the home 
governments have made to the EC budget. Adherence to the principle of juste retour, 
which dates back to the British Terms of Accession renegotiations in 1975 (Taylor,
Figure 6.3 EC Member States: Financial Performance Criteria,
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1983:36), disregards the longer-term, non-monetary benefits that national companies,
regions, or other national actors may derive from participating in EC
programmes/funds. Moreover, application of the principle of juste retour may result in
policies which work against the European interest; a strict adherence to this political
concept of fair distribution may undermine the objectives of EC programmes (CEC
sources, Interviews 6,24,26; 1993).
The current insistence on juste retour has been fuelled by the recession of the
early 1990s. As Scott (1993:88) explains: "With the decline in economic activity,
higher public spending is triggered automatically as unemployment mounts while
government revenue accruing from taxes falls." With the exception of Ireland and
Germany, the countries' ratio of public debt to Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
increased over the late 1980s and early 1990s - symptomatic for cyclical downturns12
(see Figure 6.3). At the same time, budget surpluses declined while budget deficits
increased, leading most European governments to record a deterioration in their
financial position. The tighter financial conditions and the need to reduce government
spending have made national governments far more insistent on obtaining a just return.
Overall, since the late 1980s, the terms of co-existence have been under
increasing pressure. As one DG 3 source contemplated:
The Commission is in a weak political situation at the moment [to initiate and 
implement further IT policies], due to the difficulties associated with the 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the emphasis on subsidiarity and the 
economic crisis. The general attitude towards integration, Europe and the 
Commission has become less favourable (Interview 3; 1993).
6.3 EC ENLARGEMENT: IMPACT ON ITS POLICY-SUPPLYING
CAPABILITIES
Over time, the geographical scope of the European Community has increased.
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In 1973, the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland acceded to the EC. In 1981, 
Greece became the Community's 10th member. In 1986, Portugal and Spain joined the 
EC, bringing the Community's membership to twelve. Provided that national approval 
will be secured, Austria, Sweden, Finland and Norway are expected to join<the EC by 
1995. A fifth wave of enlargement may include the Eastern European countries. Other 
outstanding applications include Malta, Turkey and Cyprus.
Beyond the impact of widening on the EC's voting rules (see above), the 
widening of the European Community in Southern direction in the early and mid-1980s 
has influenced the supply of EC IT and IT-related policies over the 1980s and early 
1990s in two areas: (1) the increasing priority attached to cohesion within the 
Community, and (2) the role of regional support measures, including national 
incentives to FDI.
6.3.1 COHESION
The Southern enlargement of the 1980s, which has led to the accession of three 
countries with an economic performance below the Community's average, has changed 
the type of issues prevailing on the EC agenda. In the mid-1980s, these countries 
expressed, together with Ireland, their concerns about the prospects of deeper 
integration; they feared that further economic and monetary integration might impose 
disproportionally large costs on the economically weaker Member States (Nicoll and 
Salmon, 1994: 150,236,267,270,274; Pinder, 1993:63).
Their argument has been that the adjustment costs associated with greater 
economic and monetary integration, such as corporate relocations, lay-offs, and close­
downs, would be concentrated in the economically weak regions. Although the move 
towards a common market and economic and monetary union would lead to a greater
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wealth of the Community as a whole, it would not necessarily lead to greater wealth 
of each individual Member State. The four Member States therefore argued that 
economic and monetary integration should be associated with instruments which would 
eliminate regional economic and social disparities and bring about a greater cohesion 
amongst the Member States.
The principle of cohesion was written into the original EEC Treaty by the 
Single European Act ((87):Art.l30a-e) and further amended by the Maastricht Treaty 
(EC Treaty (93):Art.l30a-e). Over the late 1980s and the early 1990s, this commitment 
to greater economic and social cohesion, strongly supported by the three new Southern 
Member States and Ireland, has led to a rapid increase in the Community's structural 
funds and to the creation of a cohesion fund (Gardner, 14 December 1992:2).
Moreover, it has given the Southern Member States a legal basis to view EC 
policies, such as ESPRIT and other EC R&TD programmes, from the perspective of 
their impact on cohesion. First of all, this has diluted EC-wide support for policies that 
mainly benefit the Northern countries and led to demands for policies that target the 
Southern countries. The Southern M/S, for example, are relatively well-represented in 
BRITE - an EC R&TD programme aimed at upgrading the technological base of 
existing industries through the application of new technologies (Sharp, 1993:210; 
1990:60). Second, this has led to demands for greater participation in policies that 
currently mainly benefit the Northern countries; with their insistence on the principle 
of juste retour, for example, the Southern Member States have sought to increase their 
share in ESPRIT.
6.3.2 REGIONAL SUPPORT MEASURES
The need to bring about cohesion, not only between the Southern Member
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States and the Northern ones but also within the "richer" Member States, has also 
prompted the national governments to introduce a wide range of regional support 
measures, including incentives to invest in economically weak regions.
Although such incentives have been allowed under the EC’s competition 
legislation, as outlined in Chapter 4, the IT Roundtable and EECA have claimed that 
these incentives have distorted competition at their expense and to the benefit of 
foreign-owned new-comers investing in the relevant regions. However, the chances that 
an EC-wide consensus will be reached on introducing controls on such incentives are 
relatively small; too many Member States, including Northern ones like the reunified 
Germany, have a vested interest in companies investing in their peripheral regions (see 
Chapter 9).
6.4 CONCLUSION
This chapter has focused on the European Community as a supplier of public 
policies; it has discussed the changes in the EC's policy-supplying capabilities 
following the transformation of the international system and the Community's 
deepening and widening. As we will see in the following three chapters, these changes 
have affected the political activity of the European-owned IT multinationals, the weight 
attached to corporate policy preferences by the EC and its Member States and the 
extent to which the EC has been able to meet corporate policy demands.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the EC’s position as a supplier of policies 
was affected by three factors: (1) the transformation of the international system; (2) the 
deepening of the Community; and (3) the enlargement of the EC. First, the 
transformation of the bipolar system into a multipolar one has lifted the constraints 
imposed by the Cold War on the Community's political freedom of action and elevated
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the Community to the status of an economic superpower with substantial latent 
economic bargaining power. At the micro-level, the end of the Cold War has led to 
substantial cuts in defence-related expenditures, thus structurally reducing the size of 
military procurement markets. At the same time, however, the relaxation of COCOM 
constraints imposed on the exports of dual-use technologies and products, has opened 
up new opportunities for the European-owned IT companies in the rapidly growing 
Eastern European markets.
Second, the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty have shifted new 
policy competencies to the Community level and altered decision-making procedures 
and voting rules. EC IT policies have obtained a legal basis, albeit subject to 
procedures and rules that vary according to the Member States' sensitivity to the 
specific issue in question. Active identity-building on the side of the Commission and, 
to a lesser extent, the European Parliament, has fostered the establishment of the EC 
as a locus of public decision-making and a target of political activity in co-existence 
with the national governments; the involvement of interest groups in the EC policy­
making process has been stimulated by the EC institutions for both legitimation as well 
as information purposes.
However, despite the fact that, by the late 1980s and early 1990s, the EC was 
more established and more influential than ever before, the terms of co-existence 
between the EC and its M/S governments have continued to be subject of debate. 
Beyond the degree of ideological convergence amongst the Member States which has 
influenced the Community's range of competencies, type of policy instruments, and 
nature of policy implementation at any given point in the history of the EC, the terms 
of co-existence during the late 1980s and early 1990s have been affected by the 
Member States' inclination to defend, prioritize and maximize their national interests. 
The process of deepening the Community combined with the recession of the early
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1990s has prompted the M/S governments to insist on adherence to the principles of 
subsidiarity and juste retour and to opt for national solutions over European ones.
Third, the Southern enlargement of the EC has led to the inclusion of three 
Member States with a below Community average economic performance and with 
political priorities diverging from those of the richer, Northern states. Their insistence 
on cohesion has diluted EC-wide support for policies that mainly benefit the Northern 
countries, such as IT policies. Moreover, it has made greater control on national 
incentives to companies willing to invest in peripheral regions less likely.
On the basis of this analysis of the changing politics of the European 
Community, one could reiterate the main sets of short-term and structural factors that 
have affected the political influence of the European-owned IT companies, as will be 
illustrated in Chapters 7 to 9:
1. One set of factors is formed by the EC's position within the international 
system, and the change therein following the transformation of the military 
power based, bipolar system into an economic power based, multipolar system.
2. A second set of factors is formed by the deepening the European Community, 
under which competencies have been transferred from the national to the 
Community level and EC decision-making processes and voting rules have been 
altered. This process has been fostered by active identity-building on the side 
of the EC institutions. The ideologies of the individual Member States and their 
inclination to adhere to subsidiarity, repli sur soi and juste retour, however, 
have continued to test the terms of co-existence.
3. A final set of factors is formed by the Southern enlargement of the Community 
and the associated emphasis on cohesion and regional development.
The following three chapters will seek to explain, on the basis of these short­
term and structural factors as well as those outlined in Chapter 5, why the European-
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owned IT companies, as represented in the IT Roundtable were, politically, less 
influential in the late 1980s and early 1990s than in the early and mid-1980s. Chapters 
7 to 9 will discuss the impact of these changes in the IT industry and in Community 
politics on respectively (1) the political activity undertaken by the IT Roundtable and 
its members, (2) the political weight attached by the EC and the M/S governments to 
the companies' policy preferences, and (3) the extent to which the EC and the M/S 
governments have been able to realize these preferences.
6.5 NOTES
1. For a historical overview of Europe's efforts in the area of foreign and security 
policies, see, for instance, Nicoll and Salmon (1994: Chpts.1,10); Rummell and 
Schmidt (1990); Pryce (1987: Chpts.1,2); Urwin (1991: Chpts.2,5,8,11,15).
2. Unanimity voting is applied to those proposals initiating a new policy or 
modifying and further developing an existing policy framework. Unanimity is also 
required when the Council seeks to amend a Commission proposal, against the wishes 
of the Commission. Under unanimity, all Member States have to be in favour of a 
proposal. This implies that one country could block a proposal. Abstentions, however, 
count as neither a positive nor a negative vote. It is thus possible to reach unanimity 
even if there are abstentions, provided that a minimum of six members do vote (Lodge, 
1993:16; Nugent, 1991:118).
3. Simple majority voting usually applies to procedural votes. In contrast to QMV, 
simple majority voting is not based on a weighted majority; rather, each Member State 
has one vote each. A simple majority requires more than 50 per cent of the votes in 
favour of a certain proposal (Nugent, 1991:118).
4. Qualified majority voting has been applying to those proposals designed to 
implement and clarify established policy guidelines. Additionally, qualified majority 
voting applies to those areas subject to the co-operation procedure, as introduced by 
the Single European Act and reiterated by the Maastricht Treaty. A qualified majority 
constitutes of a weighted majority of 54 votes out of the 76 votes in favour of a certain 
proposal. A proposal can be blocked by a minority of 23 votes. Abstentions count as 
de facto negative votes, as abstaining does not reduce the majority requirements. These 
voting rules imply that two large states cannot form a blocking minority without the 
support of any other country, and that the five largest Member States cannot outvote 
the seven smaller ones. The votes have been distributed as follows over the Member 
States: (1) Germany, France, Italy and the UK have ten votes each; (2) Spain has eight 
votes; (3) Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal have each five; (4) Denmark 
and Luxembourg have three votes each, while (5) Luxembourg has two votes (Lodge, 
1993:16; Nugent, 1991:118).
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5. The Luxembourg Compromise of January 1966 has come to be interpreted as 
a mechanism under which each Member State retains the right to veto proposals which 
affect vital national interests, even when decisions are taken by majority voting 
(Nugent, 1991:119-120). The introduction of qualified majority voting by the Single 
European Act has not undermined the applicability of the Luxembourg Compromise.
6. For a full account of the historical development of the European Community 
and the economic and political imperatives behind periods of relative stagnation and 
progress in the widening and deepening of the Community, see, for instance, El-Agraa 
(1990:Ch.2); Nicoll and Salmon (1994:Chpts.l-3); Nugent (1991 :Chpts. 1,2; 1992); 
Swann (1992:Chpts.l-2); Tsoukalis (1991:Ch.l); Urwin (1991); Wallace (1990:Ch.3). 
For the reasons behind the introduction of an IT policy at the Community level and 
the subsequent expansion of its scope, see Chapters 3 and 4.
7. Sources: DTI sources, Interviews 10,40,41 (1993); Cassell, 26 April 1993:8; 
Gourlay, 1 February 1994:14.
8. Sources: Dawkins, 11 April 1991:3, 8 April 1991:16, and 29 January 1992; 
Rawsthom, 6 July 1993:25, 3 February 1994:20; Rawsthom and Buchan, 1993:23; 
Rawsthom and Thornhill, 24 August 1993:2: Ridding, 24-25 July 1993:12; Ridding and 
Buchan, 2 March 1994:3.
9. In an interview with The Independent on 3 March 1993, John Major argued that 
he disagreed with the Thatcherite economic philosophy of emphasizing the service 
sector. He outlined that a "different attitude" to industry and commerce was needed 
and argued that the United Kingdom would "not grow and thrive throughout the 90s" 
if it would not remain at the leading edge of technology (Atkins, 4 March 1993:8). See 
also Goodhart, 26 May 1994:10.
10. Maastricht Treaty, Art. 3(b): "The Community shall act within the limits of the 
powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In 
areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take 
action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States 
and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved by the Community."
11. Sources: Financial Times, 21 September 1992:1-4; 20 June 1992:2; 4 June 
1992; 9 June 1992:3; 19 May 1993; 18 May 93:2; Economist, 23 May 1992:54; 6 June 
1992; 20 June 1992; 26 September 1992:15-16, 25-30; 3 October 1992:15-16,49; 17 
October 1992:50-51; 19 December 1992:32-33; 13 March 1993:46; 15 May 1993:25- 
26; 22 May 1993:33-34.
12. In a number of countries, notably Italy, Greece and Belgium, the financial 
problems have not been just cyclical but structural.
Chapter 7
POLITICAL ACTIVITY
Corporate political activity is, as Chapter 2 outlined, a necessary precondition 
for influencing the Community. As discussed in Chapter 4, the IT Roundtable did meet 
this condition; the Roundtable and its members formulated and voiced their 
preferences. However, while in the early and mid-1980s the IT Roundtable and its 
member companies merely lobbied for subsidies for precompetitive, collaborative 
R&TD, by the early 1990s the scope of their policy preferences had broadened 
considerably following the 1989 decision of the IT Roundtable companies to discuss 
and present their positions on a wider range of issues (see Chapter 1).
In the early 1990s, the IT Roundtable and its members lobbied, first of all, for 
a second generation of R&TD projects, which would be closer to the market and better 
funded, and which would preferably be combined with measures to foster vertical ties. 
Second, the Roundtable pressed for transitional protective arrangements to secure a 
balanced opening of third country markets and for controls on national incentives to 
inward investment. Third, the Roundtable advocated a relaxation of the Community's 
anti-trust policy and preferential treatment of the European-owned IT companies in the 
implementation of TENs (see Table 4.1). To a large extent, these specific policy 
preferences appear to have been a product of the increasingly internationalized nature 
of the IT industry, the absence of a level playing field in the world markets, and the 
crisis developing in the IT industry in the early 1990s (see Chapter 4).
As the IT Roundtable and its members did articulate their preferences, the loss 
of political influence in the early 1990s cannot be explained by the absence of liaising 
activities. However, were these activities adequate to bring across the IT Roundtable's 
policy preferences? Were there changes in the intensity, methods, targets and timing 
of the European-owned IT companies' political activity that may have undermined the
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success of their efforts in the early 1990s?
This chapter seeks to explain the IT Roundtable's loss in political influence in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, in comparison to the early and mid-1980s, by analyzing 
the changes in the political activity undertaken by the IT Roundtable members, both 
individually and as a group. In accordance with the framework outlined in Chapter 2, 
the first section focuses on the effort that the companies have put into lobbying. The 
second section outlines the channels of the companies' lobbying activities. The third 
section discusses the lobbying targets. In particular, this section pays attention to the 
"openness" of the Community's political systems and how the different systems affect 
the opportunities of the IT Roundtable members' to articulate their policy preferences. 
The fourth section focuses on the timing of the companies' lobbying activities.
7.1 EFFORT PUT INTO POLITICAL ACTIVITY
Although the plight of the IT industry, combined with the increasing legislative 
powers of the EC (see Chapters 5,6), might have prompted the companies to increase 
their corporate political activity at the Community level, this thesis expected otherwise. 
Chapter 2 outlined the expectation that, in the early 1990s, the disappointing corporate 
profit margins, symptomatic for the structural changes in the IT industry and the 
recession, would have reduced the companies' resources and led to cut-backs in their 
lobbying efforts.
Measuring the effort put into political activity, however, has proven to be a 
difficult task as most of the necessary information is not generally in the public 
domain. At the level of the individual firm, indicators could include the number of 
man-hours that have been billed to political activity, the stature of the people involved, 
and the frequency at which interaction with government officials has been taking place.
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Similarly, one could look at the company's membership fees for industry and other 
interest groups and, if legally allowed, its donations to political parties or action 
committees. At the level of the interest group, indicators could include the group's 
budget, its number of employees, its activity agendas, and the frequency at which 
representations have been made to the EC. As the time and work involved in 
operationalizing these indicators would warrant a separate research project, this thesis 
bases its general impression of the effort put into corporate lobbying in the early 1990s 
on the perception of the representatives of the IT Roundtable and its members 
(Interviews 5,8,14,15,16,29,36;1993; Cane, 9 December 1991).
This thesis has found that, in contrast to expectations, the economic difficulties 
of the early 1990s do not appear to have led to any reduction in the IT Roundtable's 
lobbying efforts. To the contrary, as a representative, speaking on behalf of the IT 
Roundtable, argued: "we have reinforced our activities, because we feel that the 
Commission should do something in times like these. The harder the times, the more 
we press the Commission for developing solutions" (Communication 36; 1994).
Measured by the number of manhours devoted to liaising the Community, the 
representatives of Siemens, Thomson, Olivetti and ICL noted an increase in the effort 
put into lobbying the Community since the late 1980s, while Bull maintained its effort 
at the same level. As an Olivetti executive illustrated:
Olivetti has invested more resources into lobbying the EC. We have done more.
We believed in this approach and invested quite a lot of time in developing
ideas, and in interacting with the EC (Interview; 1993).
The only exception appears to have been Philips, which substantially cut down 
its resources put into lobbying. Prompted by its financial crisis, Philips "put little effort 
in EC-related activities" and "adopted a more inward-looking strategy" (Philips sources, 
Interview; 1993). Moreover, in the context of Operation Centurion (see Appendix 1.1), 
Philips made redundant a large number of its older employees - those that were
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extremely suitable for EC-related work due to their experience and intimate knowledge 
of the company (Philips sources, Interview; 1993). By the end of 1993, however, Philips 
had returned to the European political scene with calls for a "constructive European 
industrial scenario" and greater "cooperation" between the EC, the national 
governments, the scientific community and industry in order to improve Europe's 
technological competitiveness (NRC, 30 September 1993:22; Hill, 12 November 
1993:2). In February 1994, moreover, Philips' President Timmer was appointed, 
together with his colleagues from ICL, Olivetti, Siemens and IBM Europe, as a 
member of the "Bangemann Group", formed to prepare specific policy 
recommendations in the field of new information technologies (Presse 4426/94; 
Communications 5,15; 1994).
With the exception of Philips, the reduced corporate profit margins thus do not 
appear to have undermined the companies' political activity in the early 1990s. Yet, 
this hypothesis was not without justification, as evidence from the field of 
standardization will show. European standardization bodies, like CEN, CENELEC, 
ETSI, ECMA and EWOS, operate on the basis of voluntary contributions; whenever 
a company sends out its specialists, either directly or via the national standardization 
bodies, it is responsible for the experts' wages and overhead costs. In recent years, 
however,
The number of man-hours made available by member companies has definitely 
become less. Companies withdraw from participation or offer less man-hours, 
and the people that they offer are more squeezed for time (EWOS sources, 
Interview 38; 1993).
The companies can no longer afford that some people work only part-time for 
them and part-time for us, while they pay their full-time wages (CENELEC 
sources. Interview 25; 1993).
Consequently, it has not been easy for the standardization bodies to tap into the
expertise they need to formulate European standards - an exercise vital for the
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establishment of a level playing field within the Community's Single European Market 
(see Chapter 3).
Considering this evidence, why have the EC lobbying activities of the European 
IT companies largely escaped the negative impact of the tighter financial conditions 
under which the companies have been operating since the late 1980s? A first 
explanation might lie in the size and degree of diversification of the companies in 
question. Large, diversified companies, like Siemens and Thomson, appear to have 
been less sensitive to the impact of the changes in the IT industry, as unsatisfactory 
performances in the IT business segments could be compensated by other, more 
profitable activities. As a Siemens executive argued:
Although we have to reduce costs, we have less need to reduce expenditures
in areas where Siemens thinks it is important to keep a presence
(Interview; 1993).
In the case of Philips, however, this argument does not apply. By the early 1990s, the 
financial performance had deteriorated to such a degree that the company was unable 
to compensate for its loss-making activities, forcing it to cut expenditures across the 
board.
A second explanation could be offered by changes in the responsibility/manhour 
ratios. Although ICL, for example, tripled its "manpower" on EC-related affairs since 
the late 1980s, the range of responsibilities that the executives in question had to deal 
with increased as well (Communication; 1994).
A third explanation might be found in the basis on which the representative 
offices have been financed. Siemens' liaison office, for example, is not being paid out 
of an overhead. Rather, the office finances itself through selling its services to Siemens' 
business units. If the units do not perceive the Liaison Office's work as paying off, 
they will not pay for the services provided (Interview; 1993).
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7.2 CHANNELS OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY
Considering the fact that the loss of political influence of the IT Roundtable 
cannot be explained by a drastic reduction in the effort put into lobbying, one could 
question, as Chapter 2 did, whether the loss of political influence in the early 1990s 
has been due to a growing ineffectiveness of the IT Roundtable as a channel of 
political activity.
7.2.1 EFFECTIVENESS OF THE IT ROUNDTABLE AS A CHANNEL OF
POLITICAL ACTIVITY
The IT Roundtable, which brings together the largest, European-owned IT and 
telecommunications (equipment) producers into a private club, can be considered an 
"association of companies" (see Figure 7.1). As Chapter 2 outlined, the small number 
of companies involved and their direct line of representation should help overcome the 
problems of free-riding and compromised interests that hamper many industry 
federations. Moreover, political actions, collectively undertaken by these large 
companies, should confer semi-representativeness on them and increase their political 
clout. Despite these advantages, however, the IT Roundtable's effectiveness as a 
channel for political activity appears to have been undermined.
On the basis of the interviews, three factors were mentioned that, in the 
perception of the interviewees, hampered the IT Roundtable's effectiveness: (1) the 
declining representativeness of the IT Roundtable, following the structural changes 
taking place in the industry; (2) the outdated structure of the Roundtable, suitable for 
articulating preferences in the area of R&TD but inappropriate for voicing broader 
preferences on industrial policy; and (3) the lack of internal coherence within the IT
Figure 7.1 The European-Grown IT Companies: Channels of 
Corporate Political Activity
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Roundtable caused by the diverging interests of its members.
The IT  Roundtable: Representativeness
When the IT Roundtable companies were invited by CommissionerDavignon 
for roundtable discussions, the twelve member companies were perceived as 
representative for the industry. By the early 1990s, however, this perception had 
changed - at least in the eyes of national government and EC officials (Interviews 
3,33,39; 1993). As one DG 3 official argued, "they are less and less representative of 
the electronics industry" (Interview 3; 1993).
This change in perception was not so much a consequence of the reduction in 
the IT Roundtable's membership, as one might expect. Although the take-overs of 
Plessey and Nixdorf and the expulsion of ICL ffom the IT Roundtable did lead to a 
reduction in the Roundtable's membership-base from twelve to nine companies (see 
Table 7.1), these nine companies continued to account for the majority of the European 
Community's indigenous supply of computers and semiconductors (Appendices 5.4 and 
5.9). As one IT Roundtable representative argued, "we consider ourselves as 
representing about 70 per cent of IT industry, in terms of personnel and turnover" 
(Communication 36; 1994). Rather, the perception that the Roundtable had become less 
representative of the IT industry, appeared to be the result of two structural changes 
taking place in the IT industry.
First, while the IT industry has been shifting away from the production of 
computer hardware towards the production of software and services (see Chapter 5), 
the IT Roundtable has remained largely a group of hardware producers. Although the 
individual Roundtable members have been retargeting their operations towards software 
and services, the Roundtable as a group has not been representing an "important part 
of the European-owned software and services industry" (DG 3 sources, Interview
Table 7.1
IT ROUNDTABLE: PROFILE
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ETTIRT
Formed
Location
Members
Structure
Decision
Objective
Issues
Sources
European Information Technology Industry Roundtable (TT Roundtable)
1979/80
Brussels
Largest European-owned IT and telecommunications (equipment) companies. 
Initially, the membership of the IT Roundtable comprised the Group of Twelve, 
i.e.: General Electric Company (UK), ICL (UK), Plessey (UK), Thomson (F), Bull 
(F), CIT-Alcatel (CGE) (F), Siemens (G), AEG (G), Nixdorf (G), Olivetti (I),
STET (I) and Philips (NL). After expulsion of ICL and the take-overs of Nixdorf 
by Siemens, Plessey by GEC and Siemens, and AEG by Daimler-Benz, the IT 
Roundtable's membership base has been reduced to nine companies: GEC Marconi 
(UK), Thomson (F), Bull (F), Alcatel (F), Siemens (G), Daimler-Benz (G), Olivetti 
(I), STET (I) and Philips (NL).
(1) Top-level Meetings: Semi-annual meetings of the CEOs of the member 
companies, led by rotating presidency. At these meetings the Roundtable's policy- 
line is set Also: participation of CEOs in ad-hoc special meetings, for example 
with Commissioners.
(2) Strategic Committee: Executives responsible for the long-term strategic 
planning in IT in their respective companies. The Strategic Committee, which 
meets about 10 times a year, identities the areas of action, prepares the decisions 
of the CEOs at the Top-level Meetings, and executes the decisions taken. This 
Committee is responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the IT Roundtable.
(3) Working Groups: Groups, consisting of representatives of the member 
companies, dealing with specific issues, such as R&TD and ENS, and reporting to 
the Strategic Committee.
(4) Industrial Office: Secretariat
Additionally, IT Roundtable members (R&D executives) participate in the 
ESPRIT/IT Steering Committee, which gives scientific advice on EC R&TD 
programmes.
Consensus.
Representation of the European-owned IT industry's interests to the EC with the 
ultimate aim of improving the European IT industry's international 
competitiveness.
(1) IT  Research and Development:
Collaborative R&TD in the context of the ECs Framework Programmes: (a) 
ESPRIT; (b) new generation IT R&TD programme.
(2) Industrial Policy in the area o f IT:
Industrial policy; completion of the Single European Market; programmes for 
Central and Eastern Europe; industrial (re)structuring; international trading 
conditions; demand stimulating projects, et cetera.
IT Roundtable sources (Interview 36;1993; Communications 29,36;1994); IT 
Roundtable manifestos, opinions and papers; Cane, 11 March 1991; De Jonquieres 
and Thomson, 5 February 1991; Peterson (1992:231-232); Sharp (1993:206); Sharp 
and Shearman (1987:49-50).
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3; 1993). The software and services producers Cap Gemini Sogeti1 (F), Finsiel (I) and 
the Sema Group (UK), for example, have no membership in the IT Roundtable (see 
Table 7.1) while these companies did belong to the 10 largest European-grown 
dataprocessing companies in 1992 (See Appendices 5.9 and 5.11). <
Second, with the greater focus on the use of information technology rather than 
its supply, it has become increasingly important for government officials to get the 
policy input of IT users (see Chapter 4). The IT Roundtable, however, is mostly seen 
as an association of IT (and telecommunications equipment) suppliers. Although this 
criticism is not totally justified, as the IT Roundtable members are simultaneously 
large consumers of IT, the Roundtable does not represent large IT users in industries 
other than IT and telecommunications equipment - with the notable exception of 
Daimler-Benz, which took over AEG (see Table 7.1).
As a consequence of the perceived decline in representativeness of the IT 
Roundtable, the Commission does not "follow in the footsteps of the Big 12" any 
more, as was the case in the early and mid-1980s (EZ sources, Interview 19; 1993). As 
Chapter 4 illustrated in the case of the Community's second generation IT R&TD 
programme, by the early 1990s, "the Roundtable's monopoly on industry-input into the 
Commission", had come to an end (Business Europe, 15 February 1991:6; 
Communication 30; 1993).
Although the IT Roundtable remains one of the main sources of policy inputs 
into the Commission, computer software and services companies and IT users have 
begun to compete with the IT Roundtable in providing policy inputs. Additionally, 
SMEs and foreign companies - neither of which have ever been represented by the IT 
Roundtable - appear to have become increasingly involved in EC policy formulation.
The wider range of parties consulted in EC IT policy-making resulted, in part, 
from a conscious Commission policy to widen the scope of its consultations to include
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parties of which the contributions, for various reasons, have been perceived as
important. This has been applying very clearly to the effort of the Commission to
involve users in the development of the Community's new IT R&TD programme (see
Chapter 4). Similarly, the increased consultation of SMEs can be interpreted as an EC-
initiated, top-down initiative, which appears to have been driven by a political lobby,
convinced about the benefits that SMEs, as a group, may yield (CEC and industry
sources, Interviews 4,21; Communication 28; 1994). The attention paid to foreign-
owned companies and their policy positions, meanwhile, can be seen as reflecting a
growing recognition on the side of the Community and its Member States of the value
of the contribution of foreign, and particularly, American companies to the
Community's economy - a recognition displayed by Ireland, for example, in the
Council discussion on the 1991 White Paper (see Chapter 4).
The broader scope of consultation, however, has also been a consequence of an
increase in political activity undertaken by the competing interested parties, following
their recognition of the increasing importance of the EC as a policy-supplier (see
Chapter 6)2. As one national government official argued:
When ESPRIT started shaping up according to plan, the large users became 
interested as well. They told the EC to pay more attention to the demand-side. 
They argued that it was no use to continue supporting the supply of a 
technology, if the users were not ready to apply it. This was a clear movement 
towards the end of the 1980s, which has brought the users together. They 
subsequently started formulating their needs (EZ sources, Interview 19; 1993).
Not only users, but also the academic world and SMEs started to organize themselves
and to attune their policy stances on the Community's IT policies; "Brussels got more
information and faced more lobbies, more pressure from different sides" (EZ sources,
Interview 19; 1993).
Indicative for an increase in political activity of competing interest groups has
been, amongst others, the establishment of the Group of Six in 1991, an association
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of six European-owned computer software and services companies3. The Group of Six 
seeks to give the computing services industry a "European voice" and to 
counterbalance the influence of the main European hardware manufacturers, i.e. the IT 
Roundtable, in EC policy formulation (Cane and Taylor, 13 March 1992:2)/Similarly, 
foreign-owned companies have stepped up their political activities. In 1985, for 
example, the American Chamber of Commerce established its "EC Committee", which 
acts as the voice of companies like IBM, Digital Equipment, Intel, Motorola, Texas 
Instruments, Unisys and Sun Microsystems. In 1991, the American Electronics 
Association founded a European affiliate, representing over 80 European electronics 
companies of American parentage to the Community and the M/S governments 
(Communication 46; 1994).
The IT  Roundtable: Alignment o f Structure and Function
It has also been argued that the effectiveness of the IT Roundtable as a channel
of political activity has been hampered by the mismatch between the IT Roundtable's
structure and its current functions; while the IT Roundtable was designed to meet the
objective of providing policy input into the Commission on EC IT R&TD policies, the
IT Roundtable's structure was arguably not adequate to provide policy input on a wider
range of industrial policies. As one DG 3 official argued:
The representatives of the participating companies are R&D people. They are 
not geared towards broad topics relevant to the strategy of the company. Such 
issues can only be discussed at the CEO level. The structure is not geared 
towards industrial policy making (Interview 3; 1993).
Although such a perception is bound to have affected the degree to which the 
official in question has been receptive to the IT Roundtable's policy preferences, the 
perception is not totally justified. Albeit true for the IT Roundtable members present 
in the IT (ESPRIT) Steering Committee, this assertion does not fully hold for the IT
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Roundtable's Strategic Committee. This Committee, which plays together with the 
Working Groups an important role in preparing the IT Roundtable’s positions (see 
Table 7.1), consists of the executives responsible for long-term IT planning in their 
respective companies. In Spring 1993, the Strategic Committee included not only 
Technical Directors, but also Assistants to the Board of Management and Vice 
Presidents (Membership list; April 1993). Although the responsibilities of the latter may 
certainly include IT research and development, generally their position covers a wider 
range of issues. As an IT Roundtable representative argued, "they are not only dealing 
with R&D. They deal with IT in general" (Communication 36; 1994).
IT  Roundtable: Internal Coherence
A third factor allegedly hampering the effectiveness of the IT Roundtable has 
been the occasional lack of internal coherence within the association. Despite the fact 
that the Roundtable consists of a small group of selected companies, which implies 
that it is more homogeneous than most interest groups (see Chapter 2), it has been 
argued by IT company sources that the Roundtable's set-up does merely "accommodate 
and not solve" the member companies' divergent interests (Interview 15; 1993).
One faultline has divided the telecommunications (equipment) producers and 
the IT firms - although, obviously, some companies belong to both camps (IT company 
sources, Interviews 5,15; 1993). While the telecommunications firms, mostly profitable, 
have been operating in a highly regulated and nationally protected environment, the 
IT companies, mostly loss-making, have been operating in a relatively deregulated and 
globalized industry (see Chapter 5) - leading to differences in their attitude towards 
public ownership and intervention. While the telecommunications producers have been 
serving a relatively small number of clients predominantly within the home market, the 
IT companies have been serving hundreds of customers across the world - resulting in
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"different views of how the market develops" (IT company sources, Interview 
15; 1993). These different conditions of operation have led to divergencies of interests 
on a "regular" basis (IT company sources, Interview 15; 1993).
Even within the IT camp, interests have been split, notably between the 
semiconductor producers and the computer companies (see Chapters 3,4). Beyond the 
divergent opinions on the EC semiconductor tariff, anti-dumping duties and price 
undertakings, the semiconductor and computer producers also have differed on the 
allocation of EC R&TD funds. While the semiconductor producers allegedly pleaded 
for more funds, an executive from a computer producing company commented:
Our view is that any ECU invested in semiconductors is wasted. It is too late.
They can maintain their position in ASICs, niches or RISCs, but Europe will
not recover the gap in the larger volume semiconductors (Interview 5; 1993).
Although the advantage of the IT Roundtable, at least in the perception of one 
participant, has been that the companies "talk to each other, know each other, and 
know each other's positions" (Interview 8; 1993), understanding each other has not been 
sufficient to reach consensus on sensitive policy issues that risk dividing the 
membership base along the lines outlined above. Lack of consensus, meanwhile, has 
led to none or very general statements on the policy issues in question, such as: "the 
EC should adopt a sector by sector approach to the reduction of tariffs" or "anti­
dumping procedures" should be "reinforced" (IT Roundtable sources, 1991). As a 
consequence, it is only in those broad areas that affect all Roundtable members, such 
as unfair trade and market access in general (see Chapter 4), that the IT Roundtable 
has been able to build the consensus to formulate and sustain common positions. As 
an IT company executive commented about the Roundtable:
If you have very divergent interests, you cannot have a very strong position.
Then it becomes a forum. And when it is a forum, it has no influence
(Interview 29; 1993).
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IT  Roundtable: Effectiveness
Although the IT Roundtable was regarded as a highly effective channel of
political activity in the early and mid-1980s, by the early 1990s, this appeared not to
be the case. In the perception of government officials, the reduced representativeness
of the IT Roundtable and their rightly or wrongly attributed "R&D" image have
hampered the effectiveness of the Roundtable as a channel for articulating policy
preferences (CEC and national government sources, Interviews 3,19,33,39;1993;
Communication 30; 1993).
In the perception of corporate executives, the lack of internal coherence has
undermined the IT Roundtable's effectiveness (IT company sources, Interviews
5,8,15,29). As one executive concluded on the basis of his experience:
I am not impressed by the results, given the amount of time invested. [..] I am 
not overly impressed by the coherence of the IT Roundtable and the impact 
that we have had on EC policies. As a group, we have not gotten very far 
(Interview 5; 1993).
7.2.2 ALTERNATIVE CHANNELS OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY
In Chapter 2, the expectation was outlined that doubts about the effectiveness 
of the IT Roundtable as a vehicle for articulating policy preferences may have 
prompted the European-owned IT companies to opt for alternative channels of political 
activity. This thesis, however, found that, although the IT Roundtable "is not 
necessarily as good as any of the participating companies would like it to be" (IT 
company sources, Interview 5; 1993), the European-owned IT companies have 
continued to use the Roundtable as a channel of political activity. It was felt that, i f  
consensus could be reached, collective actions through the IT Roundtable could add 
greater political clout to the policy preferences brought forward. As one IT company
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executive argued, "one should always try to use [the IT Roundtable] to bring the 
message to the Commission" (Interview 29; 1993).
In certain cases, however, the companies have used alternative channels, which 
appear more appropriate to articulate the companies' preferences on specific issues than 
the IT Roundtable. The alternative IT-related channels of political activity, and their 
membership, have been outlined in Table 7.2. Appendix 7.1 summarizes the 
membership of the main European-level interest groups, their decision-making 
requirements, objectives and range of issue areas. The cases in which the European- 
owned IT companies as well as ICL have opted for alternative channels include: trade; 
TENs and software; and standardization.
Trade-Related Issues: EECA and EUROBTT
The European IT companies have opted to pursue their trade-related policy 
preferences through EECA and EUROBIT. The two European industry federations 
represent respectively the European component industry and the European business 
machines, IT and telecommunications terminal equipment industries (see Appendix 
7.1).
The European IT companies have not been directly represented in these industry 
federations; rather, they have been represented via their membership of national 
industry associations (see Table 7.2). This indirect line of representation implies that 
the companies may formally be represented by their national associations in EECA or 
EUROBIT without actively contributing to the formulation of the national associations' 
policy stances. Olivetti, for example, has been a member of ANIE, which represents, 
amongst others, the interests of Italian component manufacturers in EECA. Olivetti has 
had an interest in participating in ANIE/EECA related activities via its control of 
Technicom, a Printer Circuit Board (PCB) producer. In a cost-reduction exercise
Table 7.2
CHANNELS OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY: CORPORATE MEMBERSHIP
Companies Brussels Prof. Associations European Industry Federations
Office Lobbyist E R T  I T R T  B O S  U N I C E  O R G A L I M E  E E C A  E U R O B I T
Representation via national associations only. Membership of national associations does not necessarily imply 
involvement.
Siemens/SNI • a  a • • • BPA/BDI • ZVEI • ZVEI • VDMA/ZVEI
Philips • • • • VNO/NCW • FME • FAPEL
Bull « • • • • CNPF • FIEE • SYCEP-SIT. • SFIB
Olivetti • • • • • Confind. • ANIE • ANIE • ASSINFORM
Thomson • a  b A C • • CNPF • FIEE • SYCEP-SIT. • SFIB
ICL •/« A d • CBI BEAME • ECIF • EEA
Sources: Interviews with corporate executives, 1993; European Round Table list of members, November 1992; 
Communications with ANIE, SFIB, BEAMA, SYCEP-SITELESC, FIEE, EUROBIT, March 1994; Appendix 7.1.
Notes
• Member
a  Former Member/Use
« Shuttle Diplomacy
a Karlheinz Kaske, President and Chief Executive Officer, used to be vice president of the ERT
b From ca.1990-1993: use of consultant to lobby the EP only
c Alain Gomez, chairman and chief executive officer of Thomson-CSF, used to be a member of the ERT
d ICL was expelled from the IT Roundtable after its take-over by Fujitsu
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around 1993, however, Olivetti (Technicom) left ANIE in this particular sector. 
Although still a member of ANIE in different areas, Olivetti has not been involved in 
electronics component-related ANIE activities since 1993 (ANIE sources, 
Communication 44; 1993).
The preference of the European IT companies to handle their trade-related 
issues through EECA and EUROBIT can be explained by the inability of the IT 
Roundtable to accommodate the array of interests amongst its members. Despite their 
broad membership base (see Appendix 7.1), EECA and EUROBIT have obviously been 
sufficiently homogeneous to come up with specific positions. In that context, it is 
interesting to note that, despite the membership of foreign-owned companies in EECA's 
member associations, no foreign companies have been allowed to participate in EECA's 
Semiconductor Product Committee which prepares EECA's policy stance on 
semiconductors (Interview 31 ;1993; Appendix 7.1). The additional advantage of 
operating through EECA and EUROBIT has been that it has conferred de facto 
representativeness on the IT companies, as illustrated in the semiconductor anti­
dumping cases (see Chapter 3).
TENs and Software: BOS
In 1991, the IT Roundtable's remaining indigenous European computer 
companies, i.e. Bull, Olivetti and SNI, chose to concentrate their forces and to jointly 
pursue their interests on two very specific issues, namely TENs and software. The 
three companies, facing similar problems and challenges, formed a new association: 
BOS. BOS is as much a cooperative alliance as it is an "interest" group. The BOS 
initiative seeks to provide for joint responses to Community calls for public 
procurement tenders relating to IT Trans European Networks; joint defmition of a 
common computer platform which will secure the interoperability of the companies'
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products and joint development of software; and, finally, joint promotion of the 
companies' case to the EC and national governments (IT company sources, 
Interviews; 1993; Appendix 7.1).
Even the formula adopted by BOS, however, does not shield the association 
from the "coherence" problems faced by the IT Roundtable. The interests of the BOS 
companies allegedly have been diverging along two lines: (1) public versus private 
ownership, pitting Bull against Olivetti and Siemens Nixdorf, on actions that might 
involve closer ties between the three partners; and (2) mainframe versus PC production, 
pitting Bull and Siemens Nixdorf against Olivetti, on the timing of actions that might 
affect mainframe sales.
Standardization: CEN, CENELEC, ETSI, ECMA, EWOS, AND SPAG
Standardization-related issues have mostly been pursued through the European 
standardization bodies. These include both the formal European organizations CEN, 
CENELEC, and ETSI, and the standardization associations ECMA and EWOS (see 
Table 7.3).
While ETSI allows for direct corporate membership, CEN and CENELEC 
consist of nationally organized standardization organizations (see Appendix 7.1). CEN 
and CENELEC's indirect lines of representation prevent any direct company 
membership. Nevertheless, it has occurred that employees of one European-owned IT 
company were sent out as the "national representatives" of multiple EC countries 
(CENELEC sources, Interview 25; 1993). In particular, this may occur when the 
company in question is the only one with a significant expertise in the area under 
discussion and when this company has sufficient interest in the standardization process 
to be willing to assign its specialists to the standardization effort. The exercise of such 
a "monopoly of legitimate expertise" is particularly preponderant in the area of
Table 7.3
STANDARDIZATION BODIES: CORPORATE MEMBERSHIP
Companies Associations
E C M A  E W O S S P A G
European Industry Federations
C E N  C E N E L E C
Mixede
E T S I
Siemens/SNI • • Aa
Representation via national 
associations only. Membership of 
national associations, however, 
does not necessarily imply involvement.
• DIN • DKE •
Philips • Ab Aa • NNI • NEC •
Bull • • Aa • AFNOR • UTE •
Olivetti AC • Aa • UNI • CEI •
Thomson Ad Aa • AFNOR • UTE •
ICL • • Aa • BSI • BEC •
Sources: Interviews with corporate executives, 1993; ECMA Memento 1993; EWOS, Interview 38;1993 ; EEA information
brochure; ETSI, Communication 45;1994; SPAG, Communication 47;1994; Schneider, 1992:57; Communications with ETSI,
UNI, CEI; June 1994; Communications with AFNOR, UNI, CEI, UTE, June 1994; Appendix 7.1.
Notes
• Member 
a Former Member 
a SPAG S.A. has not been in existence since December 1993
b Philips reduced its involvement following its decision to withdraw from microcomputer production
c Olivetti was a member of ECMA according to ECMA Memento 1991, quoted in Schneider (1992:57)
d Thomson-CSF was a member of ECMA according to ECMA Memento 1992
e Direct membership for companies and other interested parties, but approval of ETSI standards by national
standardization bodies
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standardization, although it may also occur in the case of detailed R&TD proposals. 
Most industrial policy issues, however, affect a broader base of interested parties with 
adequate expertise.
In contrast to CEN and CENELEC, EWOS and ECMA are associations of 
companies. While effective participation in CEN and CENELEC requires that the 
European IT companies successfully lobby the national standard bodies, EWOS and 
ECMA allow the producers to participate directly. This implies that the manufacturers 
have a direct influence over the formulation of the draft standard. EWOS and ECMA, 
however, cannot endorse European standards; the draft standards will subsequently 
have to be put up for adoption by CEN, CENELEC or ETSI, or by the international 
standardization bodies.
During the 1980s, a third standardization association was operational, namely 
the Standard Promotion and Application Group (SPAG). Comprising the Big Twelve 
companies, SPAG was "a major promoter of a mechanism where organizations could 
participate directly in the standardization process" (EWOS sources, Interview 38; 1993; 
Pannenborg, 1986:27). Established in 1984, SPAG initially sought to develop 
functional standards (OSI profiles) and to promote the use of these standards in public 
procurement. In 1987, however, SPAG's mission was altered dramatically - as 
"negotiating as a club, as the Twelve amongst each other, did not work any more" 
(SPAG sources, Interview 35; 1993). Realizing the importance of users, SPAG co­
founded EWOS which took over the task of developing profiles. SPAG, meanwhile, 
decided to concentrate on the conformance testing of standards, while SPAG Services, 
a 1986 offspring, would commercialize the testing tools. The economic difficulties in 
the IT industry in the early 1990s, however, prompted the participants to end their 
cooperation in SPAG. In December 1993, SPAG formally stopped its operations. By 
that time, SPAG Services had already been out of business for some time (SPAG
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sources, Communication 47; 1994).
Individual Corporate Representations
In the face of the growing importance of lobbying the Community (see Chapter 
6) and the shortcomings associated with indirect representations, the European IT 
companies appear to have put increasing emphasis on direct, individual representations 
- a conclusion underscored by the establishment of liaison offices in Brussels. Since 
the late 1980s/early 1990s, all European-grown IT companies, with the exception of 
Bull, have established a base in Brussels, responsible for informing the headquarters 
and corporate divisions on EC-related issues and for liaising with the EC institutions 
and the national delegations to the Community (see Table 7.2).
Siemens opened its Liaison Office to the EC in 1989. In addition to the eight- 
strong permanent staff (1993), the Brussels office also uses specialists dispatched from 
the headquarters. Philips has had an office in Brussels since the 1960s. Initially, the 
office merely consisted of a secretary and was not actively representing Philips' views 
to the EC. Only when "Europe became an issue", the company decided to staff the 
office with more employees, and of a higher stature. Currently, the office is manned 
by one executive, one assistant and one secretary. Olivetti set up its European Affairs 
Division in 1992 and employed six people in this division by 1993. Thomson-CSF has 
been operating a one-man office in Brussels since 1990. The office, which is solely 
responsible for liaising with the Commission, has been supplemented by various other 
specialists responsible for issue areas, such as the EC's R&TD Framework Programme. 
Additionally, until recently, a full-time, Paris-based consultant was responsible for 
liaising with the EP. Like Bull, ICL has been pursuing its relations with the EC 
through a regular shuttle diplomacy by the responsible, London-based manager. In 
respectively 1990 and 1992, however, ICL also decided to appoint two Brussels-based
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employees to work on EC-related issues (TT company sources, Interviews
5,8,15,16,29;1993; Communications 5,8,14,15,16,29;1994).
As Table 7.2 shows, the establishment of a Brussels office and/or shuttle
diplomacy between the headquarters and Brussels have made the 1 need for
representations via independent intermediaries, such as consultants or professional
lobbyists, largely unnecessary. Lobbying via such organizations has been perceived as
more expensive and less effective. In fact, one corporate executive felt that lobbying
through any intermediary, whether this would be a professional lobbyist, an association
of companies or an industry federation, was not as effective as lobbying the
Community directly and on an individual basis;
Individual companies are more effective in the lobbying of both the Member 
States as well as the Commission than were they to operate through any 
organization. The European Round Table, for example, is not ineffective, but 
it is not as effective as individual firms (Interview 5; 1993).
7.3 LOBBYING TARGETS
Over time, the EC has developed into a more mature supplier of public 
policies; issues that were formerly decided by the national governments, are now 
decided in Brussels (see Chapter 6). With the shift in competencies, the European 
Community has become increasingly important as a corporate lobbying target, as 
Figure 7.2 illustrates.
The EC comprises a network of institutions, including the European 
Commission, the European Parliament (EP), the Economic and Social Committee 
(ESC), and the Council of Ministers, which vary in their importance as lobbying 
targets. The Commission has been the primary lobbying target, due to its role in the 
EC policy-making processes (see Chapter 6). The European-grown IT multinationals
Figure 7.2 Proliferation of Interest Groups Operating at the EC 
Level, 1970-1994
Number
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Circa 1994
Year
"Industry Federations "Public Affairs Consultancies 
"Law Firms "Regional and Local Authorities
Sources: Andersen & Eliassen, 1991:174; Butt Philip (1987:282); Financial Times, 26 May 1994:4
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have been particularly interested in the Commission's mandate to draft legislative
proposals and communications on issues of concern - an interest justified by the fact
that approximately 80 per cent of an initial Commission proposal is retained in the
fmal version adopted by the Council (Hull, 1993:83; Green, 2 April 1992:8). As one
IT company executive explained:
It is essential to lobby the Commission because it is when proposals are being 
discussed at the Commission level, that you can influence them. If you are too 
late, you cannot change them any more (Interview 29; 1993).
Additionally, the European-grown IT companies have been interested in the
Commission's own executive powers, notably those in the area of competition policy,
commercial policy and the administration of funds, as the Commission's actions in
these areas have affected the companies' operations and the playing field in which they
operate.
The European Parliament also constitutes a lobbying target of the European IT
companies, albeit of secondary importance to the Commission. However, since the
introduction of the cooperation and co-decision procedures which confer greater
political leverage on the EP (see Chapter 6), the importance of the European
Parliament as a lobby target has increased substantially (Andersen and Eliassen,
1991:181). As one IT Roundtable member illustrated:
Lobbying the European Parliament has become more important since the Single 
European Act. The fact is that the European Parliament could introduce 
political amendments. For example, we were afraid that the European 
Parliament would do so in the case of HDTV. The Commission had come up 
with an interesting proposal. There was the risk that the European Parliament 
would change it or amend it in the wrong way. It was thus important to 
persuade them to support our case (Interview; 1993).
The ESC, as a mainly consultative body on selected legislative proposals, does 
not "really play a key role in influencing and deciding on EC policies" (UNICE 
sources, Interview 4; 1993). Consequently, the ESC's ranking as a lobbying target has 
been low.
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Finally, the Council of Ministers, responsible for the final approval of 
legislative proposals, is targeted "at home, not via the IT Roundtable" (IT Roundtable 
sources, Interview 36; 1993). The individual IT Roundtable members target their 
respective home governments, as "the government is the last defender of ydur interest 
in the Council, in the case that you have not succeeded in convincing the Commission" 
(IT company sources, Interview 29; 1993). Additionally, efforts have been undertaken 
by the individual companies to lobby other M/S governments as the introduction of 
QMV on various IT-related policy-issues has made it imperative to get the support of 
either a winning majority or a blocking minority (IT company sources, Interviews 
5,8,29; see below).
As the Council, its subordinate bodies, and expert committees advising the 
Commission consist of national government officials (see Chapter 1), lobbying the M/S 
governments remains a vital ingredient for successfully influencing EC policies 
(Andersen and Eliassen, 1991:181; Butt Philip, 1987:283; 1985:56). The Community's 
increasing importance as a lobbying target has thus not led to a shift in corporate 
political activity away from the national governments. Rather, lobbying the Community 
appears to have been complementary to lobbying the national governments.
As Chapter 2 outlined, the success of any political activity aimed at the 
Community depends in part on the "openness" of the political system targeted. It is, 
therefore, possible that the IT Roundtable's loss of political influence over the EC's IT 
policies in the early 1990s, caused in part by its intrinsic shortcomings, may have been 
aggravated by a reduction in the openness of the EC and its Member States to 
corporate lobbying. The following sections will discuss the openness of the European 
Community in terms of: (1) the degree of fragmentation of EC policy-making and 
implementation, (2) the extent of insulation of the policy-making and implementing 
bureaucracy, (3) its legitimacy, (4) its need for information, notably on technical
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issues; and (5) its attitude towards corporate demands, based on ideology and past 
experiences. The openness of the national governments will be discussed in more 
general terms.
7.3.1 FRAGMENTATION OF EC POLICY-MAKING
As Chapter 6 has shown, the decision-making at the EC level has been 
relatively fragmented, involving the Commission proposing policies, the European 
Parliament submitting opinions and proposing amendments, the Economic and Social 
Committee voicing opinions, and the Council of Ministers taking the final decisions 
(Figure 6.2). Additionally, the policy-making and implementing processes have been 
fragmented within each institution, as Figure 7.3 illustrates.
Within the Commission, the drafting process has been divided into four stages, 
involving different levels of the Commission hierarchy. First, a proposal is initiated by 
one or more officers within the responsible DG, i.e. DG 3 and 13 for IT-related policy 
proposals (see Chapter 4), and drafted in close consultation with interested 
governmental and societal parties. Second, once drafted, the proposal is subject to 
formal procedures for inter-DG consultation, which may be extremely contentious as 
the DG 4-DG 13 antagonisms in the case of the 1991 White Paper have illustrated (see 
Chapter 4). Third, prior to its discussion by the Commission, the draft proposal is 
being evaluated by the Commissioners' cabinets. Finally, the draft is subject to 
approval by the Commission. Once approved, the proposal will be send for perusal to 
the Council of Ministers, EP and ESC.
The ESC develops its draft opinions within the ESCs sectorally-organized 
fractions and, subsequently, adopts these by the 189-strong committee (see Figure 7.3). 
The EP develops its opinions and amendments, which are approved by the MEPs
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during the plenary sessions of Parliament, in parliamentary committees (see Figure 
7.3). Two committees, in particular, have been working on IT-related issues, namely: 
the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy, which 
prepared the EP's position on the Bangemann communication on an EC1 industrial 
policy (see Chapter 4, OJ C240, 1991) and the January 1994 Resolution on the IT 
industry (see Chapter 10), and the Committee on Energy, Research and Technology, 
which has been involved in the Fourth Framework's legislative process (EP sources, 
Interview 21;1993; Chapter 4).
The European Parliament and the ESC feed their input on legislative proposals 
into the Council Working Groups and the Committee for Permanent Representatives 
(COREPER). These organizations, which are subordinate to the Council of Ministers, 
are responsible for the preparatory negotiations on the legislative proposals which will 
eventually be discussed in the Council meetings (see Figure 7.3).
Once a policy proposal has been adopted by the Council, these policies will be 
implemented by either the national governments or by the Commission. As the 
implementation of the 1991 White Paper has illustrated, this may also be a fragmented 
affair; not only DG 3, but also DG 1 (external trade) and DG 5 (training), for example, 
have been involved (DG 3 sources, Interviews 3,11 ;1993).
In conclusion, EC policy-making has been very fragmented. As outlined in 
Chapter 2, such a fragmented policy-making structure opens up an array of 
opportunities for companies to articulate their policy preferences and, thus, contributes 
to the openness of the EC towards corporate political activity. Yet, one notion of 
caution is warranted. Although a fragmented policy-making organization opens up 
many opportunities to influence, convincing all decision-making points to adhere to a 
coherent policy line may be a difficult and time-consuming process. As one industry 
representative argued: "As long as there is not a more integrated European political
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system, we will not get a coherent European IT policy" (Interview 31;1993). This has 
been illustrated, for example, by the lack of coherence between the Community's 
commercial policies, aimed at protecting the European semiconductor producers against 
foreign competition, and the regional policies, offering incentives tb foreign 
competitors to directly invest in what could be considered the European-owned 
semiconductor producers' "back-yard" (see Chapter 4).
7.3.2 INSULATION OF EC INSTITUTIONS
Not only has EC policy-making been relatively fragmented, also the 
Commission, the Parliament and the national governments constituting the Council of 
Ministers, have been relatively exposed to corporate interests (see Chapter 2). The 
following section will not discuss the exposure of the ESC, because of its limited 
importance as a lobbying target.
The Commission
Due to its "open door" policy, the Commission has encouraged the input of the
European-owned IT companies. As an IT Roundtable representative argued:
The receptiveness of the Commission is not to be blamed. There are regular 
meetings. I have the impression of an "open ear": they invite us to give our 
opinions (Interview 36; 1993).
As Chapter 4 has illustrated, the IT Roundtable companies were able to express their
policy preferences on a new IT policy approach, later outlined in the 1991 White
Paper, during a formal meeting in July 1990 and, subsequently, through informal
interaction. Even when the proposal had moved up the Commission hierarchy to the
rather insulated top-levels (Spence, 1993:5), the IT Roundtable companies used their
ability to get direct access to the Commissioners to voice their preferences - the
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February 1991 letter to Commissioner Bangemann being a case in point (IT 
Roundtable sources, Interviews 15,36; 1993; Chapter 4). Similarly, the IT Roundtable 
companies have been able to express their policy preferences on the formulation of the 
new IT R&TD programme and on the TENs (see Chapter 4).
When comparing the formulation of the EC's 1991 White Paper, the new IT 
R&TD programme and the TENs with the formulation of ESPRIT, however, it 
becomes clear that - although the IT Roundtable was involved in the drafting process - 
the Roundtable and its members had clearly lost their monopoly on policy input into 
the Commission (see Chapter 4). In the case of the 1991 White Paper, for example, 
they were not the only party to be consulted; informal interaction took place with, for 
example, EECA and EUROBIT (see Chapter 4). The same applies to the formulation 
of the new IT R&TD programme and the TENs.
The European Parliament
Like the Commission, the European Parliament has been exposed to the policy 
input of the European-owned IT companies. Although it has been considered "useless 
to influence the EP in its plenary session" and "even useless to distribute papers 
amongst MEPs as they receive large amounts of information" (IT company sources, 
Interview 8; 1993), the IT Roundtable companies have been able to express their views 
in two manners.
First, the companies, either operating as the IT Roundtable or in smaller groups, 
have had meetings with the parliamentary Committee on Energy, Research and 
Technology and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial 
Policy (EP sources, Interviews 1,21). These meetings, however, appear to have been 
rather ad-hoc and irregular. As one EP source argued: "The IT Roundtable and the 
Committee [on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy 1 meet about once
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a year or once in the two years" (Interview 1;1993).
Second, the IT Roundtable companies, operating on an individual basis, have
had "personal contacts with the members of Parliament" (EP sources, Interview 1;1993;
IT company sources, Interview 5,8). As argued by two IT Roundtable members:
The EP and the Commission have a different method of working. For lobbying 
the Parliament, you need to know all different influential people in the 
commissions, the political parties, and so on (Interview 29; 1993).
It is important that you target a few people and on a continuous basis; to keep 
them informed. These people are interested" (Interview 8; 1993).
Overall, however, as one EP source argued, the contacts between the EP, on the
one hand, and the IT Roundtable and its members on the other, have been "limited and
very formal". As one IT company executive admitted:
We are not very happy yet about our own performance. It is a question of time 
and resources to build up relations. [..] We have to concentrate and spend more 
time and effort on liaising with the Parliament (Interview 8; 1993).
The Council o f Ministers
In order to expose the Council to the interests of the IT Roundtable companies, 
it has been imperative to win over one or more national governments (see above). 
However, how open and how receptive have the national governments been to the 
policy preferences articulated by their former national champions? Moreover, has it 
been sufficient to "capture" only the respective home governments?
France. Despite France's reputation of being a strong, centralized state, able to 
act autonomously from corporate interests (Zysman, 1984:265; 1983:300-301), Milner 
(1987a:274-288) argues that during the 1980s, the French policy-making process has 
allowed for significant business involvement, especially of the larger companies. 
Milner (1987a:274-288) and others4 have particularly pointed to the following three 
aspects of the French policy-making process: (1) the multiple channels of access for
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business into the government, indicative of the latter's fragmentation; (2) the exposure
of French bureaucrats to corporate inputs following the high degree of labour mobility
from government to business, the close working relationships existing between high-
level government officials and corporate executives, and their common educational
background as alumni of an elite group of institutions; and (3) a long-standing tradition
of interaction between government and industry, characterized by negotiations rather
than by pure dirigisme.
As expected on the basis of Milner's work, it was felt by various interviewees
that there had been substantial interaction between the French government and its IT
champions Bull and Thomson. Although a SERICS official argued that "each country
is listening to the demands of its own companies, but not always will a country totally
and fully support these firms" (Interview 18; 1993), the relationship between the
government and its companies has been described as "very close" (Interview 18; 1993).
As one EC official argued:
With respect to the French government, it is difficult to distinguish between its 
position as a Member State advising the EC on R&TD policy and as the owner 
of [Bull and Thomson]. It is only natural that the interests coincide (Interview 
6; 1993).
The United Kingdom. In comparison to France, policy-making in the United 
Kingdom has been relatively devoid of business involvement. During the Thatcher 
years, access of manufacturing companies to the government was thwarted by: (1) the 
discrediting of "industrial" policies; (2) the demise of corporatist relations; (3) the 
preference for macro over micro-economic policies, and (4) the emphasis on services 
rather than manufacturing. The British government's relatively cohesive administration, 
combined with a general lack of mobility between the private and public sector and 
the absence of strong alumni networks, has further hampered the openness of the 
British government to corporate political activity5. As an ICL source argued: "The
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Commission is a relatively open bureaucracy - unlike the British civil service which
is relatively closed" (Interview; 1993).
Under Michael Heseltine as the Director of the Board of Trade, however, DTI
has sought to create a high-level, two-way dialogue between government and
industry6. This improvement in government openness to political activity does not
imply that the UK government will in the future be easily "captured" by the interests
of ICL. To the contrary, as one DTI official argued:
The UK is willing to fight for any firm located in the United Kingdom, 
provided the firm has a good case [e.g. distortions to competition]. There is no 
one firm that has a monopoly on policy influence, and ICL definitely has not 
(Interview 10; 1993).
This has led one EC official to conclude that "the position of the British government 
is practically independent from industry" (Interview 6; 1993).
Germany. The German government has had a long-standing, cooperative 
relationship with business, albeit mainly in setting the regulatory framework within 
which companies operate. Due to its federal nature, the structure of policy-making in 
Germany has been fragmented; the German government's position on the Fourth 
Framework Programme, for example, had to be coordinated not only with the federal 
ministries involved but also with the governments of the German Lander (BMFT 
sources, Interview 33; 1993). The government's recognition of its role as a catalyst for 
change and the administration's partnership approach in industrial policy-making have 
further contributed to the openness of the German government to corporate lobbying7.
Although the German government has been seeking to involve a wide range of 
partners in its formal and informal policy consultation mechanisms, Siemens' policy 
input has been considered of importance; "Siemens' interests are built into our 
procedures, objectives and strategies" (BMFT sources, Interview 33; 1993).
The Netherlands. Judging by recent criticisms, the Dutch government has not
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been exceedingly receptive to corporate interests. The Dutch government has allegedly
been focusing one-sidedly on services and has been neglecting manufacturing interests
since the early 1980s - following the failure of the industrial policies of the 1970s and
the rise of a free-market, pro-consumer oriented political philosophy (Ruigrok and van
Tulder, 16 November 1992:9; Philips sources, Interview; 1993).
This overall criticism, however, belies the close relationship that exists between
Philips and the Dutch government (EC and national government sources, Interviews
6,10,33,39;1993). Philips' access to the Dutch government has been largely a
consequence of the structure of the Dutch electronics industry. Characterized by a large
group of SMEs, a small category of medium-sized companies, and one very large
multinational, this structure has implied that Philips is the government's main partner
in its dialogue with business on IT policies. As an EZ official argued:
Philips is the largest company. It would be strange if we would not look at 
Philips. [..] We attune our policy stances to Philips" (Interview 19; 1993).
Italy. The Italian government has been relatively open to corporate policy
inputs. Its decentralized decision-making structure, particularly in the area of R&D, its
dirigiste-inclined but weak bureaucracy, and its triangular bargaining approach
involving government, business and labour, have implied that companies, notably the
large ones, have easy access to the Italian government8.
Perceived in this light, it is not surprising that Olivetti has a relatively close
relationship with its home government. Yet, at the same time, Olivetti's access to the
Italian policy-making mechanism is not as favourable as it could have been if Olivetti
would have been a government-owned company. As an Olivetti executive argued:
Olivetti has less chance to influence the Italian government. It has many 
contacts with the Italian government and its delegation, but there are Italian 
companies more powerful than Olivetti, especially in the government-owned 
segment. Private companies in Italy face some disadvantages (Interview; 1993).
From the above, one can conclude that, with the exception of the UK, the
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national governments have been open to the policy inputs of their former national 
champions and have taken these policy inputs into account. In the case of the UK, 
however, one should note that, on specific issues, such as ICL's expulsion from JESSI, 
the UK government did rally behind ICL (DTI sources, Interview 12; 1993).
Impact o f Qualified Majority Voting on Corporate Lobbying Strategy
Winning over the home governments, however, has not been sufficient in the
European political arena, following the application of majority voting to various IT-
related policy areas (see Chapter 6). The need to secure either a blocking minority or
a winning majority has made it imperative for the companies to either directly lobby
third governments or to coordinate their policy stances.
Direct lobbying may not be a realistic option, as the national governments from
other Member States may not see any direct benefit in supporting the company's cause,
particularly if the company's presence in the countries in question is small or declining.
As one IT company executive argued, "[our company] also lobbies other Member State
governments, but with our relocations [to South East Asia] that has become less
important". With the shift of manufacturing operations offshore, the company felt that
it was losing in political influence (Interview 5; 1993). A similar experience was noted
by another IT company in its attempt to lobby for an EC HDTV standard:
We have become isolated. We are one of the few remaining companies and 
originate from a small country. Because [we] have become so isolated, [we] do 
not have any political clout any more (Interview; 1993).
Coordinating policy stances appears to be a more realistic option. As an
ORGALIME representative exemplified, it was only when qualified majority voting
was introduced, that the national industry associations understood that they had to
coordinate their positions in order to convince a sufficiently large number of national
governments to block the proposals in question. Prior to 1987, the national associations
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would simply ask their respective home governments to veto unwanted EC proposals 
(ORGALIME sources, Interview 23; 1993). Similarly, although not all national 
governments need to be convinced any more, coordination is still necessary to reach 
a winning majority.
This example illustrates that associations, like the IT Roundtable, have an 
extremely important role to play in that respect; they offer companies at least the 
possibility to exchange views, test the waters for political support, and attune their 
policy stances.
7.3.3 QUEST FOR LEGITIMACY
The lack of insulation of the EC institutions, and the Commission in particular, 
has been caused, in part, by the EC's quest for legitimacy. According to Peterson 
(1992:244), this need for legitimacy was one of the factors behind the IT Roundtable's 
powerful voice in EC R&TD decision-making in the early and mid-1980s; the 
Commission "realized that Europe's IT champions formed a powerful constituency for 
lobbying national governments to expand the EC's technology role".
In contrast to the expectation outlined in Chapter 2, the EC's increasing 
importance as a lobbying target (see Figure 7.2) did not reduce the Community's need 
for legitimation. To the contrary, the national governments' leeriness about the 
Community's powers, fuelled by fears about the EC's democratic deficit in the wake 
of the Maastricht Treaty ratification, the costs of participating in the ERM, and the 
recession (see Chapter 6), have only increased the Commission's need to find a wide­
spread support for its proposals;
The EC needs the support of industry. Subsidiarity will apply very strongly vis- 
h-vis the private sector. It is up to the private sector to come up with 
initiatives. They are the main players.
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If firms are in agreement with our plans of an information infrastructure policy, 
they should organize themselves. They should make clear and known what they 
want, and have the right people in the commissions, and develop strategies in 
line with what the Commission wants (DG 3 sources, Interview 3; 1993).
The rise in the numbers of interest groups lobbying the EC, however, did
reduce the Community's dependency on the IT Roundtable for legitimation; especially
the large users appear to have become an increasingly powerful lobby in support of EC
policies (see Chapters 4,8). Nevertheless, the Commission would benefit if the
European-owned IT producers would support their plans, considering the access of the
latter to their respective home governments and their continued importance as IT
suppliers (see above); "If they want to be active and give industrial support, that would
be appreciated" (DG 3 sources, Interview 3; 1993). This support is of particular
importance if a trade-off is at stake between the IT sector and other (high-tech) sectors,
such as biotechnology - as has been the case for the allocation of funds for ITC within
the EC's Fourth Framework Programme (see Chapters 4,8,9).
7.3.4 NEED FOR INFORMATION
The lack of insulation of the EC institutions, and the Commission in particular, 
has also been caused by the EC's quest for technical information. As Chapters 3 and 
4 have illustrated, the Commission has relied on the European IT companies, as 
sources of legitimate expertise, to provide it with policy input on R&TD - an issue 
area in which the Commission has no expertise. However, while the Commission relied 
predominantly on the IT Roundtable in the pilot and first phase of ESPRIT, by the 
early 1990s, the Commission had started to tap alternative sources of information. As 
Chapter 4 illustrated, the input of users has become more important in the 
Community's new IT R&TD programme following the shift in the Commission's
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objective from technology push to demand pull.
7.3.5 IDEOLOGY AND NATURE OF INTERACTION
The exposure of the EC's bureaucracy and decision-makers to corporate policy 
preferences may have been further facilitated if the officials or politicians in question, 
on the basis of their ideological affiliation or past experiences, recognize a role for 
companies in policy-making (see Chapter 2). On the basis of their ideological 
orientation, for example, one might expect that DG 13 within the Commission, the 
Socialist Group within the EP, and France, Italy and the Southern Member States 
within the Council, would have been relatively open towards political activity 
undertaken by the IT companies.
Prior to 1993, IT-related affairs were the responsibility of DG 13 within the 
Commission. Not only had DG 13 the reputation of being ideologically more inclined 
to intervene on behalf of industry, its mission also had been "to promote [the IT] 
sector, develop a new technology, strengthen the industrial base" from the very 
beginning (IT company sources, Interview 29; 1993). Towards the late 1980s, however, 
DG 13's relationship with selected IT Roundtable members, already under strain9, 
further deteriorated when Commissioner Pandolfi was unable to deliver upon a promise 
made to the IT firms to fund 25 per cent of the JESSI projects (see Chapter 3). When 
this became apparent, the companies decided to go public and expose the 
Commission's broken promise (Castle, 1 November 1991). This turned out to be a PR 
disaster, partly due to its timing; Philips had just withdrawn from JESSI while ICL had 
been expelled. The refusal of the EC to fund the problem-ridden JESSI projects, 
despite the insistence of the companies, created the impression to the general public 
that JESSI was obviously not worth investing in. This incident casted a long shadow
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over the relationship between the EC and the IT multinationals. As one observer 
concluded:
Pandolfi had certain problems with industry. He had to defend his position as 
he promised money to JESSI. He blamed industry and they blamed him. This 
was the end of it. Pandolfi subsequently lost the lobby of the IT firms.
This does not mean that the Commission and the IT firms have lost their co­
operative relationship; rather, they are not mutually supportive any more 
(Interview 11;1993).
Within the Parliament, the Socialist Group and, indeed, most EP parties have
been relatively open to the political activity undertaken by the IT Roundtable
companies. In the early 1990s, however, some EP sources regarded what they saw as
a lack of corporate leadership in times of crisis, as hampering a supportive relationship:
We asked the [European-grown IT] companies: what are your needs? Do you 
need more money for R&D or a general framework to prepare for the future? 
There answer was: "No, we do not need anything. The situation is good" 
(Interview 1; 1993).
Within the Council, France and Italy have indeed been open to the lobbying 
activities of their respective national champions, but so have Germany and the 
Netherlands - countries which are normally categorized as less interventionist-inclined 
(see Chapter 6 and above). Rather than based on ideological differences, the openness 
of the Member States to the political activities undertaken by the IT Roundtable 
companies appears to have been determined by the presence or absence of an IT 
Roundtable member (see above). In that respect, the Southern enlargement of the 
Community may not have benefitted the European-owned IT companies, as it has 
increased the number of countries without an indigenous IT MNE (see Chapters 6,8 
and 9).
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7.3.6 OPENNESS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
Overall, the European Community has been very open towards the lobbying of 
the IT Roundtable and its members - implying that the loss in political influence of the 
IT Roundtable cannot be explained by a sudden "closure" of the EC towards corporate 
political activity. The EC's fragmented policy-making procedure has been sustaining 
many alternative avenues for corporate lobbying. Driven by a need for information and 
a quest for legitimacy, the EC's policy-formulating bureaucracy, notably the 
Commission, has been exposed to the interests of the European-owned IT companies 
in the formulation of its IT policies in the early 1990s - despite occasional frictions in 
the interaction between the companies and the EC institutions. Yet, it should be 
stressed that the EC has not only been open to the IT Roundtable companies, but also 
to competing interested parties. As Figure 7.2 has illustrated, the EC has been open to 
a myriad of IT and non-IT related interest groups.
7.4 TIMING
The EC's openness should have been an advantage to the IT Roundtable, 
provided that the Roundtable and its companies timed their political activity correctly. 
As expected in Chapter 2, the IT Roundtable's formal and informal interaction with the 
Commission over the course of 1990/1991 (see Chapter 4), appear to have been timed 
rightly to affect the Commission's drafting process. Similarly, the pressure exerted by 
the IT Roundtable companies on the Commission and the national governments in the 
period immediately following the Council's endorsement of the White Paper seem to 
have been timed rightly to press for a more aggressive implementation of the White 
Paper - particularly since the Council called upon the Commission to propose policy
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measures in close consultation with a high-level working party (see Chapter 4). Finally, 
the IT Roundtable appears to have voiced its policy preferences on IT R&TD and 
TENs correctly; they coincided with the drafting of the Fourth Framework and the 
attempts to realize the provisions outlined in the Maastricht Treaty on TENs (see 
Chapter 4).
However, albeit timed rightly to affect the policy-making process, the 
realization of these policy preferences has been seriously hampered by the economic 
and political conditions at the times that the preferences were articulated (see Chapter 
9).
7.5 CONCLUSION
This chapter has sought to explain the loss in political influence of the IT 
Roundtable, an association comprising the largest European-owned IT companies, in 
the early 1990s in comparison to the 1980s, by analyzing changes in the political 
activity undertaken by the IT Roundtable and its members. The following conclusions 
can be drawn.
First, the loss in political influence in the early 1990s cannot be explained by 
the absence of any liaising activities on the side of the IT Roundtable and its members, 
as the companies did undertake political activity and timed these efforts rightly. The 
preferences that the IT Roundtable articulated, however, were broader and more far- 
reaching in scope than those articulated in the 1980s.
Neither can the loss in political influence be explained by a reduction in the 
effort put into lobbying by the IT Roundtable and its members. Despite the tight 
financial conditions, the IT Roundtable companies have increased their efforts put into 
lobbying or maintained them at a stable level, with the notable exception of the crisis-
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ridden Philips. While, in certain cases, the companies' size and degree of diversification 
may have made these companies less susceptible to the crisis in the IT industry, in 
other cases, the size of the funding required, the way in which the funding has been 
arranged, and the pay-off of the funding in terms of duties assigned to the lobbying 
staff has allowed the companies to reinforce rather than cut their lobbying efforts.
The intensification of corporate political activity at the EC level reflects the 
shift in competencies from the national governments to the European Community. 
While the Commission has been a primary lobbying target of the IT Roundtable 
companies, the EP has become more important as a target following the Single 
European Act. Due to the national governments' role in EC policy-making, the Member 
States have remained important as lobbying targets; lobbying the Community thus 
cannot serve as a substitute for lobbying the national governments.
With the exception of the UK government, the home governments have been 
both open to lobbying of the IT Roundtable companies as well as susceptible to their 
arguments. However, following the introduction of majority voting on certain IT- 
related issues and the emphasis on cohesion, it has become increasingly important for 
the IT Roundtable companies not only to lobby the home government, but also to 
target other M/S governments, either directly or through coordination of their policy 
stances.
Over the 1980s and early 1990s, the Community has been very open to the 
lobbying of the European-owned IT companies due to the fragmentation of its policy­
making processes, its lack of insulation, and its continued need for legitimation and 
information - undermining the validity of the argument that the IT Roundtable's loss 
of influence might have been caused by the reduction in the openness of the 
Community to corporate political activity. The EC, however, has not only been open 
to the policy input of the IT Roundtable companies on IT-related policy issues, but
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also to those of competing interested parties, including software and services 
companies, IT users, IT SMEs and foreign-owned IT companies; notably the large IT 
users have become credible alternative sources of legitimation and expertise. 
Additionally, the EC has been open to non-IT related interests, such as biotechnology 
companies.
From the above, it follows that the loss of the IT Roundtable’s political 
influence cannot be explained by (1) the absence of any political activity or the wrong 
timing thereof; (2) a drastic reduction in effort put into lobbying; or (3) a decline in 
the openness of the Community and its Member States. Rather, the main explanatory 
variable of the loss in political influence appears to have been that, in the early 1990s, 
the effectiveness of the IT Roundtable as a channel of political activity had been 
undermined by the following three factors: (1) the declining representativeness of the 
IT Roundtable, following the structural changes taking place in the IT industry; (2) the 
perception that the Roundtable has been suitable for articulating preferences in the area 
of R&TD but inappropriate for voicing broader preferences on industrial policy; and 
(3) the lack of internal coherence within the IT Roundtable caused by the diverging 
interests of its members.
Despite the growing ineffectiveness of the IT Roundtable, the European-owned 
IT companies have continued to use this channel. However, in specific cases, such as 
trade-related issues, public procurement and standardization, the IT Roundtable 
companies have preferred to use alternative channels, more appropriate to the IT 
companies' cause. Moreover, in the face of the growing importance of the Community 
as a lobbying target and the shortcomings associated with indirect and/or collective 
representations, the companies appear to have put more emphasis on direct, individual 
representations to the EC, giving substance to the hypothesis that individual 
representations may be relatively effective, if not the most effective form of corporate
lobbying.
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7.6 NOTES
1. As part of an alliance concluded between Daimler-Benz and CGS in 1991, 
Daimler - an IT Roundtable company since its take-over of AEG - has a minority stake 
of 34 per cent in CGS and an option to take majority control of CGS in 1995, should 
CGS's founder and largest shareholder agree thereto (Economist, 10 October 1992; 24 
February 1994; Dawkins, 24 July 1991).
2. Sources: National government and industry sources, Interviews 19,39; 1993, 
Communication 30; 1993.
3. The Group of Six, whose membership has been limited to one firm per EC 
Member State, comprised at its inception: Serna Group (UK/F), Logica (UK), Cap 
Gemini Sogeti (F), Finsiel (I), Eritel (Sp), Debis (G), and Volmac (NL). In 1991, CGS 
and Debis, the software arm of Daimler-Benz, set up a joint venture in which CGS had 
a 49 per cent stake, as part of an alliance between CGS and Daimler-Benz. In 1992, 
Volmac merged with CGS' Benelux operations (Cane and Taylor, 13 March 1992:2; 
NRC, 7 May 1992; Economist, 26 February 1994; Dawkins, 24 July 1991).
4. Cawson, Holmes and Stevens (1987:15,27-28,33); Coleman (1990:234); 
Dawkins, 16 March 1993:21; Dyson (1993:93); Holmes and Sharp (1989:9-13); 
Ridding, 10 February 1994:21; Sally (1992:135,149,168-169); Safarian (1993:208); 
Wilks and Wright (1987:287).
5. Sources: Bamber and Lansbury (1987:47,50); Grant (1987:17); Grant and 
Streeck (1985:167); Holmes and Sharp (1989:4-5,9-15); Porter (1990:504-506).
6. Sources: Tim Sainsbury, Minister of Trade and Industry, Channel 4 News, 4 
March 1993; DTI Sources, Interviews 40,41 ;1993.
7. Sources: BMFT sources, Interview 33; 1993; Coleman (1990:234-235); Grant 
and Streeck (1985:167); Turner and Hodges (1993:138).
8. Sources: Bamber and Lansbury (1987:125-137); Dyson (1993:95); Porter 
(1990:447-449), and Turner and Hodges (1993:141).
9. EC and national government sources, Interviews 10,11,12;1993; MacKenzie, 
2 January 1993.
Chapter 8
POLITICAL WEIGHT
Chapter 7 has argued that the loss of the IT Roundtable's political influence can
1
be explained by the growing ineffectiveness of the Roundtable as a channel of political 
activity. However, to the extent that the IT Roundtable articulated its policy 
preferences, one could question whether these preferences carried sufficient political 
weight (see Chapter 2). This chapter seeks to explain the IT Roundtable's loss in 
political influence in the late 1980s and early 1990s, in comparison to the early and 
mid-1980s, by analyzing the changes in the political weight of the IT Roundtable's 
policy preferences.
As explained in Chapter 2, the weight attached by governments to corporate 
policy preferences can be perceived as a function of the governments' real and 
perceived value of the assets that companies control - a value created by the 
dependency of governments on corporate assets for the realization of their objectives. 
The first section focuses on the Community's long-term, strategic objectives, while the 
second section addresses the EC's short-term, economic objectives. Each section seeks 
to outline (a) to what extent the European-owned IT companies and alternative sources 
of corporate assets have been perceived as contributing to the realization of these 
objectives, and (b) whether or not these perceptions have been justifiable in real terms.
8.1 THE EUROPEAN-OWNED IT INDUSTRY: STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE
AT BAY
In the early 1980s, the EC and its M/S governments considered an indigenous 
IT production capability as a necessary prerequisite for maintaining control over 
Europe's economic future and its political autonomy and security (see Chapter 3). The
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importance attached by the EC and its Member States to an indigenous capability 
contributed to the European-owned IT companies' influence over EC policies in the 
early 1980s. As one government official observed, the perception was that if the IT 
Roundtable companies "would shout loud enough that they were strategic, they would 
get what ever they wanted" (Interview 12; 1993).
In the late 1980s, however, it became clear that this was not the case any more 
- an indication of the IT Roundtable's declining political influence (DTI sources, 
Interview 12; 1993; see Chapter 4). Considering the source of the IT Roundtable's 
political weight in the early 1980s, one could question whether the decline in political 
influence was caused by any reduction in the importance attached to information 
technology and/or an indigenous IT production capability (see Chapter 2).
Overall, the interviews conducted with EC and national government officials1 
over the course of 1993 have pointed out that the European Community and its 
Member States have continued to perceive information technology as an economically 
and militarily strategic technology. In contrast to the hypothesis outlined in Chapter 
2, neither the transformation of the international system nor changes in the supply 
conditions of semiconductors and computers (see Chapters 5,6) appear to have affected 
the EC's and national governments' perception of the strategic value of IT. In fact, the 
increased importance attached to economic power following the changes in the 
international system seems to have increased the strategic value of IT.
It is, however, important to make a distinction between the strategic value of 
the technology and the necessity of an indigenous IT production capability. While 
some government officials, notably those of France, Germany and the Netherlands2, 
argued that a European IT production capability, and in particular a semiconductor 
capability, was an absolute requirement for capturing the benefits of IT, other officials, 
notably those representing the UK3, have questioned this. As a DTI official
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commented:
We do support the technology, which affects not only the IT industry, but 
industries across the board. However, we do not support the IT industry as 
such. (Interview 40; 1993).
Although this argument could be perceived as a peculiar British view, caused by the
UK government's non-interventionist ideological orientation and the large share of
foreign ownership in the UK-located IT industry (see Chapters 1,6), two developments
appear to indicate that this argument is justifiable in certain cases: (1) the growing
recognition that it is the application of IT that matters; and (2) the alleviation of
concerns regarding the security of IT supply.
8.1.1 THE SUPPLY VERSUS THE APPLICATION OF IT
As outlined in Chapter 3, in the early and mid-1980s, the EC sought to
strengthen the European-owned IT companies, as indigenous sources of IT, through
R&D subsidies. Underlying this push strategy was the notion that the value that society
derives from information technology is intrinsic to the technology; the mere production
of IT would lead to benefits. By the early 1990s, however, it had become clear that
stimulating the supply of IT as such would not necessarily yield the expected societal
benefits. Beyond the EC's failure to bring about a general improvement in the
competitiveness of Europe's indigenous suppliers, a general understanding had
developed that IT would only generate business value if the technology would be
applied by companies. It became clear that it was not IT as such that mattered, but IT’s
application (CEC and national government officials, Interviews
19,26,28,39,40,41; 1993). As one industry observer concluded:
IT has matured. It does not any longer have any high priority placing. Policy 
makers see it for what it is. Policy makers do not any longer judge information 
technology by its intrinsic value, but by its applicability: how effective is it
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from a user's point of view (Interview 30; 1993).
An effective application of IT, however, does not make a domestically-owned 
and controlled source of supply per definition imperative. From a purely economic 
point of view, using an indigenous source of IT would actually be inadvisable if the 
latter is relatively uncompetitive and technologically lagging behind; the potential 
advantages of lower transportation costs and zero tariffs are unlikely to outweigh the 
disadvantages of higher costs and lower quality faced by the consumer. Policy-wise, 
this would imply that EC and M/S policies aimed at stimulating IT supply may not be 
necessary; rather, government efforts should concentrate on the application of IT - as, 
for example, is the case in the Community's BRITE programme.
This thesis argues that an indigenous source of supply is only advisable in the 
following three cases: (1) IT for military applications; (2) customized IT for 
commercial applications; and (3) mass-produced IT for commercial applications if 
world supply conditions raise substantial security of supply concerns.
IT  for M ilitary Applications
If IT is applied in military equipment, an indigenous European source of IT 
continues to be advisable, even though the phasing out of security-inspired restrictions 
on IT exports is likely to have facilitated European access to foreign-produced IT (see 
Chapter 6). From a European user's point of view, incorporating indigenous 
components increases the chances of securing military contracts. From the point of 
view of the EC and its Member States, incorporating indigenous components in 
military equipment prevents that the military's dependency on foreign IT can be used 
as a bargaining chip in international trade negotiations - as allegedly the Japanese 
government was considering (Fallows, 1994:41-42).
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IT for Commercial Applications
In contrast, if IT is applied in commercial equipment, an indigenous European
source of IT may not be necessary. As one industry representative argued with respect
to the sourcing of semiconductors: 4
Special chips used for military purposes, such as those fabricated by Plessey, 
are most of the time produced within the Member States. Chips used in 
commercial products, however, should be bought from the cheapest supplier, 
whether European or not (Interview 32; 1993).
Within IT for commercial applications, however, one should distinguish
between customized IT products and commodities (see Chapter 5).
Customized IT. With respect to ASICs, the optimal situation would be that the
European IT users produce their own ICs, as, for instance, Mercedes does. Through
maintaining an in-house production capability at the cutting edge of technology,
synergies may be exploited optimally; security of supply concerns may be eliminated;
and concerns about any leakage of technology may be reduced (see Chapter 3). As
Klaus Knapp, Director of Siemens' Semiconductor Division, argued:
If you want to have a competitive edge in consumer electronics, you have to 
develop the required chips yourself. Because the state-of-the-art components, 
you will get from no one (in Wammes, 14 January 1994:14).
Maintaining an in-house capability of customized ICs, however, may be
expensive, certainly if the scale of production is limited. During the 1980s, many IT
companies sought to finance their in-house capability of customized ICs through the
production of "cash-cows", i.e. low cost/high margin operations. To produce memory
chips for that reason, however, has proven to be a costly mistake; it has been more
difficult to succeed in DRAMs than in ASICs (see Chapter 5). Alternatively, IT users
have sourced their customized components from external suppliers. This, however,
requires that the users develop a close working relationship with their suppliers with
sufficient safeguards against any unwanted transfer of technology. This working
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relationship may be facilitated (albeit not necessarily) by the geographical and cultural 
proximity of the IT suppliers (EECA sources, Interview 31;1993) - the cooperation 
between Siemens and IBM (an American company located in Europe) on DRAM 
technology being a case in point (see Chapter 5).
IT  Commodities. In contrast to the difficulties related to sourcing customized 
IT products, companies have been able to source mass-produced IT products from 
external suppliers without too many problems - provided that access to a stable, 
internationally competitive source of IT at the cutting edge of technology had been 
secured. As an IT user argued, "firms do not care where components come from as 
long as it is the right quality at the lowest price" (Interview 13; 1993).
An indigenous supply capability is only required if the prevailing world supply 
conditions of these commodities would raise security of supply concerns, i.e. concerns 
that monopoly prices might be charged, poor quality products might be delivered, 
supply lines cut off, deliveries delayed, and information transferred unwantedly (see 
Chapter 3). Over the 1980s, however, concerns regarding the supply of mass-produced 
IT products have eased; fears that the EC industries' access to IT might be hampered 
have been reduced (TT company and EEA sources, Interviews 8,11,15,32; 1993).
8.1.2 EASED SECURITY OF SUPPLY CONCERNS
A structural analysis of the supply conditions in the IT industry over the 1980s 
and early 1990s, based on the framework outlined in Chapter 2, appears to justify the 
reduction in security of supply concerns.
Supply o f Memory Chips
In the early and mid-1980s, the security of DRAM supply was perceived as
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precarious. At first sight, these threat perceptions seem rather surprising. Not only had 
the commoditization of memory chips led to an ample supply of DRAMs at relatively 
low and falling prices, but also the supply risk continued to be spread over a large 
number of suppliers; as DRAMs have been near-perfect substitutes, the cost of 
switching from one supplier to another has been relatively low (see Chapter 5). The 
security of supply concerns that prevailed in the early and mid-1980s, however, were 
bom out of the fact that over the late 1970s and early 1980s, the development and the 
production of DRAMs concentrated into the hands of Japanese producers. By 1986, 
Japanese producers held nearly 80 per cent of the world DRAM market (Dataquest in 
Tyson, 1992:106). In that year, the world's Top 4 DRAM producers, all Japanese, 
accounted for 62 per cent of the market - a T4 index considerably higher than in the 
overall semiconductor industry (Dodsworth, Kehoe and Wagstyl, 25 July 1988; Chapter 
5).
This concentration of supply affected both suppliers as well as consumers. First, 
associated with the rise of the Japanese DRAM producers had been a shake-out 
amongst the non-Japanese suppliers. As DRAM development and production were 
considered to be vital for making technological progress and improving 
competitiveness in the higher value-added ASIC segments, it was believed that the exit 
from DRAM development and production meant that the companies would have to 
forego the alleged benefits of DRAMs as technology drivers. Moreover, if they would 
subsequently want to enter the industry, the companies would not only have to face the 
rapidly increased R&D costs, but also have to overcome the cost advantages enjoyed 
by the Japanese companies due to the sheer size of their market share (see Chapter 5).
Second, although a DRAM consumer could still choose amongst various 
Japanese suppliers, the fear prevailed that Japanese producers would give preferential 
treatment in terms of pricing, quality and delivery times to Japanese consumers over
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western clients - whether intentionally or not (SERICS, EZ and EECA sources,
Interviews 18,19,31;1993; GAO/NSIAD-91-278; OTA/PB92-115757, 1991:12-13).
These claims, however, have remained largely anecdotal and may have been used
merely as an argument by supporters of government intervention (IT company sources,
Interview 8; 1993). Nevertheless, as one IT company executive argued:
Even if the risk of discriminatory treatment is only latent, this constitutes 
sufficient motive to look for alternatives and second sourcing (Interview 
8;1993).
This perception of a supply risk was further fuelled by the fact that the 1986 US-Japan 
Semiconductor Trade Agreement (STA), which provided for the monitoring of 
production costs and prices of certain Japanese semiconductor exports to the US and 
third countries4, resulted in an increase in DRAM prices (Tyson, 1992:113-124; 
Kostecki, 1989:27; OTA/PB92-115757, 1991:11).
Over the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, this situation improved for three 
reasons. First, the technological progress in the more complex, higher value-added 
ASICs had become less dependent on the mass production of DRAMs - reducing the 
necessity to develop an in-house DRAM production capability (see Chapter 5). For 
example, while the technology driving capabilities of DRAMs were "the main reason 
why Siemens concluded an alliance with IBM", "currently, this has become less 
important." (DG 3 sources, Interview 3; 1993; also: Siemens sources, Interview; 1993).
Second, the dominance of Japanese producers in the DRAM industry had 
decreased. The Japanese share of the DRAM market fell from nearly 80 per cent in 
1986 to approximately 60 per cent in 1991, due to the stabilization of the American 
share and the rapidly rising share of South East Asian producers (Dataquest in Tyson, 
1992:106). Moreover, the high degree of concentration declined; in 1991, the world’s 
Top 4 companies (three Japanese and one South Korean) only accounted for 46.5 per 
cent of the DRAM market (Dataquest in NRC, 15 July 1992:15). This change in the
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DRAM supply structure not only increased the number of alternative DRAM suppliers,
but also intensified the competition in the DRAM markets substantially, leading to
dramatic price cuts. The changing supply structure reduced corporate security of supply
concerns. As illustrated by a Siemens executive when explaining their decision in the
early 1990s to reduce their concentration on DRAM production (see Chapter 5):
The main motive for our [1980s] decision to produce DRAMs in-house was 
that Japanese companies owned the process and had a monopoly. The rest of 
the world felt threatened and feared that Japanese companies would give 
preferences in price and time to home companies. Now, this threat is not 
perceived as such any more (Interview; 1993).
Third, technological changes had led to the rise of a new type of EPROM, the
Flash memory chip, which is expected to execute functions currently performed by
DRAMs (Economist, 18 April 1992). In contrast to other memory production, Flash
memory production has been dominated by American producers, with Intel accounting
for an 85 per cent share of the market.
Over the late 1980s and early 1990s, in other words, supply conditions
improved. As an EEA representative argued:
There are enough semiconductor producers to produce what we need. The 
shortage in DRAMs, for example, was more a cock-up than a conspiracy on the 
side of the Japanese. Anyhow, that example also showed that the shortage of 
DRAMs was quickly picked up by Motorola and Siemens through increases in 
their production. It is very unlikely that Europe will run out of supply. It is not 
a very big danger that Europe will be isolated (Interview 32; 1993).
Supply o f Microprocessors
In contrast to memory chips, microprocessors have hardly been subject of 
security of supply concerns within the EC, despite supply conditions that would 
warrant concern. First, the market for microprocessors has been dominated by 
American producers, with Intel accounting for 53.2 per cent of the market (Dataquest 
in Tyson, 1992:127). Second, the market has been relatively concentrated; in 1990, the
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world's Top 4 microprocessor companies (three of which were American) accounted 
for over 75 per cent of the market. Third, despite the availability of alternative sources 
of microprocessors, the costs of switching have been relatively high, since 
microprocessors have been either proprietary products, binding their consumers to one 
supplier, or technologically trailing Intel clones, unsuitable for state-of-the-art 
applications. This situation, however, may be changing (see below). Fourth, the entry 
barriers into the industry, which would have to be overcome in order to develop an in- 
house production capability, have been relatively high due to the proprietary nature of 
microprocessors (see Chapter 5).
The main reason why the American dominance in microprocessor production 
in general, and Intel's near-monopoly in particular, did not arouse any substantial 
security of supply fears - in contrast with the Japanese dominance in memory chips - 
appears to have been the "nationality" of the dominant producers. In the EC, selected 
government officials and industry representatives5 have been perceiving "the chance 
that Japan will abuse its position greater than the chance that the US will do so" (EZ 
sources, Interview 19; 1993).
First, in contrast to the vertically-integrated Japanese semiconductor producers, 
Intel and its American competitors AMD and National Semiconductor have been 
merchant producers, i.e. companies producing mainly for the open market (Langlois 
et al., 1988:27,36; Malerba, 1985:46). This reduces the chance that, in times of 
shortage, priority will be given to the in-house demand and that contracts with client 
companies will be delayed or cancelled (EECA sources, Interview 31; 1993).
Second, in contrast to the Japanese semiconductor producers, Intel and its 
American counterparts have not traditionally been linked into a Keiretsu-like structure 
of companies. Although the American IT producers have become increasingly 
intertwined, as evidenced by the linkages between IBM and Intel, Apple and Motorola,
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and the Sematech consortium, the perception has remained that American producers 
are more reliable suppliers. The chance that preferential treatment will be given to 
financially or otherwise related companies, at the cost of the unrelated clients, or that 
information given by the semiconductor user about the system in which the chips have 
to fit will leak to competing users, has been considered smaller in the American 
industrial structure (SERICS, EZ and EP sources, Interviews 18,21,39;1993).
Third, although the American government has denied access to IT products and 
technology to non-American companies for national security reasons, microprocessor 
users have made few public complaints about the market power of the American 
producers in general, and Intel in particular. Due to the lack of user complaints, Intel's 
supply performance reputation has remained relatively unstained despite allegations 
voiced by competing producers that Intel delayed the introduction of its latest Pentium 
processor. Moreover, Intel's behaviour towards its competitors, albeit aggressive, has 
so far not given the FTC sufficient grounds to initiate anti-trust proceedings. Although 
Intel has adopted a strict licensing policy, it has not exclusively sold its 
microprocessors to any one buyer, easing security of supply concerns (Cane, 15 
November 1993:40; Kehoe, 8 March 1993:15; Ligtenberg, 23 March 1993:15).
Finally, the RISC processor, newly introduced to the markets (see Chapter 5), 
seems to be destined to challenge Intel's dominance and, thus, to improve the supply 
conditions in microprocessor markets (Banks, 26 April 1994; Kehoe, 31 May 1994). 
For example, IBM's development of its "Intel-compatible" microcode, i.e. the software 
instructions that control the functions of a microprocessor, has opened up a market for 
its PowerPC, a RISC processor jointly developed by IBM, Apple and Motorola 
(Kehoe, 26 August 1993:17). The PowerPC has been faster and cheaper than the latest 
generation Intel microprocessor, and thus may constitute substantial competition to 
Intel - particularly since the industry standard has not yet been set in this segment of
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the market (Ligtenberg, 14 December 1993:16; Chapter 5).
Supply o f Computers
European concerns about the security of computer supply date back to the mid- 
1960s when the American government blocked the exports of US-made computers to 
France, while few non-American sources of state-of-the-art computers existed. Over the 
1970s and the early and mid-1980s, IBM's preponderant position, in particular, was a 
thorn in the eye of the European champions and their home governments. Not only 
was IBM's market share many times larger than the shares of even its closest 
contenders, but also its use of proprietary systems effectively guaranteed IBM a secure 
customer base; the cost of switching to alternative suppliers would be nearly inhibitive 
(see Chapter 5).
Despite the declining degree of concentration in the computer industry as a 
whole, it has varied substantially per product segment. In 1985, for example, the Top 
4 producers only accounted for a relatively moderate 42 per cent of the midrange and
57.4 per cent of the microcomputer markets. In the same year, however, the four 
largest mainframe producers accounted for 74 per cent of the world mainframe market, 
the then largest segment of the world computer market. IBM alone accounted for 55 
per cent of this market segment (Datamation, 15 June 1986:44-45; Chapter 5).
The rapid rise of Japanese competitors over the early and mid-1980s (see 
Chapter 5) added fuel to the fire, raising fears of yet another Japanese challenge. 
Judging by the degree of protection granted to the computer industry in comparison to 
the semiconductor industry (see Chapter 3), the Community and its Member States 
appeared to regard computers as less strategic than semiconductors during the 1980s. 
Yet, computers were perceived as sufficiently strategic to incorporate projects on 
advanced dataprocessing into the ESPRIT programme (see Chapter 3).
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Over the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, these supply conditions 
improved when the seeds of change, already present in the early and mid-1980s, came 
to fruition. First, over the late 1980s, the decline of the United States and the rise of 
Japan stabilized, reducing both the threat of a major "Japanese Challenge" ,as well as 
the more latent risk of an American abuse of its dominant position.
Second, the preponderance of IBM, albeit still present, declined over the late 
1980s and early 1990s; its market share fell from 32.2 per cent of the world computer 
market in 1985 to 20.3 per cent in 1992 (see Chapter 5). While in 1985, IBM 
accounted for 55 per cent of the world mainframe market, by 1992, its share had fallen 
to 29.1 per cent. Although IBM's share of the midrange market increased from 21 per 
cent in 1985 to 26.7 per cent in 1992, its share in the microcomputer markets declined 
from 36 per cent in 1985 to 30.9 per cent in 1992. In the workstation market, IBM 
actually ranked second after Sun (Datamation. 15 June 1993:22; 15 June 1986:44-45). 
Additionally, over the 1980s, IBM and its American counterparts had become more 
acceptable "European corporate citizens", certainly in the eyes of the EC and its M/S 
governments. Notably IBM's "indigenisation" in Europe, through manufacturing in the 
Community, employing local personnel, performing R&TD, and taking management 
decisions in Europe (see below), won it a place in the Community's R&TD 
programmes (see Chapters 3,4).
Third, the overall degree of concentration in the world computer markets had 
stabilized at a moderate level (see Chapter 5). As in the early and mid-1980s, the 
degree of concentration in the mainframe market remained relatively high in the late 
1980s and early 1990s; in 1992, the T4 index for the mainframe computer market 
totalled 70.5 per cent (Datamation, 15 June 1993:22). In the early 1990s, however, 
mainframe computers no longer constituted the largest segment of the world computer 
market. Rather, the largest and fastest growing segments were formed by the PC and
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workstations markets which showed the lowest degree of concentration, as illustrated 
by their T4 indices of 42.9 and 53.2 per cent respectively (Datamation, 15 June 
1993:22).
Fourth, as outlined in Chapter 5, differential technological change in the three 
computer segments had led to an erosion of the existing markets for the larger systems, 
and the increasing importance of PCs and workstations. The reduction in their 
production costs, combined with a move away from proprietary to open systems, had 
lowered the entry barriers to microcomputer production and substantially increased 
competition. Changes in demand further added to the commoditization of 
microcomputers; they became widely available at relatively low prices, further reducing 
security of supply concerns.
8.1.3 NECESSITY OF AN INDIGENOUS IT PRODUCTION CAPABILITY
One can conclude from the above that IT has continued to be perceived as a 
strategic technology. However, some national representatives, notably those of the UK, 
have argued that an indigenous IT production capability may not be necessary to 
capture the benefits of IT - an argument justified in the case of mass-produced IT 
products for commercial applications. Not only has the shift in policy emphasis from 
production to application of IT over the late 1980s and early 1990s made the access 
of consumers to IT more important than the actual supply, but also concerns that the 
access of IT consumers to their basic inputs might be hampered have been eased 
following the improvement of supply conditions in the mass-produced IT segments 
over the late 1980s and early 1990s.
The fact that not all EC Member State governments were convinced about the 
indispensability of a European IT production capability has made it more difficult for
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the advocates of such an indigenous capability to push through preferential measures
aimed at sustaining and improving the position of the indigenous IT suppliers - as
illustrated by the endorsement debate of the 1991 White Paper, the reduction in the
Community's semiconductor tariffs, and the failure to aggressively implement the
Council Resolution (see Chapter 4). As EECA concluded with dismay:
[..] there is a tendency within Europe at the moment to dangerously 
underestimate the importance of a local European electronic components 
industry (EECA Report 1992:4).
8.2 PREPONDERANCE OF SHORT-TERM. ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES
In the early 1990s, however, even the advocates of an indigenous capability
merely paid lip-service to the need to maintain an indigenous capability (IT company
sources, Interview 16; 1993). As one industry representative argued with respect to
national government subsidies for FDI (see Chapter 4):
France is in favour of code of conduct. But what they say and do may be 
different. For example, they gave money to Sony for the production of ICs [in 
France]. The Member States, including France, all send delegations to the East 
and invite them over to invest (Interview 31; 1993).
Under pressure of the economic recession of the early 1990s and prompted by 
the widening and deepening taking place of the EC over the 1980s and early 1990s 
(see Chapters 5,6), all M/S governments appear to have given preference to the 
realization of short-term economic objectives; they have been seeking to (1) reduce 
spending and obtain "value for money" in the wake of soaring budget deficits and 
public debts; (2) sustain and create employment; and (3) address the issue of cohesion 
which has arisen from the Community's widening and deepening.
While the European-owned IT companies controlled the corporate assets that 
the Community demanded for the realization of its long-term, strategic objectives, one
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could question whether the companies controlled the assets needed for the realization 
of the Community's short-term, economic objectives. The crisis developing in the IT 
industry in the early 1990s (see Chapters 4,5) certainly raises doubts about this. 
Considering the importance attached to "value for money", employment and cohesion, 
one could question whether the decline in the IT Roundtable's political influence has 
been caused by a reduction in the importance attached to the European-owned IT 
companies as sources of these corporate assets (see Chapter 2).
The following three sections will discuss the contributions of the IT Roundtable 
companies to the realization of the three objectives outlined above.
8.2.1 VALUE FOR MONEY
The recession of the early 1990s, combined with the Member States' EMU- 
imposed obligation to bring about convergence, brought about severe constraints on 
public spending within the Community (see Chapter 6). In order to reduce or, at least, 
contain public debts and deficits, the EC and its national governments became less 
prepared to spent money on public policies - affecting the funding for JESSI, the 
Fourth Framework Programme, the TENs and the Semiconductor Initiative (see 
Chapters 3,4,7,9).
Faced with financial constraints on public spending, the EC and its Members 
had to set priorities in their allocation of financial resources in the early 1990s. 
According to various interviewees6, it became more important to allocate funding to 
those projects and programmes where they would obtain "value for money" (Interview 
30; 1993). On the basis of this allocation principle, however, one could question 
whether the European-owned IT industry constituted a worthy investment.
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Perceived Return on Public Investments into the IT  Industry
As Chapter 4 outlined, it became clear in the early 1990s, that, despite 
government efforts, the performance of the European-owned IT companies had not 
improved; the expected larger market shares and improved corporate results, had failed 
to materialize. Worse, the European-owned companies continued or had begun to incur 
losses on their IT operations, faced escalating debts, laid off an increasing number of 
employees, and halted high-profile R&TD projects (see Figure 8.1). Moreover, ICL, 
the only profitable computer producer, was taken over by a Japanese company (see 
Chapter 4). Only in 1993, two years after the Commission presented its new IT policy 
approach, some improvement occurred.
The continued absence of significant improvements in the competitive position 
of the European-owned IT companies, however, did not only raise questions about the 
choice, form and shape of EC policies (see Chapter 4), but also about the object of the 
EC's public funding: the European-owned IT industry. Fuelled by the crisis in the 
European-owned IT industry, the perception prevailed, both amongst politicians across 
the EC as well as amongst the general public7, that the large sums of public funding 
spent on the European-owned IT industry had been wasted. In particular, money spent 
on the semiconductor industry was seen as ineffective:
It is like a "black hole". The more money you throw in, the wider the hole gets
(DTI sources, Interview 12; 1993).
Reduced Value for Money: Reality or Perception?
However, was this perception justified? - for, by virtue of their sheer size and 
type of operations, the European-owned IT companies continued to be large sources 
of corporate assets, i.e.: value-added, capital expenditures and employment, technology, 
exports and FDI (see Chapter 2). The structural and short-term changes in the IT
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industry (see Chapter 5), however, have also affected the value of the companies' assets 
in absolute terms. On the basis of Figures 8.2 to 8.6, which give an indication of the 
real value of the assets that the IT Roundtable members' have been controlling, one can 
draw the following conclusions.
First, the European-grown IT companies' individual contributions to value-added 
have not declined over the late 1980s and early 1990s; rather, productivity has 
increased. In the semiconductor industry, the rising turnover (see Appendices 5.4 and 
9), combined with reductions in the labour force in the early 1990s (see Figure 8.1), 
has led to increases in the value of the output produced per employee (see Figure 8.2). 
In the computer industry, the job cuts have been so extensive, that despite a fall in 
revenues experienced by some computer producers in the early 1990s, productivity has 
still improved. Judging by Figure 8.2, one may conclude that the rise in productivity, 
which leads to improvements in value-added and, thus, in wealth, has provided no 
justification for the then prevailing perception that public funding of the indigenous IT 
industry did not yield sufficient "value for money".
Second, the 1991 drop in the European-grown IT companies' investments does, 
however, provide support for the perception that public investment in the European- 
owned IT industry in the late 1980s and early 1990s would yield little return (see 
Figure 8.3). Although the "headquarters-effect" may have limited the negative impacts 
of the capital expenditure cuts on the companies' home countries, it is unlikely that 
these countries have remained unaffected, considering their share in the companies' 
total capital expenditures. Germany, for example, accounts, with a few annual 
exceptions, for 50 to 70 per cent of Siemens' capital spending (Siemens Annual 
Reports). Even a small country, like the Netherlands, still accounts for approximately 
one third of Philips' capital expenditure (gross investments) (NRC, 25 May 1990:11).
Third, the perception that investing in the European-owned IT industry did not
Figure 8.2 Corporate Assets 1: Labour Productivity, 1987-1993
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provide sufficient "value for money" has also been supported by the reduced 
contribution of the European-grown IT companies to employment; over the early 
1990s, the absolute number of jobs offered by the companies has fallen (see Figure 
8.1). The share of domestic and European employment within the companies' total 
employment has remained relatively stable over the early 1990s, with the exception of 
ICL, implying that the job cuts have been spread across the companies' geographical 
scope (see Figure 8.4). As, however, the majority of the jobs have been located within 
the European economies, the absolute employment level within the EC has been 
negatively affected by the companies' job losses.
These job losses, however, have been merely referring to losses in direct 
employment. The relatively poor performance of the indigenous European IT 
companies also has affected indirect employment, notably jobs at supplying and 
distributing companies. Philips, for example, accounted for an estimated 24,000 jobs 
in the supplying sector before the start of Operation Centurion; nearly one fifth of all 
Dutch companies with 5 or more employees supplied the company, accounting in total 
for 20 per cent of Philips' supplies. Additionally, approximately 25,000 jobs in the 
distribution sector were dependent on Philips (NRC, 25 May 1990:11). Although this 
example may be misleading to the extent that Philips has been disproportionally large 
in comparison to the small Dutch economy, it does show how many jobs may have 
been affected by Philips' poor corporate performance.
Fourth, the perception that financially supporting the indigenous IT industry 
constitutes a waste of money has been neither fully supported nor fully undermined by 
data on the Roundtable members' contribution to product and process technology and 
management skills (see Figure 8.5). Over the period 1987-1992, the IT companies 
either increased their R&D expenditures in absolute terms or roughly maintained their 
spending levels - providing no real justification for the perception outlined above. The
Figure 8.4 Corporate Assets 3: Employment, 1987-1993
Breakdown by Area
100% 
80% 
60% 
40% 
20% 
0%
87888990919293 89 90919293 878889909192 919293
Siemens Philips Bull Olivetti ICL
Domestic BRest of Europe E^Non-Domestic, incl. Rest of Europe unless differentiated
Source: Appendix 8.2 Data SGS: N/A; ICL Data 1987-1990: N/A; Olivetti Data 1993: N/A; Bull Data 1987-1989: 
N/A; Philips: Only 1989 domestic data available
Figure 8.5 Corporate Assets 4: R&D Expenditures and
Employees, 1987-1993
R&D Expenditures: in $ Million and as % of Sales
6000
4000
3000
^Siemens
EUPhilips
■  Siemens (%)
■  Philips (%)
“  0
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Year
Source: Appendix 1.1
R&D Employees as % of Total Labour
Percentage
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Year
■  Philips ^Siemens EUBull dO livetti
Source: Appendix 1.1 Siemens D3T3 1987! M/A; BUH' Onty 19 9 1. 1993 available ; 01TV5TT1 Data 1993: N/A; Data ICL. 
SGS-Thomson not available
Computer R&D Expenditure: in $ Million and as % of Sales
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
$ Million Percentage
18
15
12
9
6
3
lOlivetti
El ICL 
EUSNI 
■Olivetti (%)
■  Bull (%) 
«SNI (%)
0 “  ***  "  ; ^  ^  0
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Year
Source: Appendix 1.1 and SNI A/R; Philips: Data for R&D Expenditures on C om puters not available; ICL Data 
1987-1989: N/A; SNI: Data 1987-1993: N/A; Olivetti 1993: N/A
Semiconductor R&D Expenditures: in $ Million and as % of
$ Million
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Source: Appendix 1.1 Siem ens. Philips Data 1992: N/A
Year
fUSiemens EUPhilips □SGS-Thomson 
■  Siemens (%) aaPhilips (%) »SGS-Thomson (%)
351
majority of these R&D expenditures are likely to have benefitted the home country; 
the Netherlands, for example, accounts for approximately 60% of Philips' R&D 
operations (NRC, 25 May 1990:11). Only in 1993, well after the plans of the 
Commission were outlined, corporate R&D expenditures dropped significantly.
In relative terms, however, the general trend appears to have been one of 
stabilization or decline - with the notable exception of Philips and Siemens' 
semiconductor R&D expenditures. While Philips' and Siemens' share of R&D in 
overall sales fell over the late 1980s and early 1990s, over the period 1989-1990/91, 
Philips and Siemens increased substantially the share of their semiconductor R&D 
expenditures - most likely to prepare their respective RAM technologies for production. 
In contrast, SGS-Thomson's share of R&D in total corporate sales fell over the late 
1980s and early 1990s. Similarly, the computer R&D expenditures of SNI and ICL fell 
as a percentage of their overall sales, while Olivetti and Bull maintained their R&D 
commitment at stable, albeit widely diverging levels. Facing the realities of its 
upcoming privatization, Bull's commitment to R&D dropped significantly in 1993.
Data on the absolute number of R&D employees and their share in the 
companies' total labour force have been inconclusive; the individual corporate trends 
appear to be related to the financial conditions of the company in question and/or the 
extent to which they have been cutting their R&D force relative to other employees. 
For example, the rate at which the financially-squeezed Philips has reduced its R&D 
personnel has been higher than the rate at which the company has been reducing its 
overall labour force, resulting in both an absolute as well as a relative decline in R&D 
personnel. As an estimated 50 per cent of Philips' R&D personnel has been located in 
the Netherlands8, this has had negative consequences for the overall employment level 
in the Netherlands. In contrast, the cash-rich Siemens, which employs over 70 per cent 
of its R&D personnel in Germany, has been increasing its R&D employees in absolute
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terms, although the share of R&D personnel in Siemens' total labour force has 
remained relatively stable (see Figure 8.5).
Five, the reduction in non-European sales in the early 1990s, used as a proxy 
for exports and FDI, gives some support to the perception that funding the European- 
owned IT industry does not yield "value for money". Figure 8.6 does not only illustrate 
the IT Roundtable members' heavy concentration on the European market and, thus, 
its limited contribution to extra-EC exports and FDI, it also shows that the companies' 
presence in international markets became even smaller in the early 1990s. In 1991, the 
falling share of non-European dataprocessing sales in total dataprocessing sales 
coincided with an absolute fall in non-European sales.
In sum, the perception that financially supporting the European-owned IT 
industry would not yield "value for money", has been supported by the reduction in the 
IT Roundtable companies' investments, IT-related employment, R&D expenditures in 
relative terms and exports/FDI. However, this perception was not supported by any fall 
in the companies' productivity nor by reductions in the absolute amount spent on R&D. 
Although various government officials have continued to perceive the European-owned 
IT producers as important sources of value-added and R&D (Interviews 19,33,39; 1993), 
in the early 1990s, these corporate assets were not the ones that mattered most. Instead, 
the main public emphasis appeared to be on creating and sustaining employment - a 
corporate asset of which the value depreciated markedly over the early 1990s.
8.2.2 CREATING AND SUSTAINING EMPLOYMENT
The recession of the early 1990s and the rising unemployment in the 
Community, made it increasingly imperative that jobs be sustained and created in the 
EC (National government sources, Interviews 19,18,33,40; 1993). As an IT company
Figure 8.6 Corporate Assets 5: Contribution to Exports/FDI, 
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executive argued: "The level of employment that a firm guarantees is very important. 
That is the first priority of the government" (Interview 5; 1993).
The decision of the European-owned IT companies, as well as their foreign 
competitors, to cut employment in response to the structural changes taking place in 
the IT industry in the early 1990s, however, implied that, from an employment point 
of view, the electronics industry in general, and the IT industry in particular, left much 
to be desired (see Figures 8.1 and 8.4). Moreover, it was felt that the contribution to 
employment by the electronics industry in general, and the IT industry in particular, 
had not been as high as in other industries. Especially the car industry, which is a user 
of IT, was perceived as scoring better in this respect (SERICS sources, Interview 
18; 1993) - a perception verified by Figure 8.7.
Additionally, it was felt that EC programmes seeking to support an IT 
manufacturing capability in Europe had contributed very little to employment in IT 
manufacturing. As a DG 13 official argued: "the initiatives produced very few jobs. 
Their effect [on employment] was minimal" (Interview 6; 1993). This perception may 
have added to the doubts concerning the effectiveness of programmes like ESPRIT (see 
Chapter 4).
8.2.3 WORKING TOWARDS COHESION
The political clout of the IT industry was further undermined by the fact that 
it was felt that the benefits that the companies did  generate, were spread unevenly over 
the Community (EC, national government and IT industry sources, Interviews 
16,24,29,31,36,39;1993). The concentration of the operations of the European-owned 
IT companies in France, Italy, Germany and the Netherlands (see Figures 1.2, 5.20, 8.4 
and 8.5) has indeed implied that the employment sustained, the R&D activities
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undertaken, and the value-added generated by these companies predominantly benefit
the developed regions within the EC.
In the early 1980s, the uneven distribution of the companies' assets did not
appear to be a problem. This changed, however, over the 1980s, following both the
deepening and widening of the Community (see Chapter 6). The impact of EC policies
on regional disparities became increasingly an issue in EC policy-making - as the
concerns expressed by, for example, Ireland in the 1991 White Paper endorsement
discussion have illustrated (see Chapter 4). Similarly, the allocation of EC R&TD
funding to IT, which would mainly benefit France, the UK, Germany, Italy and the
Netherlands, has become a subject of debate (see Chapters 4 and 9).
Moreover, judging by the EC's response to the request of the European-owned
IT companies to control national subsidies to foreign companies investing in peripheral
regions (see Chapter 4), the EC and its Member States have begun to attach a greater
importance to the companies that would invest in the Community's lesser developed
regions. As one BMFT official argued in response to the IT Roundtable members'
complaints about national incentives to foreign inward investors (see Chapter 4):
If the industry comes to us and raises concerns about Texas Instruments in Italy 
and says: "you must intervene in Brussels", our reaction is: "why do you not 
invest in those areas?" The answer is: "yes, but we are not interested”.
Nevertheless, the subsidies do constitute competition to the Europeans. But we 
have not intervened in this situation. We recognize that it is not a good 
situation, but we cannot prevent it, as we have no similar plans coming from 
our European industries (Interview 33;1993).
8.2.5 ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES DOMINANT
Under pressure of tighter economic conditions and the deepening and widening 
of the Community, the policy emphasis of the EC and its M/S governments shifted
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over the late 1980s and early 1990s from long-term to short-term objectives. With the 
shift in objectives, the Community's demand for corporate assets shifted as well - away 
from the European-owned IT companies' ability to develop and produce strategically 
important products and technology, to the companies' ability to contribute to the EC’s 
short-term, economic objectives: "value for money", employment, and cohesion. 
However, while the European-owned IT companies had been able to meet the 
Community's demand for an indigenous source of IT, the companies were less able to 
contribute to the realization of the Community's economic objectives.
The perception that public funding of the European-owned IT industry did not 
yield sufficient "value for money", particularly in terms of jobs and cohesion, made it 
politically and financially more difficult to justify any further investments of public 
funds in programmes specifically supporting the European-owned IT suppliers - as 
illustrated by the difficulties of the JESSI firms to secure the promised Commission 
funding, the discussions about the share of funding assigned to IT in the Fourth 
Framework Programme, the problems encountered in securing funding for the TENs, 
and the failure of the Semiconductor Initiative (see Chapters 3,4,7,9).
8.3 THE RISE OF ALTERNATIVES TO THE EUROPEAN-OWNED IT
HARDWARE INDUSTRY
The perception that public investments in IT may not be yielding a high-return 
has prompted a debate, amongst EC officials, national officials and industry 
representatives about the allocation of EC funding. In line with Chapter 7, which found 
that other companies have begun to compete with the IT Roundtable and its members 
in providing policy input into the Commission, the findings in this Chapter appear to 
indicate that these alternative companies have also started to compete with the IT
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Roundtable members as sources of corporate assets.
IT  Hardware Segments: Priority on Semiconductors
It has been argued that, in any trade-off between the semiconductor and the 
computer industry, public funds should be targeted at the semiconductor industry, even 
though the latter has been perceived as merely absorbing funding (SERICS sources, 
Interview 18; 1993). The argument goes beyond the strategic importance of 
semiconductors as components in downstream applications (see Chapter 3). It states 
that public investments in the semiconductor industry have a greater chance of success 
than public investments into the computer industry, due to the better competitive 
position of the European-owned semiconductor producers (see Chapter 5) and/or the 
better options to intervene in this sector (see Chapter 9). Public investments in the 
semiconductor industry would thus be more likely to yield value in the near future than 
government support for the computer industry. As a French government official 
illustrated:
Our financial resources are limited: we need to set priorities. We do not 
hesitate to support computer producers, but when you want to succeed, you 
have to support those [sectors] in which you are most likely to succeed.
The European actors in the computer industry are doing poorly. In the computer 
industry, the competition is harder. We do not have the same level of world 
wide ranking [as the European semiconductor and telecommunications 
companies]. The European computer firms do not have the same strength. The 
computer industry is a synonym for crisis. It is a question of priority. One has 
to focus on the main things; which sector could be saved more easily (SERICS, 
Interview 18; 1993).
IT  Industry Segments: Priority on Software and Services
Following the structural changes in the IT industry, it has been argued that 
public funds should not be invested in components and computer hardware, but rather 
in the rapidly growing, higher value-added computer software and services segments
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(see Chapter 5). Due to the falling margins in the semiconductor and computer
industries, subsidizing hardware has been perceived as an intrinsically bad investment,
while the computer software and services industry, notably at the higher end, has been
perceived as offering more potential. As summarized by an industry observer:
As a government, you have to ask yourself: where do you put your money? 
You have to be selective and determine what are the EC's strengths. Its 
strengths are in software and in telecommunications, not in hardware (Interview 
30;1993).
In 1990, EC producers accounted for over 25 per cent of the world software and
services market - a considerably larger presence than in the world computer and
semiconductor markets. Moreover, as Table 8.1 illustrates, members of the Group of
Six as well as other European-owned software and services companies have been well-
positioned within the European market, especially at the higher end of the market9.
In 1990, the estimated employment offered by software and services companies within
the EC totalled well over 400,000, which, if correct, would be substantially more than
the jobs sustained by the electronic components and the computer and office equipment
industries (EC Panorama, 1993:25-3 to 5; Chapter 5; Figures 8.1 and 8.7).
As Chapter 7 outlined, the shift in production from hardware to software and
services has prompted the EC to seek the input of the European-owned customized
software and professional services producers, notably the Group of Six. Their relatively
strong economic position appears to have conferred a greater political weight on their
policy preferences. As one industry observer argued:
Judging by the effect, the interface of the software and application software 
industry with the EC has been quite successful. They have had a significant 
impact (Interview 30; 1993).
Priority on Other EC Industries
It has also been argued that the EC should change its focus from supporting the
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Table 8.1
MAIN SUPPLIERS TO THE EUROPEAN COMPUTER SOFTWARE AND 
SERVICES MARKET, 1987 AND 1990
1
1987 MS % 1990 MS %
IBM 8.3 IBM 7.4
Nixdorf (EUR) 3.0 CGS (EUR) 2.3
Unisys 2.0 Reuters (EUR) 1.9
CGS (EUR) 1.5 Siemens (EUR) 1.6
Siemens (EUR) 1.5 Finsiel (EUR) 1.4
Digital Equipment 1.3 Fujitsu, incl.ICL 1.3
Finsiel (EUR) 1.2 Digital Equipment 1.3
Reuters (EUR) 1.1 Andersen Consulting 1.3
Transpac 1.0 SEMA Group (EUR) 0.9
Olivetti (EUR) 0.9 Sligos (EUR) 0.9
Bull (EUR) 0.7 Bull (EUR) 0.8
Datev (EUR) 0.7 SD-Sicon (EUR) 0.8
Sligos (EUR) 0.6 Computer Associates 0.7
GSI (EUR) 0.6 Unisys 0.7
McDonnel Douglas 0.6 ESD 0.7
Scicon (EUR) 0.6 Microsoft 0.7
Volmac (EUR) 0.6 SAP (EUR) 0.7
SEMA Metra (EUR) 0.5 Olivetti (EUR) 0.7
CISI (EUR) 0.5 Debis (EUR) 0.6
Andersen Consulting 0.5 Oracle 0.6
Computervision 0.5 MacKinsey 0.5
Computer Associates 0.5 Datev (EUR) 0.5
ICL (EUR) 0.5 Concept (EUR) 0.5
Telesystemes (EUR) 0.4 Axime (EUR) 0.5
Thorn SW (EUR) 0.4
Top 25 $10675ran 29.9 Top 24 $18573mn 29.1
Others $25025ran 70.1 Others $45157mn 70.9
Total $35700mn 100.0 Total $63730mn 100.0
Sources: 1987 Data: Input in  EC Panorama 1990:30-15; 1990 Data: Datamation and SEMA
Group/Consultronique in  EC Panorama 1993:25 -6 and 25-3.
Notes
EUR Europe
MS Market Share
Exchange Rates: see Appendix 5.1
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IT industry to supporting other, newly emerging and/or seemingly more valuable
sectors. As one UNICE representative expressed it,
UNICE has been stressing that the ITC industry is not the only industry. [..] 
Stopping costly programmes allows the government to save money for sectors 
with better assets (Interview 4; 1993).
These better "options" could comprise: (1) other high-tech industries, and (2) related
industries, notably IT users.
First, the search of some M/S governments to increase their national returns on
payments made to the EC (see Chapter 6) has made high-tech industries other than the
IT industry, more important as political actors. Prioritized by Member States without
a significant IT capability (DG 3 sources, Interview 26; 1993), biotechnology and other
HT industries have become increasingly effective competitors to the IT industry in the
allocation of EC R&TD funding; the share of funding allocated to, for example,
biotechnology has shown a marked increase in the Fourth Framework Programme (see
Chapters 4,9).
Second, the recognition that it is the application of IT that matters rather than
its supply, has made IT users more important as political actors (EC and national
government sources, Interviews 21,26,33,39; 1993). Not only has this recognition
prompted the EC to seek and incorporate the input of users of IT in its development
of EC IT policies, as Chapters 4 and 7 outlined, also it appears to have induced the EC
to attach more political weight to the policy preferences of these users. As an industry
observer summarized with respect to the Community R&TD programmes:
For some time now, there has been a concern among policy makers about the 
direction of R&D; there has been the feeling that the thrust of the R&D 
programs has been too much on the supply side and too little on the market 
side. It was felt that there should be a much greater focus on the application, 
the use of information technology. Subsequently, users of IT have been getting 
more influence (Interview 30; 1993).
The telecommunications equipment industry and the automotive (motor vehicle)
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industry, in particular, have been identified as IT users with an already large, and 
increasing political clout (Interview 30; 1993) - a judgement justified by the size of 
their corporate assets (see Figure 8.8).
The telecommunications equipment industry, which has been represented in the 
IT Roundtable (see Chapter 1) has been drawing its political weight mainly from its 
commercial success, as its overall profitability, its positive extra-EC trade balance, and 
its revealed technological advantage (RTA) index illustrate (see Figure 8.8; De 
Jonquieres, 25 July 1990; Cane, 2 March 1994:11). Moreover, the industry has been 
the largest contributor to value-added within the Community's electronic engineering 
sector. The industry, however, has sustained far less employment than the consumer 
electronics industry and even less than the computer and office equipment industry.
The political weight of the automotive industry has been based on its enormous 
size in terms of both value-added as well as employment. Its contribution to value- 
added has far outweighed those of the computer, component, and even 
telecommunications industries. Its labour force has been larger than the number of 
people employed in the whole electronic engineering industry. Internationally, Europe 
has been relatively strong in motor vehicle technology. Not surprisingly, the industry's 
contribution to extra-EC exports has been positive (see Figure 8.8).
Priority on European-Owned IT  SMEs
As Chapters 4 and 7 have illustrated, the EC has been intensifying its efforts 
to improve the participation of SMEs in the EC IT policy-formulation and 
implementation - convinced about the benefits that SMEs may yield.
Despite their reputed innovative capability, the EC has not been considering the 
SMEs' potential to innovate as their main corporate asset. Particularly in the IT 
industry, where only the large multinational enterprises have both the funds to finance
Figure 8.8 Alternative Sources of Corporate Assets, 1984-1991 
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R&D and the financial staying power to wait for the results of basic research, the 
SMEs' contribution to new technologies has been comparatively small. Rather, the EC's 
recent enchantment with SMEs derives from the SMEs' employment generating 
capability (EP sources, Interview 21;1993). In the early 1990s, small to medium-sized 
enterprises constituted, as a group, the largest contributors to employment - a welcome 
resource in times of recession (EC Panorama, 1991:116).
This perceived advantage, however, may not have been justified in the case of 
SMEs operating in the European-located IT industry. A very crude estimate of the 
employment generated by these enterprises in the European-located IT industry appears 
to suggest the contrary, namely that the large IT multinationals have been constituting 
the largest employers within the European-located IT industry10. Nevertheless, 
concerns that support measures for the IT industry might discriminate against IT SMEs, 
as expressed by Ireland and Spain in the Council meeting endorsing the 1991 White 
Paper (Europe, 29/30 April 1991:7-8), form indications of the weight attached by some 
M/S governments to SMEs.
Priority on Inward Investors
After the stir caused by Fujitsu's take-over of ICL in 1991 (see Chapter 4), the 
Community and its national governments appear to have become more open towards 
foreign equity participation in the European industry and/or alliances between 
European-owned and foreign companies. Although changes in government may have 
contributed to this change in attitude, more likely is that this attitude change was 
imposed on the EC and its national governments by the harsh economic realities (see 
Chapter 6).
While the European-owned IT companies came to realize that they could not 
afford to "go it alone" and that they needed to cooperate with non-European companies
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in order to stay competitive (see Chapter 5), the EC and its national governments came 
to realize that they could not afford to continue financing uncompetitive home 
companies and that a solution had to be found in order to improve the competitiveness 
of the former national champions. This applies even to France, if one accepts the 
explanation that the French government's 1993 capital injection in Bull has been aimed 
at preparing the company for privatization (see Chapter 6). As one French government 
official argued, provided certain safeguards are met (see below), foreign participation 
and cooperation could "enhance and improve the technological level of the European 
companies" (SERICS sources, Interview 19; 1993).
Moreover, as illustrated above, despite the fact that, for example, the French 
government has nurtured its IT industry over the past, at the same time, it has actively 
encouraged foreign-owned companies to invest in France in general, and in its 
regionally deprived areas in particular. Foreign inward investors have been perceived 
by both the EC as well as the national governments as substantial additional sources 
of corporate assets, especially in terms of employment and investment (EC and 
national government sources, Interviews 6,11,18,19,40; 1993). In 1989, for example, 
IBM employed 100,000 employees in its 12 European manufacturing plants and its 9 
European R&D operations - more than twice the number that Olivetti employed in the 
Community in that year. Similarly, Texas Instruments' ECU 1.09 bn investment into 
a wafer fabrication plant in Italy in 1990 constituted a welcome addition to the 
European-owned IT companies' capital investments (Peters, 1992:93; EC Panorama 
1991:12-14; Appendix 8.2).
Not all EC governments, however, have been welcoming inward investors in 
a manner as undiscriminating as the UK, which has argued that "any company 
operating in the UK is valuable" (DTI sources, Interview 40; 1993). French, German 
and Dutch government officials, for example, have argued that in order to derive
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benefits for their national economies, the attitude towards the foreign inward investors 
should depend on the type of operations involved (merely assembly or also R&D and 
management activities), and the investors' integration into the European industrial 
fabric (linkages) (BMFT, SERICS, EZ sources, Interviews 18,19,33; 1993).,
Although several of the foreign IT companies located in the Community have 
gone through similar restructuring exercises as the European-owned IT companies (see 
Chapter 5), concerns that the implementation of the 1991 White Paper might 
discriminate against foreign-owned IT companies, as expressed by Ireland and the UK 
in the Council meeting endorsing the White Paper (Europe, 29/30 April 1991:7-8; 
Chapter 4), form indications of the increased political weight of the foreign-owned IT 
companies. As one industry observer argued, the inward investors' contribution to 
employment, R&D and cohesion has yielded them "a substantial influence" in the EC 
(Interview 30; 1993).
8.4 CONCLUSION
This chapter has sought to explain the loss in political influence experienced 
by the IT Roundtable in the early 1990s, in comparison to the 1980s, by analyzing 
changes in the political weight of the IT Roundtable's policy preferences.
In the early 1980s, the political weight attached by the European Community 
and its national governments to the IT Roundtable members' policy preferences was 
based to a large extent on the perception that the European-owned companies, as 
indigenous sources of IT, were necessary for capturing the benefits of IT. Although the 
EC and its Member States continued to perceive information technology as an 
economically and militarily strategic technology in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
notably the UK government questioned whether maintaining an indigenous IT
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production capability was an absolute prerequisite - a perception supported by the shift 
in emphasis from the supply to the application of IT and by the alleviation of security 
of supply concerns in the commodity IT market segments.
Over the late 1980s and early 1990s, the EC shifted its policy strategy from the 
supply of IT to the use of IT in recognition that it is the application of IT, and not its 
production, that generates value. An effective application of IT, however, does not 
necessarily require an indigenous supply source of IT. Although this thesis argued that 
an indigenous capability would be advisable in the case of IT products used in military 
applications and an in-house capability preferable in the case of ASICs and other 
commercially-applied customized IT products, reliance on foreign sources of IT could 
be justified in the case of mass-produced IT products used in commercial applications, 
provided that the European IT users would have access to an internationally 
competitive, state-of-the-art source of information technology. The main reason 
underlying this argument was that over the late 1980s and early 1990s, the supply 
conditions of both semiconductors as well as computers improved, securing access of 
the IT users to IT sources and easing security of supply concerns.
Whether justified or not, the reduced importance attached by some EC 
governments to the strategic necessity of a European-owned and controlled industry has 
made it more difficult to adopt EC-wide measures in support of the European-owned 
IT industry - explaining in part the IT Roundtable’s loss in political influence in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. Doubts about the necessity of an indigenous IT capability 
have depreciated the perceived value of the IT Roundtable's main asset, that wielded 
it so much political weight in the early and mid-1980s: its capability to supply 
economically and militarily strategic technologies and products.
Instead, in the early 1990s, short-term economic objectives became increasingly 
important - even amongst the Dutch, French and German governments that had been
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paying lip-service to the necessity of an indigenous IT and, particularly, a European- 
owned and controlled semiconductor capability. Under pressure of the economic 
recession of the early 1990s and the widening and deepening taking place of the EC 
over the 1980s and early 1990s, "value for money", employment and cohesion became 
increasingly important issues on the EC policy agenda.
Due to the crisis in the IT industry, however, public support of the European- 
owned IT companies was perceived as yielding insufficient "value for money". 
Although this perception was not fully justified, the companies did score poorly on the 
one corporate asset that mattered most; over the late 1980s and early 1990s, the IT 
Roundtable members' contribution to employment was not only relatively small in 
comparison to other industries, but also rapidly declining. Moreover, the companies' 
employment and other contributions to the European economy mostly benefitted the 
Northern, developed regions, and contributed little to cohesion.
Whether justified or not, the perception that public support of the European- 
owned IT industry did not yield sufficient "value for money", made it politically and 
financially more difficult to justify any further investments of public funds in 
programmes specifically supporting the European-owned IT suppliers. As such, the 
crisis in the IT industry contributes to an explanation of the IT Roundtable's loss in 
political influence in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Moreover, with the increasing preponderance of short-term, economic 
objectives, alternative sources of corporate assets appear to have become more 
important - implying that the IT Roundtable did not only face competition in providing 
policy inputs into the Commission in the early 1990s, but also in convincing the 
Commission about the importance of meeting its policy preferences and not those of 
others. The policy preferences of the software and services companies, IT user firms 
and other high-tech companies may have carried more political weight, judging by
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their contributions to the realization of the Community's economic objectives. IT SMEs 
and foreign-owned IT companies have been perceived as welcome additional sources 
of corporate assets, boosting their political weight within Community politics.
8.5 NOTES
1. DG 13, EP, SERICS, EZ, BMFT and DTI sources, Interviews
6,18,19,21,33,40,41,*1993; Italian government sources, Communication 42;1994.
2. DG13, EP, SERICS, EZ and BMFT sources, Interviews 6,18,19,21,33;1993.
3. IRDAC and DTI sources, Interviews 13,40,41; 1993; Walker (1993:185-186).
4. This provision was contested by the EC under GATT Article XXII and won by 
the EC in 1988 (Europe, 22 June 1989:8).
5. EP, SERICS, EZ, EEC A and ORGALIME sources, Interviews
18,19,21,23,31 ;1993.
6. DTI, EP, IT consultancy sources, Interviews 1,10,12,30,41; 1993.
7. EP, EZ, SERICS, DTI, UNICE and IT company sources, Interviews 
1,4,8,10,12,18,30,39; 1993.
8. In the late 1980s, approximately 16000 Philips NL employees were involved 
in R&D. In 1990, Philips employed in total 35127 employees in R&D related activities 
(NRC, 25 May 1990:11; Philips Annual Report).
9. The market for packaged software has been dominated by American producers 
(Oracle, Computer Associates, Microsoft) (EC Panorama, 1993:25-5).
10. In 1988, the EC computer and office equipment industry employed 265900
people. It has been estimated that, in total, 5701 micro (0-9 employees) and small
enterprises (10-99 employees) accounted for 13.6 per cent of the jobs (36162), while 
213 medium (100-499) and large companies (500 and more employees) accounted for
86.4 per cent (229738). On average, each medium and large company would thus 
employ 1079 people. Most likely, however, there have been a large number of 
medium-sized companies employing less than 500 employees and a small number of 
large companies employing more than 500 employees. In 1988, for example, Olivetti 
alone already accounted for an estimated 46080 European jobs. Not all these jobs may 
have been in the computer and office equipment segment or within the European 
Community, but the sheer size of the number employed supports the expectation 
outlined in the text (Appendix 1,1; Figure 8.4; EC Panorama, 1993:10-18; 1991:114).
Chapter 9
POLITICAL REALIZATION
Chapters 7 and 8 have argued that the loss of the IT Roundtable's political 
influence can be explained by the declining effectiveness of the IT Roundtable as a 
channel of political activity and by the reduced political weight attached to its policy 
preferences. However, even if the IT Roundtable would have voiced its policy 
preferences in an optimal fashion and these preferences would have carried sufficient 
political weight, one could question whether these policy preferences could be realized 
(see Chapter 2). Would the EC be able to supply the policies requested?
This chapter seeks to explain the loss in political influence experienced by the 
IT Roundtable in the early 1990s, in comparison to the 1980s, by analyzing changes 
in the ability of the European Community to provide the policies, as requested by the 
IT Roundtable. The first section focuses on the internal impediments hampering the 
EC's ability to realize the IT companies' policy preferences. The second section 
discusses the limitations set by the nature of the industry in which the EC has been 
intervening.
9.1 THE EC AS A POIiCY-SIJPPI JER: INTERNAL SHORTCOMINGS
As Chapter 2 outlined, the effectiveness of the EC as a policy supplier may 
have been affected by four factors. First, the EC may not have had the competencies 
to provide the policies preferred by the IT Roundtable, i.e. (1) a better funded, near­
market, second generation IT R&TD programme; (2) transitional protective 
arrangements to secure a balanced opening of third country markets and controls on 
national incentives to inward investments; and (3) a relaxation of the EC's anti-trust 
policy and preferential treatment of the European-owned IT companies in the
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implementation of the Trans European Networks (see Table 4.1). Second, the EC may 
not have been endowed with an adequate array of policy instruments to execute its 
competencies. In particular, is it possible that the EC's policy instruments have been 
inept to deal with the far more interventionist-inclined policy demands < of the IT 
Roundtable in the early 1990s? Third, the realization of the IT Roundtable's policy 
preferences may have floundered due to the lack of resources available for Community 
activities and, especially, the Community's IT R&TD programmes and TENs. Finally, 
the EC, as a fragmented policy supplier, may not have been able to respond 
sufficiently fast to keep up with the pace of change in the IT industry.
9.1.1 SCOPE OF COMPETENCIES
By the time the Commission's 1991 White Paper was drafted, the competencies 
to build an IT industrial policy at the Community level were not yet in place. The 
White Paper, however, was written with the clear understanding that the EC would be 
endowed with a competency in this area and, indeed, after substantial delays in its 
ratification, the Maastricht Treaty did so (see Chapter 6).
The institutional changes brought about by the Maastricht Treaty, however, 
have only partially strengthened the EC's competencies in the area of industrial policy 
(DG 3 sources, Interview 11;1993). The provisions outlined in the Treaty limit the 
actions that the EC, as such, can take. First, the Community should seek to realize the 
objectives outlined in the provisions through the "policies and activities it pursues 
under other provisions of the Treaty" (EC Treaty (93):Art.l30). Second, as Church and 
Phinnemore (1994:214) argue: "The only decisions the Community may take on the 
basis of Article 130 are specific measures designed to support action taken in Member 
States". Third, the implementation of such common actions has been made subject to
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unanimity voting in the Council of Ministers - a forum characterized by ideologically 
diverging policy-stances regarding government intervention in support of industry (see 
Chapters 2,4,6). Finally, the Treaty has set clear limits to the interventionist nature of 
any measure to be taken on the basis of Art. 130; they should not lead to a, distortion 
of competition. This has implied that the EC's responsibility to ensure "that the 
conditions necessary for the competitiveness of the Community's industry exist" is still 
far away from a comprehensive and coherent EC Industrial Policy in the area of IT.
The competencies for the individual policy areas identified in the 1991 White 
Paper, however, either were in place or were being put into place under other 
provisions in the Treaty. As Chapter 2 expected, the EC should thus be able to 
implement the White Paper and satisfy even the IT Roundtable's more far-reaching 
policy demands - particularly after it was endowed with new competencies by the 
Maastricht Treaty.
R&TD: Second Generation
When the IT Roundtable lobbied in favour of a Community R&TD programme 
in the early 1980s (see Chapter 3), the EC competencies thereto were not in place. The 
lack of formal competencies on R&TD, however, did not hamper the realization of the 
IT Roundtable's policy preferences; the first Community R&TD Framework 
Programme (OJ C208, 1983) and the ESPRIT programme (OJ L67, 1984) were 
introduced on the basis of Article 235 of the EEC Treaty (58) (see Chapter 3). When 
the IT Roundtable lobbied for a second generation IT R&TD programme in the early 
1990s (see Table 4.1), no such problems existed; in 1987, the Single European Act had 
formally endowed the EC with powers in the area of Community research and 
technological development and had made EC R&TD decisions subject to more lenient 
voting rules (see Chapters 3,6).
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Fair Competition and Market Access
As the institution responsible for the Community's commercial policy, the EC 
was, in theory, in a position to satisfy the IT Roundtable's demand for transitory 
protective arrangements (see Table 4.1). First of all, the EC could exercise its rights 
under the GATT; in international negotiations, it could make the reduction of existing 
tariff or non-tariff barriers pending on concessions offered by third countries or, in 
more urgent cases, resort to safeguard measures. Alternatively, the necessary measures 
could be taken on the basis of Article 113 of the EC/EEC Treaty (93;87;58), which 
allows the Commission to submit proposals to the Council for the implementation of 
its common commercial policy. With some exceptions (EC Treaty (93):Art.228), the 
Council would decide on these proposals by qualified majority.
Similarly, the EC could satisfy, in theory, the IT Roundtable's preferences for 
controls on national incentives to inward investments (see Table 4.1) through a far 
stricter interpretation of the EC rules on those forms of state aid that are compatible 
with the common market, notably those on aid to promote the economic development 
of regionally underdeveloped areas (EC/EEC Treaty (93;87):Art.92.2 and 3).
Trans European Networks
In the context of the Maastricht Treaty, the EC also acquired a legal 
responsibility in the area of TENs (see Chapter 6). Satisfying the IT Roundtable's wish 
for preferential treatment for European-owned IT companies, however, would be more 
difficult to realize within the context of the GATT. Nevertheless, to the extent that the 
development of these TENs would involve bidding for government tenders involving 
the formerly excluded sectors and, particularly, telecommunications, the EC's 
preferential treatment clauses could apply; a three per cent price preference could be 
given to European bidders in the allocation of the contracts (Art.29). Any waiver of
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these preferential clauses could be made conditional upon reciprocal access to the third 
countries' markets - as illustrated by the waiver towards American companies bidding 
for contracts in all formerly excluded sectors but telecommunications (see Chapter 4).
Moreover, the EC Commission, as the authority responsible for the 
Community's competition policy, could, in theory, reinterpret its guidelines on the 
application of its rules on undertakings - allowing the EC to meet the IT Roundtable's 
demand for a more pragmatic anti-trust policy in the implementation of TENs (see 
Table 4.1). A precedence thereto was set in 1971, albeit in a different area, when the 
Commission was empowered to apply exemptions to R&D agreements up to the stage 
of industrial application (OJ L285, 1971). In 1984, the Commission made use of this 
power by adopting a regulation exempting joint R&D and exploitation agreements 
from EC competition rules (OJ L53, 1985). This block exemption was further amended 
and extended in 1992 to cover the joint distribution of products resulting from joint 
R&D - provided the market share of the participating companies would not exceed a 
certain limit (OJ L21, 1993).
Theory versus Practice
In theory, the competencies were thus in place to implement the White Paper 
and satisfy the IT Roundtable's policy demands. As Chapter 2 expected, however, in 
practice, it has been more difficult to implement the areas identified in the White 
Paper, let alone to realize the IT Roundtable's more far-reaching policy preferences 
(DG 3 and EP sources, Interviews 3,11,21,26; 1993). First, as outlined in the case of 
a common industrial policy, ideological divergencies amongst the Member States have 
hampered the realization of the White Paper and more aggressive interpretations 
thereof - the difficulties to implement the Council Resolution being a case in point (see 
Chapter 4).
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Second, the new terms of co-existence between the EC, as a supplier of IT and 
other industrial policies, and the national governments (see Chapter 6), have 
constrained the actions the EC can actually undertake, as is particularly clear in the 
case of the Community's R&TD policies and the TENs. In the area of R.&TD, the 
application of the principle of subsidiarity, for example, has strengthened the position 
of EUREKA, the inter-governmental R&TD programmes, vis-a-vis Community 
programmes. In the area of TENs, clear limits have been set as to the EC's ability to 
raise funds; the development of a new financial instrument at the EC level, namely the 
Union bonds, was not welcomed by the M/S governments (see Chapter 4; see below).
9.1.2 PORTFOLIO OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS
By the time the Commission's 1991 White Paper was drafted, the EC did have 
at its disposal various policy instruments to execute its competencies in the area of 
R&TD, trade and competition, and TENs. However, were these instruments adequate 
to satisfy the IT Roundtable's more far-reaching policy demands, as Chapter 2 has 
questioned?
R&TD: Second Generation
The SEA’s formalization of the EC's competencies in the area of research and 
development bestowed the EC with a new policy instrument, namely R&TD subsidies 
for precompetitive collaborative R&TD projects. By keeping the collaborative projects 
precompetitive, the EC stayed within the confmes of the derogations allowed under 
Art. 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty. In the early 1990s, however, the IT Roundtable 
members began calling for subsidized collaborative R&TD projects which would go 
beyond the precompetitive stage (see Table 4.1). Subsidizing near-market R&TD
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projects, however, would raise the question of the impact of these projects on
competition. As one IT Roundtable source argued:
We are reaching the ceiling of what can be interpreted as precompetitive. We 
need actions in the competitive field, but how to do so? The Commission is not 
allowed to do so on the basis of its competition policy. It cannot agree to 
sponsor the development of a product (Interview 36; 1993).
The constraints imposed by the EC's competition policy on the application of
R&TD subsidies, however, do not appear to have hampered the development of a more
market-oriented second generation of IT R&TD programmes within the context of the
EC's Fourth Framework Programme. As Chapter 4 outlined, the EC has resorted, first
of all, to focused clusters, under which the EC’s financial support will be confined to
the up-stream precompetitive elements, and secondly, to closer linkages with the more
market-oriented EUREKA projects. As one IT Roundtable member commented with
respect to the new IT programme: "The precompetitive wording has disappeared in the
Commission document. [..] Now the goal is commercial products" (Interview 5; 1993).
Market Access
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the EC had access to a wide array of trade 
policy instruments to protect and promote the interests of its IT industry, including the 
Common Customs Tariff1, its safeguard provisions2, its anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty clauses3, its rules of origin4 and its de facto local content 
requirements (Vermulst and Waer, 1990; Kelly, 1988; 1992). In 1984, the Community 
expanded its portfolio of trade policy instruments by forming the New Trade Policy 
Instrument (NTPI). This instrument would allow the Community to take measures to 
counter unfair trading practices or to ensure the full exercise of its international trade 
rights (OJ L252, 1984). None of the EC’s trade policy instruments, however, has been 
able to work as effectively as the American "Section 301" in opening third country
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markets.
Section 301 of the US 1974 Trade Act, as extended by the 1988 Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act, gives the US President the power to take trade 
measures to enforce America's rights under any trade agreement; it gives the US the 
powers to force open foreign markets which are deemed to be closed to US exports. 
Moreover, it gives the President the powers to take retaliatory measures to counter 
trade practices which the US considers to be unjustifiable, unreasonable, or 
discriminatory, and which injure or restrict US trade. The main power of Section 301 
lies in the fact that it has allowed the US to act unilaterally in defining its trading 
rights, determining their infringements, and meting out the punitive measures 
(Bhagwati, 1989:440; CEC, 1990:2). Moreover, as Bhagwati (1989:441) notes, the 
Super 301 provisions of the 1988 Act, outlined in Section 301, allow the US to 
reprimand entire countries (not just individual industries) as unfair traders, at the end 
of a mandatory course of actions. As such, the current Section 301 is incompatible 
with the multilateral obligations of the United States.
In contrast to the American Section 301, the Community's trade policy 
instruments adhere to the multilateral trading principles, although in particular in the 
case of the EC's anti-dumping legislation, the defmition of what is legitimate under 
GATT has been stretched to a breaking point5 (Economist, 10 September 1988:77-78; 
DG 3, Interview 11 ;1993; Kelly 1988:92; Norall, 1989:83). However, even the 
Community's NTPI, which comes closest to the American Section 301 provisions, 
requires that the EC retaliatory measures have to be compatible with the EC's existing 
international obligations and procedures (OJ L252, 1984). This implies that, in the case 
of frictions between the EC and its GATT partners, the EC would have to participate 
in an international consultation or dispute settlement procedure, prior to imposing the 
retaliatory measures, and that the final policy actions would have to take into account
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the results of these consultation and settlement procedures. Lack of consensus about 
the formation of a GATT panel or the adoption of panel reports, would not allow the 
EC to act unilaterally under this instrument (GATT, 1993:225). The NTPI can only be 
used unilaterally against non-GATT member countries - hampering the EC's ability to 
pry open third country markets (Buchan, 22 July 1993:6).
In line with the hypothesis outlined in Chapter 2, the main reason for the 
Community's adherence to multilateral trading principles in the application of its trade 
policy instruments appears to have been the EC's inherent ideological balance between 
liberal and interventionist Member States (see Chapter 6; Buchan, 18 May 1993:4; 
Barber, 9 February 1994:6). Although the French government has called for more 
effective commercial policy instruments, the overall ideological balance within the EC 
over the 1980s and early 1990s has been such that political consensus in favour of any 
departure from the multilateral trading principles has been difficult to reach - the 
problems in reaching a compromise on the 1991 Council Resolution and the 
subsequent inaction being the case in point (see Chapter 4).
The EC has even been reluctant to use the NTPI in its present form, which is 
still GATT-compatible - making the prospects of any removal of the references to 
GATT procedures in the NTPI, as suggested by the French (Buchan, 22 July 1993:6), 
highly unlikely. Over the first ten years of its existence, only four investigations have 
been conducted under the provisions of the NTPI, while none of the three concluded 
cases has led to retaliatory action. The EC, however, has met the French demand for 
efficiency improvements in the Community's anti-dumping regime despite initial 
opposition of the UK, Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands - allegedly as part of 
the price demanded by France for supporting the Uruguay Round agreement (Barber, 
9 February 1994:6; Presse 4426/94:11).
The lack of policy instruments similar to the American Section 301, which have
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been perceived by Commissioner Pandolfi as "totally outside the multilateral trading 
framework" has meant that the EC would "have to rely on a mixture of patience and 
determination" to realize the 1991 White Paper's objective of equitable access to third 
country markets (Pandolfi in Business Europe, 5 April 1991:7).
Fair Competition: National Incentives on Inward Investment
Despite the Commission's competencies in the area of competition policy, no 
mechanism has been in place to control national incentives to inward investment, as 
advocated by the IT Roundtable. Instead, the status quo is that state aids to promote 
the economic development of regionally underdeveloped areas are compatible with the 
common market provided that such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to 
an extent contrary to the common interest (EC/EEC Treaty (93;87):Art.92.3c). 
Considering the Member States' interest in attracting inward investors into their 
peripheral regions, they are unlikely to perceive the "common interest" as being 
adversely affected by these national incentives.
Trans European Networks
As the TENs are only in their preliminary stages (see Chapter 4), it is hard to 
assess whether or not the instruments in place have been adequate to realize the IT 
Roundtable's specific policy preferences - although Article 29 and Commissioner van 
Miert's more pragmatic interpretation of EC competition rules would seem to confirm 
this (see Chapter 4 and above). However, at this stage in the implementation, the 
realization of the TENs, as such, is still at stake. Two aspects are crucial for the 
realization of a Trans European Telecommunications or Information Network: (1) the 
liberalization of the nationally protected telecommunications markets and the 
consolidation of demand at the Community level, and (2) the funding of these
382
networks (IT company sources, Interview 5; 1993 and Communication 15; 1994).
First, although the liberalization of telecommunications infrastructure and 
services has been on the EC's policy agenda since its decision to complete the Single 
European Market (Catinat, 12 November 1993:13-14), progress has been slow - 
reflecting the vested interests of the national telecommunications operators, notably 
France Telecom, Deutsche Telekom and STET, in maintaining their monopolies. 
Without the cooperation of the M/S governments in liberalizing these markets, 
however, the EC does not have at its disposal the instruments to overcome the 
fragmentation of the European market and to consolidate demand at a level where 
companies would be interested to invest in the so-called telecommunications or 
information networks. In that sense, the Corfu Summit's endorsement of the 
Bangemann Group's conclusions may signal a greater political commitment to the 
realization of the TENs (see Chapter 4).
Second, although the EC does possess financial instruments that could be used 
to finance the networks, such as the European Investment Bank, the introduction of a 
new, additional instrument at the Community level - favoured by the EC to raise the 
necessary funds - has run into opposition of the M/S governments. In particular, some 
Member States expressed their concern that the creation of Union bonds would thwart 
the national governments' budgetary discipline and that loans to Member States with 
poorer credit ratings would undermine the Commission's own credit rating (Dixon, 21 
February 1994:17; Hill, 14 December 1993:5). As will be outlined below, the Corfu 
Summit may also have brought the TENs' financing problem one step closer to 
solution (Gardner, 27 June 1994:3).
No Alternative Actions at the National Level
In sum, one could conclude that the evidence on the adequacy of the
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Community's policy instruments is ambiguous. While the EC's R&TD policy 
instruments have been adequate, the EC’s trade policy instruments have certainly not 
been sufficient to realize the IT Roundtable's more interventionist policy preferences.
One might expect that the shortcomings in the EC's array of policy instruments 
have prompted the IT Roundtable companies to resort to their respective national 
governments (see Chapter 2). Although the M/S governments have been reasserting 
their sovereignty in those areas where the division of tasks between the EC and the 
national governments is not clearly defined, the EC has been curtailing the powers of 
the national governments in those areas which fall explicitly under the EC's authority - 
notably trade and competition. Since the EC has started to regulate national industrial 
policy instruments in order to create a level playing field within Europe, the Member 
States' ability to use their portfolio of policy instruments has been reduced.
Over the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the EC abolished national quotas on 
non-EC imports or replaced them by EC-wide quotas (see Chapter 3). Although most 
national quotas on electronic goods concern consumer electronics rather than IT 
products, the implication of this Commission policy has been that, at any future point 
in time, the European-owned IT companies cannot ask their national governments to 
impose such barriers, as has been done in the past for VCRs, colour TVs, et cetera 
(GATT, 1989:169-170; Barber, 9 February 1994:6).
Moreover, at the same time, the Commission started to enforce a stricter 
competition policy (see Chapter 3). National capital transactions to companies, in 
particular, have been put under increasing scrutiny - the Commission's investigations 
into French aid to Groupe Bull being a case in point.
Over the period 1991-1993, the capital transactions of the French government 
and the state-owned France Telecom to Groupe Bull totalled nearly FF 18 bn (see 
Appendix 1.1). If it could be proven that the French state had acted like any private
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investor, these capital transactions would not constitute aid and, therefore, fall beyond
the scope of the Commission's competition authorities (OJ C273, 1991; Dawkins and
Leadbeater, 5 April 1991:2; Economist, 8 June 1991:18-20; 2 March 1991:14-15). Even
if the capital transactions would constitute aid, these still could be legal, providing that
they would be compatible with the common market, as outlined in EC/EEC Treaty
(93;87:Art.92.2 and 3). In two cases, however, the Commission doubted the
commercial behaviour of the French government and the justification of its transactions
sufficiently to open an investigation.
The first investigation was initiated in July 1991, spurred by complaints of ICL
that the capital injections of FF 4 bn and the R&D funding of FF 2.6 bn by the French
government and France Telecom, would distort competition in the European computer
industry (Drozdiak, 28 April 1991:E5; Daily Telegraph, 16 April 1991). In line with
remarks made by Roger Fauroux, French Minister of Industry, that
No private shareholder would make the effort that the state will make [for 
Bull]. It is a political investment" (quoted in "Liberation", Browning, 4 April 
1991),
the Commission concluded that the French government indeed had not acted as a 
private investor. The funds transacted therefore constituted state aids (OJ C244, 1992). 
After an extensive period of investigation, the Commission eventually approved the 
French state aids in 1992, on the basis of the derogation outlined in Art.92.3c of the 
EEC Treaty (87). As required for the applicability of Art.92.3c, the aid was perceived 
as "facilitating the development" of the Community's computer industry without 
"adversely affecting trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest" 
(Art.92.3c; OJ C244, 1992). One should note, however, that the direct investments of 
IBM and NEC in Bull over the course of 1991 and 1992, combined with the 
company's restructuring efforts, played a crucial role in convincing the Commission of 
the legality of the French state aids.
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The second investigation was initiated in October 1993, following a capital 
injection of FF 2.5 bn into Bull. This enquiry was extended in January 1994 to include 
another FF 8.6 bn in capital pledges, directly from the French government and via 
France Telecom. In anticipation of the results of the Commission's investigation, the 
French government was asked by the Commission to freeze FF 2.5 bn of the latest 
capital transactions, as the justifications given by the French government for the 
funding merely constituted of a statement of intent rather than a serious restructuring 
plan.
By the end of July 1994, the Commission had not yet ruled on the case. 
However, van Miert's positive response to the restructuring and privatization plans 
outlined by the company in Spring 1994 did increase the chances of approval6. 
Although, formally, the Commission cannot tie aid to privatization as it is not allowed 
to discriminate between private and public ownership, the EC could apply a "premium 
to privatization"; privatization would make the restructuring plans more credible and 
increase the chances that the aid would indeed be a "one time, last time" event (Dixon, 
11 March 1994:17; Ridding, 18 February 1994:24, 2 March 1994:30).
The Bull state aid examples illustrate that the Community's scrutiny of state 
aids has constrained the French government's freedom of action. Although the first 
batch of state aid was approved and the second batch looks bound to be accepted as 
well, the French government still had to go through extensive lengths to justify its 
actions - making political investments without a sound commercial base or without 
restructuring or privatization provisions increasingly unlikely.
The constraints imposed by the EC on national trade measures and state aids, 
has implied that the M/S governments have been less able to use their own policy 
instruments in support of their indigenous IT companies. Despite the political influence 
exercised by these companies over their home governments (see Chapter 7), the
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companies may thus not even see their policy preferences translated into national 
actions.
9.1.3 ACCESS TO RESOURCES
The Community's overall budget has been relatively small - despite the 
resentment voiced by national governments about its size (Nugent, 1991:314). 
Although the Community's deepening has been accompanied by an increase in its 
budget, the tight financial conditions faced by the EC Member States and their 
preference for subsidiarity and national solutions (see Chapter 6) have set a clear 
ceiling to the expansion of the Community's budget. This has implied that the EC's 
resources have been limited - providing a reason to belief that the hypothesis outlined 
in Chapter 2 has been correct; the EC's resources may not have been sufficient to 
realize the IT Roundtable's policy preferences on IT R&TD and TENs (see Table 4.1).
R&TD: Second Generation
As Chapter 4 has illustrated, the adoption of the Fourth Framework was delayed 
by the reluctance of Germany, France and the United Kingdom to approve the R&TD 
budget suggested by the Commission. Moreover, the IT Roundtable's demands for a 
significant increase in funding allocated to IT R&TD were not met - leading us to 
question why the EC and its Member States did not allocate more funding to IT 
despite its "strategic" technology status. Four explanations can be discerned.
First, within its overall budget, Community funding for R&TD programmes 
accounts for only a small share. Despite the European Council's statement in the mid- 
1980s that at least 6 per cent of the EC's budget should be devoted to Community 
R&TD (DG 12 sources, Interview 24; 1993), the budgeted expenditures on R&TD have
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stayed well below that goal; in 1990, R&TD totalled only 3.3 per cent of the 
Community's budget (see Figure 9.1). In absolute terms, the EC's R&TD funds were 
smaller than the individual R&D budgets of Germany, France, Italy, Great Britain and 
Spain in that year. Even the Netherlands, a small state, spent more on R&P than the 
Community (Eurostat in P-13, 1993). The main reason for the R&TD's small share in 
the EC budget is that the Member States have been attaching a far greater priority to 
alternative Community objectives in their allocation of resources. In line with the 
expectation outlined in Chapter 2, the emphasis on cohesion following the 1986 
enlargement of the Community (see Chapter 6) has been diverting resources to other 
Community initiatives, away from R&TD programmes. As one national government 
official commented regarding the budget compromise concluded at the 1992 Edinburgh 
Summit:
Cohesion, structural funds and external policies ranked above the internal 
policies of which R&D is a part. It got die least priority (SERICS sources, 
Interview 18; 1993).
As R&TD constitutes a budget items in which the vested interests of the Member 
States are not as high as in other areas, by default, these items are subject to 
expenditure cuts (IT company sources, Interview 14; 1993).
Second, the relatively limited funds available for R&TD activities have been 
spread over a large number of sectors, creating the risk that the funds have been spread 
too thinly. Politically, however, concentration of funding on a few sectors has proven 
to be unfeasible since each Member State would like to reap its "fair" share of the 
Community's R&TD funding (see Chapter 6). As one national government official 
observed:
When the Commission contacted the Member States to ask their opinions about 
the Fourth Framework Programme, all national government officials said: "This 
is a good paper, but could you add this or that?" Nobody indicated which topic 
could be cancelled (BMFT sources, Interview 33; 1993).
Figure 9.1 Structure of EC Budget Expenditure, 1980-1992
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Although ITC research has been accounting for the largest share in the Framework 
budgets over the 1980s and early 1990s (see Tables 4.3 and 4.4), as Chapter 4 outlined, 
maintaining this preponderant share has not simply been a matter of course. Notably 
those Member States without a strong presence in ITC production, such as, Denmark, 
have strongly pressed for the allocation of funds to other high-tech sectors, such as 
biotechnology (DG 3 sources, Interview 26; 1993). As Figure 9.2 shows, in contrast to 
the share of IT funding, the share of funding allocated to, for example, biotechnology, 
non-nuclear energies and environment research has risen substantially over time.
Third, despite the preponderance of ITC research in the Community's R&TD 
budget, the actual funds allocated to IT R&TD projects have been small. In 1990, for 
example, the EC's commitment to IT R&TD activities was comparable to Groupe 
Bull's S 687.5 mn annual R&D expenditures, larger than ICL's and Olivetti's annual 
expenditures on R&D, but far smaller than Philips' and Siemens' annual R&D spending 
(see Appendix 1.1). This amount of funding, moreover, has been allocated to a large 
number of projects - reflecting the unwritten rule that EC programmes should benefit 
all parties involved. The result has been that when the Community's R&TD funds have 
been spread out over all the information technology research projects and all its 
participants, the actual Commission funding allocated to the large, European-owned IT 
companies has been very modest indeed; Community funding constitutes approximately 
1 per cent of Siemens' and Thomson's annual R&D expenditures (Siemens and 
Thomson sources; 1993). As one IT company executive argued:
There has been an incredible amount of small projects. None of these have a
critical mass: you just scratch the surface (Interview 5; 1993).
Fourth, the unwritten rule that EC programmes should benefit all parties 
involved has led the Commission to make a conscious effort to involve SMEs (see 
Chapters 4,7). Moreover, there have been pressures to apply the principle of juste
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retour to the allocation of project contracts and, thus, funding (Dekker Report,
1992:12,60). As one national government official argued:
The Commission proposes more or less a compromise. The Commission will 
never propose a set of projects where the money only goes to France, the 
Netherlands and Germany. The Commission looks for a mixture {Interview 
33;1993).
The danger of applying the concept of juste retour at the level of allocating project 
contracts, however, has been that geography, rather than technological excellence, 
determines the allocation of EC funds - as most of the IT industry's capability has been 
concentrated in France, Germany, Italy, the UK and the Netherlands (see Chapter 1). 
Although this hypothesis has been hard to prove, insistence on the application of juste 
retour might, in that case, lead to an inefficient allocation of resources which 
compromises the very objective of the Community's R&TD programmes: the 
improvement of the IT industry's competitiveness (Dekker Report, 1992:12,60; DG 3 
and 13 sources, Interviews 6,24,26; 1993).
Although, for the reasons outlined above, the resources available for 
Community R&TD have been clearly constrained, hampering an optimal 
implementation of the R&TD programmes, this statement should be qualified. EC 
R&TD funding has been neither the only nor the main benefit of participating in the 
Community's IT programmes. Although the IT Roundtable companies lobbied 
unsuccessfully for more funding (see Table 4.1), "money has not been the main issue" 
(IT company sources, Interview 15; 1993). As one IT Roundtable member commented: 
"For the financial aspects, we would never participate in Commission projects" 
(Interview 8; 1993). Instead, the main benefits of participating in ESPRIT have been 
the value-added that cooperation in well-aimed priorities can bring, and the 
continuation of these cooperative arrangements beyond the scope of the projects (IT 
company sources, Interviews 8,15,16; 1993). As one executive noted:
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Collaborative R&D projects allow a company the leverage out of five to six 
other organizations. You might end up with 10 man years of R&D for the costs 
of one man (Interview 15; 1993).
Trans European Networks
As in the case of IT R&TD, the hesitance of the Member States to contribute
funds to the TENs has been hampering their speedy realization (see Chapter 4).
Although the ITC-related projects would be largely funded by the private sector and
the financing could be eased by loans from the European Investment Bank and the
Cohesion Fund, the Member States’ fear has been that the TENs would still involve
a considerable amount of government spending (Norman, 14 December 1992; Financial
Times. 8 December 1993:2). As one IT company executive commented:
Since the troubles with ratifying the Maastricht Treaty, the Member States have 
not been willing to create Trans European Networks. This is a public budget 
issue: the TENs need a few billion ECU for funding. The Member States are 
not unwilling to proceed, but they are careful not to make any commitments 
(Interview 5; 1993).
In this respect, the Corfu Summit's statement that "measures will be taken - if proved 
necessary - in order that priority projects do not run into financial obstacles that would 
jeopardise their implementation" (Gardner, 27 June 1994:3), may prove to be a turning 
point (see Chapter 4). Considering the American political drive behind the realization 
of its "information super-highways", this move to overcome the financial obstacles to 
implementation has been long overdue (Cookson and Fisher, 2 March 1994:11).
9.1.4 SPEED OF POLICY-MAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION
The delays incurred in the implementation of the TENs and the Fourth 
Framework were not only caused by delays in the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty 
or by squabbles between the national governments and the EC about the means and
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level of funding. The realization of these EC initiatives was also affected by the 
fragmentation of the Community's policy-making structure, as Chapter 2 expected.
Commission: Fragmentation ■
While the EC's IT policy during the 1980s fell mainly under the responsibilities
of DG 12 and 13, the broader policy approach adopted by the Commission in the early
1990s, implied that the policy proposals went beyond the responsibilities of DG 12 and
13; due to the incorporation of trade, training and demand-stimulating elements in the
1991 White Paper, the latter had a direct bearing on other DGs as well (see Chapters
4,7). The involvement of multiple DGs with different mandates and ideologies in the
development of the 1991 White Paper, and their lengthy inter-DG consultations, have
been seen as one of the main reasons for the 12-months development time of the White
Paper - too long for an industry, where a speedy policy response is essential (DG 3 and
IT Roundtable sources, Interviews 11,16,36; 1993).
As outlined in Chapter 4, this was one of the reasons why the Member States
opted for a fast-track procedure in the adoption of the 1991 Council Resolution, thus
infringing on the Commission's prerogative to develop proposals (DG 3 sources,
Interviews 3,11; 1993). As one Commission source indicated:
If you want to get a rapid solution, the only solution is to let the Council 
presidency present it. If not, you have to do it via the Commission, which is 
more time consuming (Interview 3; 1993).
Similarly, the perception exists that the slow implementation of the 
Community's Trans European Networks has been caused, in part, by the involvement 
of at least five DGs in the realization of these networks, namely those on transport 
(DG 7), energy (DG 17), IT and telecommunications (DG 13), internal market (DG 3) 
and R&D (DG 12,13), as this has hindered the formulation of a coordinated approach, 
complicated the building of consensus and delayed the decision-making and
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implementation processes (Hill and Barber, 10 December 1993:2, IT Roundtable 
sources, Interview 36; 1993).
EC Institutions: Fragmentation
In order to formulate a coherent and speedy policy response, it is not only 
important that the various Commission DGs coordinate their activities, but that the 
various EC institutions do so as well. Not only might this avoid delays in decision­
making, also it secures that every institution is able to contribute to the debate about 
a policy when it is being formulated In this respect, it is interesting to note that the 
January 1994 Metten Report and EP Resolution on the IT industry, which called for 
urgent action in support of the IT industry, followed from a decision taken in May 
1991. As one DG 3 source commented:
The report arrived very late in comparison to the events. It took [the EP] a long 
time to reply. We [the Commission] have progressed. We have the Fourth 
Framework Programme, we have the 1993 White Paper, we have the 
Bangemann Group's report and their recommendations. We are mainly working 
on these recommendations. (DG 3 sources, Communication 3; 1994).
In terms of decision-making, it is expected that the new decision-making
procedures introduced by the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty will further delay the
policy-making processes; the introduction of new elements, such as the EP's increased
role and the Conciliation Committee's mediating activities, are expected to extend the
length of EC decision-making (see Chapter 6). As a DG 12 official commented:
The total adoption of the research plan, i.e. the Framework Programme and the 
specific programmes, took on average one year. Now, it will take much more 
due to Maastricht. From this point of view, Maastricht is bad for research 
(Interview 24; 1993).
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9.1.5 INTERNAL CONSTRAINTS TO POLITICAL REALIZATION
In conclusion, the realization of the IT Roundtable's policy preferences has been 
hampered by four shortcomings in the EC's policy-supplying capabilities, namely: (1) 
its inability to actually use the competencies assigned to it, due to ideological 
divergencies between the M/S governments and their insistence on subsidiarity; (2) the 
absence of interventionist trade policy instruments in its portfolio which could realize 
the IT Roundtable's more far-reaching trade policy preferences; (3) its dependency on 
the M/S governments to financially contribute to Community initiatives, resulting in 
delays in the implementation of the initiatives and in limited financial resources for IT 
R&TD; and (4) its fragmented structure, slowing down policy-making and 
implementation.
9.2 THE EC AS A POLICY-SUPPLIER: EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS
As Chapter 2 outlined, the EC's ability to supply the policies requested by IT
Roundtable members may also have been constrained by factors external to the EC,
i.e. the structural changes in the IT industry. On the basis of interviews with corporate
executives and IT industry representatives, EC and national government officials7, this
thesis found that the internationalization of the IT industry (see Chapter 5) has limited
the Community's practical possibilities of intervention, as it has made the more
interventionist EC policies, i.e. those involving forms of protectionism, preferential
treatment and subsidies, increasingly ineffective. As one DG 13 official commented:
I think the point is that the IT industry is the type of industry where there are 
very little opportunities for intervention. It is not like other sectors that depend 
on regulations. It is an industry where the trade issue is very complex (April 
1993).
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The declining effectiveness of the EC's policy instruments can be attributed to three 
factors: (1) the difficulties in determining corporate nationality and product origin; (2) 
the costs imposed on indigenous European companies; and (3) the threat of retaliation 
posed by third countries in response to EC policies.
9.2.1 DETERMINING NATIONALITY AND ORIGIN IN A GLOBAL INDUSTRY
Central to an effective implementation of a more "pro-European" interpretation 
of the Community’s trade policy instruments, government procurement and R&TD 
programmes is the definition of the "Community industry" and the determination of 
the national identity of companies and the origin of their products; the EC would have 
to distinguish between the "European" industries, companies and products that would 
be eligible for preferential treatment, protection and other benefits, and the "foreign" 
industries, companies and products that would not. Determining Community industry, 
corporate nationality and product origin, however, has become increasingly difficult 
in a globalized, interlinked industry, while the outcome has become increasingly 
subject to the discretion of the regulatory regimes.
Defining Community Industry
The "Community Industry" has been defined as comprising all those companies 
producing within the EC. Due to inward investments of foreign IT companies into the 
Community, however, this criterion cannot be used any longer to separate the 
European-grown IT companies from those that originate from non-EC countries. This 
has made discrimination between the group of companies that should benefit from EC 
policies and those that should not far more difficult - as illustrated by the 1987 DRAM 
anti-dumping case (see Chapter 3).
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In that case, none of the complainants commercially manufactured DRAMs 
during the period of investigation. In contrast, the EC-located subsidiaries of the 
Japanese firms that were charged with dumping did produce DRAMs (see Chapter 3). 
To resolve this situation, the Community eliminated the Japanese-owned production 
facilities in the Community from the scope of the domestic industry through invoking 
the "related-party" provision, i.e. the exclusion of the Japanese subsidiaries on the basis 
of the fact that they were related to the exporters or importers of DRAMs, or were 
themselves importers of the allegedly dumped or subsidized products (OJ L209, 
1988:Art.4; Vermulst and Waer, 1990:83). Because of the significant investment costs 
incurred in unsuccessfully setting up DRAM production facilities, the Commission 
defined the "Community industry" subsequently as consisting of the four complainants, 
i.e. Siemens, SGS, Thomson and the American-owned European subsidiary of 
Motorola - illustrating the impact of the Commission on which companies constitute 
"Community industry" and which do not.
Defining European Corporate Nationality
Similarly, traditional criteria for determining the identity of companies, such
as percentage "Community" ownership, the overall citizenship of management and
employees, or the location of the majority of value-added, have been invalidated by
the trend towards cross-ownership, cross-border alliances, and the spread of R&D and
other high value-added activities across borders (Kline 1989:26; Business Europe, 21
September 1990:5). As a Siemens executive commented, with respect to the
"nationality" of the American-owned IBM, which derives more than 50 per cent of its
value-added from its operations in Europe:
How do you handle IBM? Who is us? IBM is like a European company. Do 
you handle it differently? We, Siemens, have 40.000 people working in US, we 
do R&D -we would like to be treated as an American company. Surely we
398
want equal access, and we want to be equally well treated (Interview; 1993).
The influence that the regulatory regime can have on the outcome, i.e. whether 
or not a company is considered "European", has been illustrated by the divergent 
attitudes of the EC and EUREKA towards ICL's participation in collaborative R&TD 
projects. When ICL was taken over by Fujitsu, ICL's continued participation in both 
ESPRIT and JESSI was questioned, since it was felt that EC and EUREKA R&TD 
projects should benefit only European-owned companies, and not their main 
competitors. The JESSI-board, consisting of executives of European electronics 
companies, decided to oust ICL from all its projects, and reinvite the company to 
participate in those cases where its absence would be too disruptive (see Chapter 4; 
DTI sources, Interview 12). In contrast, the Council of Research Ministers did not 
reconsider ICL's participation, despite France's insistence; faced with divergent 
opinions amongst its own ranks, the EC argued that ICL was meeting its conditions 
for foreign firms to participate, namely that it had been established in the Community 
for several years and had been carrying out R&D in IT within the borders of the EC. 
Under ESPRIT's rules of participation, ICL was regarded a "European" company for 
all practical purposes.
Defining European Product Origin
Moreover, due to the involvement of IT companies in internationalization, 
alliances and M&As, it has become increasingly difficult for the EC to determine the 
origin of products, as multiple countries have become involved in their production. For 
example, one of the questions brought up in the 1987 DRAM anti-dumping case (see 
Chapter 3) was whether or not DRAMs assembled in third countries from processed 
wafers and dice produced in Japan, should be considered as originating in Japan - a 
question circumvented by the Commission by excluding such products from the
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investigation (Vermulst and Waer, 1990:78-79).
The influence that the regulatory regime can have on the outcome, i.e. whether 
or not a product is considered of "Community" origin, has been illustrated by the 
Community's rules of origin on integrated circuits. The Community ,has been 
determining the origin of a product on the basis of four criteria, of which, in practice, 
the location of the "last substantial process" has been by far the most important factor8 
(Vermulst and Waer, 1990). The last substantial process refers to those operations that 
bring about a substantial transformation in the properties and composition of the 
product and give the product its essential character9 (OJ L148, 1968).
In the case of integrated circuits, the Community used to interpret the assembly 
stage as the "last substantial process", thus determining the origin of semiconductors 
by the location of the assembly operations. Under this interpretation, however, the ICs 
produced by Japanese companies, assembled and tested within the Community, would 
have "Community" origin. The products of the European-owned semiconductor 
producers, in contrast, would be considered "non-European", as they had moved their 
assembly and testing operations to South East Asian countries (see Chapter 5) 
(Vermulst and Waer, 1990:66). Formally, the European-owned IC producers would 
thus not be able to benefit from EC policies that discriminate between European and 
foreign companies, such as EC protection against dumping and illicit trade practices, 
et cetera.
In 1989, the Community changed its interpretation of the "last substantial 
process", following concerted lobbying by the European-owned semiconductor 
producers. The new rules determine the origin of chips by the location of diffusion (OJ 
L33, 1989). As the European-owned producers have been locating their diffusion 
processes within the Community, while the Japanese producers have been executing 
these stages of the production process elsewhere, the new rules rectified the regulatory
400
mismatch caused by the internationalization of the European-owned semiconductor 
producers' operations. Moreover, it secured the upgrading of Japanese investments 
within the Community, as diffusion involves more capital and R&D and yields more 
value-added than assembly.
9.2.2 THE COSTS IMPOSED ON INDIGENOUS EUROPEAN COMPANIES
The number of alliances and cross-ownership existing between the European- 
owned IT companies and non-European firms has increased dramatically over the late 
1980s and early 1990s (see Chapter 5). This has implied that when the EC imposes 
policies that benefit its own indigenous producers at the cost of non-European 
producers, these support measures might at the same time impose a cost on the foreign 
partners of European-owned companies and, thus, indirectly hurt the latter. 
Consequently, many European firms have been reluctant to cooperate with policies that 
would discriminate against their foreign partners - hampering the effectiveness of the 
EC's policy instruments. As one national government official illustrated in the case of 
the centralized information point provided for in the 1991 Council Resolution (see 
Chapter 4):
You will not get a lot of information on what is going on in other countries, 
not even from your own firms. The problem is that the firms are involved in 
cooperative agreements with foreign companies. Their cooperation could be 
hampered by antagonisms. You will not get a lot of information from industry 
for the use in political battles (Interview 33; 1993).
9.2.3 THE THREAT OF RETALIATION
Finally, the Community's practical possibilities of intervention have been 
limited by the threat of retaliation, which has become increasingly credible over the
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1980s and early 1990s (see Chapter 5). The risk of retaliation has implied that the EC, 
when intervening, has to weigh the benefits of intervention against the costs of 
potential retaliatory actions.
In comparison to Japan, the United States has more opportunities to retaliate 
(Sally, 1992). Although the European-owned IT companies' shares in third country 
markets has been small (see Chapter 5), the European-owned IT firms' stake in the 
American market, partly secured through exports and partly through ownership of 
American companies like Zenith, is larger than their minute presence in the Japanese 
market - giving the American government more chances to "hurt" European-owned 
producers than the Japanese government. Moreover, beyond the domain of the IT 
industry, the Community's stake in the American market is far larger than its stake in 
Japan. Combined with the assertive attitude that the US has adopted in its trading 
relations, as illustrated by its use of the highly effective Section 301, this has implied 
that the US could set a credible threat - a view confirmed by DG 3 sources (Interview 
11; 1993).
9.2.4 THE NEED FOR A WORLD-WIDE LEVEL PLAYING FIELD
However, even if the EC would succeed in overcoming these three practical 
limitations to intervention in an increasingly globalized industry, its policy instruments 
would not be sufficient to improve the competitiveness of the European-owned IT 
producers. The increasingly globalized nature of competition has implied that the 
European-owned IT companies need a level playing field, not only within Europe, but 
also internationally (see Chapters 4,5). At the world-wide level, however, such a level 
playing field has not been present - as illustrated by, for example, the structural 
impediments to entering the Japanese market and the "Buy American" clauses in
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American state government procurement.
The Community's traditional policy instruments, however, have not been geared 
towards securing an international level playing field, while global instruments, such 
as the internationally agreed minimum competition rules envisaged by the, EC's new 
Competition Commissioner van Miert, have not been realized as yet (DG 3 sources, 
Interview 3;1993; Hill, 9/10 October 1993:2;25 October 1993:36). The structural 
changes taking place in the IT industry have thus put pressure on the Community to 
bring about this world-wide level playing field through alternative policy approaches,
i.e. multi- or bilateral negotiations.
Inducing the "cooperation" of the US or Japan to grant market access or 
national treatment through multi- or bilateral negotiations, however, depends to a large 
extent on the economic and political leverage of the Community over its partners in 
the international system, namely the US and Japan. This, in turn, depends on the 
asymmetry in economic inter-dependency; how dependent is the Community on certain 
economic assets from Japan and the US, in comparison to the dependency of Japan and 
the US on the economic assets of the home country? (see Chapter 2).
As Chapter 5 has illustrated, the Community has been a small supplier to the 
American and Japanese semiconductor and computer markets, accounting for 5 per cent 
of the American semiconductor market, less than 1 per cent of the Japanese 
semiconductor market, 4 per cent of the American computer market, and less than 3 
per cent of the Japanese computer market. Meanwhile, American and Japanese 
producers have accounted for over 60 per cent of the European semiconductor market, 
and approximately 70 per cent of the European computer market (see Chapter 5). The 
EC's dependency on American and Japanese sources of computers and semiconductors, 
while American and Japanese IT users remained relatively independent from EC 
sources of supply, has strongly undermined the Community's leverage over Japan and
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the US in bilateral or multilateral negotiations - as illustrated by the 1986 Japan-US
Semiconductor Trade Agreement.
The STA, exemplifying the increasing US reliance on managed trade, included
a clause which de facto set the semiconductor prices that European semiconductor
producers and users would have to face, without the latter having had any input in the
decision-making process (see Chapter 8). The EC condemned the agreement, arguing
that it was unacceptable that Japan, its main source of semiconductors, would
unilaterally determine its export prices in a strategic sector and thus threaten legitimate
Community interests (Europe, 22 June 1989:8; EC Memo 79/87; EC Memo 32/89).
Although the Community won the subsequent GATT dispute settlement case, and
Japan lifted its restraints on exports to third countries, the incident showed that the EC,
as a small player, was not only a taker of market prices, but also of politically
determined prices (van Walsum, 1990). As Flamm (1990:248) argued:
The 1986 Agreement contained the implicit message that Europe had ceased 
to be an important player in the international semiconductor industry and could 
safely be ignored by the two top semiconductor producers in "managing" their 
trade relations.
Ironically, to the extent that the EC has some form of bargaining power in 
multi- or bilateral negotiations on IT-related issues, it is in the area of semiconductors. 
As follows from the above, however, the EC’s bargaining power is not production but 
consumption based; the EC derives its leverage from (1) the relatively large size of its 
semiconductor market and (2) the fact that this market, in contrast to its computer 
market, has been shielded by a relatively high tariff. The relatively high degree of EC 
protection on semiconductors, for example, has given the Community a bargaining chip 
in multi- or bilateral negotiations; it can offer the opening of its market in return for 
trade concessions, i.e. the lowering of existing non-tariff barriers, by the American and, 
notably, the Japanese government. In contrast, the Community's computer market
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yields little leverage; although the market is relatively large, its relatively low tariff of 
4.9 per cent implies that the EC has already given away its most important bargaining 
chip: market access.
Inducing reciprocity through erecting tariff or non-tariff barriers which close off 
the European market, is far more difficult to achieve than inducing reciprocity through 
resisting any lowering of the existing entry barriers to the European market - as the EC 
is a signatory to GATT. As one IT Roundtable member argued, establishing a 
"balance" in trade liberalization is essential; unless the EC negotiates the opening of 
third country markets simultaneously with the opening of its Common Market, it will 
be in difficult situation diplomatically; it is hard to be successful in negotiations if all 
the bargaining chips have already been given away (Interview 14; 1993; see also EP 
Rapporteur Metten in NRC, 12 January 1994:16).
9.3 CONCLUSION
This chapter has sought to explain the loss in political influence experienced 
by the IT Roundtable in the early 1990s, in comparison to the 1980s, by analyzing 
changes in the ability of the European Community to supply the policies, as requested 
by the IT Roundtable.
First of all, this chapter found that shortcomings in the EC's competencies, its 
portfolio of policy instruments, its resources, and its speed of policy-making and 
implementation have hampered the Community's policy supplying capabilities and, 
thus, its ability to realize the actions identified in the 1991 White Paper and the IT 
Roundtable's policy preferences.
Although the Community's competencies to supply a comprehensive IT 
industrial policy have remained limited despite the institutional changes outlined in the
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Maastricht Treaty, the competencies to implement the individual areas outlined in the 
1991 White Paper and to satisfy the IT Roundtable's policy demands were either in 
place or being put into place. Nevertheless, two sets of short-term factors appear to 
have undermined the de facto capabilities of the EC to realize the actions, identified 
in the White Paper and the IT Roundtable's more far-reaching policy preferences: (1) 
the ideological divergencies amongst the Member States, hampering consensus about 
the measures to be taken; and (2) the national governments' insistence on subsidiarity, 
limiting the actions the EC can actually undertake.
Despite the EC's access to a wide portfolio of policy instruments, the 
Community's trade instruments were inadequate to satisfy the IT Roundtable's more 
far-reaching policy demands; the Community's ideological composition has made the 
introduction of a unilateral, aggressive trade policy instrument unlikely. Resorting back 
to the policy instrument portfolios of the M/S governments, however, would not bring 
any solution either; the EC has been curtailing the independent powers of the national 
governments in those areas which fall explicitly under the EC's authority, namely: 
competition and trade. In contrast to the expectations outlined in Chapter 2, however, 
the EC appears to have found a way around the shortcomings of its policy instruments 
in the area of R&TD.
The resilience of the M/S governments to transfer funds to the EC level, 
prompted by the recession and fuelled by the emphasis on subsidiarity and national 
solutions, has further hampered a speedy implementation of both the new IT R&TD 
programme as well as the TENs. Moreover, the priority attached to cohesion and the 
Southern countries' emphasis on juste retour has diverted resources away from R&TD 
in general, and from R&TD in the area of information technology in particular - as the 
latter would mostly benefit the Northern countries. Furthermore, a speedy 
implementation of the areas identified in the White Paper and the Council Resolution
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has been hampered by the EC's fragmented decision-making structure - arguably 
making the EC, as a policy supplier, less suitable to respond to the rapidly changing 
conditions in the IT industry.
Second, the EC's policy-supplying capabilities have been hampered by the 
increasingly global nature of the IT industry. The internationalization of corporate 
operations has made it increasingly difficult to define "Community" industry and to 
determine corporate nationality and product origin - concepts that are crucial to 
implementing an effective "pro-European" policy. This has implied that regulators, like 
the Commission or the JESSI board, increasingly determine whether or not industries, 
companies or products are considered to be European. Moreover, the cross-border 
linkages existing between companies have implied that a policy which appears to 
benefit the indigenous company, may, at the same time, impose a cost on the 
company's foreign partner, and thus indirectly hurt the indigenous company. Also, such 
policies may prompt the US and Japan to retaliate - a threat enhanced by the EC's 
relatively large stake in the US market.
These developments have prompted the EC to reconsider its policy approach 
and instruments; there has been a clear realization that pursuing policies to protect or 
subsidize the IT Roundtable companies is not sufficient any more to improve the 
competitiveness of the European-owned producers. The increasingly globalized nature 
of the IT industry has implied that the IT Roundtable members need access to an 
international level playing field - an objective that, with the current instruments, can 
only be reached through multi- and bilateral negotiations. However, as the Community 
has been only a small IT supplier to the Japanese and American markets and hugely 
dependent on Japanese and American semiconductors and computers, its economic 
leverage over Japan and the US in bilateral or multilateral negotiations on IT has been 
relatively weak. This applies to its negotiations on both semiconductors as well as
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computers - although with respect to semiconductors, the EC at least holds the 
bargaining chip of a relatively closed market.
9.4 NOTES
1. EC/EEC Treaty (93;87;58): Art 18-29.
2. Council Regulation (EEC) No 288/82 (OJ L35, 1982) as amended by various 
regulations, the last one being Council Regulation (EEC) No 2875/92 (OJ L287,1992).
3. 1979-1984: OJ L339 (1979); 1984-1988: OJ L201 (1984); 1988 onwards: OJ 
L209 (1988).
4. OJ LI48, 1968; OJ L363, 1987; OJ L33, 1989.
5. The only point where a GATT Panel has marked the EC's anti-dumping
legislation as incompatible with the GATT's provisions, has been the EC's inclusion 
of an anti-dumping duty circumvention clause in its legislation (OJ L209, 1988; LI 67, 
1987). Concluding that the Panel's report did not provide any GATT-compatible 
solution to the problem of circumvention through relocation of production, the EC 
argued that a solution should be found within the Uruguay Round negotiations. The 
Uruguay Round agreement did indeed provide for rules on the circumvention of anti­
dumping duties (Financial Times, 16 December 1993:4).
6. Sources: Hill, 21 January 1994:2; Hill and Ridding, 7 October 1993; 27 January 
1994:2; NRC, 27 January 1994:21; Buchan, 30 July 1994.
7. Interviews 3,6,8,11,14,18,19,29,32,36;1993.
8. The basis of the Community's non-preferential rules of origin are laid down in
EC Regulation 802/68, which states that products wholly obtained in one country shall 
be considered as originating in that country. If two or more countries have been 
involved in the production of goods, these products shall be considered as originating 
in the country in which (1) the last substantial process or operation (2) that is 
economically justified was performed, (3) having been carried out in an undertaking 
equipped for the purpose and (4) resulting in the manufacturing of a new product or 
representing an important stage of manufacture (OJ LI48, 28 June 1968).
9. For the three definitions of "substantial transformation" used by the EC, see 
Annex D.l of the International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization 
of Customs Procedures which was accepted by the EC by Council Decision of 18 
March 1975 and 3 June 1977.
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PART 4
Chapter 10
CONCLUSION
10.1 THE ARGUMENT
1
The weak competitive position of the Community's IT industry has been for 
long a concern to the European Community and its Member States. In the mid-1960s, 
the M/S governments sought to overcome the competitiveness problems of their 
national IT industries through a three-way policy approach, comprising industrial 
restructuring, preferential government procurement, and R&D programmes. When the 
shortcomings of these national solutions became apparent in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, ESPRIT was adopted - a subsidized R&TD programme at the Community level, 
aimed specifically at the European IT industry. The crisis developing in the IT industry 
over the course of 1990 combined with doubts about the efficacy of a precompetitive 
R&TD programme in improving corporate competitiveness, however, prompted the 
European Community to present a new IT policy approach in the early 1990s: the 1991 
White Paper.
While the European-owned IT multinationals, as represented in the IT 
Roundtable, exerted a preponderant influence over the shape, approval and 
implementation of ESPRIT, particularly in its early phases, they appeared to have less 
influence on the development, endorsement and subsequent implementation of the 1991 
White Paper. The 1991 White Paper fell far short of the expressed preferences of the 
Roundtable, notably in terms of its support for the European-owned IT producers and 
its implications for foreign-owned competitors. Subsequent efforts to secure a more far- 
reaching implementation of the areas of action identified in the White Paper and to 
adopt specific support measures beyond the scope of the White Paper, were largely 
unsuccessful. Even the implementation of the areas identified in the White Paper
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proved to be a time-consuming process, particularly in the areas of R&TD, market 
access, and TENs. Although the IT Roundtable did see various of its policy preferences 
that were within the scope of the White Paper, translated into the new IT R&TD 
programme and into the TENs, the European-owned IT companies were unsuccessful 
in securing their preferred levels of funding.
Despite the fact that, in the early 1990s, the factors which could yield political 
influence appeared to be in place - the companies continued to account for the majority 
of Europe's indigenous IT production capability, internationalization continued to shift 
control over national wealth into the hands of corporate management, and rapid 
technological change continued to move high-tech policy-making beyond the 
proficiency of the Commission officials into the realm of corporate executives -, this 
thesis found, on the basis of interviews with Community and national government 
officials, corporate executives and representatives, and industry/government observers, 
that the IT Roundtable companies' diplomacy was less effective in the early 1990s than 
it was in the early and mid-1980s.
This thesis argues that the loss in political influence could be explained by: (1) 
changes in the political activity undertaken by the IT Roundtable members, both 
individually and as a group; (2) changes in the political weight attached by the EC and 
its national governments to the policy preferences articulated by the IT Roundtable 
companies; and (3) changes in the ability of the EC to realize corporate policy 
preferences.
The loss of the IT Roundtable's political influence cannot be explained by the 
absence of any political activity or the wrong timing thereof, nor by a drastic reduction 
in effort put into lobbying or a decline in the openness of the Community and its 
Member States. The loss in political influence, however, can be explained by the fact 
that, in the early 1990s, the effectiveness of the IT Roundtable as a channel of political
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activity had been undermined by the following three factors: first, its declining 
representativeness following the structural changes taking place in the IT industry; 
second, its lack of internal coherence caused by the diverging interests of its members; 
and, third, the perception that the Roundtable has been suitable for articulating 
preferences in the area of R&TD but inappropriate for voicing broader preferences on 
industrial policy. While the lack of internal coherence made it more difficult for the 
IT Roundtable companies to present one substantial policy stance, the Roundtable's 
declining representativeness and doubts about its expertise in industrial policy 
formulation made it imperative for the EC to widen the scope of its consultation to 
include software and services companies, IT users, IT SMEs and even foreign-owned 
IT companies - thus ending the IT Roundtable's near-monopoly on policy input (see 
Chapter 7).
The policy preferences articulated by the IT Roundtable, moreover, did not 
carry as much political weight as they used to do. The doubts expressed by some 
national governments about the necessity of an indigenous IT capability depreciated 
the perceived value of the IT Roundtable's main bargaining chip: its capability to 
supply economically and militarily strategic technologies and products. Rather, the M/S 
governments - even those paying lip-service to the need for an indigenous IT capability 
- attached a greater importance to the realization of short-term economic objectives 
and, thus, to those corporate assets meeting these objectives. In this respect, however, 
the crisis-ridden European-owned IT companies had little on offer, particularly not in 
terms of contribution to cohesion and employment. Consequently, public investments 
into this industry were perceived as yielding little "value for money".
This made it politically and financially more difficult to justify any further 
investments of public funds in programmes specifically supporting the European-owned 
IT suppliers. Rather, alternative sources of corporate assets, such as software and
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services companies, IT user firms and other high-tech companies appeared to have 
become relatively more important - implying that the IT Roundtable did not only face 
competition in providing policy inputs into the Commission in the early 1990s, but 
also in convincing the Commission about the importance of meeting their rather than 
other companies' policy preferences (see Chapter 8).
Finally, even in those cases in which the IT Roundtable's policy preferences 
carried sufficient political weight, the translation of the IT Roundtable's policy 
preferences into policy outcomes was hampered by shortcomings in the EC's ability 
to supply the requested policies - caused by the national governments' lack of 
consensus based on diverging ideologies, their insistence on subsidiarity, national 
solutions and juste retour, their resilience to spending money in times of recession and 
soaring public debts and deficits, and the fragmented EC decision-making structure. 
These shortcomings have hampered the EC's de facto use of its competencies, the 
realization of the IT Roundtable's more interventionist policy preferences, the allocation 
of the preferred levels of resources, and a rapid implementation of the areas identified 
in the 1991 White Paper. Additionally, the EC’s ability to supply the policies requested 
has been hampered by the increasingly internationalized nature of the IT industry, 
making it more difficult to implement an effective "pro-European" policy without 
imposing high costs on other industrial segments or triggering retaliation. The EC's 
limited leverage over Japan and the US in international negotiations on IT, moreover, 
has undermined the EC's ability to impose a level playing field in the world IT 
markets (see Chapter 9).
10.2 EVALUATING THE METHODOLOGY
Central to this argument have been two methodological issues, namely: (1) how
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to measure the influence of companies on public policy outcomes, and (2) how to 
explain corporate political influence and changes therein. This section seeks to evaluate 
the methodology used in this thesis.
10.2.1 MEASURING CORPORATE POLITICAL INFLUENCE
As establishing a correlation between the IT Roundtable's professed policy 
preferences and the EC IT policy outcomes does not provide sufficient proof of any 
causal links (see Chapter 1), this thesis has sought to measure the political influence 
of the IT Roundtable companies over the 1980s and early 1990s in terms of 
"perceived" influence, i.e. the political influence of companies on public policy 
outcomes as perceived by selected government officials, corporate executives and 
representatives, and industry/government observers. With the benefit of hindsight, what 
can be said about the strengths and weaknesses of this approach?
As Chapter 1 outlined, the main strength of this approach is that it allows for 
the measurement of corporate political influence, both relative to other explaining 
variables as well as over time. The main weakness of this approach, however, is that 
its value depends to a large extent on the selection of the so-called "well-placed 
observers". In particular, one could ask the following questions. Were the relevant 
officials and executives from the main institutions, organizations and companies 
included in this selection? Did these observers occupy key positions in both time 
periods? Were these observers able to assess the importance of corporate political 
influence relative to the pressures exerted by other variables?
Selection o f Key Actors. As outlined in Chapter 1, this thesis used three 
complementary methods to select the interviewees. The author feels confident that the 
selection made did represent the key actors involved in the EC IT policy network; the
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fact that, towards the end of the interview cycle, the "observers" referred to persons 
that had already been interviewed can be interpreted as an indication thereof.
Nevertheless, the selection of interviewees could be improved by incorporating: 
(1) representatives of DG 1, DG 4 and other directorates; (2) representatives of the 
seven remaining Member State governments; (3) representatives of IT users, foreign 
IT producers, and small to medium-sized European IT suppliers; and (4) representatives 
of national industry associations and standardization bodies (see Chapter 1).
This, however, would substantially expand the scope of research. In order to 
separate the wheat from the chaff, it may be useful to conduct a policy network 
analysis prior to any in-depth research on measuring corporate political influence. By 
plotting the extent and the nature of the interaction between actors, such an analysis 
would help to define the boundaries of the Community's policy network, to determine 
which actors occupy a central position within this network and, thus, to decide whom 
to interview.
Comparisons over Time. In order to measure the influence of the IT Roundtable 
over time, the observers were asked to give their perception of the influence of the IT 
Roundtable in both time periods. As outlined in Chapter 1, it did not prove difficult 
to trace the persons that were actually occupying key positions during the formulation 
of the 1991 White Paper and its implementation. Few of the interviewees, however, 
had been directly involved in the ESPRIT policy-making and implementation processes 
in the early and mid-1980s - raising doubts about the validity of their judgements.
In order to overcome this weakness and to verily the assumption that the IT 
Roundtable exerted a preponderant influence in the early and mid-1980s, the 
information given by the interviewees was cross-checked and supplemented by: (1) the 
research results of various authors, including Peterson (1992), Sandholtz and Zysman 
(1989) and van Tulder and Junne (1988); (2) EC documents about the formulation and
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establishment of ESPRIT; and (3) evidence provided by the affected parties to the 
House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities (see Chapter 3). The 
similarities between the information provided by these sources and the responses of the 
interviewees have given the author no grounds to doubt the validity of this assumption. 
Nevertheless, further empirical research to strengthen our knowledge of the 
formulation, approval and implementation of ESPRIT may yield valuable insights.
The Relative Importance o f Corporate Political Influence. The author found that 
the interviewees were able to give an assessment of the importance of corporate 
political influence relative to the pressures exerted by other variables and, in particular, 
other companies, but that they were only able to do so in very general terms. The 
semi-structured interview technique used in this thesis does not lend itself for a more 
detailed specification of the relative importance of companies in influencing policy 
outcomes. However, even if a more structured technique would have been used, one 
could question whether the interviewees would have been able to "isolate" the 
influence of companies from other pressures on policy outcomes, as the various 
explaining variables have been perceived as interlinked.
10.2.2 EXPLAINING CORPORATE POLITICAL INFLUENCE
In order to explain the changes in the IT Roundtable's political influence, this 
thesis has adopted an interdisciplinary approach. The merits of this approach are three­
fold. First, this framework provides a comprehensive approach to analyzing corporate 
political influence; in contrast to many of the IPE, interest group and international 
business studies discussed in Chapter 1, this approach addresses the full process of 
converting corporate policy preferences into policy outcomes.
Second, although this approach focuses on the impact of companies on
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economic policy outcomes, other impacts, such as the influence of ideology, state 
structures and actors, societal interests, and international economic and political 
conditions, have been integrated into this framework, in recognition that both domestic- 
level as well as system-level variables are intertwined.
Third, by linking structural and short-term changes in the production and 
policy-supply arrangements to the determinants of corporate political influence, this 
approach provides a coherent basis for analyzing the dynamics of corporate political 
influence. The structural and short-term changes may include but are certainly not 
limited to rapid technological change and internationalization (see Chapter 1).
Ironically, one of the strengths of this approach could also be perceived as a 
weakness. This approach may place too little emphasis on the distinct influence that 
other explaining variables, such ideology, state actors and structures, societal actors, 
and the international economic and political conditions, may have on economic policy 
outcomes. This is due to the fact that this approach accords a central role to the 
company; it discusses the other variables only to the extent that they are related to the 
company's political activity, the weight of its policy preferences, and the extent to 
which these preferences can be realized.
In the EC IT policy case, for example, state actors and structures have been 
discussed merely in relation to the EC's "openness" for the IT Roundtable's political 
activity and in relation to the EC's ability to realize the Roundtable's policy preferences 
(see Chapters 7 and 9). Little attention, however, has been paid to the "leadership" role 
played by the EC Commissioners in establishing and maintaining relations with the IT 
Roundtable companies and in building EC-level industrial policies. This point will be 
addressed in a greater detail in section 10.4.
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10.3 CORPORATE POLICY PREFERENCES
This thesis has recorded the policy preferences as professed by the IT 
Roundtable and its members in their public statements (see Chapter 1). However, one 
could question whether these preferences reflect the companies' real interests. As one 
EP official argued:
The companies say one thing, but do something else. They say that their main 
priority is to cooperate together, but in fact they want alliances with foreign 
firms (Interview 1; 1993).
ESPRIT. It has been argued, for example, that the IT Roundtable companies' 
preference for cooperative R&TD in the early 1980s was merely bom out of a desire 
to exploit the EC as an additional source of funding. When asked about their demands 
for funding, however, the IT Roundtable companies have stressed that access to 
financial resources has not constituted the main motive behind their participation in 
ESPRIT - an argument that seems credible considering the small amount of funding 
actually available to the IT Roundtable members (see Chapter 9).
Rather, the companies' choice for R&TD cooperation over other forms of 
industrial policy can be explained by three factors. First, the European IT companies 
were technologically lagging behind their Japanese and American counterparts. In order 
to overcome this gap, a technology push was considered necessary (see Chapters 3 and 
5). Second, the companies were, however, hesitant to engage in far-reaching forms of 
cooperation within an EC policy framework, as it would require them to share sensitive 
information (see Chapter 3). Even in the area of precompetitive R&TD, the companies 
initially only opted for projects that were of marginal importance to their core business 
strategies (see Chapter 3). Third, the choice for precompetitive R&TD had the 
additional advantage that it would be compatible with the EC's competition legislation 
(see Chapter 3). Although the precompetitive nature of ESPRIT can be seen as a
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"concession" made by the companies to the anti-interventionist elements within the EC, 
the IT suppliers' hesitation towards joint production illustrates that the companies, at 
that time, were not pursuing closer cooperation within an EC policy framework (see 
Chapter 3).
In contrast to the European consumer electronics producers, which used anti­
dumping as a hidden instrument of protectionism, the IT suppliers did resort only three 
times to the EC's anti-dumping instrument (see Chapter 3). The differences in approach 
between the IT and the consumer electronics producers can be explained by the fact 
that the semiconductor anti-dumping duties did not unequivocally benefit all European 
IT producers; they imposed a cost on the EC's computer producers (see Chapters 3 and 
4).
An additional point of interest is that ESPRIT has remained open to foreign 
participation, despite its objectives of strengthening the European IT companies vis-a- 
vis their Japanese and American competitors. This "concession" to foreign companies 
is even more surprising if one takes into account that American and Japanese R&TD 
programmes generally have remained closed to foreign participation. One explanation 
may be that the European firms and their home governments have perceived 
participation of foreign companies, and American firms in particular, as beneficial; 
their participation would give the European producers access to state-of-the-art 
technologies not available amongst European producers. At the same time, however, 
the "concession" granted should not be exaggerated. Only companies with a substantial 
presence within the EC have been allowed to participate in EC R&TD projects - 
virtually excluding Europe's most feared competitors: the Japanese electronics 
companies. Moreover, the foreign companies that do participate in EC R&TD 
programmes, mainly operate in the second tier of these programmes - reducing the 
potential threat that their participation poses (see Chapter 3).
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IT  Industrial Policy. Similarly, it has been argued that the IT Roundtable's 
policy demands in the early 1990s (see Chapter 4) were merely bom out of a desire 
to protect their market shares and financial results in the face of ever increasing 
competition. The IT Roundtable's policy preferences, however, can also be seen in a 
different light. Rather than reflecting demands for protectionism and preferential 
treatment, the policies may reflect strategic industrial and commercial policy choices. 
In line with Milner and Yoffie's findings on trade policy preferences (1989), a direct 
link between the companies' policy preferences and the policies of foreign governments 
can be discerned; the IT Roundtable companies asked for trade barriers and preferential 
treatment since they perceived the American and Japanese IT markets as closed and/or 
foreign policies as discriminatory.
The author is inclined to accept the second interpretation on the basis of 
economic logic. In an internationalized and competitive industry, like the IT industry, 
companies need access to third country markets in order to obtain the economies of 
scale necessary to operate profitably in the IT industry's mainstream markets (see 
Chapter 5). The fact that the European IT companies' shares of foreign markets are 
relatively small and that their global production networks are relatively modest (see 
Chapter 5) does not reduce this need; to the contrary, it makes access to and presence 
in foreign markets even more imperative.
10.4 TRIANGULAR DIPLOMACY IN IPE
As discussed in Chapter 1, one can discern three forms of diplomacy in IPE: 
(1) the interaction between states (governments); (2) the interaction between firms 
(MNEs); and (3) the interaction between states (governments) and firms (MNEs). What 
conclusions and implications can be drawn from the EC IT policy case concerning
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these three types of interaction?
10.4.1 INTER-STATE DIPLOMACY
1
Internationalization of the IT industry has made it increasingly important to 
apply anti-trust regulations on a global rather than a regional basis. In an international 
system consisting of wealth and security-pursuing national states, however, a global 
competition regime is unlikely to be realized in the short term. A first policy 
implication is thus that the US, the EC and Japan would have to engage in bilateral 
and multilateral competition policy agreements in order to secure a level playing field 
for their companies within the Triad - the American and European cooperation on anti­
trust issues being a case in point (see Chapter 4).
The EC policy case, however, has shown that the outcome of bilateral and 
multilateral negotiations on sensitive issues like market access and fair competition, 
depends on the bargaining power of the parties involved. Despite the EC’s potential 
bargaining power (see Chapter 6), the EC's leverage over Japan and the United States 
in international negotiations on IT-related policy issues has remained limited; Europe's 
one-sided dependency on American and Japanese products has made it very difficult 
to induce the "cooperation" of the US and Japan in opening markets and eliminating 
discriminatory practices (see Chapter 9).
If the EC would want to improve its leverage in bilateral or multilateral 
negotiations on IT-related issues, it would have to correct the asymmetry in its IT trade 
and investment flows with the US and Japan. Only a symmetry in the Triad powers' 
economic inter-dependencies can create a balance of power within the Triad. In order 
to redress the balance, the EC would either have to limit its dependency on foreign IT 
suppliers, or force the American and Japanese markets to increase their dependency on
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European IT products. Neither of these options appear very realistic - thus casting 
doubts upon the EC's ability to improve its bargaining position in international 
negotiations on IT-related issues.
The first option, which would require greater protection and promotion of the 
indigenous European IT industry, would be unrealistic, considering: (1) the ideological 
objections of certain Member States to greater intervention in the IT industry; (2) the 
failure of national policies and EC initiatives to bring about a drastic improvement in 
the performance of the European IT industry; (3) the Member States' resistance to 
increase their public expenditures and their emphasis on value for money; (4) the 
benefits that inward investment in the IT industry has brought; and (5) the increasingly 
interlinked nature of the IT industry (see Chapters 8 and 9).
The second option, which would require the EC to pry open the Japanese and 
American markets, might offer more prospects. The EC's recent attempts to strengthen 
its anti-dumping and countervailing regime, however, may not be sufficient to improve 
market conditions abroad. Despite the changes to the EC's portfolio of trade policy 
instruments, any introduction of unilateral measures similar to Section 301 of the US 
Trade Act remain unlikely (see Chapter 9). Moreover, strengthening the Community's 
portfolio will not solve the problems posed by the internationalization of the IT 
industry: i.e. the difficulties of discriminating between "us" and "them"; the 
increasingly uncontrollable distribution of costs and benefits; and the threat of 
retaliation, notably from the American government (see Chapter 9).
10.4.2 INTER-FIRM DIPLOMACY
A first lesson that could be drawn from the EC IT policy case regarding inter­
firm diplomacy is that inter-firm cooperation involves a large element of "learning".
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This is evidenced by the history of the IT Roundtable. Initially, the cooperation 
between the companies took place under the patronage of Commissioner Davignon; as 
staunched competitors, the companies mistrusted each others' intentions. Only later, 
when the companies had learned to act according to an informal code of conduct, did 
their cooperation, both economically as well as politically, take a momentum of its 
own; over the 1980s, the IT Roundtable companies extended their cooperation on R&D 
and other business operations beyond the framework of ESPRIT and broadened the 
scope of their political cooperation to include a wide range of industrial policy issues 
(see Chapters 1, 3 and 5).
Second, as illustrated by the IT Roundtable example, inter-firm cooperation 
within lobby groups offers companies a venue to exchange their views, attune their 
policy stances, and build coalitions. Chapter 7 has argued that this will prove 
increasingly important in those areas of EC decision-making governed by majority 
voting rules, as the introduction of the latter has made the building of political support 
for either a winning majority or a blocking minority imperative.
Third, the IT Roundtable's experience has demonstrated that, despite the larger 
gains that collective action through an association of selected companies might yield 
(see Chapters 1 and 2), lack of internal coherence may still hamper the elite group's 
success rate. Moreover, if the association does not include those actors that are widely 
regarded to hold the key to the industry's future, such as the IT users and software and 
services companies absent from IT Roundtable, the association's representativeness may 
be questioned by the home government - even if the combined member companies still 
account for the majority of the country's or region's production and R&D capabilities 
in that industry (see Chapter 7).
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10.4.3 STATE-FIRM DIPLOMACY
In line with Milner (1987), the EC IT policy case has illustrated that there 
exists a mutual dependency between home governments and firms; while the EC has 
been dependent upon its companies for the realization of its wealth, social stability and 
security objectives, the companies have been dependent upon the EC to open up third 
country markets and to provide other favourable policies.
On the basis of the evidence provided in this case, what can one conclude 
concerning the balance of power between home governments and their home-grown 
multinationals? Van Tulder and Junne (1988:177-197) have argued that the balance of 
power between home governments and their MNEs may have shifted towards the 
multinationals, as a result of internationalization and rapid technological change. Eden 
(1991:215), in contrast, seems to suggest the opposite. "Given the escalating demands 
for competitiveness by home states", Eden advocates the application of the obsolescing 
bargaining model to the interaction between home countries and their multinationals. 
Although both dynamics are obviously taking place in parallel, the evidence provided 
in this thesis has pointed to a shift in the balance of power towards the home 
government. Two considerations, however, have to be taken into account, as this case- 
specific outcome may by no means apply to home government-firm relationships in 
general.
First, in the EC IT policy case, one of the factors contributing to the IT 
Roundtable's loss in political influence was that the EC and its Member States gave 
prevalence to short-term, recession-induced economic objectives over strategic goals. 
In the early 1990s, the EC and its Member States were consequently less attentive to 
ownership-issues; what mattered most was the contribution of companies to investment, 
employment and value-added, not the origin of these companies. It may be possible,
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however, that in times of economic upturn, ownership considerations may once more 
grow in importance, as governments can "afford" to adopt policies that may impose 
a short-term economic cost.
The reduced importance attached to ownership, however, may not ^ simply be 
a recession-induced phenomenon. The increasing emphasis of countries on their 
national competitiveness and wealth (see Chapter 6), combined with the pragmatic 
difficulties faced in determining ownership and nationality (see Chapter 9), may signal 
a more structural change in the attitude of home governments towards ownership. In 
that case, a home government may indeed be able to exert its bargaining power. With 
alternative sources of corporate assets widely available within the Triad (due to the 
inward investment flows), home governments may be able to set the terms of their 
interaction with their former national champions.
Second, in the EC IT policy case, the IT Roundtable companies appear to have 
been unable to politically exploit their control over wealth-creating operations. 
Although the companies have occasionally threatened to move their operations to other 
regions, one could question the IT Roundtable companies' ability to fully execute this 
threat in the face of their dependency on the European market and their sunk-in 
investments in production operations. Other home-grown companies, however, may be 
far more "foot-lose" and thus in a better position to exploit their bargaining chips.
10.5 DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
What conclusions and implications can be drawn from the EC IT policy case 
concerning the dynamics of European integration?
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10.5.1 CULTIVATED SPILL-OVER
This thesis has found that the Commission has been "cultivating" spill-over; it 
has been using the IT Roundtable to strengthen its information base and to build 
political support for its proposals (see Chapter 7). Commissioner Davignon, in 
particular, has played an important role in this respect (see Chapter 3). By establishing 
a mutually supportive relationship between the IT Roundtable companies and the 
Commission, Davignon has strengthened the EC vis-a-vis its Member States; with the 
help and support of the companies, Davignon has contributed to the creation of a new 
"technology" policy role for the European Community, complementing its role in 
restructuring traditional industries.
Davignon's successor, Commissioner Pandolfi, displayed a clear willingness to 
support the European IT companies. Yet, the Roundtable companies were allegedly not 
happy to work with Pandolfi. As one of the interviewees commented, he would "turn 
any opportunity into a disaster" (Interview 10; 1993). Pandolfi's autocratic management 
style and unrealistic vision, in particular, have been criticized for undermining the 
special relationship between the IT Roundtable companies and the Commission 
(Commission, IRDAC and M/S government sources, Interviews 10,11,12,13; 1993).
Since 1990/91, Commissioner Bangemann has been involved in IT policy­
making. As Chapter 4 has illustrated, Bangemann played an important role in defining 
the principles underlying an industrial policy at the Community level. His efforts also 
opened the way for an information technology industrial policy. In contrast to 
Davignon, however, Bangemann resorted to a wider constituency for expanding the 
EC's industrial policy role; as illustrated by the development of the 1991 White Paper, 
the Commission also used large IT users and other lobbies as sources of information 
and legitimation (see Chapter 7).
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Over 1993 and 1994, moreover, Bangemann's case-by-case approach to 
industrial policy appears to have favoured the telecommunications industry over the 
IT industry. Pragmatic considerations may well have been underlying this choice. The 
practical possibilities of intervening in the telecommunications industry have been 
greater than in the IT industry due to the telecommunications industry's regulated 
nature and the EC's limited dependency on foreign suppliers. Moreover, the prospects 
of a successful intervention have been relatively good due to the telecommunications 
industry's current commercial success (see Chapters 7 and 8).
10.5.2 POLITICAL SPILL-OVER
With the institutional strengthening of the EC (see Chapters 5 and 6), the 
Commission and the European Parliament have become increasingly important as 
lobbying targets. Chapter 7, however, did not find evidence that the IT companies have 
shifted their political activity away from the national governments. Certainly, some 
form of political spill-over has taken place (see Chapter 1), but the prevailing 
importance of the Member States in EC policy-making has made a continued lobbying 
of the national governments imperative.
As Chapter 7 has discussed, the relationship between the IT companies and 
their home governments has remained very close, with the possible exception of ICL 
and the UK. Lobbying the home government, however, did not prove to be sufficient 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. By then, the introduction of majority voting (see 
Chapters 6 and 7) and the widening of the Community (see Chapters 6 and 9) had 
made it increasingly important to lobby the remaining national governments as well. 
The IT Roundtable companies’ (direct or indirect) relationships with these Member 
States, however, have yet to be cultivated to a greater degree (see Chapter 7).
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As Chapter 9 has illustrated, the Southern enlargement has diluted EC-wide 
support for high-tech policies, including IT. The upcoming "Nordic" enlargement of 
the Community may shift this balance of interests again - albeit not necessarily in 
favour of information technology. Although Sweden and Finland did develop their own 
national champions in electronics and other high-tech industries, their presence in IT 
has been relatively weak. While Ericsson's data systems division was taken over by 
Nokia in 1988, Nokia Data was subsequently acquired by ICL.
10.6 IT INDUSTRY: STRATEGIC OR NOT?
As Chapter 3 has illustrated, the development of an Community-level IT policy 
was justified by the argument that a presence in IT was of strategic importance for the 
wealth, political autonomy and security of the EC and its Member States. Was this 
indeed the case, or was the argument merely used to justify government support for 
the IT industry?
While Chapter 2 has outlined which technologies are generally considered 
"strategic" and how the necessity of an indigenous production capability is linked with 
the supply conditions in the industry in question, Chapters 3 and 8 have applied these 
concepts to European IT policy case.
This thesis has found that it is important to make a distinction between the 
strategic importance of a technology and the products embodying this technology on 
the one hand, and the strategic importance of an indigenous production capability on 
the other. While IT meets the defmition of an economically and militarily strategic 
technology (see Chapter 3), a domestic production capability may not always be 
necessary - certainly not if it concerns mass-produced IT products for commercial 
applications. Chapter 8 found that by the early 1990s, the world supply conditions of
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mass-produced IT products for commercial uses did not give rise to security of supply 
concerns any more - justifying the UK in its belief that a domestic IT production 
facility is not indispensable and proving wrong those Member States that did belief 
otherwise.
The continued lip-service paid by some Member States to the strategic necessity 
of a European IT production capability, despite changes in the IT supply conditions 
(see Chapter 8), can be explained by the fact that the threat perceptions of governments 
may suffer from "inertia"; the perceptions may not reflect the prevailing security of 
supply conditions at any given point in time. Companies, in particular, may have a 
vested interest in maintaining certain threat perceptions, notably if such perceptions 
would strengthen their political influence.
Linking the concept of the necessity of an indigenous production capability 
with the supply conditions in an industry, however, raises the following questions. Is 
it worthwhile investing in a strategic production capability if the supply conditions 
justifying this capability are subject to change over time? Are there other, more 
efficient and effective ways in which the government might correct the conditions in 
the world markets that give rise to security of supply concerns? In the end, 
governments may find the alternative of cooperating in a global competition regime, 
responsible for regulating the concentration and anti-competitive practices in the world 
IT industry, less costly than building up a competitive, indigenous IT production 
capability.
APPENDICES
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Appendix 1.1
EUROPEAN-GROWN IT MNEs: PROFILES (1987-1993)
Siemens
Siemens has been a large, diversified electronics producer (see Figure 1.1). In 
1990, the Munich-based company derived 20 per cent of its S 34 bn sales from 
dataprocessing. The share of dataprocessing revenues in Siemens' total revenues had 
been boosted by the merger of its profitable dataprocessing operations with the German 
minicomputer producer Nixdorf in 1990. The resulting, legally independent entity 
"Siemens Nixdorf Informationssysteme AG", however, was hampered by the partners' 
diverging corporate cultures and incompatible business procedures and computing 
systems; in the early 1990s, SNI was heavily loss-making.
Siemens' semiconductor operations, largely loss-making, accounted for roughly 
3 per cent of Siemens' sales in 1990. In 1989, it transpired that Siemens sought to 
acquire the cash-rich and profitable electronics producer Plessey, in a joint bid with 
GEC. Plessey's semiconductor operations would be jointly owned by Siemens and GEC 
and Siemens would exert management responsibility. Although Siemens and GEC 
eventually succeeded in their take-over bid, Plessey's microelectronics operations were 
consolidated fully within the GEC structure, following objections of the UK Ministry 
of Defence to the control Siemens would have over Plessey's defence-related chip 
manufacturing capabilities.
Despite their lack of profitability, Siemens has stressed that both 
semiconductors as well as computers remain core businesses within Siemens (Cane, 
14 May 1992:26; Parkes, 15 January 1993:15). Siemens' overall profitability and its 
cash-richness have implied that the company has had the financial means to sustain its 
loss-making computer and semiconductor operations. However, supporting loss-making
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operations out of profits has a number of disadvantages. It limits the funds available 
for both dividend payments and reinvestment in profitable divisions. Moreover, there 
may be a point where Siemens' net income from its large holdings of liquid assets 
(1990: S 1.4 bn, in comparison to Philips' S 0.4 bn), cannot any longer compensate for 
disappointing performances on industrial operations. In 1993, however, Siemens still 
appeared to be far from this point1.
Philips
Comparable in size to Siemens is the Dutch electronics company Philips (see 
Figure 1.1). Over the 1980s, Philips' results on its business operations were 
consistently disappointing. The company blamed these results mostly on external 
factors, such as aggressive Japanese competition, high interest rates, unfavourable 
exchange rate fluctuations and the fragmentation of the European home market. 
Corporate analysts, however, also point at a number of internal factors, including a 
complacent corporate culture, a tendency to treat prestigious projects as "sacred cows", 
and an organizational structure which impeded the formulation and execution of a truly 
global policy. Over the 1980s, however, Philips managed to prop up its poor results 
from operations through sales of real estate and non-core operations.
Meanwhile, however, the group's financial position had become more and more 
precarious with long-term debt rising to over 120 per cent of its stockholders' equity 
in 1990. Philips ended up in a spiral of debt - borrowing money to finance existing 
debts (Kerres, 22 February 1992:15,16). In Spring 1990, Philips' financial difficulties
1 Sources: Bradshaw, 11 March 1991:VI; Cane, 14 May 1992:26: Dickson, 25 
August 1989; Economist, 22 December 1990:94; 13 January 1990:66; Electronics, 
March 1989:56B; Financial Post, 13 December 1988:12; Fisher, 7 July 1992:27, 22 
October 1991:25; Krause, 14 March 1991:7,12; Nakamoto, 17 March 1992:1; NRC, 18 
August 1992:13; Siemens A/R; Skapinker, 16 October 1990; Wittenberg, 24 January 
1991:15.
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came to a climax when it became clear, after unexpectedly disappointing first quarter 
results, that the company would make a loss over 1990. While in April 1990, President 
van der Klugt still argued that the group would improve its results in 1990, by May 
it had become clear that Philips first quarter profits totalled only /  336 mn, of which 
/  330 mn guilders came from the sale of its defence companies and only f  6 mn 
guilders from business operations (NRC, 30 June 1990:17).
Philips' extraordinary income for the year 1990 was expected to be insufficient 
to counterbalance the low income on normal business operations, which was depressed 
by extremely high losses on various production segments, notably semiconductors and 
computers. Dataprocessing accounted in that year for approximately 11 per cent of 
Philips' total revenues from sales, while the semiconductor operations accounted for 
roughly 18 per cent of the company's revenues2.
As a result of the credibility crisis caused by the forecast of substantial losses, 
which resulted in a fall of Philips’ shares from about f  50 guilders in 1989 to /  32 in 
Spring 1990, the company initiated a large-scale restructuring programme dubbed 
"Operation Centurion ". The most visible elements of the operation included: (1) the 
trimming of Philips' organization, notably its bureaucracy, (2) the elimination of 
unprofitable business operations, particularly semiconductors and computers, at (3) a 
radical cut in employment. Less visible elements of the restructuring process comprised 
attempts to: (1) speed up decision-making, (2) change management mentality, and (3) 
increase performance in terms of quality, cost, output and innovation time-span.
In the context of Operation Centurion, Philips substantially reduced its 
computer and semiconductor operations. Over 1990-1991, the company withdrew from
2 Philips' semiconductor operations are part of its Components and 
Semiconductors Division. In 1990, deliveries in the components and semiconductors 
sector totalled 10,378 mn guilders. This constitutes 17.4 per cent of Philips' total sales 
of 59,821 mn guilders and 18.6 per cent of Philips' net sales (Philips A/R 1991).
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high-cost semiconductor projects such as the SRAM project. In 1991, it sold its 
minicomputer and automatization operations of its Data Systems division to Digital 
Equipment. The company initially retained its PC operations, albeit in a scaled-down 
form, but withdrew completely from the production of PCs in 1993.
After losses of S 2.3 bn in 1990, the company returned to the black in 1991. 
In 1992, however, business performance deteriorated again, particularly in consumer 
electronics, leading to an overall loss. In 1993, however, Philips' net result became 
positive once more. Its debt to equity ratio fell markedly, partly due to the company's 
sale of its 35 per cent interest in Matsushita. In November 1993, Philips' president Jan 
Timmer announced that Philips had met all targets set by Operation Centurion. In early 
1994, he argued that Philips had gone through the worst. Judging by the price rise of 
Philips' shares, by mid-1993 the public confidence in Philips' performance appeared to 
have returned3.
Bull
In comparison to the electronic giants Siemens and Philips, the state-owned 
computer producer Bull has been considerably smaller. In 1990, Bull's total revenues 
totalled S 6.4 bn - approximately 0.2 times the size of Siemens' sales. In that year, 
Bull's labour force of 44,500 people was about 8 times smaller than Siemens' body of 
employees (see Figure 1.1).
In 1990, Bull became loss-making - partly caused by the substantive losses 
made by Zenith Data Systems, its American acquisition of 1989. In contrast to
3 Sources: Economist, 21 August 1993:55; Electronics. 23 November 1992:14; 
Fentrop, 3 July 1990:11; Financial Times. 11 August 1992:12; Kernes, 2 August 
1991:9, 22 February 1992:15-16, 24 July 1991:16, 5 November 1993:16; Metze, 1991; 
Nakamoto and van de Krol, 25 February 1992:19; NRC, 30 June 1990:17, 24 March 
1993:17; Philips A/R; Philips Quarterly Report, 30 June 1993; Teulings, 31 October 
1990:3; van Alphen, 31 March 1993:25; van de Krol, 9 March 1994:21; Wammes, 4 
March 1993:4; Wittenberg, 14 May 1990:11.
Appendix 1.1 434
Siemens and Philips. Bull did not have the option of compensating its loss-making 
operations through profits on non-IT activities; it has been deriving all its revenues 
from dataprocessing. Instead, the French government came to the aid of the ailing 
computer firm. The government has held a majority interest in Compagnie des 
Machines Bull (CMB), the parent company of the Bull Group, since it nationalized 
CEI-HB (as Bull was called then) in 1982. In 1991 and 1992, the French government 
supported the group through FF 4 bn in capital injections and FF 2.6 bn in research 
funding. The capital injections were funded in part by the state-owned France Telecom, 
which currently has a 17 per cent stake in Bull (Browning, 4 April 1991; Dawkins and 
Leadbeater, 5 April 1991:2).
In response to its substantive losses, Bull initiated a transformation programme, 
geared at improving the company’s performance. Over the course of 1991 and 1992, 
Bull also sold part of its shares to NEC and IBM. By then, foreign equity participation 
in a state-owned national champion operating in a strategic industry, had become 
possible; the French government had relaxed its regulations to allow for a partial 
privatisation of the state companies on the condition that the French or foreign private 
investors would provide new capital for the state firm and close an industrial, 
commercial or financial cooperation accord. In November 1991, NEC (J), which had 
been supplying mainframes to Bull, acquired 4.7 per cent of the shares of CMB in 
exchange for its 15 per cent share in Bull HN Information Systems. In February 1992, 
Bull balanced the share of NEC by selling 5.68 per cent of its CMB-shares to IBM, 
in exchange for a capital injection of S 102.3 mn, a transfer of RISC technology and 
cooperation in the areas of marketing and R&D.
Despite Bull's transformation programme, the company made substantive losses. 
In February 1993, the French government granted the ailing computer group a capital 
injection of 2.5 bn FF, to prop up its financial condition. In May 1993, the new
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conservative government announced its intention to privatize Bull. Bull had been on 
the list of companies proposed for privatization of the 1986-88 conservative 
government. The group's precarious financial condition, however, thwarted at that point 
in time a speedy realization of the government's intent.
Following the need to stem the losses, return to profitability, and prepare the 
company for privatization, Bull announced a new restructuring programme in 
November 1993. This programme would have far reaching consequences for the 
strategy, internal organization, and employees of the company. The programme would 
cost 8.6 bn FF, financed by the French state (7 bn FF) and France Telecom (1.6 bn 
FF). NEC and IBM, the other principal shareholders, were asked to contribute through 
new capital injections - a request rejected by IBM, but accepted by NEC4.
Olivetti
Like Bull, Olivetti is considerably smaller than Siemens and Philips (see Figure 
1.1). In 1991, the group, which derives the majority of its sales from dataprocessing, 
turned loss-making despite ongoing restructuring. It became clear that Olivetti needed 
the additional funds, the technology and the commercial advantages that a partnership 
with a foreign firm could provide - as AT&T had provided before their alliance fell 
apart in 1989. In June 1992, De Benedetti’s holding company, which had in 1991 a 
41.54% stake in Olivetti, agreed to sell 10 per cent of its shares to DEC, Olivetti's
4 Sources: Browning, 4 April 1991; Bull A/R; Cane, 9 June 1992:27,10 February 
1992:17, 17 February 1992:1, 29 January 1992:24, 5 December 1991:26, 23 April 
1991:111; Cane, Alan and John Ridding, 4 October 1993:15; Dawkins, 8 April 1991:16, 
11 April 1991:3, 5 February 1992:23, 27 April 1992:8; Dawkins and Leadbeater, 5 
April 1991:2; Dryden. 14 March 1991:9; Economist, 8 June 1991:18,20, 4 January 
1992:58, 27 June 1992:97; 1 February 1992:90-91, 6 November 1990:113; Financial 
Times, 28 March 1991:7; Hill, 25 June 1992:2; Hill and Ridding, 7 October 1993:2; 
Nakamoto and Ridding, 10 December 1993:24; NRC. 21 March 1991:15, 19 October 
1993:19; OJ C244 of 23.9.92; Ridding, 19 November 1993:32, 18 February 1994; 
Ridding and Hill, 19 October 1993:23; Ridding and Kehoe, 16 December 1993:26.
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long-time OEM partner, for approximately S 370 mn in equity capital and access to 
RISC technology.
Olivetti remained loss-making over 1992 and 1993, but in 1993, its 
competitiveness as expressed in market shares improved in both European1 as well as 
US markets, while its financial position became healthier due to a rights issue. Olivetti 
hopes to break even by 19955.
SGS-Thomson
SGS-Thomson was formed in 1987, when the French defence (CSF) and 
consumer electronics (TCE) group Thomson merged its civil microelectronics 
operations with the Italian company SGS-Microelettronica. Although it is by far the 
smallest company discussed in this thesis (see Figure 1.1), it has been amongst the Top 
3 semiconductor suppliers to the European market. Moreover, it has been backed up 
by two larger groups.
Initially, the defence arm of the state-owned Thomson Group, Thomson-CSF, 
owned 50 per cent of the venture, while the other 50 per cent was owned by the Italian 
telecommunications producer STET, which is part of the state-owned holding company 
IRI (IRI/STET). In 1989, SGS-Thomson acquired the British semiconductor producer 
Inmos, which was owned by Thom-EMI. As a consequence, the shareholder structure 
changed; by 1991, Thomson-CSF held 45 per cent of SGS-Thomson, the Italian 
partners (IRI/Finmeccanica) 45 per cent, and the UK company Thom-EMI the 
remaining 10 per cent.
Since its creation, the merged operations have been subject to substantive
5 Sources: Cane, 17 March 1992:VII, 1 July 1992:28; Economist, 1 December 
1990:108,110; Electronics, 22 March 1993:11, 24 August 1992:14; Financial Times, 
18 March 1992:25; Flissi, 14 March 1991:7,9; Olivetti A/R; Simonian, 25/26 
September 1993:14, 30 April 1993:23, 11 March 1991 :X, 13 May 1992:27.
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restructuring programmes, including the closure of redundant factories, the lay-offs of 
employees, and the move of the labour-intensive production facilities off-shore. Over 
the period 1987-1992. however, SGS-Thomson either broke even or remained loss- 
making. Moreover, its financial condition was precarious, as illustrated by total debt 
to equity ratios of over 200 per cent.
In November 1992, the Italian and French government agreed to provide 
approximately S 1 bn in funds to meet SGS-Thomson's recapitalization needs and S 1 
bn to meet its R&D requirements over a period of five years. As the funds provided 
would wipe out SGS-Thomson's debts, this action would improve the company's 
financial situation considerably. Thom-EMI decided not to inject new capital into the 
venture, which implies that its stake in the company will fall from 10 to 6 per cent in 
five years time. Facilitated by SGS-Thomson's timely return to the black, the EC 
Commission cleared the capital injections as legal investments rather than illegal state 
aids.
In November 1992, the Italian and French governments also agreed to bring in 
other industrial partners to increase the shareholders' base of the microelectronics 
producer. In February 1993, a company was created to hold the 45 per cent French 
stake in SGS-Thomson. Thomson-CSF owns currently 49 per cent of the holding 
company, with other French shareholders (France Telecom and CEA-Industrie) 
accounting for the remaining shares. Eventually, Thomson-CSFs share in the holding 
company will fall to approximately 25 per cent.
In 1993, SGS-Thomson's profitability increased substantially, partly due to a 
surge in the market. The future of SGS-Thomson, however, is to a certain degree 
dependent on the fate of its owners and their ability to invest in SGS-Thomson. In 
1992, the Italian government earmarked the portfolio of the heavily indebted state 
holding IRI for privatization. It is expected that IRI's holdings in the high-technology
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area will become publicly quoted within two years, but that the state will maintain a 
controlling stake. Similarly, the new conservative French government has announced 
its intention to privatize the Thomson group. The latter had been on the 1986-88 
conservative government's list of companies proposed for privatization.1 Although 
Thomson-CFS has been profitable, the overall group has been loss-making due to the 
heavy losses in the group's consumer electronics arm Thomson-TCE. In order to shape 
up the Thomson Group for privatization, the Bahadur government has asked the group 
to consider merging Thomson-CSF with Thomson-TCE6.
ICL
Similar to Bull and Olivetti, ICL is an undiversifled computer company, but 
relatively small in comparison (see Figure 1.1). For most of the 1980s, ICL was wholly 
owned by Standard Telephone and Cables Pic (STC), the British-owned 
telecommunications producer. Following ICL's acquisition in 1984, STC derived the 
majority of its revenues from its Information Systems group, which comprised ICL. At 
the end of the 1980s, however, STC sought to hive off its computer subsidiary; in 
November 1990, the company sold an 80 per cent ownership interest to Fujitsu for 
SI.3 bn. Fujitsu could provide ICL with the necessary funds, the microelectronics 
technology and expertise needed, and additional sales outlets for ICL's products. 
Moreover, it would increase ICL's credibility with both customers and suppliers, and 
dampen fears about ICL's long-term survival.
ICL's takeover by the Japanese company, however, stirred a row of protests
6 Buchan, 26 May 1993; Buchan and Graham, 11 November 1992:2; Dawkins, 
3 February 1993:25, 16 November 1992:4, 15 October 1991:27; Dodsworth, 14 
September 1988; Friedman, 14 July 1989; Graham, 4 December 1992:20, 7 February
1989; Hudson and Gumbel, 18 April 1994:1; Parkes, 15 January 1993:15; Rawsthom,
8 July 1993:31; Rawsthom and Buchan. 27 May 1993:23; Thomson-CSF A/R; 
Skapinker. 11 May 1990.
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amongst the continental European computer vendors, which eventually led to ICL's 
exclusion from the IT Roundtable. It was felt that the Roundtable's membership should 
be reserved for truly European-owned firms. On similar grounds, ICL was excluded 
from three of the five JESSI projects. By 1993, however, the strained relations between 
ICL and its European counterpans appeared to have relaxed.
Although Fujitsu and ICL cooperate closely in the areas of R&D and 
marketing, ICL has been operated by Fujitsu at arm's length, as British competition law 
requires that the interests of the minority shareholder are protected (ICL sources. 
Interview, October 1993). ICL's minority owner is Northern Telecom, which took over 
STC shortly after the Fujitsu take-over of ICL. The ownership structure is expected to 
change in 1995, when Fujitsu will float 25 per cent of its ICL shares on the London 
Stock Exchange.
Over the early 1990s, ICL engaged in an active acquisition policy, including 
the takeover of the Finish producer Nokia Data and various smaller software and 
services companies. In contrast to the IT operations of the continental European 
computer producers, ICL has been profitable over the early 1990s. Its profitability, 
however, has been falling. At the end of 1993, the company decided to raise £100 mn 
through a formal rights issue, financed by Fujitsu, in order to boost its financial 
position. As Northern Telecom, ICL's minority shareholder, will not contribute, 
Fujitsu's share in the company will increase to 84 per cent7.
7 Sources: Adonis, Andrew, 30 July 1993:21; Cane, 2 July 1992:25, 3 December 
1993:21; Economist, 11 January 1992:67-68, 10 April 1993:73; ICL A/R; Kerres, 30 
May 1991:15; Leadbeater, 19 July 1990; Walker, 24 May 1991.
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S i e m e n s  in $ mn 1987 1988 1989 1990 ( a )  1991 ( a ) 1992 ( a ) 1993 ( a )
Sales ( b ) 28572.8 33735.2 32514.9 39003.1 43980.7 50326.3 49482.4
Total IT Sales 5703 .0 5951.0 6010.6 7735 .1 7308.6 8345.1 7225 .5
Net Income 708.3 790.3 838.8 1029.6 1079.5 1253.2 1201.2
Shareholders7 Equity ( c ) 9058 .3 10019 .3 9869.2 10837.7 11234 .3 13039.1 12440 . 0
Net Income on Equity in % 8.0 8.2 8.7 9.2 9.9 9.6 9.7
Financial Position
Long-term Debt ( d ) 1119 .4 1100.6 995.2 980.3 1226.6 1878.9 1416.4
As % of Shareholders' Equity 12 .4 11. 0 10.1 9.1 10.9 14 .4 11.4
Liquid Assets ( e ) 12805.6 13618.2 11297 .3 11942.6 11184 .3 12613.5 13220.0
Capital Expenditure ( f ) 2951.7 2960.2 4187.2 4361.7 3370.5 5496.2 4044.4
Semiconductors 140 . 0 110 . 0 130 .0 180.0 160.0 140 .0 N/A
Employees (xlOOO) 359 353 365 373 402 413 391
R&D 3450.6 3681.8 3656.9 4308.6 4754.2 5375.0 4665.5
As % of Sales 12 .1 10.9 11.2 11.0 10.8 10.7 9.4
Employees as % Total Labour N/A 11.7 11.4 11.6 11.7 11.6 11.9
Semiconductor R&D 90.0 90.0 320.0 340.0 330.0 N/A N/A
As % of Sc. Sales 13.7 11.5 26.8 28.2 26.1 N/A N/A
(a) Data include Siemens Nixdorf (SNI). Siemens acquired Nixdorf in 1990
(b) Sales: Net Sales, including revenues from leasing and license agreements
(c) Shareholders' Equity = Capital Stock plus Additional Paid-in Capital plus Retained Earnings plus Unappropriated
Consolidated Net Income plus Minority Interests
(d) Long-term Debt: Debt minus Debt due Within One Year
(e) Liquid Assets: Securities and other Liquid Assets
(f) Capital Expenditure: Capital Spending (for property, plant and equipment and for acquisition of investments)
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P h i l i p s  G r o u p  in $ mn 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Sales ( a )
Total IT Sales
25968.0
2601.6
28322.7
2794.6
26992.5
2814.8
30639.6
3283 .9
30473.8
N/A
33254.0
N/A
31626.3
N/A
Net Income
Shareholders' Equity ( b )  
Net Income on Equity in %
403.0
7642 .4 
5.2
533.3
8353 .5 
6.6
648.1
7966.0 
8.2
-2329.7
6134.6 
- 30.2
642.8
6168.4 
10.6
-511.4
5154.0 
- 9.5
1056.5
6155.4 
17 .2
Financial Position
Long-term Debt ( c )
As % of Shareholders' Equity 
Liquid Assets ( d )
5096.1
66.7
907.4
6071.7 
72 . 7 
721.7
5724.5 
71. 9 
729.7
7588.5 
123 . 7 
1384 .1
6904 .3 
111. 9 
1034.2
7211.4 
139 .9 
942 .1
5039.8 
81.8 
1248 .4
Capital Expenditure ( e )
Semiconductors
2342.9
290.0
2093.4
290.0
1949.5
290.0
1943.4
280.0
1580.8
150.0
1892.1
170.0
1385.0
N/A
Employees (xlOOO) 337 310 305 273 240 252 239
R&D
As % of Sales 
Employees as % Total Labour 
Semiconductor R&D 
As % of Sc. Sales
2149.8
8.3 
11.9 
220.0 
13 .7
2334.9
8.2 
13 .3 
210.0 
12 .1
2149.5
8.0 
13 .2 
400.0 
23 .3
2405.5
7.9 
12 .2 
430.0 
22 .0
2069.5
6.8 
11.4 
270.0 
13 .4
2079.6
6.3
10.8
N/A
N/A
1826.3
5.8
10.3
N/A
N/A
(a) Sales: Net Sales, i.e. total deliveries minus internal deliveries
(b) Shareholders' Equity = Issued, Paid-up Capital plus Share Premium Account plus Revaluation Surplus + Retained
Earnings plus (Goodwill + Foreign Exchange Translation Differences)
(c) Long-term Debt = Total Long-term Liabilities, Amount Outstanding
(d) Liquid Assets: Securities and other Liquid Assets
(e) Capital Expenditure = Gross Investments
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G r o u p e  B u l l  in $ mn 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Sales ( a ) 3006.8 5293.1 5128.7 6345.0 5930.9 5717.2 5909.9
Total IT Sales 3007.5 5296.7 6465.4 6349 . 6 5929.8 5715.1 5000.0
Net Income 37.4 50.8 - 41.9 -1245.9 -585.3 -894.8 -583.0
Shareholders' Equity ( b ) N/A N/A 904 . 7 - 193.4 -139.2 -518.4 66 .1
Net Income on Equity in % N/A N/A - 4 . 6 - - - - 8.8
Financial Position
Long-term Debt N/A N/A 1304.2 1739.1 1393 .1 1582 .4 735 . 8
As % of Equity N/A N/A 144 .2 - - - 1113.2
Liquid Assets ( c ) N/A N/A 374.5 355 .4 296.3 242 .5 236.1
Capital Expenditure ( d ) N/A N/A N/A 497.3 432.4 383 .0 315.9
Employees (xlOOO) 26.3 45.6 43.6 44.5 39.9 35.2 31.7
R&D 338.6 610.9 580.3 687 .5 683.2 703 .4 571.0
As % of Sales 11.3 11.5 11.3 10.8 11.5 12 . 3 9.7
Employees as % Total Labour N/A N/A N/A N/A 15.0 N/A 16.0
(a) Sales: Total Revenue, comprising Sales, Rental Service and Other
(b) Shareholders' Equity = Common Stock plus Additional Paid-In Capital plus (Retained Earnings or Deficit) plus
(Translation Adjustment)
(c) Liquid Assets: Marketable Securities and Cash
(d) Capital Expenditure: Expenditure for Property and Increase in Investments and Other
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O l i v e t t i  G r o u p  in $ mn 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Sales ( a ) 5686.7 6458.9 6584.0 7593.7 6935.6 6551.4 N/A
Total IT Sales 4637.2 5427.9 5573 .3 6414.5 6050.8 5762 .0 5070.2
Net Income 310.0 273.7 147.9 50.8 -370.5 -530.5 N/A
Shareholders' Equity ( b ) 2530.1 2590 .3 2637.2 2930.4 2484.7 1927 .5 N/A
Net Income on Equity in % 12 .3 10.6 5.6 1. 7 - 14.9 - 27.5 N/A
Financial Position
Long-term Debt ( c ) 1880 .5 2204.1 3156.0 3731.9 3535.0 3255.5 N/A
As % of Shareholders' Equity 74 .3 85.1 119 .7 127 .4 142 .3 168.9 N/A
Liquid Assets ( d ) 3147 .2 2807.3 3688.3 4145.0 3679.1 3761.1 N/A
Capital Expenditure ( e ) 411.0 468.6 334.6 349.6 234.9 373.8 N/A
Employees (xlOOO) 58.1 57.6 56.9 53.7 46.5 40.4 N/A
R&D 330.6 347.2 348.5 394.0 371.6 374.9 N/A
As % of Sales 5.8 5.4 5.3 5.2 5.4 5.7 N/A
Employees as % Total Labour 7.0 7.0 7.8 7.7 8.1 9.3 N/A
(a) Sales: Net Revenues
(b) Shareholders' Equity = Share Capital plus Capital in Excess of Stated Value plus Revaluation Reserves + Retained
Earning and Other Reserves plus (Treasury Stock Reserved for Employees + Cumulative Translation Adjustments) plus
(Net Result for The Year)
(c) Long-term Debt = Banks Plus Bonds
(d) Liquid Assets = Cash + Bank Deposits + Marketable Securities
(e) Capital Expenditure = Increase in Fixed Assets
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S G S - T h o m s o n  in $ mn 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Sales 851 1049.7 1192.8 1350.3 1378.9 1571.0 2400.0
Net Income N/A - 68.8 3.3 - 96.5 -103.0 3.0 160.0
Shareholders' Equity ( a ) N/A 352 .7 463 .3 461.5 440 . 8 430 . 7 N/A
Net Income on Equity in % N/A - 19.5 0.7 - 20.9 - 23 .4 0 . 7 N/A
Financial Position
Debt ( b ) N/A 774 . 8 666.1 940 .2 875.7 947.2 N/A
As % of Shareholders' Equity N/A 219 .7 143.8 203 .7 198.7 219.9 N/A
Liquid Assets ( c ) N/A 102 .2 28.4 53 .0 44 .5 103.8 N/A
Capital Expenditure 182 180.9 235.1 265.1 174.3 161.6 N/A
Employees (xlOOO) 17.3 17.9 19.2 21.3 17 .7 17.8 N/A
R&D ( d ) 155 143 160 N/A N/A N/A N/A
As % of Sales 18.0 13 .6 13 .4 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Employees as % Total Labour N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Semiconductor R&D (total) 190.0 220.0 210.0 240.0 250.0 260.0 N/A
As % of Sc. Sales 22 .1 20.2 16.1 16.7 17 .4 N/A N/A
(a) Shareholders' Equity = (Common Stock) plus (Paid-in Surplus and Retained Earnings) minus (Cumulative Translation 
Adjustment) plus (Revaluation Reserve) minus (Treasury Stock)
(b) Debt: includes short term and long-term debt
(c) Liquid Assets: Cash and Cash Equivalents
(d) R&D = Company-funded R&D
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I C L  in $ mn 1 9 8 1  ( a ) 1988 ( a ) 1989 ( a ) 1990 1991 1992 1993
Sales ( b ) 2129.5 2433.8 2649.5 2967.5 3290.7 4347.2 3902.4
Total IT Sales 2123.9 2425.1 2643 .7 2862.9 3308.1 4354.8 3915.7
Net Income ( c ) 180.2 230.0 238.9 115.9 72.1 46.1 0.9
Shareholders' Equity N/A N/A N/A 597.3 527.5 466.5 424.9
Net Income on Equity in % N/A N/A N/A 19 .4 13 .7 9.9 0.2
Financial Position
Debt ( d ) N/A N/A N/A 82 .0 239.5 254.9 150.2
As % of Shareholders' Equity N/A N/A N/A N/A 45 .4 54 .7 35.3
Liquid Assets ( e ) N/A N/A N/A N/A 214.6 213 .5 318.7
Capital Expenditure ( f ) N/A N/A N/A N/A 161.2 211.1 121.2
Employees (xlOOO) 20.4 22.1 22.1 N/A 26.8 25.6 24.0
R&D N/A N/A N/A 383.9 390.9 426.1 311.8
As % of Sales N/A N/A N/A 12.9 11.9 9.8 8.0
Employees as % Total Labour N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
(a) Data 1987-1989 refer to STC Information Systems; (b) Sales: Turnover, comprising Revenues from Sales and Hire of 
DP Equipment and from Software and Services; (c) Net Income = 87-89: Profit before Tax; 90-93: Profit after Tax and
Minority Interests; (d) Long-Term Debt = Loans and Other Liabilities, Due After More than One Year; (e) Liquid Assets: 
Cash at Bank and in Hand; (f) Capital Expenditure = Purchase of Tangible Fixed Assets
Sources: Siemens A/R; Philips A/R; NRC. 25 May 1990:11; Hudson and Gumbel, 18 May 1994:1,4; Bull A/R; Olivetti A/R; Thomson-CSF A/R; ICL PLC A/R; Dataquest in BMFT (June 1993); Datamation. 15 June 1994:46; 15 June 1993; 
1 July 1992:61,63; 1 July 1991:61-62; 1 July 1990: 112-2/3; 15 June 1989:56,65,66,83; 1 August 1988:48-2/3; Stopford (1992); Appendix 8.1.
Note: Comparison of the different companies only yields a rough indicator, due to the fact that each company uses a different system of accountancy, based on different currencies, and applying to different fiscal years; With the exception 
of data on IT revenues, the data have been taken over directly from the annual reports and converted into dollars, unless indicated otherwise. Exchange Rates: see Appendix 5.1
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Appendix 1.2
DEFINING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
Information Technology (IT) has been an ill-defined concept, the meaning of 
which varies per application. Datamation (Top 100) and Price Waterhouse (in the 
Financial Times, 23 April 1991:11) define IT as computer hardware, software, services, 
datacommunications and other, dataprocessing products. Hardware, in its turn, can be 
split up into two product categories: processing hardware and peripheral equipment. 
Processing hardware comprises: (a) mainframes or large-scale computer systems, (b) 
minis or mid-range systems, and (c) personal computers and workstations or micros. 
Peripheral equipment refers to devices used for storing, entering and outputting data, 
such as printers, tape drives and disk drives (Trainor and Krasnewich, 1992:69).
The European Community uses a wider definition in its R&D framework 
programmes and policy documents. In addition to the "dataprocessing" product 
categories mentioned above, the EC includes upstream components and downstream 
applications in its working definition of IT. Components encompass three categories 
of products: (1) active components, including semiconductors; (2) passive components, 
and; (3) electromechanical components. Downstream applications comprise, for 
example, computer-integrated manufacturing and distributed systems (OJ L302,1987:8- 
9; LI 17, 1990:33-34; SEC(91)565:2).
The IT Roundtable, meanwhile, gives the broadest definition of IT, not only 
including dataprocessing, components and applications, but also telecommunications, 
consumer and professional electronics (European IT Industry Roundtable, April 
1992:2).
As this thesis focuses on the political influence of European-owned IT 
companies over the EC, it is imperative to incorporate those technologies that the EC
Appendix 1.2
has been addressing through its R&TD framework programmes and other policies. In 
other words, this thesis defines Information Technology as "components" plus 
"dataprocessing" (computer hardware, software, services, datacommunications, and 
other dataprocessing products) plus "applications".
These areas are covered by the following European Community's industrial 
classification code numbers: NACE 345 (electronic components) and NACE 33 
(computer and office equipment). The applicable trade classification (SITC Rev.2) 
codes are: SITC 77 (electronic equipment, including electronic components) and SITC 
75 (automatic data processing machines and units, and office machinery). The 
applicable EC tariff headings are: CN 8541 and 8542 (NIMEXE 85.21) for electronic 
components and CN 8471 (NIMEXE 84.53) for automatic data processing machines 
and units thereof. Information technology, as such, has not been awarded a separate 
NACE, SITC or CN (NIMEXE) classification code.
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EC MEMBER STATES: COUNTRY PROFILES (1988-1989)
National Shares in Total EC Semiconductor Production, 
Consumption, Exports and Imports
GER FRA UK ITA NL OTH EC12
Production
1988
- ICs
32 .0
(%)
19.0 22.0 7.0 13 .0 7.0 100
Consumption
1989
(%)
28.0 13 .0 25.0 11.0 N/A 23 .0 100
Exports - Microcircuits
1988 33.0 20.6
1989 32.9 16.5
(%)
22.8
25.7
11.4
11.2
6.6 
7 .1
5.6
6.6
100
100
Imports - Microcircuits
1988 25.7 17.1
1989 25.2 14.9
(%) 
23.1 
23 .7
18.1
18.9
5.2
5.4
10.8
11.9
100
100
Sources: EC Panorama (1990:12-5); EC Panorama (1991:12-10); UN International Trade Statistics Yearbook (1989).
National Shares in Total EC Dataprocessing Production, 
Consumption, Exports and Imports
GER FRA UK ITA NL OTH EC9
Production
1989
(%)
25 .3 23 .2 24.2 18 .2 OTH 9.1 100
Consumption
1989
(%)
28.4 22 .5 23 .5 12 .7 OTH 12 .9 100
Exports
1989
(%)
22 .0 14 . 0 24.0 OTH 14 . 0 26.0 100
Imports
1989
(%)
24.0 17.0 25.0 OTH 14 . 0 20.0 100
Sources: EC Panorama (1991:12-34,12-35).
Appendix 5.1
OECD AVERAGE EXCHANGE RATES, 1987-1993
1$ e q u a ls :
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
FF 6 . 01 5.96 6.38 5 .45 5.64 5 .28 5 . 66
L 1296.97 1301.68 1371.69 1190.00 1241.00 1225.00 1573.66
/ 2.03 1.98 2 .12 1.82 1.87 1.76 1.86
£ 0 .61 0 .56 0 .61 0 .56 0 .57 0 .57 0.67
DM 1.80 1.76 1.88 1.62 1.66 1.56 1.65
ECU 0.78 0.8450 0.9082 0.7877
Sources: Datamation, 15 June 1988:24; 1 August 1988:48-8; 15 June 1989:18; 15 June 1990:24;
1 July 1991:64; 1 July 1992:63; 15 June 1993:7; OECD Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade, April 1994:113.
449
450
Appendix 5.2
WORLD SEMICONDUCTOR PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION, AND
US DOMINANCE IN SUPPLYING MARKETS, 1950s-1960s
World Semiconductor Production by Region of Origin in $ mn, 
1958-1970
Year USA JAP EUR UK GER FRA
1958 236 19 26 8 10 8
1961 607 78 97 35 30 32
1964 635 139 179 66 61 52
1970 57% 27% 16% N/A N/A N/A
S o u r c e : M a l e r b a  ( 1 9 8 5 : 5 8 ; 1 0 1 ; 1 5 3 ) .
Notes:
• EUR = UK + GER + FRA
World Semiconductor Consumption by Region in $ mn, 1956-
1972
Year USA JAP EUR UK GER FRA
1956 80 5 7 2 3 2
1960 560 54 80 . 28 25 27
1965 1064 132 191 . 72 52 67
1970 1547 420 420 . N/A N/A N/A
1972 1708 742 542 210 218 114
S o u r c e s M a l e r b a  ( 1 9 8 5 : 5 9 ; 1 0 1 )
Notes:
• EUR = UK + GER + FRA
US Dominance in Supplying World Semiconductor Markets
(Japan , UK, France and Germany): Percentage of Demand
Supplied by US Direct Exports, 1960 -1970
Year Import Penetration Year Import Penetration
1960 11 1966 27
1961 15 1967 32
1962 16 1968 30
1963 17 1969 37
1964 16 1970 30
1965 23
Source: Finan in Braun and MacDonald (1978:150)
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Appendix 5.3
WORLD SEMICONDUCTOR PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION AND TRADE,
1975-1992
World Semiconductor Production by Region of Origin in % and 
$ mn, 1975-1991
Year USA JAP EUR OTH WORLD
1975 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
63 .9 19.3 16.7 100.0
1980 11135 3840 1620 320 16915
65.8 22.7 9.6 1.9 100.0
1983 13620 6210 1975 430 22235
61.3 27.9 8.9 1.9 100.0
1985 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
47.0 39.0 11.0 3.0 100.0
1987 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
39.0 48.0 11.0 2.0 100.0
1988 18586 25942 4917 1414 50859
36.5 51.0 9.7 2.8 100.0
1989 19978 29809 5443 1983 57213
34.9 52 .1 9.5 3.5 100.0
1990 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
36.5 49.5 10.5 3.5 100.0
1991 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
38.0 47 .0 14 . 0a a 100.0
S o u r c e s :  D a t a  19 75 :  M a l e r b a  ( 1 9 8 5 : 1 5 3 ) ;  D a t a  1 9 8 0 - 1 9 8 3 :  I n t e g r a t e d  C i r c u i t  
E n g i n e e r i n g  C o r p o r a t i o n  i n  L a n g l o i s  e t  a l . ( 1 9 8 8 : 2 7 ) ;  D a t a  1985:
I n t e g r a t e d  C i r c u i t  E n g i n e e r i n g  C o r p o r a t i o n  i n  Thomas,  18 D e c e m b e r  1986 ;  
D a t a  19 87:  D a t a q u e s t  i n  Ke ho e ,  8 J a n u a r y  19 8 8 ;  D a t a  1 9 8 8 - 1 9 8 9 :  D a t a q u e s t  
i n  E l e c t r o n i c s , A u g u s t  1 9 9 0 : 3  6; D a t a  1990 :  D a t a q u e s t  i n  S k a p i n k e r ,  3
J a n u a r y  1991;  D a t a  1991:  e s t i m a t e s  b a s e d  on D a t a q u e s t  i n  T yson  ( 1 9 9 3 : 1 0 5 )  .
Notes:
a 14 per cent to the share held by European and other (South East
Asian) producers
• Data for 1992 and 1993 not available at -time of submission
World
1989
Semiconductor Consumption by Region of Origin in %,
Year USA JAP EUR OTH WORLD
1989 30.0 40.0 18.0 12.0 100 .0
Source: EC Panorama (1991:12-10)
A p p e n d ix  5 . 3
The EC Semiconductor Industry: Trade, Import Penetration, Export Orientation, and Value Added (in 
current value) in Ecu mn, 1981-1992.
T r a d e 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2
Extra EC (Active Components)
EC EXP 1 3 6 6 1 5 4 2 1 8 0 3 2 7 6 0 2 9 7 7 2 8 2 5 3 0 4 0 3 5 9 4 4 1 0 7 4 3 7 0 4 7 6 7 N / A
EC IMP 2 1 8 8 2 4 6 8 3 0 1 8 4 8 9 9 5 0 6 8 4 4 5 9 4 7 7 7 6 0 5 4 6 9 7 8 6 6 4 1 7 3 6 2 N / A
EC BAL - 8 2 2 - 9 2 6 - 1 2 1 5 - 2 1 3 9 - 2 0 9 1 - 1 6 3 4 - 1 7 3 7 - 2 4 6 0 - 2 8 7 1 - 2 2 7 1 - 2 5 9 5 - 4 0 4 5 E
Extra EC (Semiconductors)
EC EXP 9 8 5 1 1 1 9 1 3 1 5 2 2 0 2 2 2 9 0 2 2 4 3 2 4 7 7 3 0 7 9 3 6 1 6 3 8 6 3 N / A N / A
EC IMP 1 6 4 4 1 9 5 4 2 4 3 7 4 2 2 3 4 3 3 5 3 7 3 3 4 0 0 6 5 2 0 4 6 0 8 8 S i l l N / A N / A
EC BAL - 6 5 9 - 8 3 5 - 1 1 2 2 - 2 0 2 1 - 2 0 4 5 - 1 4 9 0 - 1 5 2 9 - 2 1 2 5 - 2 4 7 2 - 1 9 1 4 - 2 3 6 5 N / A
EC (Active Components)
CONS 4 1 0 4 4 6 3 8 5 6 0 0 7 9 9 7 8 0 6 4 7 8 5 2 8 0 2 6 9 0 5 8 1 0 2 1 5 9 8 7 2 1 1 5 8 3 E 1 2 6 2 5 E
PROD 3 2 8 2 3 7 1 2 4 3 8 5 5 8 5 8 5 9 7 3 6 2 1 8 6 2 8 9 6 5 9 8 7 3 4 4 7 6 0 1 8 0 1 9 E 8 5 8 0 E
Extra EC (Active Components)
M/C (%) 53  .3 53  . 2 5 3 . 9 6 1 . 3 6 2 . 9 5 6 . 8 5 9 . 5 6 6 . 8 6 8 . 3 6 7 . 3 63  . 6 E N / A
X / P  (%) 4 1 . 6 4 1 . 5 4 1 . 1 4 7 . 1 4 9 . 8 4 5  . 4 4 8 . 3 5 4 . 5 5 5 . 9 5 7  . 5 5 9  . 5 E N / A
Sources: Data 1981-1990: EC Panorama 1992:12 -4,6,7; Data 1991 -1992: EC Panorama 1993: 10-9.
Notes:
• EXP = Exports • IMP = Imports • BAL = Trade Balance • CONS = Consumption • PROD = Production • M/C =
Import/Consumption = Import Penetration • X/P = Export/Production = Export Orientation • VA = Value Added
• Statistics refer to active components (which include semiconductors), unless stated otherwise
• Data 1981-1983 apply to the EC10
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Appendix 5.4
TOP 20 SEMICONDUCTOR SUPPLIERS TO THE WORLD AND EUROPEAN MARKETS, 1987-1992
World Top 20 Semiconductor Suppliers by Revenues in $ Millions, 1987 -1992
Y e a r / R a n k 1 9 9 2 R 1 9 9 1 R 1 9 9 0 R 1 9 8 9 R 1 9 8 8 R 1 9 8 7 R
I n t e l  (US) 5 0 6 4 1 4 0 1 9 3 3 1 7 1 5 2 4 3 0 8 2 3 5 0 7 1 4 9 1 10
NEC ( J ) 4 9 7 6 2 4 7 7 4 1 4 3 2 2 1 5 0 1 5 1 4 5 4 3 1 3 3 6 8 1
T o s h i b a  ( J ) 4 7 6 5 3 4 5 7 9 2 4 2 0 2 2 4 9 3 0 2 4 3 9 5 2 3 0 2 9 2
M o t o r o l a  (US) 4 6 3 5 4 3 8 0 2 4 3 5 3 9 3 3 3 1 9 4 3 0 3 5 4 2 4 3 1 4
H i t a c h i  ( J ) 3 9 0 2 5 3 7 6 5 5 3 5 1 6 4 3 9 7 4 3 3 5 0 6 3 2 6 1 8 3
T e x a s  I n s t r . ( U S ) 3 0 5 2 6 2 7 3 8 6 2 5 7 4 7 2 7 8 7 6 2 7 4 1 5 2 1 2 7 5
F u j i t s u  ( J ) 2 5 8 3 7 2 7 0 5 7 2 5 9 9 6 2 9 6 3 5 2 6 0 7 6 1 8 0 1 6
M i t s u b i s h i  ( J ) 2 3 0 7 8 2 3 0 3 8 2 1 0 8 8 2 5 7 9 7 2 3 1 2 8 1 4 9 2 9
P h i l i p s  (NL) 2 1 0 8 9 2 0 2 2 10 1 9 5 5 9 1 7 1 6 10 1 7 3 8 10 1 6 0 2 7
M a t s u s h i t a  ( J ) 1 9 2 9 10 2 0 3 7 9 1 8 2 6 10 1 8 8 2 9 1 8 8 3 9 1 4 5 7 11
N a t .  S e m i .  (US) N / A 1 6 0 2 11 1 6 5 3 11 1 6 1 8 11 1 6 5 0 11 1 5 0 6 8
S a m s u n g  (SK) N / A 1 4 7 3 12 1 3 1 5 13 1 2 6 0 14 9 0 5 18 3 2 7 2 0
S G S - T h o m s o n  ( F / I ) N / A 1 4 3 6 13 1 4 4 1 12 1 3 0 1 13 1 0 8 7 12 8 5 9 13
S a n y o  ( J ) N / A 1 3 6 2 14 1 1 9 6 15 1 3 6 5 12 1 0 8 3 14 8 5 1 14
S h a r p  ( J ) N / A 1 3 1 8 15 1 1 9 4 16 1 2 3 0 15 1 0 3 6 15 5 9 0 18
S i e m e n s  (G) N / A 1 2 6 3 16 1 2 0 4 14 1 1 9 4 16 7 8 4 2 0 6 5 7 1 6
AMD (US) N / A 1 2 2 6 17 1 0 5 3 17 1 1 0 0 18 1 0 8 4 13 9 8 6 12
S o n y  ( J ) N / A 1 1 9 6 18 1 0 1 0 18 1 0 7 7 19 9 5 0 16 5 7 4 19
O k i  ( J ) N / A 9 8 1 19 9 5 4 19 1 1 5 4 17 9 4 7 17 * 6 5 1 17
Rohm  ( J ) N / A 9 3 4 2 0 [ 7 5 9 21] N / A N / A N / A
AT&T (US) N / A N / A N / A 8 7 3 2 0 8 5 9 19 8 0 2 15
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Y e a r / R a n k 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 0 1 9 8 9 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 7
Cum. T 1 0 3 5 3 2 1 3 2 7 4 4 2 9 8 1 2 3 1 5 9 5 2 9 1 1 0 2 1 4 6 5
Cum. T 2 0 N / A 4 5 5 3 5 4 1 5 9 1 a 4 3 7 6 7 3 9 4 9 5 2 9 2 1 9
O t h e r s 3 0 2 6 6 1 4 1 0 1 E N / A 1 3 4 4 6 1 1 3 6 4 N / A
T o t a l  W o r l d 6 5 5 8 7 5 9 6 3 6 E N /A 5 7 2 1 3 5 0 8 5 9 N / A
Sources: 1992 d a t a : D a t a q u e s t i n  Keho e ,  9 F e b r u a r y  1 9 9 3 : 1 3 ;  1991 and 1990 d a t a : D a t a q u e s t  i n  Nakamoto , 2 S e p t e m b e r  1 9 9 2 : 1 5
1989  d a t a :  D a t a q u e s t  i n  CEC SEC(91) 565  f i n a l : 3 6  an d E l e c t r o n i c s , A u g u s t  1990;  1988  d a t a :  D a t a q u e s t  i n  E l e c t r o n i c s , Augu s  
19 9 0 ;  1987  d a t a :  Flamm, 1 9 9 0 : 2 6 4 .
Notes:
[ ] Not in Top 2 0
a Top 2 0 = Revenues of the Top 19 firms + Rohm
E Estimate based on reverse calculation, through calculating the sum of each Top 10 player's ((sales/market share)
100), and dividing this by 10
A p p e n d ix  5 . 4
Top 20 Semiconductor Suppliers to the European Market by Revenues in $ Millions, 1987-1992
Y e a r / R a n k 1 9 9 2 R 1 9 9 1 R 1 9 9 0 R 1 9 8 9 R 1 9 8 8 R 1 9 8 7 R
P h i l i p s  (NL) N / A 1 1 7 2 1 1 3 3 0  . 5 1 9 6 3  . 4 1 1 0 0 2 1 9 6 9 1
S i e m e n s  (G) N / A 9 5 8 2 1 1 1 0  . 6 2 9 3 5 . 9 2 5 7 1 5 4 4 6 5
S G S T h o m s o n  ( F / I ) N / A 8 8 7 3 1 0 4 6 . 1 3 7 4 9  . 8 3 6 5 0 2 5 3 5 2
M o t o r o l a  (US) N / A 7 7 0 4 8 8 1 . 3 4 6 5 7 . 3 4 6 1 6 4 5 0 1 4
T e x a s  I n s t . (US) N / A 7 6 0 6 7 3 3  . 8 5 6 4 7  . 4 5 6 3 6 3 5 2 5 3
I n t e l  (US) N / A 6 2 9 5 7 1 6  . 5 6 5 2 9 . 6 6 4 8 5 6 2 9 5 7
T o s h i b a  ( J ) N / A 5 0 9 7 5 6 4  . 4 7 4 2 2  . 8 8 3 4 9 9 1 6 4 13
NEC ( J ) N / A 4 5 2 8 4 8 0  . 4 8 4 2 8 . 3 7 3 7 0 8 2 5 8 8
N a t . S e m i c . (US) N / A 4 0 8 9 4 7 0  . 0 9 3 8 1 . 0 9 3 9 0 7 3 8 2 6
H i t a c h i  ( J ) N / A 3 1 8 10 3 1 4  . 5 11 2 9 0 . 7 10 N / A 1 8 1 12
AMD (US) N / A 3 0 7 11 3 1 4  . 5 10 2 8 6  .3 11 2 7 9 10 2 4 6 9
S a m s u n g  (SK) N / A 2 6 3 12 2 1 8 . 9 15 2 0 0  . 4 14 N / A N / A
I T T  (US) N / A 2 4 0 13 2 6 7  . 2 12 2 5 0 . 0 12 N / A 2 4 3 10
GEC P l e s s e y  (UK) N / A 2 2 1 14 2 5 0 . 0 13 N / A  a N / A  a N / A  a
T e l e f u n k e n  (G) N / A 2 2 0 15 2 4 5  . 4 14 2 1 4  . 7 13 N / A 1 9 4 11
M i t s u b i s h i  ( J ) N / A 1 7 9 16 1 5 5 . 5 18 2 0 0 . 4 15 N / A N / A
H a r r i s  (US) N / A 1 5 0 17 1 9 1 . 2 17 1 4 5 . 3 17 N / A N / A
F u j i t s u  ( J ) N / A 1 4 7 18 2 0 0 . 5 16 1 9 8 . 2 1 6 N / A 7 7 17
A n a l o g  D e v . ( U S ) N / A 1 3 6 19 1 1 8  . 7 19 [ 9 4 . 7 21] N / A 7 7 1 6
O k i  ( J ) N / A 1 0 4 2 0 N / A N / A N / A N / A
L S I  L o g i c  (US) N / A N / A 9 7 . 9 20 [ 7 2 . 7 23] N / A N / A
GE S o l i d  (US) N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A 1 2 2 14
P l e s s e y  (UK) N / A N / A  a N / A  a N / A N / A ‘ 92 15
ABB (CH) N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A 72 18
F e r r a n t i  (UK) N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A 6 5 a 19
HP (US) N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A 5 1 2 0
A p p e n d ix  5 . 4
Y e a r / R a n k 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 0 1 9 8 9 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 7
US (%) N / A 3 7 . 4 4 0  . 7 3 6 . 9 42  . 0 4 9 . 8
J a p a n  (%) N / A 18 . 6 13 . 7 1 9 . 0 1 4 . 2 5 . 7
E u r o p e  (%) N / A 4 4  . 0 4 5 . 6 4 4  . 1 4 3 . 9 4 4  . 3
Cum. T 1 0  i n $mn N / A 6 8 6 3  . 0 7 6 4 8 . 1 6 0 0 6 . 2 5 0 6 9 . 0 4 4 0 0  . 0
US (%) N / A 3 8 . 5 3 9 . 1 4 0  .Ojb N / A 4 4  . 4
J a p a n  (%) N / A 19  . 4 17  . 7 20  . l jb N / A 12  . 4
E u r o p e  (%) N / A 3 9 . 2 4 1 . 0 3 1 . 3 b N / A 4 3  . 2
O t h e r  (%) N / A 3 . 0 2 . 3 2 . 6 b N / A 0 . 0
<
Cum. T 2 0  i n $mn N / A 8 8 3 0  . 0 9 7 0 7  . 9 1 6 6 8 . 9 b N / A 5 4 9 5 . 0
EUR M a r k e t i n  $mn N / A 1 1 3 7 0  . 0 1 2 2 8 4 E 8 8 0 8 . 6 N / A N / A
S o u r c e s : 1991 .D a ta :  D a t a q u e s t i n  Nakamoto ,  28  May 1 9 9 2 : 6  and Nakamoto ,  13 J a n u a r y  19 9 2 ;  1990  D a t a : EC Panorama,  1 9 9 2 : 1 2 - 5 / 6
Data. 1989 :  EC Panorama , 1991: 1 2 - 1 1 ;  D a ta  19 88:  The E c o n o m i s t . 18 F e b r u a r y  1989: 74; D a t a  1987: D a t a q u e s t  i n  D o d s w o r t h ,  1.
D e c e m b e r  1 9 8 8 .
Notes:
• Statistics denoted in ECUs have been converted into dollars on the basis of Annex.01
[ ] Not in Top 2 0
a In 1987, Ferranti was taken over by Plessey which, in its turn, was acquired by Siemens and GEC.
b Top 20 = Revenues of the Top 17 firms plus AD and LSI Logic
E Estimate based on reverse calculation, through calculating the sum of each Top 10 player's ((sales/market share) x
100), and dividing this by 10
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Appendix 5.5
WORLD MEMORY AND MICROPROCESSOR PRODUCTION BY REGION, 
1990
Share in World Production (in %), 1990
4
USA JAP EUR OTH
DRAMs 17 .2% 64.5% 4.2% 14.0%
EPROMs 41.0% 49.5% 7.0% 3.5% (a)
MICROPROCESSORS 74.3% 9.2% 2.3% 14.2% (a)
Sources: Data DRAMs: Dataquest in Butler and Kehoe, 14 July 1992:17
Data EPROMs and Microprocessors: Dataquest in Tyson (1992:125,127). 
Note:
(a) This category may include smaller American, Japanese and European 
as well as South East Asian suppliers
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Appendix 5.6
WORLD COMPUTER PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION AND US
DOMINANCE IN SUPPLYING MARKETS, 1950s-1960s
World
1958-
Computer
1964
Production by Region of Origin
1
in $ mn,
Year USA JAP EUR . UK GER FRA
1958 324 _ 52 15 27 10
1961 546 13 193 74 48 71
1964 977 71 332 124 102 106
S o u r c e : Freeman, H a r l o w  and F u l l e r  ( 1 9 6 5 : 4 3 - 4 4 )  .
Note: EUR = UK + G + F
World Computer Consumption: Computer Use per Million People 
by Region, 1950-1970
Year USA JAP EUR . UK GER FRA
1950 0.01 0.0 0.02 . 0.05 0.0 0.0
1955 1.5 0.0 0.2 . 0.3 0.1 0.1
1960 29.9 0.9 4.4 . 4 .1 5.4 3.6
1965 127.1 19 .0 33.3 . 29.2 39.2 30.9
1970 361.2 77 .4 112.4 . 113 .1 115 .4 108 .1
S o u r c e s : Flamm ( 1 9 8 8 : 1 3 5 ) ; S t a t i s t i c a l A b s t r a c t s  o f  F r a n c e ,  t h e  UK,
Germany, Ja pa n and t h e  US.
Note: EUR = UK + G + F
US Dominance 
Percentage of
in Supplying World Computer 
Demand Supplied by US Firms, 1961-
Markets: 
1971
Year USA JAP EUR . UK GER FRA
1961 100 56 45 17 70 49
1966 100 35 58 51 72 51
1971 100 32 59 50 78 50
S o u r c e :  Flamm ( 1 9 8 8 : 1 3 5 ) .
Notes:
• EUR = UK + G + F
• USA 1971 Data = Estimate. Percentage was probably less than 100
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Appendix 5.7
WORLD COMPUTER PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION AND TRADE, 1975-
1993
World Computer Production by Region 
mn, 1975-1993
of Origin
i
in % and $
Year USA/CAN JAP/SEASIA EUR WORLD
1975 N/A N/A N/A N/A
89.5 6.5 4.0 100.0
1984 105571.3 12084.7 14427.3 132083 .3
79.9 9.2 10.9 100.0
1985 115566.5 18517 .2 16747.0 180830.7
76.6 12 .3 11.1 100.0
1986 123600.3 30580.7 22704.7 176885.7
69.9 17 .3 12.8 100.0
1987 132986.3 39906.0 35989.6 208881.9
63 .7 19.1 17 .2 100.0
1988 149120 .7 53907 .4 40094.3 243122.4
61.3 22 .2 16.5 100.0
1989 158980.9 58740 .2 38052.2 255773.3
62 .2 23 .0 14 .9 100 .0
1990 174968 .1 64139.5 39404.0 278511.6
62.8 23 .0 14 .2 100.0
1991 180357 .2 77530 .3 31302.2 289921.6
62 .2 26.7 10.8 100.0
1992 199795 .8 83609.3 34588.2 317993.3
62 .8 26.3 10.9 100.0
1993 213781.4 93618 .2 30598 .3 337997.9
63 .3 27 . 7 9.1 100.0
S o u r c e s :  D a t a  1975:  M a l e r b a ,  T o r i s s i  and  vo n Tu nz e lman  ( 1 9 9 1 : 1 0 7 - 1 0 8 ) ;
D a t a  1 9 8 4 - 1 9 9 2  : D a t a m a t i o n . 1 June  1 9 8 5 : 5 0 ,  52 ;  15  J u n e  1 9 8 6 : 5 6 - 5 9 ;  15 Jun e
1 9 8 7 : 4 2 - 4 5 ;  15 Jun e  1 9 8 8 : 2 9 ;  15 June  1 9 8 9 : 1 1 ;  15 J u n e  1 9 9 0 : 2 0 2 - 2 0 3 ;  15
June  1 9 9 1 : 1 1 ;  15 June  1 9 9 2 : 1 3 ;  15 June  1 9 9 3 : 1 3 ;  15  Ju n e  1 9 9 4 : 4 6 .
Notes:
• Data 1975: North American Data = 100% - (SE Asian% + EUR%)
• Data 1984+: World Computer Production = IT Revenues Top 100 IT 
Firms
• Statistics incorporate data on computer hardware, software, 
services and datacommunications
• ICL has been incorporated into the European share, also after its 
takeover by Fujitsu. If ICL is included into the Japanese share, 
the latter would increase to 24.1 per cent in 1990, 27.9 per cent 
in 1991, 27.7 per cent in 1992 and 28.9 per cent in 1993, while the 
European share would decline to 13.1 per cent in 1990, 9.7 per cent in 
1991, 9.5 per cent in 1992 and 7.9 per cent in 1993
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World Computer Consumption by Region in %, 1989-1992
Year USA JAP EUR ROW WORLD
1989 39.0 26.0 32.0 3.0 255.8 $bn
1992 35.3 17.4 36.5 10.8 351.4 ECUbn
S o u r c e :  1989:  D a t a m a t i o n , 15 June  1 9 9 0 : 2 7 ;  1992:  IDC i n  EITO ( 1 9 9 3 : 2 1 0).
Notes:
• 1989 World Computer Consumption = IT Sales Top 100 IT 
Firms
• Statistics incorporate data on computer hardware, software, 
services and datacommunications
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The EC Computer Industry: Trade, Import Penetration, Export Orientation, and Value Added (at current 
prices) in Ecu mn, 1980-1992.
Trade 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Extra EC
EC EXP 
EC IMP 
EC BAL
2809
4537
-1728
3277
5803
-2526
3669
7133
-3464
4612
9113
-4501
6525
12875
-6349
8316
14448
-6133
7753
13663
-5910
7752
15229
-7477
8211
18966
-10755
9327
21444
-12117
9190
21695
-12505
9907E 
23772E 
-13865E -
10502E
26200
15698
EC
CONS
PROD
15467
13739
17272
14746
23432
19968
28592
24091
36464
30115
42514
36381
42068
36158
43817
36340
53364
42609
57636
45519
59370
46865
62377
48512
67761E
52083E
Extra EC
M/C (%) 
X/P (%)
29.3 
20 .4
33 . 6 
22 .2
30.4 
18 .4
31.9
19.1
35 .3 
21. 7
34 .0 
22.9
32 .5 
21.4
34.8
21.3
35 .5 
19 .3
37 .2 
20.5
36.5
19.6
38 .IE 
20 .4E
N/A 
20 .2%
VA 6582 7249 9763 10719 13203 15265 15619 16148 18145 19410 20668 19285 N/A
Sources: Data 1980-1981: EC Panorama, 1991:12-28/36; Data VA: EC Panorama 1992:12-13; Data 1982-1992: EC Panorama
1993:10-14.
Notes:
• EXP = Exports • IMP = Imports • BAL = Trade Balance • CONS = Consumption • PROD = Production • M/C =
Import/Consumption = Import Penetration • X/P = Export/Production = Export Orientation • VA = Value Added
• Statistics incorporate data on computer and office equipment
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MARKET SHARES OF THE LEADING 15 FIRMS BY PRODUCT SEGMENT AND REGION OF ORIGIN, 1985-1992
Mainframes, in % of Datamation Top 100 Revenues
1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985
Top 15
USA 44.5 
J/SEA 45.5 
EC 9.1 
Non-Top 15 0.9
44 .1 
44.2 
9.6 
2 .1
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
53 .5 
36 .7 
8.3 
1.5
57.1 
32 .2 
8.4 
2.2
68 . 0 
22 .4 
7.7 
1. 9
78 .4 
14 . 5 
5.2 
1.9
Minicomputers, in % of Datamation Top 100 Revenues
1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985
Top 15
USA 53.1 
J/SEA 30.8 
EC 11.9 
Non-Top 15 4.2
54 .7 
30.6 
8 . 0 
6.7
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
57 .6 
13 .3 
6.5 
22 .6
55.0 
12 .7 
5.4 
26.9
50 .7 
10.9 
9.2 
29.2
63.0 
2.6 
6.7 
27 .7
Microcomputers, in % of Datamation Top 100 Revenues
1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985
Top 15 PC 
USA 51.9 
J/SEA 21.2 
EC 6.7 
Non-Top 15 20.2
WS 
66 .5 
25.7
7.8
PC
50.7 
21.3 
5,6 
22 .4
WS 
61.2 
26 .7 
1.6 
10.5
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
62 .6 
12 .4 
7.9 
17.1
63.8
11.2
7.3
17.7
64 .1 
10.3 
6.6 
19.0
74 .6 
4.0 
7.3 
14.1
Sources: Datamation, 15 June 1993:22; 15 June 1992:26; 15 June 1990: 184,185,187,189; 15 June 1989:150,152,154; 15 June 1988: 156,157,160; 15 June 
1987:30,31; 15 June 1986:44,45.
Notes: PC Personal Computer, WS Workstation
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WORLD TOP 20 COMPUTER SUPPLIERS, TOP 10 COMPUTER SUPPLIERS TO THE EUROPEAN MARKET AND TOP 10 
EUROPEAN-GROWN COMPUTER PRODUCERS, 1987-1993
World Top 20 Computer Suppliers by Dataprocesslng Revenues in $ Millions, 1987-1993
Year/Rank 1993 R 1992 R 1991 R 1990 R 1989 R 1988 R 1987 R
IBM(US) 62716 . 0 1 64520.0 1 62840.0 1 67090.0 1 60805 .0 1 55002 .8 1 50485.7 1
Fujitsu (J) 21871. 9 2 20142 .2 2 19330.9 2 12361.5 3 11378.9 4 10999 .1 3 8740.0 4
NEC (J) 16674.8 3 15395 .0 3 15317.6 3 12350 .3 4 11480 .4 3 10475 . 7 4 8230.5 5
HP (US) 15600.0 4 12688.0 5 10726.0 5 9300.0 7 7800.0 7 6300.0 7 5000.0 9
DEC (US) 13637.0 5 14162 .0 4 14237 .8 4 13072.3 2 12936.7 2 12284 . 7 2 10391.3 2
Hitachi (J) 12629.1 6 11450.0 6 10310.2 6 9590.9 5 8719.0 6 8247.6 6 6273 .7 6
AT&T (US) 9860.0 7 10450.0 7 8169.0 7 2900.0 1 8 2865.0 1 7 [2445.0 2 1 ] [2000.0 2 3 ]
Toshiba (J) 8819.7 8 7448 .7 1 0 5115.9 1 3 4764.5 1 3 4595.1 1 3 4226.6 1 3 3441.3 1 1
EDS (US) 8507.3 9 4870.0 1 5 3666.1 1 6 2870.0 1 9 [2477.9 2 3 ] [1907.6 2 7 ] [1440.5 3 1 ]
Apple (US) 7900.0 1 0 7173.7 1 1 6496.0 1 0 5740.0 1 1 5372.3 1 1 4434.1 1 2 3041.2 1 3
Siemens (G) 7225.5 1 1 8345.1 8 a 7308.6 9 a 7735.1 8 a 6010.6 9 5951.0 8 5703.0 7
Unisys (US) 7200.5 1 2 7832.0 9 8000.0 8 9302 .0 6 9390.0 5 9100.0 5 8742.0 3
Compaq (US) 7200.0 1 3 4100.0 1 8 3271.4 1 9 3598.0 1 6 2876.1 1 6 [2065.6 2 4 ] [1224.1 3 7 ]
Olivetti(I) 5070.2 1 4 5762.0 1 2 6050.8 1 1 6414.5 9 5573 .3 1 0 5427.9 9 4637.2 1 0
Matsush.(J) 5050.7 1 5 5060.8 1 4 5068.8 1 4 3731.0 1 5 3663 .7 1 5 3441.0 1 4 2628.5 1 7
Canon (J) 5033 .0 1 6 4633 .6 1 6 3751.5 1 5 4669.2 1 4 3783 .3 1 4 3391.6 1 5 1673 .4 2 7
Bull (F) 5000.0 1 7 5715.1 1 3 5929.8 1 2 6349.6 1 0 6465.4 8 5296.7 1 1 3007.5 1 4
Sun (US) 4493 .0 1 8 3832.0 1 9 3454.7 1 7 [2762.8 2 2 ] [2062.5 2 7 ] [1461.6 3 7 ] [ 755.9 5 6 ]
Microst.(US) 4110 .0 1 9 3253.0 2 0 [2275.9 2 4 ] [1480.0 4 2 ] [ 952.8 5 0 ] [ 718.6 6 6 ] [ 456.7 7 8 ]
ICL (J/UK) 3915.7 2 0 4354.8 1 7 3308.1 1 8 2862.9 2 0 [2643 .4 2 2 ]  jb [2425 .1 2 2 ] b  2123.9 2 0 b
NCR (US) N/A d N/A d N/A d 5617.0 1 2 5319.0 1 2 5324.0 1 0 5075.7 8
Annex 5 . 9
Year/Rank 1993 R 1992 R 1991 R 1990 R 1989 R 1988 R 1987 R
Philips (NL) N/A c N/A c N/A c 3283.9 17 2814.8 1 8 2794.6 1 9 2601.6 1 8
Nixdorf (G) N/A a N/A a N/A a N/A a 2792.6 1 9 3044.9 1 8 2821.5 1 6
Control Data (US) N/A [ 517.0 9 7 ] [1172.6 4 6 ] [1121.9 5 0 ] [1691.0 3 5 ] 3524.3 1 6 3000.9 1 5
Wang (US) 904.2 6 5 [1490.0 42] [1940.0 3 1 ] [2363.0 24] [2697.0 2 1 ] 3074.4 1 7 3045.7 1 2
Xerox (US) 3330.0 22 [3016.0 23] 2930.0 2 0 [2800.0 2 1 ] 2790.0 2 0 2650.0 2 0 2415.0 1 9
Cum. T10 178215.8 172433.0 162736.1 153566.2 140559.3 129112.8 113279.1
Cum. T2 0 232514.4 221188.0 205283.2 193602.7 177431.2 164991.0 141406.2
Cum. T100 337997.9 317993.3 289921.6 278511.6 255773.3 243122.4 208881.9 ^
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________On------------------------------------------------------------------  4^
S o u r c e s :  1993 d a t a :  D a t a m a t i o n , 15 Jun e  1 9 9 4 : 4 5 ;  1992 data: D a t a m a t i o n ,  15 Jun e  1 9 9 3 : 1 3 ;  1991 d a t a :  D a t a m a t i o n ,  15 June
1 9 9 2 : 1 3 ;  1990 d a t a :  D a t a m a t i o n ,  15 J un e ,  1 9 9 1 : 1 1 ;  1989  d a t a :  D a t a m a t i o n ,  15 Ju ne ,  1 9 9 0 : 3 2 ;  1988 data: D a t a m a t i o n ,  15  Ju ne ,
1 9 8 9 : 1 1 ;  1987  d a t a :  D a t a m a t i o n ,  15 Ju ne ,  1 9 8 8 : 2 9 .
Notes:
• Statistics incorporate data on computer hardware, software, services and datacommunications
a Data for the period 1990-1992 refer to Siemens/Nixdorf (SNI). Nixdorf was taken over by Siemens in 1990
b Data for the period 1987-1989 refer to STC and include ICL's revenues. STC sold a majority stake of ICL to Fujitsu
in 1990
c Philips and Mannesmann sold their computer divisions to Digital (US), while Nokia Data was taken over by ICL. Nokia
Data was formed in 1988, when Nokia took over Ericsson's data systems business 
d AT&T acquired NCR in 1991
[ ] Not in Top 2 0
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Top 20 Computer Suppliers to the European Market by European Dataprocessing Revenues in $ Millions,
1987-1993
Year/Rank 1993 1992 1991 R %TR 1990 R %TR 1989 R %TR R88 1987 R %TR
IBM (US) N/A N/A 25136.0 1 40 26836.0 1 40 21281.8 1 35 1 18332 .5 1 36
Siemens (G) N/A N/A 6943 .2 2 95 6961.0 2 90 5409.6 2 90 2 4961.6 2 87
DEC (US) N/A N/A 6549 .4 3 46 6490.4 3 42 4915.9 3 38 3 3533 .0 4 34
Olivetti (I) N/A N/A 5082.6 4 84 5324.1 4 83 4514.4 4 81 4 3802.5 3 82
Bull (F) N/A N/A 4269.5 5 72 4508.2 5 71 4073 .2 5 63 5 2345.8 6 78
HP (US) N/A N/A 3968.6 6 37 3534.0 6 38 2886.0 6 37 8 1800.0 9 36
Fujitsu (J) N/A N/A 2899 . 6 7 15 [1483 .4 N/A] N/A N/A N/A
ICL (J/UK) N/A N/A 2845.0 8 86 2290.3 9 80 2167.6 b  9 82 1 0 1720.4h> 1 0 81
Unisys (US) N/A N/A 2400.0 9 30 2883 .6 7 31 2723.1 7 29 7 2272.9 7 26
Apple (US) N/A N/A 1883 .8 1 0 29 1607 .2 1 2 28 1235.6 1 3 23 1 7 [ 547.4 2 1 ] 18
Compaq (US) N/A N/A 1635.7 1 1 50 1691.1 1 1 47 1179.2 1 5 41 2 5 N/A
AT&T (US) N/A N/A 1470 .4 1 2 18 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Canon (J) N/A N/A 1087.9 1 3 29 1354 .1 1 4 29 945.8 1 6 25 1 6 N/A
Sun (US) N/A N/A. 1036.4 1 4 30 828.9 1 9 30 N/A N/A N/A
Finsiel (I) N/A N/A 1015.6 1 5 100 861.2 1 8 100 [ 636.0 2 3 ] 96 N/A N/A
Xerox (US) N/A N/A 966.9 1 6 33 980.0 1 7 35 892.8 1 8 32 N/A N/A
Commodore (US) N/A N/A 903 .5 1 7 87 [ 746.8 2 3 ] 75 [ 597.9 2 5 ] 69 N/A N/A
Andersen (US) N/A N/A 881.4 1 8 39 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Wang (US) N/A N/A 698.4 1 9 36 [ 756.2 2 2 ] 32 836.1 1 9 31 1 9 822 .3 1 9 27
Prime (US) N/A N/A 691.2 2 0 50 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Philips (NL) N/A N/A N/A c 2495.8 8 76 2054.8 1 0 73 9 2055.2 8 79
NCR (US) N/A N/A N/A d 1966.0 1 0 35 1702.1 1 1 32 1 1 1383.6 1 1 31
CGS (F) N/A N/A N/A 1465.9 1 3 87 893.8 1 7 81 2 1 [ 545.8 2 2 ] 80
Alcatel (F) N/A N/A N/A 1341.9 1 5 71 1476.2 1 2 82 1 2 1272 .3 1 3 62
Nokia (FIN) N/A N/A N/Ac 1279.9 1 6 100 1180.0 1 4 99 1 4 N/A c
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Year/Rank 1993 1992 1991 R %TR 1990 R %TR 1989 R %TR R88 1987 R %TR
Memorex (NL) N/A N/A N/A 831.7 20 42 [ 678.7 22] 33 N/A 832.9 1 8 80
Nixdorf (G) N/A N/A N/Aa N/Aa 2597.1 8 93 6 2652.2 5 94
Mannesmann (G) N/A N/A N/A N/A 753.6 2 0  92 N/A 617.0 2 0 90
Ericsson (Sw) N/A N/A N/Ac N/A c N/Ac N/A 1284.9 1 2 85
Inspector.(CH) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1033.0 1 4 84
SG (F) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 970.1 1 5 100
Atlantic (UK) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 892 .7 1 6 93
Honeywell (US) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 885.4 1 7 43
US (%) N/A N/A 64 .4 65 .4 60.4 N/A 59.7
Japan (%) N/A N/A 4.7 0.0 0.0 N/A 0.0
Europe (%) N/A N/A 30 . 9Jb 34. 6jb 39.6 N/A 40.3 Ii
Cum. T10 in $mn 61977.7 62289.4 52623 .5 N/A 43476.1
US (%) N/A N/A 66.6 61.5 59.1 N/A 54.5
Japan (%) N/A N/A 5.5 1.8 1.5 N/A 0.0
Europe (%) N/A N/A 27.9 36.7 39.4 N/A 45.5
Cum. T2 0 in $mn 72365.1 74513.3 63718.7 N/A 53670.3
S o u r c e s :  1991 D a t a :  D a t a m a t i o n , 1 J u l y  1992 : 63;  1990 D a t a :  D a t a m a t i o n , 15 J u n e ,  1 9 9 1 : 1 1 ; 1989 and 1 98 8  Rank ( d a t a  n o i
a v a i l a b l e ) : D a t a m a t i o n , 1 J u l y 1 9 9 0 : 1 1 2 - 2 / 3 ; 1987  D a t a :  D a t a m a t i o n , 1 A u g u s t  1 9 8 8 : 4 8 - 2 / 3 .
Notes: see below
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Notes:
• Statistics incorporate data on computer hardware, software, services and datacommunications
a Data for the period 1990-1992 refer to Siemens/Nixdorf (SNI). Nixdorf was taken over by Siemens in 1990
b  Data for the period 1987-1989 refer to STC and include ICL's revenues. The European share in the cumulative T10 and
T20 includes ICL
c Philips and Mannesmann sold their computer divisions to Digital (US), while Nokia Data was taken over by ICL. Nokia
Data was formed in 1988, when Nokia took over Ericsson's data systems business 
d NCR was taken over by AT&T in 1991. AT&T subsequently became the 12th largest supplier to the European computer market
[ ] Not in Top 10
R88 Rank in 1988
%TR European computer revenues as % of total dataprocessing revenues
-P*
ON
Appendix 5.10
WORLD HARDWARE MARKETS BY SEGMENT, 1987-1992
Share in Cumulative Revenues of Datamation Top 100 Firms, in (%)
1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987
Hardware
Processing 63 .1 63 .9 61.6 62 .1 59.0 57 . 6
Peripheral 36.9 36.1 38.4 37.9 41. 0 42 .4
Total HW (in $ bn) 174 .9 167 .9 161.8 148 .6 142 .2 123 .0
Processing Hardware
Mainframes 25.9 25.7 26.8 30.5 33 .3 37 .2
Minis 19.9 20.5 21.5 22.4 27.0 31.6
PCs 41.2 41.1 41.1 39.3 35 .7 31.3
Workstations 13 .0 12 .7 10.6 7.8 4.1
Total PHW (in $ bn) 110.4 107 .3 99.7 92 .3 83 .9 70.8
S o u r c e s :  D a t a m a t i o n ,  15 Jun e  1 9 9 3 : 2 3 ;  15 Ju ne  1 9 9 2 : 2 7 .  
Notes:
HW Hardware
PHW Processing Hardware
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TOP 10 OF EUROPEAN-GROWN COMPUTER PRODUCERS AND HARDWARE PRODUCERS BY PRODUCT CATEGORY AND 
THE SUPPLY STRUCTURE OF THE EUROPEAN-GROWN COMPUTER MNEs, 1987-1993
Top 10 of European-Grown Computer Producers and Smaller European-Grown Computer Producers by Product 
Category, in $ Millions and %, 1987-1993
Year
RDP
Total DP 
Revenue
Hardware 
Total % T RH
Software 
Total % T
Services 
Total % T
Datacomms 
Total % T
Other
Total % T
Siemens (G)
1993 1 7225 .5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1992 1 8345.1 4849.4 5 8 . 1 1 1058.4 1 2 .  7 2245.0 2 6 . 9 192 .4 2 . 3 -
1991 1 7308.6 4445.5 6 0 . 8 1 964 .4 1 3 . 2 1748.0 2 3 . 9 150.7 2 . 1 -
1990 1 7735 .1 4753 .0 6 1 . 5 1 925.9 1 2 . 0 1932.7 2 5 . 0 123 .5 1 . 6 -
1989 1 6010.6 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1988 1 5951.0 2847.4 4 7 . 9 3 626.4 1 0 . 5 1138.9 1 9 . 1 1338.3 2 2 . 5 -
1987 1 5703.0 2748.6 4 8 . 2 1 550.8 9 . 7 1001.5 1 7 . 6 1402 .1 2 4 . 6 -
Olivetti (I)
1993 2 5070.2 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1992 2 5762 .0 2824.7 4 9 . 0 2 707.8 1 2 . 3 1135.9 1 9 . 7 128 .7 2 . 2 964.9 1 6 . 8
1991 2 6050.8 3198.9 5 2 . 9 2 630.8 1 0 . 4 1094.5 1 8 . 1 164.1 2 . 7 962.5 1 5 . 9
1990 2 6414 .5 3553.9 5 5 . 4 3 621.3 9 . 7 1106.6 1 7 . 3 221.4 3 . 5 911.4 1 4 . 2
1989 3 5073 .3 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1988 2 5427.9 3160.7 5 8 . 2 1 414.4 7 . 6 926.6 1 7 . 1 232.9 4 . 3 690.3 1 2 . 7
1987 2 4637.2 2731.2 5 8 . 9 2 347.9 7 . 5 776.5 1 6 . 8 164.3 3 . 5 * 617.3 1 3 . 3
Bull (F)
1993 3 5000.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1992 3 5715.1 2800 .4 4 9 . 0 3 571.5 1 0 . 0 1886.0 3 3 . 0 - 457 .2 8 . 0
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Year Total DP Hardware Software Services Datacomms Other
RDP Revenue Total % T RH Total % T Total % T Total % T Total % T
Bull (F) C o n t i n u e d
1991 3 5929.8 2942.7 4 9 . 6 3 593.0 1 0 . 0 1779.0 3 0 . 0 - 415.1 7 . 0
1990 3 6349.6 3619.2 5 7 . 0 2 635.0 1 0 . 0 1650.9 2 6 .  0 - 444 .5 7 . 0
1989 1 6465 .4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1988 3 5296.7 3021.0 5 7  . 0 2 583.0 1 1 . 0 1692 .7 3 2 . 0 -
1987 3 3007 .5 2521.3 8 3 . 8 3 193 .3 6 . 4 292 .9 9 . 7 - -
ICL (J/UK)
1993 4 3915.7 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1992 4 4354.8 1981.1 4 5 . 5 4 692 .4 1 5 . 9 1317.4 3 0 . 3 - 381.9 8 . 8
1991 4 3308.1 1339.2 4 0 . 5 4 625.6 1 8 . 9 966.1 2 9 . 2 - 377.2 1 1 . 4
1990 5 2862 .9 1266.1 4 4 . 2 6 492.0 1 7 . 2 967.0 3 3 . 8 76.0 2 . 7 61.8 2 . 2
1989 6 2643 .4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1988 6 2425.1 1870.9 7 7  . 2 5 232 .2 9 . 6 226.8 9 . 4 95.2 3 . 9 -
1987 6 2123 .9 1645.5 7 7 . 5 5 207.0 9 . 8 192 .1 9 . 0 79.3 3 . 7 -
Gap Gemini (F)
1993 5 1946.9 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1992 5 2252 .9 - 360.5 1 6 .  0 1892.5 8 4 . 0 - -
1991 5 1776.3 - 284.2 1 6 .  0 1492.1 8 4 . 0 - -
1990 8 1684.9 - 33 .7 2 . 0 1465.9 8 7 . 0 - 33 .7 2 . 0
1989 10 1103 .4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1988 12 976.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1987 14 682 .3 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Memorex (NL)
1993 6 1070.9 N/A N/A N/A N/A “ N/A
1992 6 1408 .4 995.7 7 0 . 7 5 18.7 1 . 3 394.0 2 8 . 0 - -
1991 6 1533 .1 1140.1 7 4 . 4 5 3.7 0 . 2 389.3 2 5 . 4 - -
1990 6 1951.2 1324.8 6 7 . 9 5 - 401.1 2 0 . 6 - 225 .3 1 1 . 6
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Year
RDP
Total DP 
Revenue
Hardware 
Total % T RH
Software 
Total % T
Services 
Total % T
Datacomms 
Total % T
Other
Total % T
Memorex (NL)i C o n t i n u e d
1989 7 2056.6 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1988 7 2078.5 1392.8 6 7  . 0 7 - 417 .1 2 0 . 1 - 268.6 1 2 . 9
1987 10 1041.1 681.6 6 5 . 5 9 - 198.0 1 9 . 0 - 161.5 1 5 . 5
Finsiel (I)
1993 7 1027.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1992 7 1200.0 - 633.0 5 2 . 8 567.0 4 7 . 3 - -
1991 7 1015 . 6 - 609 .4 6 0 . 0 406.2 4 0 . 0 - -
1990 11 861.2 - 525 .2 6 1 . 0 336.0 3 9 . 0 - -
1989 14 662 .5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1988 17 545 .4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1987 19 424 .1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
BT (UK)
1993 10 731.3 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1992 8 857.6 - - 450.3 5 2 . 5 407 .4 4 7 . 5 -
1991 8 823.6 - - 432.1 5 2 . 5 391.5 4 7 . 5 -
1990 12 776.8 - - 403 .9 5 2 . 0 372.9 4 8 . 0 -
1989 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1988 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1987 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Sema Group (UK)
1993 8 749.3 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1992 9 732.3 - 68.0 9 . 3 664.3 9 0 . 7 - -
1991 11 640.5 - 640.5 1 0 0 - - -
1990 16 533 .4 - 533 .4 1 0 0 - - -
1989 19 378.6 N/A N/A - N/A N/A
1988 21 375.1 N/A N/A - N/A N/A
Appendix 5.11
Year Total DP Hardware Software Services Datacomms Other
RDP Revenue Total % T RH Total % T Total % T Total % T Total % T
Sema Group (UK) C o n t i n u e d
1987 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Comparex (G)
1993 9 736 .4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1992 10 731.9 592.7 8 1 . 0 6 - 139 .2 1 9 . 0 - -
1991 9 752 .3 631.9 8 4 . 0 6 - 120 .4 1 6 . 0 - -
1990 14 689 .4 578.6 8 3 . 9 10 - 110.8 1 6 . 1 - -
1989 16 566.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1988 15 614 .5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1987 18 530.8 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
R e m a i n i n g  1 9 9 1 : T o p  10 C o m p u t e r  F i r m s
Racal (UK)
1993 14 583.6 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1992 12 690 .7 - - - 690.7 100 -
1991 10 679.0 - - - 679.0 100 -
1990 13 693.0 - - - 693 .0 100 -
1989 15 573.9 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1988 16 554.1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1987 16 549.1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
R e m a i n i n g  1 9 9 0  T o p  1 0 C o m p u t e r  F i r m s
Philips (NL)
1993 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1992 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
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Year
RDP
Total DP 
Revenue
Hardware 
Total % T RH
Software 
Total % T
Services 
Total % T
Datacomms 
Total % T
Other
Total % T
Philips (NL)i C o n t i n u e d
1991 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1990 4 3283 .9 2075.8 63.2 4 104 .3 3.2 472.3 14.4 510 .7 15.6 120.8 3.7
1989 4 2814.8 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1988 5 2794.6 1626 .2 58.2 6 184 . 6 6.6 417 .3 1 4 . 9 460.3 16.5 106 .2 3.8
1987 5 2601.6 1411.9 54.3 6 162 .9 6.3 385.1 1 4 . 8 518 .3 1 9 . 9 123 .4 4.7
Alcatel (F)
1993 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1992 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1991 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1990 7 1890.0 911.0 48.2 7 91.0 4.8 94 .2 5 . 0 793 .8 4 2 . 0 -
1989 8 1800.3 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1988 8 1716.0 828 .4 48.3 8 106.5 6.2 - 721.9 4 2 . 1 59.2 3.5
1987 7 2052.1 853 .1 41.8 7 103.8 5.1 - 1037.6 5 0 . 6 57 .6 2.8
Nokia (FIN)
1993 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1992 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1991 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1990 9 1279.9 691.7 54. 0 9 59.1 4.6 352.6 2 7 . 6 91.0 7 . 1 85.5 6. 7
1989 9 1191.9 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1988 11 1165.1 721.2 6 1 . 9 9 59.1 5.1 203.0 1 7 . 4 58.1 5 . 0 123 .1 1 0 . 6
1987 22 375.3 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Mannesmann (G)
1993 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1992 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1991 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1990 10 893 .2 759.2 8 5 . 0 8 - 134.0 1 5 . 0 - -
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Year
RDP
Total DP 
Revenue
Hardware 
Total % T RH
Software 
Total % T
Services 
Total % T
Datacomms 
Total % T
Other
Total % T
Mannesmann (G)' C o n t i n u e d
1989 11 819.1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1988 14 779 .0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1987 13 686.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
R e m a i n i n g  1 9 8 7 / 8 8  T o p  1 0 C o m p u t e r  F i r m s
Nixdorf (G)
1993 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1992 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1991 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1990 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1989 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1988 4 3044.9 2100.5 69.0 4 418 .6 1 3 . 8 346.9 1 1 . 4 178.9 5.9 -
1987 4 2821.5 1945 . 6 6 9 . 0 4 405.8 1 4 . 4 295.3 1 0 . 5 174.8 6 . 2 -
Ericsson (Sw)
1993 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1992 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1991 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1990 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1989 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1988 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1987 8 1511.6 755.8 5 0 . 0 8 - - 529.0 35.0 226.8 15.0
Inspectorate (CH)
1993 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1992 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1991 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
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Year
RDP
Total DP 
Revenue
Hardware 
Total % T RH
Software 
Total % T
Services 
Total % T
Datacomms 
Total % T
Other
Total % T
Inspectorate (CH)
1990 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1989 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1988 9 1230.3 44 .4 3 . 6 - N/A N/A N/A 1185.9 96.4
1987 9 1225.0 61.3 5 . 0 - N/A N/A N/A 1163 .7 9 5 . 0
R e m a i n i n g  E u r o p e a n  T o p 1 0  H a r d w a r e  P r o d u c e r s ( R H )
Getronics (NL)
1993 11 703.8 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1992 14 584.3 240.3 4 1 . 1 7 25 .6 4.4 232 .9 3 9 . 9 85 .4 14 . 6 -
1991 14 442 .5 132 .7 3 0 . 0 10 - 274 .4 6 2 . 0 35 .4 8 . 0 -
1990 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1989 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1988 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1987 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Amstrad (UK)
1993 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1992 24 214.1 214.1 1 0 0 8 - - - -
1991 21 313 .4 289 .2 9 2 . 3 7 13 .3 4 . 2 10.9 3 . 5 - -
1990 17 518.7 509.8 9 8 . 3 11 8 .9 1.7 - - -
1989 12 717 .0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1988 13 841.8 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1987 17 533.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A * N/A
Tulip (NL)
1993 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1992 25 185.6 185 .6 1 0 0 9 - - - -
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Year
RDP
Total DP 
Revenue
Hardware 
Total % T RH
Software 
Total % T
Services 
Total % T
Datacomms 
Total % T
Other
Total % T
Tulip (NL) C o n t i n u e d
1991 25 215.5 215.5 1 0 0 8 - - - -
1990 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1989 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1988 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1987 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Sligos (F)
1993 12 675.2 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1992 13 689.1 82 .5 1 2 . 0 10 68. 9 1 0 . 0 537.7 78. 0 - -
1991 12 569.3 85.4 1 5 . 0 NT 56. 9 1 0 . 0 427.0 7 5 . 0 - -
1990 15 538.7 79.6 1 4 . 8 NT 53 .1 9 . 9 406.0 7 5 . 4 - -
1989 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1988 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1987 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Norsk Data (N)
1993 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1992 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1991 24 282 .0 154.5 5 4 . 8 9 22 .7 8 . 0 104.8 3 7 . 2 - -
1990 20 383 .5 212 .0 5 5 . 3 12 31. 2 8 . 1 140.3 3 6 . 6 - -
1989 20 358.1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1988 18 450.2 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1987 20 422 .6 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
S o u r c e s :  1987  Data.: D a t a m a t i o n ,  15 June  1988;  1988 D a t a :  1 J u l y  1989;  1990  D a t a :  D a t a m a t i o n ,  1 J u l y  1 ^ 9 1 : 6 4 ;  1991 D a t a :  
D a t a m a t i o n ,  1 J u l y  1 9 9 2 : 6 2 ;  1992 D a t a :  D a t a m a t i o n ,  1 J u l y  1993;  1993 D a t a :  15 Jun e  1 9 9 4 : 4 6 .
Notes: see below
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Top 10 of European-Grown Hardware Producers, in $ Millions and %, 1987-1993
Year HW Peripherals Processing Mainframes Minis PCs Workstations
RH Total Total % HW Total % HW Total % HW Total % HW Total % HW Total % HW
Siemens (G)
1993 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1992 1 4849 .4 1770 .4 3 6 . 5 3079.0 6 3 . 5 962.2 1 9 . 8 1026.3 2 1 . 2 705.6 1 4 . 6 384 .9 7 . 9
1991 1 4445 .5 1773 .0 3 9 . 9 2712.5 6 1 . 0 964 .4 2 1 .  7 934.3 2 1 . 0 602 .8 1 3 . 6 211.0 4 . 8
1990 1 4753 . 0 1994 .4 4 0 . 9 2808.6 5 9 . 1 1018.5 2 1 . 4 925.9 1 9 . 5 709 .9 1 4 . 9 154.3 3 . 3
1989 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1988 3 2847 .4 1566.1 5 5 .  0 1281.3 4 5 . 0 683 .4 2 4 . 0 284.7 1 0 . 0 313 .2 1 1 . 0 -
1987 1 2748.6 1502 .3 5 4 . 7 1246 .3 4 5 . 3 695.5 2 5 . 3 311.6 1 1 . 3 239.2 8 . 7 -
Olivetti (I)
1993 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1992 2 2824.7 895.3 3 1 . 7 1929 .4 6 8 . 3 104.5 3 . 7 476.2 1 6 . 9 1348.7 4 7 . 8 -
1991 2 3198 .9 1018 .6 3 1 . 8 2180.3 6 8 . 2 115.6 3 . 6 478.6 1 5 . 0 1586.1 4 9 . 6 -
1990 3 3553 .9 1113 .8 3 1 . 3 2440.1 6 8 . 7 121.8 3 . 4 526.6 1 4 . 8 1791.7 5 0 . 4 -
1989 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1988 1 3160.7 999.7 3 1 . 6 2161.0 6 8 . 4 119.2 3 . 8 614.3 1 9 . 4 1427.5 4 5 . 2 -
1987 2 2731.2 855.5 3 1 . 3 1875 .7 6 8 . 7 95.8 3 . 5 603 .9 2 2 . 1 1176.0 4 3 . 1 -
Bull (F)
1993 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1992 3 2800.4 914 .4 3 2 . 7 1886.0 6 7 . 4 857.3 3 0 . 7 342 .9 1 2 . 3 685.8 2 4 . 5 -
1991 3 2942 .7 1067 .4 3 6 . 3 1875.3 6 3 . 7 630.2 2 1 . 4 355.6 1 2 . 1 889 .5 3 0 . 2 -
1990 2 3619.2 1333 .4 3 6 . 8 2285.8 6 3 . 2 825.4 2 2 . 8 317.5 8 . 8 1142 .9 3 1 . 6 -
1989 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A * N/A
1988 2 3021.0 1325.0 4 3 . 9 1696.0 5 6 . 1 901.0 2 9 . 8 477 .0 1 5 . 8 318.0 1 0 . 5 -
1987 3 2521.3 1172 .1 4 6 . 5 1349 .2 5 3 . 5 962 .6 3 8 . 2 193 .3 7 . 7 193 .3 7 . 7 -
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Year HW Peripherals Processing Mainframes Minis PCs Workstations
RH Total Total % HW Total % HW Total % HW Total % HW Total % HW Total % HW
ICL (J/UK)
1993 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1992 4 1981.1 - 1981.1 1 0 0 531.2 2 6 . 8 713 .5 3 6 .  0 736.4 3 7 . 2 -
1991 4 1339.2 - 1339.2 1 0 0 582.0 4 3 . 5 268.8 2 0 . 1 297 .4 2 2 . 2 191. 0 1 4 . 3
1990 6 1266.1 260.8 2 0 . 6 1005.3 7 9 . 4 392.0 3 1 . 0 351.3 2 7 . 8 159.0 1 2 . 6 103 .0 8 . 1
1989 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1988 5 1870.9 813 .7 4 3 . 5 1057 .2 5 6 . 5 658 .4 3 5 . 2 398.8 2 1 . 3 - -
1987 5 1645 .5 715.0 4 3 . 5 930.5 5 6 . 6 596.8 3 6 . 3 333 .7 2 0 . 3 -
Memorex (NL)
1993 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1992 5 995.7 757 .3 7 6 . 1 238 .4 2 3 . 9 - - 238 .4 2 3 . 9 -
1991 5 1140 .1 888 .2 7 7 . 9 251.9 2 2 . 1 - - 207.6 1 8 . 2 44 .3 3 . 9
1990 5 1324.8 1111.5 8 3 . 9 213 .3 1 6 . 1 - - 213 .3 1 6 . 1 -
1989 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1988 7 1392.8 1339.1 9 6 . 1 53 .7 3 . 9 53 .7 3 . 9 - - -
1987 9 681.6 681.6 1 0 0 - - - - -
Comparex (G)
1993 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1992 6 592 .7 326.5 5 5 . 1 266.2 4 4 . 9 266.2 4 4 . 9 - - -
1991 6 631.9 346.0 5 4 . 8 285.9 4 5 . 2 285.9 4 5 . 2 - - -
1990 10 578.6 329.2 5 6 . 9 249.4 4 3 . 1 249.4 4 3 . 1 - - -
1989 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1988 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1987 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A “ N/A
Getronics (NL)
1993 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1992 7 240 .3 113 .9 4 7  . 4 126 .4 5 2 . 6 - - 69.5 2 8 . 9 56.9 2 3 . 7
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RH
HW
Total
Peripherals 
Total % HW
Processing 
Total % HW
Mainframes 
Total % HW
Minis
Total
PCs 
% HW Total % HW
Workstations 
Total % HW
Getronics (NL) C o n t i n u e d
1991 10 132 .7 88 .5 66. 7 44 .2 3 3 . 3 - - 26.6 2 0 . 0 17.6 1 3 . 3
1990 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1989 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1988 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1987 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Amstrad (UK)
1993 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1992 8 214.1 11. 6 5 . 4 202 .5 9 4 . 6 - - 202 .5 9 4 . 6 -
1991 7 289.2 17 . 6 6 . 1 271.6 9 3 . 9 - - 271.6 9 3 . 9 -
1990 NT 509 . 8 10.7 2 . 1 499.1 9 7 . 9 - - 499 .1 9 7 . 9 -
1989 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1988 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1987 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Tulip (NL)
1993 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1992 9 185.6 - 185.6 1 0 0 - - 185.6 1 0 0 -
1991 8 215.5 - 215.5 1 0 0 - - 215.5 1 0 0 -
1990 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1989 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1988 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1987 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Sligos (F)
1993 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A *N/A
1992 10 82 .5 N/A 82 .5 1 0 0 - - 82 .5 1 0 0 N/A
1991 NT 85.4 N/A 85 .4 1 0 0 - - 85.4 1 0 0 N/A
1990 NT 79 . 6 N/A 79.6 1 0 0 - - 79.6 1 0 0 N/A
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Year HW 
RH Total
Peripherals 
Total % HW
Processing 
Total % HW
Mainframes 
Total % HW
Minis
Total % HW
PCs
Total % HW
Workstations 
Total % HW
Sligos (F) C o n t i n u e d
1989 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1988 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1987 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
R e m a i n i n g  1 9 9 1 ,  1 9 9 0  a n d 1 9 8 7 Top 1 0 H a r d w a r e  P r o d u c e r s
Norsk Data (N)
1993 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1992 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1991 9 154.5 - 154 .5 1 0 0 - 140.3 9 0 . 8 14 .2 9.2 -
1990 NT 212.0 - 212 .0 1 0 0 - 212.0 1 0 0 - -
1989 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1988 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1987 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Philips (NL)
1993 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1992 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1991 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1990 4 2075.8 1164 .2 5 6 . 1 911. 6 4 3 . 9 - 335.0 1 6 . 1 576. 6 27.8 -
1989 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1988 6 1626.2 902 .9 5 5 . 5 723 .3 4 4 . 5 - 414 .8 2 5 . 5 308. 5 1 9 . 0 -
1987 6 1411.9 839.2 5 9 . 4 572 .7 4 0 . 6 - 375.2 2 6 . 6 197. 5 1 4 . 0 -
Alcatel (F)
1993 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1992 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1991 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
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Year HW
RH Total
Peripherals 
Total % HW
Processing 
Total % HW
Mainframes 
Total % HW
Minis
Total % HW
PCs
Total % HW
Workstations 
Total % HW
Alcatel (F) C o n t i n u e d
1990 1 911. 0 781. 0 8 5 . 7 130. 0 1 4 . 3 - - 130.0 14.3 -
1989 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1988 8 828. 4 710 .1 8 5 . 7 118. 3 1 4 . 3 - - 118.3 14.3 -
1987 7 853 .1 691. 7 8 1 . 1 161. 4 1 8 . 9 - - 161.4 1 8 . 9 -
Nokia (FIN)
1993 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1992 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1991 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1990 9 691. 7 32 .2 4 . 7 659 .5 9 5 . 3 - 182.1 26.3 304 .5 4 4 . 0 172.9 2 5 . 0
1989 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1988 9 721. 2 298 .6 4 1 . 4 422 .6 5 8 . 6 19.1 2.7 65.7 9 . 1 337.8 4 6 . 8
1987 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Mannesmann (G)
1993 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1992 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1991 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1990 8 759. 2 446. 6 5 8 . 8 312 .6 4 1 . 2 - 312 .6 4 1 . 2 - -
1989 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1988 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1987 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Nixdorf (G)
1993 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1992 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A * N/A
1991 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1990 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1989 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
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Year HW
RH Total
Peripherals 
Total % HW
Processing 
Total % HW
Mainframes 
Total % HW
Minis
Total % HW
PCs
Total % HW
Workstations 
Total % HW
Nixdorf (G) C o n t i n u e d
1988 4 2100.5 1280.3 6 1 . 0 820.2 3 9 . 1 131.1 6 . 2 484.1 2 3 . 1 205.0 9 . 8 -
1987 4 1945.6 1250.9 6 4 . 3 694.7 3 5 . 7 128.1 6 . 6 566.6 2 9 . 1 - -
Ericsson (Sw)
1993 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1992 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1991 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1990 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1989 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1988 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1987 8 755.8 241.2 3 1 . 9 514 . 6 6 8 . 1 - 229 .8 3 0 . 4 284.8 3 7 . 7 -
S o u r c e s :  1987  Data.: D a t a m a t i o n ,  15 June  1988;  1988  D a ta :  D a t a m a t i o n ,  15 June  19 89 ;  1990 D a t a :  D a t a m a t i o n ,  1 J u l y  1 9 9 1 : 6 4 ;  
1991 D a t a :  D a t a m a t i o n ,  1 J u l y  1 9 9 2 : 6 2 ;  1992 D a t a :  D a t a m a t i o n ,  1 J u l y  19 9 3 .
Notes:
RDP Rank based on DP revenues
RH Rank based on hardware revenues
DP Dataprocessing, i.e. hardware (mainframes, minicomputers, PCs, workstations, peripherals), software, datacomms 
and services (incl. maintenance)
HW Hardware
NT Not in Top 10
• Siemens: Data for the period 1990-1992 refer to SNI
• 1987-1989 data ICL = 1987-1989 data STC
• 1987-88: PC statistics may include data on workstations
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Supply Structure of the European-Grown Computer Multinationals
SIEMENS OLIVETTI BULL PHILIPS ICL
DP/TR 87 19 .9% 81.5% 100.0% 10.0% 62.9%
90 19.8% 84.5% 100.0% 10 . 7% 96.5%
92 16 .6% 88.0% 100.0% N/A 100.0%
HW/DP 87 48.2% 58.8% 83 .8% 54.3% 77.5%
90 61.5% 55 .4% 57 . 0% 63 .2% 44 .2%
92 58.1% 49.0% 49 . 0% N/A 45.5%
MF/DP 87 12 .2% 2.1% 32 .0% - 28.1%
90 13 .2% 1.9% 13.0% - 13 .7%
92 11.5% 1.8% 15 .0% N/A 12 .2%
MI/DP 87 5.5% 13 .0% 6.4% 14.4% 15.7%
90 12 .0% 8.2% 5.0% 10.2% 12 .3%
92 12 .3% 8.3% 6.0% N/A 16.4%
PC/DP 87 4.2% 25.4% 6.4% 7.6% _
90 9.2% 27.9% 18.0% 17.6% 5.6% ,
92 8.5% 23 .4% 12.0% N/A 16.9%
WS/DP 87 - - - - _
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90 2.0% - - - 3.6%
92 4.2% - - N/A -
PE/DP 87 26.3% 18.3% 39.0% 32.3% 33 .7%
90 25.8% 17 .4% 21.0% 35.5% 9.1%
92 21.2% 15.5% 16.0% N/A -
SW/DP 87 9.7% 7.5% 6.4% 6.3% 9.8%
90 12.0% 9.7% 10.0% 3.2% 17.2%
92 12 . 7% 12 .3% 10.0% N/A 15.9%
SV/DP 87 17.6% 16.8% 9.7% 14.8% 9.0%
90 25.0% 17 .3% 26.0% 14 .4% 33.8%
92 26.9% 19.7% 33.0% N/A 30.3%
DC/DP 87 24.6% 3.5% - 19 .9% 3.7%
90 1.6% 3.5% - 15.6% 2.7%
92 2.3% 2.2% - N/A -
OTH/DP 87 - 13 .3% - 4.7% -
90 - 14.2% 7.0% 3.7% 2.2%
92 - 16.8% 8.0% N/A 8.8% -
Sources: Appendix 5.11; Datamation/Annual Reports
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DP/TR Share of Dataprocessing (DP) Revenues in Total Revenues from Net Sales
HW/DP Share of Hardware Revenues in Dataprocessing
MF/DP Share of Mainframes in Dataprocessing
MI/DP Share of Minis in Dataprocessing
PC/DP Share of PCs in Dataprocessing
WS/DP Share of Workstations in Dataprocessing
SW/DP Share of Software in Dataprocessing
SV/DP Share of Services in Dataprocessing
DC/DP Share of Datacommunications in Dataprocessing
OTH/DP Share of Other Operations in Dataprocessing
• 1987-88: PC statistics may include data on workstations
• SNI: Data for 1987 refer to Siemens
• 1987 data ICL = 1987 data STC
4^oo
L/1
Top 10 Hardware Data:
The Hardware Top 10 ranking is based on the hardware revenues of the European Top 25 firms listed in this Appendix. In 
theory, it is possible that firms, whose dataprocessing revenues are too low to rank them in the Top 25, nevertheless have 
hardware revenues which equal or are larger than those of the 10 largest hardware selling Top 25 firms. Analysis of the 
Datamation European Top 25 dati shows that in 1990, non-Top 25 firms could not possibly have had higher hardware revenues 
than the 10 largest hardware selling Top 25 firms, even if they would produce only hardware, as their total dataprocessing 
revenues were far below the hardware sales of the 10th largest hardware producer. In 1991, however, the European Top 25 
producers only yielded the eight largest hardware producers. Based on the Top 25 data, no. 9 and 10 in the European Hardware 
Top 10 would be Norsk Data and Getronics. However, in their case, it is theoretically possible that a lower ranked producer 
has had the same or more hardware sales as these companies; if, for instance, the 26th largest producer had dataprocessing 
revenues of approximately 18 0 $m and 17 0 $m would be derived from the sales of hardware, this producer would have had more 
hardware revenues than either Norsk Data or Getronics. The same applies for Amstrad, Tulip and Sligos in the 1992 Top 10. 
It is not possible to determine the 10th largest hardware producer for the years 1987 and 1988 as the available data is not 
sufficient.
Appendix 5.12
WORLD COMPUTER MARKETS BY SEGMENT, 1987-1992
Share in Cumulative Revenues of Datamation Top 100 Firms, in %
1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987
Hardware 55.0 57.9 58.1 58.1 58.5 58.9
P r o c e s s i n g  H W 6 3 . 1 6 3 . 9 6 1 . 6 6 2 . 1 5 9 . 0 5 7 . 6
P e r i p h e r a l s 3 6 . 9 3 6 . 1 3 8 . 4 3 7 . 9 4 1 . 0 4 2 . 4
Software 11.6 11.5 10.2 9.7 8.8 8.1
Services 24 .4 22 .1 21.6 20 .4 20.0 20.6
Datacomms 5.5 5.3 6.3 7.7 7.3 7 .1
Other 3.5 3.2 3.8 4.1 5.4 5.3
Total ($ bn) 318.0 290.0 278 .5 255.8 243 .1 208.9
S o u r c e s :  D a t a m a t i o n ,  15 June  1 9 9 3 : 2 3 ;  15 June  1 9 9 2 : 2 7 .  
Note :
• Services include maintenance
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Appendix 5.13
EUROPEAN-GROWN COMPUTER MNEs: DEPENDENCY ON THE
EUROPEAN MARKET, 1987-1993
Dependency on the European Market , 1987 -1993
1
in percentage
1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3
S i e : D S / S  
E S / S  
E C S / T C S
4 8 . 6
7 6 . 0
8 7 . 0
5 1 . 8
7 7 . 0
8 9 . 0
4 6 . 5
7 5 . 5  
9 0 . 0
4 6  . 4
7 5 . 0
9 0 . 0
4 5 . 6
7 6 . 0
9 5 . 0
4 6 . 5
7 5 . 0
N / A
4 5 . 7
7 1 . 0
N / A
P h i : D S / S  
E S / S  
E C S / T C S
6 . 5
6 1 . 4
7 9 . 0
6 . 6
6 1 . 2
7 9 . 0
6 . 0  
5 7 . 0  
73 . 0
6 . 5
6 0 . 9
7 6 . 0
5 . 6
5 9 . 0
N / A
5 . 4
6 0 . 3
N / A
5 . 0
5 4 . 5
N / A
B u i : D S / S  
E S / S  
E C S / T C S
N / A
N / A
7 8 . 0
N / A
N / A
5 9 . 0
N / A  
74  . 0 
63 . 0
N / A
6 9 . 7
7 1 . 0
3 5 . 0  
7 1 .  0
7 2 . 0
3 8 . 0
7 4 . 0  
N / A
N / A  
72  . 2  
N / A
O l i : D S / S  
E S / S  
E C S / T C S
5 0 . 8
7 9 . 9  
82  . 0
5 0 . 2  
79  . 5  
8 1 . 0
4 9 . 5  
77  . 5  
8 1 . 0
5 0 . 3  
7 7 . 6  
83 . 0
4 8 . 3
7 7 . 3  
8 4 . 0
4 9 . 4
7 6 . 9
N / A
N / A
N / A
N / A
I CL : D S / S  
E S / S  
E C S / T C S
73 . 2  
8 6 . 8  
8 1 . 0
69  . 3  
8 1 . 4  
8 5 . 0
6 6 . 2  
7 8 . 8  
82 . 0
N / A  
N / A  
82  . 0
N / A  
85  . 4  
8 6 . 0
N / A
8 6 . 9
N / A
N / A  
84  . 2  
N / A
Sources: Siemens Annual Reports; Philips Annual Reports; Bull Annual 
Reports; The Olivetti Group (Olivetti, 1991); Olivetti Group
Consolidated Financial Accounts; ICL PLC Accounts and Review of 
Operations; Stopford, 1992; Datamation, 1 July 1992:61,63; 1 July
1991:61-62; 1 July 1990:112-2/3; 15 June 1989:56,65,66,83,86; 1 August 
1988:48-2/3; 1 August 1987:58,59.
Notes :
DS Domestic Sales
ES European Sales
S Sales (see Appendix 1.1)
ECS European Computer Sales (EC+EFTA)
TCS Total Computer Sales 
Si Siemens
B Bull
I ICL
• 1980-89 Data ICL = Data STC
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TRIAD POWERS: COMPARISON, 1990
Pop ( 1990)  GDP ( 1990)  PCap Exp ( 19 9 0 )  Imp ( 1 9 9 0 )
xlOOO % $ mn % $  $ mn % $ mn
EEC
of which is extra-EC
3 2 7 8 9 8 3 9 . 8 6 0 2 3 1 6 4 36 .9 18369 1 3 4 1 9 7 0
520957
5 5 . 0
21.3
1 4 0 7 1 6 0
576696
54 . 7  
22.4
USA 2 4 9 9 7 5 3 0 . 4 5 4 6 4 7 9 3 33 .4 2 1 8 6 1 3 9 3 5 9 2 16 . 1 5 1 6 9 8 7 20 . 1
J a p a n 1 2 3 5 3 7 1 5 . 0 2 9 4 0 3 6 6 18 .0 2 3 8 0 2 2 8 6 9 4 9 1 1 . 8 2 3 4 8 0 0 9 . 1
T o t a l  DC 8 2 3 6 9 7 1 0 0 . 0 1 6 3 4 7 4 2 6 1 0 0 . 0 2 4 4 0 9 0 0 1 0 0 . 0 2 5 7 4 8 0 0 1 0 0 . 0
Sources: United Nation Conference on Trade and Development (1993). Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics 1992. New York: UN.
N o t e s :
D C D e v e l o p e d  M a r k e t  E c o n o m y  C o u n t r i e s
E E s t i m a t e
G D P G r o s s  D o m e s t i c  P r o d u c t
P C a p P e r  C a p i t a
P o p P o p u l a t i o n
T h i s  t a b l e  c o m p a r e s  t h e  E C  w i t h  t h e  U S A  a n d  J a p a n  a n d  n o t  w i t h  t h e  ( N o r t h )  A m e r i c a n  b l o c  a n d  t h e  S o u t h  E a s t  A s i a n  t r a d i n g  a r e a ,  a s  t h e s e  t w o  c o u n t r i e s  d o m i n a t e  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  t r a d i n g  b l o c s .  I n  1 9 9 1 ,  t h e  U S A  
a c c o u n t e d  f o r  7 8  p e r  c e n t  o f  t h e  W e s t e r n  H e m i s p h e r e ’ s  G D P  w h i l e  J a p a n  a c c o u n t e d  f o r  6 4  p e r  c e n t  o f  t h e  S o u t h  E a s t  A s i a n  G D P .  T h i s  c o m p a r e s  w i t h  G e r m a n y ,  E u r o p e ’ s  l a r g e s t  e c o n o m y ,  a c c o u n t i n g  f o r  2 2  p e r  
c e n t  o f  E u r o p e ’ s  G D P  ( W o l f ,  1 3  D e c e m b e r  1 9 9 3 : 2 7 ) .  N o t e  t h a t  o n e  s h o u l d  c o m p a r e  t h e  A m e r i c a n  a n d  J a p a n e s e  t r a d e  s t a t i s t i c s  w i t h  t h e  E C ’ s  e x t r a - r e g i o n a l  t r a d e  s t a t i s t i c s .  E s t i m a t i o n  o f  E C  e x t r a - r e g i o n a l  i m p o r t s  
a n d  e x p o r t s  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  E u r o s t a t  p e r c e n t a g e s  e x t r a / i n t r a - r e g i o n a l  t r a d e  f o r  1 9 9 0 .
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EC MEMBER STATES: FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE CRITERIA, 1987-1992
Growth in Gross Domestic 
Year at Constant Prices)
Product (in % Change on 
, 1987-1992
Preceding
1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2
B e l g i u m 2 . 0 5 . 0 3 . 8 3 . 4 1 . 9 1 . 0
D e n m a r k 0 . 3 1 . 2 0 . 8 1 . 7 1 . 2 1 . 0
G e r m a n y 1 . 4 3 . 7 3 . 4 5 . 1 3 . 7 1 . 7
G r e e c e - 0 . 7 4 . 1 3 . 5 - 0 . 2 1 . 8 1 . 5
S p a i n 5 . 6 5 . 2 4 . 8 3 . 6 2 . 4 1 . 2
F r a n c e 2 . 2 4 . 3 3 . 8 2 . 2 1 . 1 1 . 9
I r e l a n d 5 . 0 4 . 9 6 . 5 8 . 3 2 . 5 2 . 9
I t a l y 3 . 1 4 . 1 2 . 9 2 . 2 1 . 4 1 . 1
L u x e m b o u r g 2 . 9 5 . 7 6 . 7 3 . 2 3 . 1 2 . 2
NL 0 . 8 2 . 6 4 . 7 3 . 9 2 . 2 1 . 3
P o r t u g a l 5 . 3 3 . 9 5 . 2 4 . 4 1 . 9 1 . 7
UK 4 . 8 4 . 3 2 . 1 0 . 5 - 2 . 2 - 0 . 9
T o t a l 2 . 9 4 . 1 3 . 4 2 . 8 1 . 4 1 . 1
Source: Scott, 1993:91.
Gross Public Debt as Per Centage of Nominal GDP, 1987-1992
1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2
B e l g i u m 1 3 1 . 8 1 3 3  . 2 1 3 0 . 4 1 3 0 . 3 1 3 2  . 2 1 3 4  . 4
D e n m a r k 5 5 . 9 5 8 . 0 5 8 . 3 5 9 . 7 6 0 . 6 62  . 2
G e r m a n y 4 4  . 3 4 4  . 8 4 3 . 9 4 4  . 1 4 1 . 8 4 4  . 0
G r e e c e 6 4 . 7 7 1 . 5 7 6 . 3 8 0 . 7 82  . 9 8 4 . 3
S p a i n 4 7 . 9 43  . 7 4 3  . 1 4 4 . 0 4 6 . 3 4 8  . 4
F r a n c e 4 7 . 2 4 6 . 8 4 7 . 5 4 6 . 7 4 8 . 6 5 0 . 1
I r e l a n d 1 2 0 . 6 1 1 8  . 2 1 0 8 . 0 1 0 3  . 1 1 0 1 . 2 9 8 . 1
I t a l y 9 2 . 6 9 4 . 8 9 7 . 9 1 0 0 . 5 1 0 2 . 7 1 0 8  . 4
L u x e m b o u r g N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A
NL 75  . 2 77  . 5 7 7  . 8 7 7  . 3 7 7 . 0 7 8 . 3
P o r t u g a l N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A
UK 4 8 . 9 4 2  . 5 3 7 . 0 3 4 . 9 3 6 . 5 4 1 . 9
Source: Scott, 1993:94
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Budget Balances as Per Centage of Nominal GDP, 1987-1992
1 9 8 7  1 9 8 8  1 9 8 9  1 9 9 0  1 9 9 1  1 9 9 2
B e l g i u m  -  7 . 5 -  6 . 7 -  6 . 7 -  5 . 7 -  6 . 6  ^ 6 . 7
D e n m a r k  2 . 4 0 . 6 -  0 . 5 -  1 . 4 -  2 . 0 -  2 . 3
G e r m a n y  - 1 . 9 - 2 . 2 0 . 1 -  2 . 0 -  3 . 2 -  3 . 2
G r e e c e  - 1 1 . 6 - 1 3  . 8 - 1 7 . 7 - 1 8 . 8 - 1 5  . 4 - 1 3  . 4
S p a i n  -  3 . 1 -  3 . 3 -  2 . 8 -  4 . 0 -  4 . 9 -  4 . 6
F r a n c e  -  1 . 9 - 1 . 7 -  1 . 1 -  1 . 4 - 1 . 9 -  2 . 8
I r e l a n d  -  8 . 9 - 4 . 8 -  1 . 8 -  2 . 5 -  2 . 1 - 2 . 7
I t a l y  - 1 1 . 0 - 1 0 . 7 - 9 . 9 - 1 0 . 9 - 1 0  . 2 - 1 0  . 5
L u x e m b o u r g  2 . 4 3 . 1 5 . 3 5 . 0 -  0 . 8 -  0 . 4
NL - 5 . 9 -  4 . 6 -  4 . 7 - 4 . 9 -  2 . 5 -  3 . 5
P o r t u g a l  -  6 . 8 -  5 . 4 -  3 . 4 - 5 . 5 -  6 . 4 -  5 . 6
UK - 1 . 3 1 . 0 0 . 9 -  1 . 3 -  2 . 8 -  6 . 1
T o t a l  - 4 . 1  - 3 . 6  - 2 . 8  - 4 . 1  - 4 . 7  - 5 . 4
Source: Scott, 1993:95
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CHANNELS OF CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITY: PROFILES
BOS
Founded
Location
Members
Structure
Decision
Objective
Issues
Sources
Bull/Olivetti/Siemens Nixdorf
1991
Remaining "indigenous" European computer manufacturers Bull, Olivetti and 
Siemens Nixdorf (SNI). Together, the companies represent approximately 27% 
of the European public procurement market
Specific initiatives.
The three constituting companies seek to cooperate on a number of specific 
issue areas, and to jointly lobby the EC and its Member States to promote 
their case.
(1) Trans European Networks: (a) August 1991: agreement in principle to 
submit joint responses to EEC calls for tenders concerning TENs; (b) TEIS.
Trans European Information Systems (TELS): a Brussels-based consortium set 
up in 1992 seeking to develop applications for public authorities that will run 
on the common hardware and software platforms of the three founding 
companies. By doing so, THIS seeks to strengthen the overall market share of 
the three founding companies in the public sector.
TEIS operates like a company with a supervisory board (manned by BOS 
executives), a management board (manned by BOS managers from sales and 
marketing), and a director.
(2) Software: European Method and Software Centre (EMSC): a Pozzuoli- 
based software competence centre seeking to define a common computer 
platform, which will secure the interoperability of the three companies' 
products. The companies will also jointly develop software.
(3) Joint Promotion
Groupe Bull, Annual Report 1991; The Olivetti Group report 1991; TEIS 
master plan; BOS sources, Interviews, 1993; Cane, 23 June 1992:26; 
Simonian, 16 April 1992, 29 October 1991.
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CEN European Committee for Standardization
Founded
Location
Members
Structure
Decision
Objective
Issues
Sources
1961
Brussels, Belgium
1
National standardization bodies of Austria (ON), Belgium (IBN), Denmark 
(DS), Finland (SFS), France (AFNOR), Germany (DIN), Greece (ELOT), 
Iceland (STRI), Ireland (NSAI), Italy (UNI), Luxembourg (ITM), the 
Netherlands (NNI), Norway (NSF), Portugal (IPQ), Spain (AENOR), Sweden 
(SIS), Switzerland (SNV) and the UK (BSI). Affiliated standardization bodies 
include EWOS.
(1) General Assembly; (2) Administrative Board; (3) Certification Committee; 
(4) Technical Board; (5) Technical Sector Boards; (6) Technical Committees; 
(7) Programming Committees.
Standard formulation: consensus process involving all interested parties.
Decisions on standards: voting procedure. Several majority criteria must be 
met to ensure that there is no sustained opposition against the proposed 
standard.
Planning, drafting and adoption of voluntary European standards in various 
areas, excluding those pertaining to electrotechnology and telecommunications.
Mechanical engineering; building and civil engineering; health technology, 
biology and biotechnology; information technology; environment; health and 
safety at workplace; gas and other energies; transport and packaging; consumer 
goods, sports, leisure; food; chemistry; materials; quality, certification and 
testing.
Cooperation with ETSI and CENELEC in ITSTC (see CENELEC)
CEN brochures "Setting Europe's New Standards", "CEN Makes Sense for 
Europe"; "More about CEN"; CEN sources, Interview 2; 1993.
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CENELEC European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization
Founded
Location
Members
Structure
Decision
Objective
Issues
Sources
1973
Brussels, Belgium
National Electrotechnical Committees of Austria (OVE), Belgium (CEB,BEQ, 
Denmark (DEK), Finland (SESKO), France (DTE), Germany (DKE), Greece 
(ELOT), Iceland (STRI), Ireland (ETCI), Italy (CEI), Luxembourg (Service de 
l'Energie de l'Etat), the Netherlands (NEC), Norway (NEK), Portugal (IPQ), 
Spain (AENOR), Sweden (SEK), Switzerland (CES) and the UK (BEC). 
Affiliated membership: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, 
Turkey. Affiliated standardization bodies include ECMA.
(1) General Assembly; (2) Administrative Board; (3) Technical Board and 
Technical bodies; (4) European Electrotechnical Sectoral Committee for testing 
and certification (ELSECOM) and Electronic Components Committee; (5) 
Central Secretariat
Standard formulation: consensus process involving all interested parties. 
Decisions on standards: voting procedure. Several majority criteria must be 
met to ensure that there is no sustained opposition against the proposed 
standard.
Preparation of a coherent set of voluntary electrotechnical standards.
Priority areas of standardization: those areas that determine the free movement 
of goods and services and/or are directly or indirectly related to EEC 
Directives and EC or EFT A standardization mandates, including:
Agreed EC or EFTA mandates for standardization of information technology 
equipment, in close collaboration with CEN and ETSI within the framework 
of the Information Technology Steering Committee (ITSTC).
ITSTC seeks to promote OSI (Open Systems Interconnection) base standards 
in Europe; (2) to develop functional standards necessary for an effective 
application of OSI; and (3) to develop a general framework for the 
certification of standardized hardware.
CENELEC Annual Report 1992; CEC Directory of European Community 
Trade and Professional Associations, 5th edition; CENELEC brochures 
"Electrotechnical Standards for Europe", "The Way Forward" and "What is 
CENELEC?"; CENELEC sources, Interview 25;1993.
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ECMA European Computer Manufacturers' Association
Founded
Location
Members
Structure
Decision
Objective
Issues
Sources
1961
Geneva, Switzerland
1
Companies which develop, manufacture and market dataprocessing machines 
or groups of machines used to process digital information for business, 
scientific, control or other similar purposes in Europe.
In 1993: 40 members, i.e. Alcatel, Apple, BASF, BT, Bull, Callscan, Compaq, 
Data General, Digital, Ericsson, Exabyte, GPT, Hitachi, Hoechst, HP, IBM, 
ICL, JVC, Kao, Kodak, Maxtor, Mitsubishi, NCR, NEC, Northern Telecom, 
Oce, Panasonic, Philips, Rank Xerox, Ricoh, SNI, Sony, Storage Tek, Sun, 
Tandem, TEAC, Telenorma, 3M, Toshiba, Unisys.
(1) General Assembly; (2) Management; (3) Secretariat; (4) Coordinating 
Committee; (5) Technical Committees; (6) Task Groups.
Two third majority required for promulgation of standards and technical 
reports.
(1) To develop standards and technical reports in order to facilitate and 
standardize the use of information processing and telecommunications systems;
(2) to promulgate various standards applicable to the functional design and use 
of information processing and telecommunications systems. The standards 
developed by ECMA are subsequently fed into the formal European and 
international standardization channels.
Data presentation, data communication, peripherals, software engineering, 
physical media, general (safety, acoustics, et cetera)
ECMA Memento 1992, 1993; ECMA sources, Interview 35;1993.
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EECA European Electronic Component Manufacturers Association
Founded
Location
Members
Structure
Decision
Objective
Issues
Sources
1973
Brussels, Belgium
1
Nationally organized electronic component manufacturers associations of 
Belgium (Fabrimetal); Germany (ZVEI FV23); France (SYCEP-SITELESO; 
Italy (ANIE Gr29); the Netherlands (FAPEL); Spain (ANIEL GrII); and the 
United Kingdom (EOF).
These national member organizations represent nearly 500 electronic 
components manufacturers with a combined workforce of over 250.000 
persons. (The EC estimates that the employment provided by the electronic 
components industry totals approximately half a million). The national 
organizations may have foreign-owned members. Example: EOF.
(1) General Assembly and Council; (2) President's Committee; (3) Secretariat;
(4) Specialist committees, and product committees and working groups. 
Specialist committees (COM): Technical Committee, Foreign Trade
Committee, Economic and Statistics Committee. Product committees and 
working groups: Colour Picture Tubes, Semiconductors, Connectors, Hybrid 
Circuits, Printed Circuit Boards.
Majority voting.
EECA seeks to promote the harmonious development, viability and 
independence of the European electronic component manufacturing industry, 
to enable it to function competitively and efficiently in the world market place.
(1) Trade with third countries: Customs tariffs; duty suspension procedures; 
rules of origin; unfair trade practices; customs nomenclature; market access to 
third countries.
(2) Standardization, quality assurance, and certification: Adoption and 
promotion of the CECC System of quality approval for electronic components.
(3) Other issues: Guidelines concerning inward investment into the EC 
electronic components industry; analysis of semiconductor manufacturing costs 
in the Triad; statistical information gathering and analysis; et cetera.
EECA information brochure; EECA European Electronic Components Industry 
Report 1992; EECA press release October 1993; EECA mimeo "Inward 
Investment: Guidelines on Behalf of the EC Electronic Components Industry"; 
CEC Directory of European Community Trade and Professional Associations, 
5th edition; Panorama of EC Industry 1993; Communication with EECA, 
August 1990 and March 1994; EECA sources, Interview 31;1993.
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ERT European Round Table of Industrialists
Founded
Location
Members
Structure
Decision
Objective
Issues
Sources
1983
Brussels, Belgium
t
40 to 50 industrial leaders (CEOs) in personal capacity. The CEOs come from 
non state-owned firms with headquarters in Europe (not EC only). CEOs of 
US companies are not accepted as members.
The industrial leaders represent companies operating in a wide range of 
industries, with a combined turnover of 500 bn ECU and roughly 3 mn 
employees. In Nov. 1992, these were: Amorim Group, Anova, Austrian 
Industries, BAT Industries, Bollore Technologies, BSN, Carlsberg, CEPSA, 
Daimler-Benz, Fiat, Generate de Belgique, Gevaert, GPA Group, Hoechst, 
HofFmann-La Roche, Iberdrola, IQ, Krupp, Lafarge Coppee, Lyonnaise des 
Eaux-Dumez, Nestle, Olivetti, Petrofina, Philips, Pilkington, Pirelli, Profilo 
Group, Robert Bosch, Saint-Gobain, Sofina, Solvay, Statoil, Telefonica, 
Thyssen, Titan Cement, Total, Trafalgar House, Unilever, and Volvo.
(1) Steering Committee; (2) Plenary session of Members; (3) Secretariat; (4) 
Policy Groups, International Group and Expert Groups. Policy Groups: 
competition policy, education and infrastructure. International Group: Central 
and Eastern Europe, GATT-US-Japan, and North-South relations; Expert 
Groups: environment, industrial relations and social policy, export controls and 
youth activities.
Adoption of ERT publications on the basis of consensus, indicating that the 
publications have the backing of all members. The views expressed in the ERT 
publications, however, remain the responsibility of the authors, and do not 
represent a unanimous view of ERT Members.
The ERT seeks to create the right environment for European industry to 
achieve economic growth and prosperity. It expresses its views through official 
publications and informal opinions.
(1) European Strategic Issues: Completion of Single European Market; 
Economic crisis of the early 1990s; European agenda for the 1990s.
(2) Education
(3) Employment: Unemployment; labour markets.
(4) Export Controls: COCOM; Single European Export Control System.
(5) Infrastructure: Transportation; business communications.
(6) Other: R&D; energy; competition policy; environment; labour relations; 
quality management; et cetera.
ERT information brochure; ERT publications; ERT sources, Interview
37;1993; Communication 43;1994.
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ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute
Founded
Location
Members
Structure
Decision
Objective
Issues
Sources
1988
Sophia Antipolis, France
Approximately 300 members representing the leading European 
telecommunications interests, from 27 European countries (EC, EFTA, Turkey, 
Malta, Cyprus, Eastern European countries).
Membership (1993) comprises predominantly manufacturers (60.42%). 
Additionally, membership of public network operators (14.21%), users 
(7.55%), administrations and national standardization bodies (10.27%), and 
research bodies, public service providers and others (7.55%).
Additionally: (a) Associate membership for interested parties from non-
European countries; (b) Observer category; (c) Counsellors: EC Commission 
and EFTA Secretariat
(1) General Assembly; (2) Technical Assembly; (3) Technical Committees; (4) 
Sub Technical Committees, Experts' or Rapporteurs' Groups, or Project Teams;
(5) Secretariat
Technical Committees: (1) Network Aspects; (2) Business
Telecommunications; (3) Signalling Protocols and Switching; (4) Transmission 
and Multiplexing; (5) Terminal Equipment; (6) Equipment Engineering; (7) 
Communications Networks and Systems Interconnection; (8) Radio Equipment 
and Systems; (9) Special Mobile Group; (10) Satellite Earth Stations and 
Systems; (11) Methods for Testing and Specification; (12) Human Factors; 
(13) Joint ETSI/ECMA Committee; (14) Security Algorithms Group of 
Experts; (15) ETSI/EBU Joint Technical Committee; (16) Intellectual Property 
Rights Committee; (17) Strategic Review Committee; (18) Programme 
Advisory Committee.
Standards Approval Procedure including (1) public enquiry: proposed standards 
are sent out to the national standardization bodies; and (2) weighted national 
voting: draft accepted if more than 50% of the national bodies have replied 
and the positive votes exceed 71%.
To set uniform telecommunications standards for Europe allowing national 
networks and services to be linked and ensuring interoperability of equipment
(1) Mobile Services
(2) Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN)
ETSI Publications Catalogue (June 1994); ETSI general information brochure; 
ETSI brochure "The Making of a European Telecommunications Standard"; 
International Herald Tribune. October 14, 1993 (supplement: advertising
section); ETSI, Communication 45;1994.
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EUROBIT
Founded
Location
Members
Structure
Decision
Objective
Issues
Sources
European Association of Manufacturers of Business Machines and Information 
Technology Industry
1974
Frankfurt, Germany
Nationally organized business machines, information technology and 
telecommunications terminal equipment manufacturers associations from 
Denmark (ESKOFOT); Germany (VDMA FG BIT; ZVEI FV I+K); France 
(SFIB); Ireland (IBETA); Italy (ASSINFORM); Spain (SEDISI); Sweden 
(LKD); Switzerland (VSM); and the United Kingdom (EEA).
These national member organizations represent together almost 100% of the 
European manufacturing capability in the field of business machines, 
information technology and telecommunications equipment, and a total of 
approximately 500,000 employees. The national organizations may have 
foreign-owned members. Example: EEA.
(1) General Assembly; (2) Council and Steering Committee; (3) Secretariat;
(4) Working groups and ad-hoc groups. Working Groups (WGs): Industrial 
Policy Group, Working Group on Customs Matters, Working Group on Postal 
Franking Machines. Ad hoc Groups: GATT Issues; IT Systems Security; 
Statistics and Market Research; IC User Group.
Consensus and majority voting.
EUROBIT seeks to protect and promote the interests of its members in Europe 
and throughout the world.
(1) Industrial Policy: Harmonization, liberalization, deregulation, EC initiatives 
and their effect on the Single European Market, technological developments, 
conformance testing and certification, in the field of information technology, 
telecommunications and standardization.
(2) EC Customs: Tariff structure, tariff classification, duty suspension 
procedures, customs valuation, other customs-related issues.
(3) Postal Franking Machines: Structural reorganization of the European PTTs, 
regulations on service of franking machines, restrictive practices preventing the 
expansion of the franking machines market
(4) Other Issues: Framework conditions for the supply of semiconductors from 
European and other sources; standardized security criteria for IT systems; 
statistical information gathering and analysis; et cetera.
EUROBIT information brochure; CEC Directory of European Community 
Trade and Professional Associations, 5th edition; Communication with 
EUROBIT, March 1994; EUROBIT sources, Communication 17; 1993; EEA 
information brochure.
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EWOS European Workshop for Open Systems
Founded
Location
Members
Structure
Decision
Objective
Issues
Sources
1987
Brussels, Belgium
1
Open forum for computer hardware and software manufacturers, network 
providers, public and private users, academia. About 70% of membership are 
manufacturers. Early 1990s: circa 100 corporate members.
(1) Steering Committee (including representatives of ECMA, SPAG, CEN, 
CENELEC and the CEC); (2) Technical Assembly; (3) Expert Groups; (4) 
Secretariat
Voting on proposals for functional standards: two-third majority required for 
adoption.
Producing proposals for functional standards (OSI Profiles), which are 
subsequently fed into the formal European and international standardization 
channels; Definition of corresponding conformance testing specifications.
Profiles for electronic mail, file transfer, distributed database, network 
management et cetera.
EWOS brochure; CEN brochure "More about CEN"; CENELEC brochure 
"Electrotechnical standards for Europe"; EWOS sources, Interview 38;1993.
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ORGAUME
Founded
Location
Members
Structure
Decision
Objective
Issues
Sources
Liaison Organisation for the European Mechanical, Electrical, Electronic 
Engineering and Metalworking Industries
1947
Brussels, Belgium
Nationally organized mechanical, electrical and electronic engineering and 
metalworking associations from Austria (Fachverband der Eisen- und 
Metallwaren industrie Osterreichs, FEE3, Fachverband der Maschinen- und 
Stahlbau Industrie Osterreichs); Portugal (FENAME); Belgium (Fabrimetal); 
Denmark (DI); Germany (VDMA, Wirtschaftsverband Stahlverformung; 
ZVE3); Finland (FIMET, SETELI); France (FIM, F1EE); Ireland (ELA); Italy 
(ANIE, AMMA); Luxembourg (GCFL); the Netherlands (FME, Metaalunie); 
Norway (TBL); Spain (Confemetal); Sweden (Sveriges Verkstadsindustrier 
VI); Switzerland (VSM); and the UK (BEAMA, METCOM).
These national member organizations represent approximately 30.000 
companies, providing employment to 6.7 mn persons in the European 
Community. The national organizations may have foreign-owned members.
(1) Presidents' Committee; (2) Executive Committee; (3) Secretariat; (4) Three 
liaison committees, four working groups, and ad-hoc groups. Liaison 
committees (COM): Mechanical Engineering Liaison COM, Electrical and 
Electronic Liaison COM, Metalworking Industries Liaison COM. Working 
Groups: Legal WG, Trade WG, Economist WG, Environmental WG.
No majority voting; decisions are taken by consensus.
ORGAUME seeks to inform its members about new EC initiatives which 
could affect the engineering industries, build an industry consensus on relevant 
issues, and present this consensus view to the EC institutions.
(1) Industry: Technical harmonisation; product liability; general product safety; 
public purchasing; SMEs; safety and health.
(2) Trade: GATT negotiations; relations with Japan, the US and Eastern
Europe; anti-dumping; counterfeiting.
(3) Environmental Issues: Waste management; emissions; equipment for
environmental control.
(4) Competition: Patent; know-how; agency; distributor; subcontracting
agreements; block exemptions.
(5) Statistics: Harmonized system; combined nomenclature; statistics.
(6) Research and Development: EC programmes.
(7) Energy: Energy policy; efficient utilisation; conservation; clean technology.
ORGAUME information brochure and inserts, January 1993; CEC Directory 
of European Community Trade and Professional Associations, 5th edition; 
ORGAUME sources, Interview 23;1993.
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UNICE Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe
Founded
Location
Members
Structure
Decision
Objective
Issues
Sources
1958
Brussels, Belgium
1
Nationally organized central industry and employers' federations from 
Austria (VOI); Belgium (FEB/VBO); Cyprus (DEB); Denmark (FDI, DEC); 
Finland (FEC, CFI); France (CNPF); Germany (BDA, BDI); Greece (FIG); 
Iceland (VSI, FIT); Ireland (CD, FIE); Italy (Confindustria); Luxembourg 
(FEDIL); Malta (MFOI); the Netherlands (VNO, NCW); Norway (CNBI); 
Portugal (AIP, C3P); San Marino (ANIS); Spain (CEDE); Sweden (SI,
SAF); Switzerland (VORORT, ZVSAO); Turkey (TISK, TUSIAD); and the 
United Kingdom (CBI). The national federations cover, by definition, a 
broad range of industries. The national organizations may have foreign- 
owned members, provided certain conditions are met For example: CBI.
(1) Council of Presidents; (2) Committee of Permanent Delegates; (3) 
Executive Committee; (4) Secretariat; (5) 55 working groups within five 
policy committees (COM): Economic & Financial Affairs, External 
Relations, Social Affairs, Industrial Affairs, and Company Affairs COMs.
Consensus and majority voting.
UNICE seeks to keep abreast of EC policy developments that interest its 
members; provide a framework which enables industry and employers to 
examine European policies and proposed legislation; prepare joint positions; 
and promote its positions at Community and national level.
(1) Economic and financial affairs: Economic policy; monetary and 
financial matters; regional policy; economic and fiscal conditions.
(2) External relations: EC trade policy; relations with Japan, the US and 
Eastern Europe; GATT negotiations; customs legislation.
(3) Social affairs: EC social policy; industrial relations; employment; 
vocational training; health/safety and social protection; Social Dialogue at 
EC level; interaction with Council of Europe & Int. Organization of 
Employers on social issues.
(4) Industrial affairs: Energy; telecommunications; research and 
development; transport; environment; SMEs; public purchasing.
(5) Company affairs: Competition policy; company law; intellectual 
property; consumer policy and marketing; civil and commercial law; 
insurance legislation; multinational companies; technical barriers to trade.
UNICE information brochure; UNICE preliminary views and positions on 
the Community's Research and Technological Development Programme,
June 1989, December 1992, April 1992, and March 1993; Collie, 1993:216; 
CEC Directory of European Community Trade and Professional 
Associations, 5th edition; UNICE sources, Interview 4; 1993.
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Appendix 8.1
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY, 1987-1993
Semiconductors
TR L 
$mn xlOOO
PROD
$/pP
Computers
TR
$mn
L
xlOOO
PROD
S/PP
Siemens
1987 657 R R 5703 .0 N/A N/A
1988 784 e i 5951.0 N/A N/A
1989 1194 d s 6010.6 N/A N/A
1990 1204 u i 7735.1a 51.9a 149038 .5a
1991 1263 c n 7308.6a 51.6a 141639.5a
1992 N/A e g 8345.1a 48. 4a 172419.4a
1993 N/A d 7225.5a 43 .3a 166870.7a
Philips
1987 1602 N/A N/A 2601.6 N/A N/A
1988 1738 N/A N/A 2794.6 N/A N/A
1989 1716 N/A N/A 2814 .8 N/A N/A
1990 1955 27.0 B 72407 .4 3283 .9 17. 0B 193170.6
1991 2022 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1992 2108 20.0 B 105400.0 N/A 8.5 B N/A
1993 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Groupe Bull
1987 3007.5 26.3 114353 .6
1988 5296.7 45.6 116155 .7
1989 6465 .4 43 .6 148289.0
1990 6349.6 44 .5 142687.6
1991 5929.8 39.9 148616 .5
1992 5715.1 35.2 162360.8
1993 5907.9 31.7 186369.1
Olivetti
1987 4637.2 58 .1 79814.1
1988 5427.9 57.6 94234 .4
1989 5573.3 56 . 9 97949 . 0
1990 6414.5 53 .7 119450 .7
1991 6050.8 46 .5 130124 .7
1992 5762.0 40.4 142623 .8
1993 N/A N/A N/A
SGS-Thomson
1987 859 N/A N/A
1988 1087 17.9 60726.3
1989 1301 19.2 67760.4
1990 1441 21.3 67652.6
1991 1436 17.7 81129.9
1992 N/A 17.8 N/A
1993 N/A N/A N/A
ICL
1987jb 2123 . 9 20.4 104112 .8
1988£> 2425.1 20.1 120651.7
1989jb 2643 .4 N/A N/A
1990 2862 .9 N/A N/A
1991 3308.1 26 .8 123436.6
1992 4354.8 25.6 170109.4
1993 3915.7 24 .0 163154 .2
Sources: Appendices 5 .4  and 5.9; Annual Reports Philips, Siemens, Olivetti, Bull, ICL and Thomson-CSF; Chapter 5.
N o t e s :  T R  T o t a l  R e v e n u e s ;  L  L a b o u r  f o r c e ;  P R O D  P r o d u c t i v i t y  ( T R / L ) ;  E  E s t i m a t e ;  a  D a t a  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  S N I ;  b  D a t a  
1 9 8 7 - 1 9 8 9  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  S T C
Appendix 8.2
EMPLOYMENT, 1987-1993
Employees x 1000 1987 % 1988 % 1989 % 1990 % 1991 % 1992 % 1993 %
Siemens 359 100.0 353 100.0 365 100.0 373 100.0 402 100 . 0 413 100 . 0 391 100.0
Germany 229 63 ,8 223 63 .2 227 62 .2 230 61.7 243 60.5 253 61.3 238 60.9
Rest of Europe ^ (21. ) (20. ) (20.0)
Rest of World ' 130 36 .2 130 36 .8 138 37.8 143 38.3 159 39.5 160 38.7 153 39.1
Philips 337 100.0 310 100.0 305 100.0 273 100.0 240 100.0 252 100.0 239 100.0
Netherlands N/A N/A 65 23 .8 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Rest of Europe |
Rest of World N/A N/A 240 76 .2 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Groupe Bull 26 100.0 46 100.0 44 100.0 45 100.0 40 100.0 35 100.0 31.7 100.0
France N/A N/A N/A N/A 41. 16 41.3 N/A 42 . N/A 43.0
Rest of Europe N/A N/A N/A N/A 28. 11 27.6 N/A 28 . N/A 28.5
Rest of World N/A N/A N/A N/A 31. 12 31.1 N/A 30. N/A 28 .5
Olivetti 58 100.0 58 100.0 57 100.0 54 100.0 47 100.0 40 100.0 N/A
Italy N/A 51. N/A 50. N/A 49. N/A 50. 22 48.3 20 49.4 N/A
Rest of Europe N/A '29. N/A 30. N/A 28. N/A 27 . 14 29.0 11 27 .5 N/A
Rest of World N/A 20. N/A 20. N/A 23. N/A 23 . 11 22 .7 9 23.1 N/A
SGS-Thomson N/A 18 100.0 19 100.0 21 100.0 18 100.0 18 100.0 N/A
France/Italy N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Rest of Europe/World N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
ICL 20 100.0 20 100.0 N/A N/A 27 (Av:23) 26 (Av:27) 24 100.0
UK N/A N/A N/A N/A 14 61.1 14 52.5 13 52.7
Rest of Europe -
Rest of World N/A N/A N/A N/A 9 38.9 13 47.5 12 47.3
Sources: Annual Reports Siemens, Philips, Olivetti, Bull, ICL, Thomson-CSF; NRC, 25 May 1990:11; Stopford (1992). 
N o t e s :  A v  =  a v e r a g e  n u m b e r  o f  e m p l o y e e s
503
504
Appendix 8.3
CONTRIBUTIONS TO EXPORT/FDI, 1987-1991
1
Siemens Philips Bull Olivetti ICL
Total Non-European Dataprocessing Sales In $ urn
1 9 8 7 7 4 1 . 4 5 4 6 . 4 6 6 1 . 7 8 3 4 . 7 4 0 3  . 5
1 9 8 8 6 5 4 . 6 5 8 6 . 9 2 1 7 1 . 7 1 0 3 1 . 3 3 6 3  . 8
1 9 8 9 6 0 1 7 6 0 2 3 9 2  . 2 1 0 5 8 . 9 4 7 5 . 8
1 9 9 0 7 7 1 . 1 7 8 8 . 1 1 8 4 1 . 4 1 0 9 0  . 4 5 7 2 . 6
1 9 9 1 3 6 5 . 4 N / A 1 6 6 0 . 3 9 6 8 . 2 4 6 3  . 1
Non-European Dataprocessing 
Dataprocessing Sales
Sales as % of Total
1 9 8 7 13 2 1 12 18 1 9
1 9 8 8 11 2 1 4 1 19 15
1 9 8 9 10 27 3 7 19 18
1 9 9 0 10 24 2 9 1 7 2 0
1 9 9 1 5 N / A 28 16 1 4
Sources: Datamation, 15 June 1992; 15 June 1991;15 June 1990:32; 15 
June 1989; 15 June 1988.
Appendix 8.4
ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF CORPORATE ASSETS, 1984-1991
Corporate Assets VA ' 91 
ECU mn
INV '89 
ECU mn
EMPL '91 RTA 84-88 Extra-EC Extra-EC 
X'91, ECUmn TB'91 ECU mn
Energy N/A N/A N/A N/A 270 a 617<
(Nil,12,13,14,15,16)
Non-Energy Mining and Quarrying 8228 N/A 188200 N/A N/A - 6632
(N21,23)
Ferrous Metals 27756 N/A 600000 N/A 13849 + 6639
(N221,222,223)
Non-Ferrous Metals N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
(N224)
Non-Metallic Minerals 39520 N/A 944000 N/A 7113 + 3500
(N24)
Chemicals 105790 N/A 1787000 N/A 47780 -i- 12184
(N25)
• Basic Industrial Chemicals (N251/2/3) 44048 N/A 632800 1.15 20968 + 1396
• Petrochemicals (N252) 26000 N/A N/A N/A 16057 + 1986
• Pharmaceuticals (N257) 26365 N/A 425700 N/A 9113 + 4369
Metal Products 71478 N/A 2185000 N/A 13756 + 4843
(N31)
Mechanical Engineering 88904 N/A 2371000 1.10 68398 + 35419
(N32)
• Machine Tools (N322) 10901 N/A 169000 N/A 4484 + 1900
• Machinery for Mining, et al. (N325) 15430 N/A 397600 N/A 9500 + 4827
Appendix 8.4
Corporate Assets VA '91 INV '8 9
ECU mn ECU mn
Electrical Engineering 56588 N/A
(N34:341,342,343.1/.2,346,347)
• Electrical Machinery (N342) 21304 N/A
Electronic Engineering 72756 N/A
(N33,344,345,345.1/2)
• Electronic Components (N345) N/A N/A
• Computer and Office Equipment (N33) 19285 2381
• Consumer Electronics (N345.1/2) 13774 N/A
• Telecommunications Equipment (N344) 39696 N/A
Transport Equipment 111760 17061
(N35,36)
• Motor Vehicles (N351,352) 57553 N/A
• Motor Vehicle Parts/Access. (N353) N/A N/A
Instrument Engineering 11265 N/A
(N37)
Food, Drink and Tobacco 96572 N/A
(N41,42)
• Meat (N412) 12614 N/A
• Diary Products (N413) 9437 N/A
• Industrial Baking (N419) 10257 N/A
• Brewing and Malting (N427) 8985 N/A
Textiles, Leather, Footwear, Clothing 53752 N/A
(N43,44,45)
• Textiles (N43) 31636 N/A
• Clothing (N453) 15337 N/A
Wood Processing 11953 N/A
(N46)
EMPL '91 RTA 84-88 Extra-EC Extra-EC
X'91, ECUmn TB'91 ECU mn
1912200
N/A
1532000
235000
261300
378800
252000
2629000
1184000
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
335500
N/A
0.90
N/A
0.67b 
0 .67b 
0 . 6 6  
1.03
N/A
1.09
N/A
N/A
23673
11152
30574
5193
9907
8399
5215
52882
25132
5685
8224
+ 12342
+ 2687
- 26542
- 8334
- 13865
- 13166 
+ 383
+ 7809
+ 6647
+ 2473
- 3050
2455900
447800
247700
480500
139000
3021000
1529000
1149100
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
26115
3797
3729
752
1108
27374
15578
6685
+ 5437
+ 28 
+ 2967
+ 553
+ 994
- 13107
- 2916
- 10004
436000 N/A 2019 7778
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Corporate Assets VA ' 91 
ECU mn
INV '89 
ECU mn
EMPL '91 RTA 84-88 Extra-EC 
X'91, ECUmn
Extra 
TB' 91
-EC 
ECU mn
Pulp, Paper, Printing, Publishing 62208 N/A 1469000 N/A 9661 _ 10435
(N47)
• Pulp, Paper and Board (N471) 9885 N/A 186400 N/A 2518 - 12811
• Paper and Board Converting (N472) 14626 N/A 403600 N/A 3173 + 271
• Printing and Publishing (N473,474) 37697 N/A 879400 N/A 3970 + 2104
Other Industrial Sectors
• Rubber (N481,482) 12361 N/A 361700 N/A 3510 + 774
• Furniture (N316.6,467) 18323 N/A 610400 N/A 5036 + 1922
Sources: Eurostat in EC Panorama 1993; Patel and Pavitt (1991:42-43); EC Panorama bimonthly supplements 5/93,3/93.
N o t e s :
a N o t  i n  E C U  m n ,  b u t  i n  x l O O O  t o e .
b E l e c t r o n i c s  c a p i t a l  g o o d s
E M P L E m p l o y m e n t
E X E x t r a - E C
I N V I n v e s t m e n t
N N A C E  ( s e e  A p p e n d i x  1 . 2 )
R T A R e v e a l e d  T e c h n o l o g y  A d v a n t a g e  I n d e x 1
T B T r a d e  B a l a n c e
V A V a l u e - A d d e d
X E x p o r t s
1 R T A :  A  c o u n t r y ’ s  o r  r e g i o n ’ s  s h a r e  o f  U S  p a t e n t s  i n  a  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  f i e l d ,  d i v i d e d  b y  i t s  s h a r e  o f  t o t a l  U S  p a t e n t s  i n  a l l  f i e l d s .  R T A  >  1 s h o w s  a  c o u n t r y ’ s  o r  r e g i o n ’ s  s t r e n g t h  i n  a  t e c h n o l o g y .
R T A  <  1 s h o w s  a  c o u n t r y ’ s  o r  r e g i o n ’ s  r e l a t i v e  w e a k n e s s  ( P a t e l  a n d  P a v i t t ,  1 9 9 1 : 4 5 ) .
Appendix 9.1
EC BUDGET EXPENDITURES: STRUCTURE, 1980-1992
Budget Items in ECU mn and as % of total budgetary expenditures/ 1980-1992
1980 1983 1985 1987
ECU mn o,“o ECU mn *o ECU mn % ECU mn %
EAGGF Guarantee 11283.2 69.3 15788 .2 64 . 9 19725.9 70.2 22951.8 64 .9
EAGGF Guidance (a) 601.9 3.7 749.7 3.1 738 .6 2.6 888 .6 2.5
Fisheries 43.7 0.3 54 .8 0.2 81.8 0.3 157.8 0.4
Regional Policy 1103 .3 6.8 2409.5 9.9 1725.5 6.2 2687 .3 7.6
and Transport 
Social Policy 771. 8 4.7 1020.9 4.2 1490.7 5.3 2852.5 8 .1
Energy 40.3 0.2 828 . 0 3.4 126 .2 0.4 89.7 0.3
Research 249 .8 1.5 423 .3 1.7 510 .6 1.8 720.2 2.0
Development Cooperation 508 . 9 3 .1 810.8 3.3 1084 .7 3.9 793 .8 2.3
Administration 819.7 5.0 1110.4 4.6 1296.0 4.6 1683 .4 4.8
Other 867 .8 5.3 1117.8 4.6 1318 .7 4.7 2499.3 7.1
Total 16290.4 100 24313.0 100 28098.7 100 35324.4 100
Sources: Court of Auditors Annual Reports in Tsoukalis, 1991:239: Official Journal, 12 December 1988:213; 12 December 1989:217; 12 December 1990:18; 13 December 1991:12; 15 December 1992:12; 
16 November 1993:12.
Notes
a  I n c l u d i n g  s p e c i f i c  m e a s u r e s
b  N e w  g r o u p i n g s  o f  b u d g e t  i t e m s ,  n o t  f u l l y  c o m p a r a b l e  t o  g r o u p i n g s  u s e d  b e t w e e n  1 9 8 0 - 1 9 9 0
c 1 9 9 1  a n d  1 9 9 2 :  S t r u c t u r a l  O p e r a t i o n s
d  1 9 9 1  a n d  1 9 9 2 :  S o c i a l  O p e r a t i o n s
e 1 9 9 1  a n d  1 9 9 2 :  E n e r g y  a n d  E U R A T O M
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1988 
ECU mn o.o
1989 
ECU mn %
1990 
ECU mn %
199lJb 
ECU mn %
1992Jb 
ECU mn %
EAGGF Guarantee 26389.6 63 .9 24460 .4 59 .5 24979.5 57.7 31527.8 58 .6 31234 .3 53 .3
EAGGF Guidance (a , c ) 1194 .6 2.9 1419.1 3.5 1928 .7 4.5
Fisheries (c) 260.0 0.6 261.9 0.6 325.6 0.8
Regional Policy (c) 3348 .5 8.1 4144 .3 10.1 4901.9 11.3 13857.7 25.8 18466.1 31.5
and Transport
Social Policy ( d ) 2501.3 6 .1 2964 .1 7.2 3546 .3 8.2 355.7 0.7 478 .6 0.8
Energy (e) 130.8 0.3 115.0 0.3 115.1 0.3 115 .7 0.2 141. 9 0.2
Research 962 . 9 2.3 1239.8 3.0 1429.4 3.3 1559 .6 2.9 2027.6 3.5
Development Cooperation 1041.3 2.5 1063.8 2.6 1225.1 2.8 2221.3 4 .1 2027.4 3.5
Administration 1899 .8 4.6 2051.7 5 . 0 2298.1 5.3 2519 .2 4.7 2847 .5 4.9
Other 3550 .1 8.6 3410 . 9 8.3 2575.1 5.9 1640 .4 3 .1 1349 .8 2.3
Total 41278.9 100 41131.0 100 43324 .8 100 53796 .6 100 58573 .2 100
Sources: see above. U\©
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